U.S.–Iran: Cutting Through the Noise - long but (hopefully) comprehensive

Amid the flood of reports, statements, threats, and denials surrounding U.S.–Iran relations, it is worth stepping back and asking a simple question: Where do things actually stand?

1. Washington believes economic pressure is working

At the beginning of August, President Trump appeared to be approaching a decision on a much broader military campaign against Iran. Instead, he changed course, opting to intensify economic pressure in the belief that sustained pressure could eventually force Tehran to compromise, or potentially threaten the regime’s stability.

From the administration’s perspective, the combination of sanctions, maritime pressure, and Iran’s deteriorating economic position is producing results. That helps explain why Washington currently sees little reason to return to the earlier memorandum of understanding, for which Trump faced considerable criticism in Washington because of the concessions it was perceived to offer Iran.

The administration’s basic assumption is therefore straightforward: time is working against Tehran, not Washington. If that assumption is correct, there is little reason for Trump to offer Iran additional concessions today.

2. The administration also believes it has made progress in the Strait of Hormuz—but the picture is more complicated

Washington has been encouraged by its ability to establish a U.S.-led operational framework, centered on the Fifth Fleet, that allows some oil to continue moving out of the Gulf.

According to various reports, this has involved highly risky nighttime operations in which tankers switch off their tracking systems and transfer oil to larger vessels in the Gulf of Oman.

Still, administration claims about the amount of oil successfully moving through or around Hormuz may be overstated. There has clearly been an operational achievement, but tanker traffic remains dramatically below prewar levels. It is also unclear how long the United States can sustain the current arrangement.

So far, the impact on U.S. gasoline prices appears limited. But there is an additional problem for which Washington has no comparable workaround: liquefied natural gas exports.

3. But Hormuz was never the main objective

This is where the broader strategic picture becomes important. For all the attention now being paid to tanker movements, maritime corridors, and America’s ability to partially restore the flow of energy through the region, the Strait of Hormuz was never the central strategic objective of the war.

The fundamental issues that drove Washington toward confrontation with Tehran were much larger: Iran’s nuclear program and its long-term military buildup. Neither problem has been resolved. More importantly, under the current trajectory, there is little reason to assume that either will be resolved anytime soon.

That distinction matters because the apparent improvement around Hormuz can create a misleading impression of strategic progress. Restoring some freedom of navigation, weakening Iran’s ability to dominate the strait, and limiting Tehran’s capacity to disrupt global energy markets are meaningful achievements. But they are ultimately consequences of the war—not the reason the war was fought in the first place.

The original strategic logic went considerably further. The confrontation was intended to address the Iranian threat at its source, with regime change viewed by some in Washington as the mechanism through which Iran’s nuclear ambitions and long-term military buildup could ultimately be eliminated. That has not happened.

Iran remains under severe pressure, but the regime remains in power. The nuclear challenge has not disappeared, and neither has the broader question of how quickly Tehran can rebuild, adapt, and regenerate its military capabilities.

This is why measuring success primarily through developments in Hormuz is potentially deceptive. The United States may be improving its operational position while remaining far from achieving the strategic objectives that brought it into the confrontation in the first place.

In that sense, Hormuz risks obscuring the bigger picture: Washington may have become better at managing one of the war’s consequences without actually solving the problems that caused the war.

4. Tehran may welcome Trump’s reluctance to escalate militarily, but economic pressure is taking a toll

Iranian leaders can take some comfort from the fact that Trump has, for now, moved away from the option of a major military campaign. But Tehran also has to acknowledge that economic pressure is hurting.

Iran entered this confrontation in an already difficult economic position. The maritime pressure in particular has further constrained the Iranian economy, contributing to a significant deterioration in key economic indicators.

This creates an uncomfortable reality for Tehran: it may have avoided, at least temporarily, a much broader American military campaign, but the alternative is hardly cost-free.

5. Iran can still disrupt Hormuz, but its freedom of action has been reduced

Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has not disappeared. But following significant U.S. strikes, its operational position appears weaker.

