Told @TheMediaLine:

The scale of Iran’s losses means the drive for retaliation is unlikely to disappear even if diplomacy eventually reduces the military confrontation.

The Iranians are now in the revenge business. This is not something that is going away. The Iranians, regardless of what will happen in terms of an agreement, yes or no, will seek revenge for Khamenei, for the foreseeable future.

Their modus operandi is very unique. They are using third-party elements because they want to create a distance between