Tehran is facing growing pressure in and around the strait and has struggled to counter the maritime corridor established by the United States. At the same time, as long as Iran retains military capabilities around Hormuz, and the ability to threaten or strike tankers, there is no realistic return to the prewar status quo.

This is the paradox of the current situation: Washington may have reduced Iran’s ability to control events in the strait without eliminating Tehran’s ability to disrupt them.

6. Tehran appears more interested than Washington in returning to the earlier diplomatic framework

Unlike the Trump administration, Iran’s leadership appears willing to return to the memorandum of understanding—at least according to Tehran’s interpretation of its terms. The problem is that Iran is also attaching additional demands to such a return. This is where the mediators come in.

Qatar and Pakistan, in particular, are engaged in an intensive diplomatic effort aimed at persuading Tehran to scale back some of those additional demands and create a path back toward the previous framework,

But the fundamental problem remains that Washington and Tehran currently have very different assessments of who is under greater pressure to compromise.

7. The danger is that Iran may conclude escalation is its best remaining option

Against the backdrop of developments in Hormuz, senior Iranian officials are again warning that if Iran cannot export its oil, other countries should not expect to export theirs either. Those threats matter.

They raise the possibility that Tehran could deliberately escalate the current confrontation, particularly if Iranian leaders believe Trump is determined to avoid another major war ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.

From Tehran’s perspective, escalation would carry enormous risks. But continued passivity carries risks as well. If Iranian leaders believe economic pressure will only intensify over time, waiting may eventually become more dangerous than acting.

8. For now, both sides are stuck

The mediators are trying to bring Washington and Tehran back toward the earlier understanding, but the underlying assumptions of the two governments remain fundamentally incompatible.

Trump appears to believe that he does not need to make additional concessions because economic pressure is working, And certainly not to embrace an agreement between Iran and Oman that would give Tehran control over the Strait of Hormuz

Iran, meanwhile, is not prepared simply to surrender to an American strategy explicitly designed to force it back to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.

Washington therefore believes time strengthens its negotiating position. Tehran may increasingly conclude that time weakens its own.

That asymmetry is what makes the current situation so dangerous. As long as both assumptions hold, the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough remain low.

9. That makes further Iranian escalation increasingly plausible

If diplomacy does not resume, Tehran may eventually conclude that escalation is the only way out of its current strategic predicament.

Iran may also calculate that Washington is underestimating the economic damage Tehran can still inflict on the international system through disruption around Hormuz.

That pressure could be amplified by continued Houthi activity around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, creating simultaneous pressure on two of the world’s most important maritime energy and trade chokepoints.

The Iranian objective would not necessarily be to defeat the United States militarily. It could instead be to raise the economic and political cost of the status quo until Trump is forced to reconsider his strategy.

In other words, Tehran’s remaining leverage may increasingly depend not on winning the confrontation, but on demonstrating that Washington cannot manage its consequences indefinitely.

10. The current status quo may work for Washington, but it is inherently unstable

For the Trump administration, the present situation may look relatively favorable. Iran is under severe economic pressure. Some energy traffic is moving. The United States has avoided becoming trapped in a much larger military campaign. And Tehran’s ability to dominate Hormuz appears weaker than before.

But that equilibrium is fragile. Iranian rhetoric, operational behavior, and the apparent evolution of its doctrine toward more offensive and unpredictable action all suggest that Tehran may not simply wait for American pressure to produce its intended effects.

Trump may believe he can run out the clock until the midterms. That calculation could prove dangerously optimistic if Iran concludes that waiting only makes its position worse.

As meintioned, this brings the analysis back to the distinction between operational success and strategic success.

The United States may currently have the advantage in managing Hormuz. But the nuclear issue remains unresolved, Iran’s long-term military regeneration remains unresolved, and the Iranian regime remains in power.

Those were the larger strategic questions before the crisis in the strait began, and they remain the larger strategic questions today.

The bottom line: Washington may have stabilized the crisis, but it has not resolved it. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz may appear more stable than it did several weeks ago, and the Trump administration clearly has little appetite for returning to a large-scale kinetic campaign.

But stability should not be confused with resolution. Nor should tactical progress in Hormuz be confused with victory over Iran.

The current American strategy depends on economic pressure eventually changing Tehran’s behavior. If that pressure fails to produce an Iranian capitulation, and instead convinces Tehran that escalation is its only remaining leverage, the present equilibrium will become increasingly difficult to sustain.

Washington may therefore discover that avoiding a decision is itself a decision. And ultimately, the success of the current strategy cannot be measured simply by whether tankers are moving again. It must be measured against the objectives that brought Washington into the confrontation in the first place:

Has Iran’s nuclear trajectory fundamentally changed? Has its ability to rebuild its military power been permanently constrained? Has the underlying strategic threat been removed? For now, the answer to all three questions appears to be no.

That leaves Washington with a potentially uncomfortable reality: it may be winning the struggle over the consequences of the war without yet winning the struggle over the reasons the war was fought.

And that is why the current calm, however welcome, should not be mistaken for an end state.

ראיון שלי @radio103fm אודות העימות הצבאי הלילה בין ארצות הברית ואיראן:

א. האמריקנים יצרו מנגנון להוצאת חלק מהנפט. הם הצליחו להוציא כמה מיליוני חביות ביום. האיראנים מנסים למנוע זאת, הם ניסו לירות מוקשים לכיוון המצר, האמריקנים תקפו את הרקטות המיוחדות של האיראנים ולכן האיראנים הגיבו בירי לירדן. בעתיד הם יחזרו לעימות כזה או אחר - המאבק לא עוצר.

ב. הלחץ הכלכלי הוא מאוד מאוד משמעותי, ואנחנו רואים אותו אפילו בתורים בתחנות הדלק באיראן. נייר הלקמוס לאירוע הזה זה הנשיא פזשכיאן, הוא רואה את עצמו כמייצג של האוכלוסיה האיראנית, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לדברים שהוא אומר על הקושי הכלכלי - הם מתכתבים עם המציאות.

ג. יש פער בין הלחץ הכלכלי לבין הנכונות האיראנית להיכנע במשא ומתן, כפי שהאמריקנים מצפים. יתרה מכך, האיראנים רואים את טראמפ, והם מבינים שאנחנו קרובים לבחירות האמצע. יש הדלפות שהפנטגון לוחץ על הגסת', מזכיר המלחמה האמריקני, לא לחדש את המלחמה מול איראן. לכן הם מבינים שדווקא האמריקנים יכולים להיות עם גבם מול הקיר, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להעריך שהעימותים הללו במצר יימשכו.

@gidonucko1
@attaliami

maariv.co.il/news/military/…

Half of this argument is correct. The other half reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Iranian regime thinks, one that could lead to dangerous escalation or ultimately force the administration to allow Tehran to take control of the Strait of Hormuz itself.

Economic pressure is clearly having an effect. That is difficult to dispute. Iran is even prepared to return to the understandings previously reached, and Washington may not need additional pressure to achieve that limited objective.

But economic pressure should not be confused with strategic capitulation. There is little reason to believe that economic pain alone will persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, dismantle its conventional military capabilities, end its support for regional proxies, or relinquish its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. From the regime’s perspective, these capabilities are not bargaining chips of equal value. They are central to its deterrence strategy and, ultimately, to its survival.

That is why the expectation that Iran will eventually come to the negotiating table prepared to concede on all of these issues simply because the economic pressure becomes unbearable is a serious misreading of the regime. It repeats a familiar mistake: assuming that Tehran will respond to pressure according to our strategic logic rather than its own.

An American strategy built around objectives the Iranian regime is fundamentally unwilling, or perhaps unable, to accept risks turning economic leverage into an open-ended confrontation.

The administration therefore faces a real choice. It can build on the understandings reached between Oman and Iran, remove the immediate threat to maritime traffic, and restore a degree of stability. Or it can continue escalating its confrontation with Tehran, with the likely consequences of higher oil prices and an increasing risk of a military escalation that neither side may ultimately be able to control.

Economic pressure can change Iranian behavior at the margins and create leverage for diplomacy. What it is unlikely to do is produce Iranian surrender. A strategy that depends on such a surrender is not a strategy grounded in the nature of the Iranian regime.

#iran
#IranWar‌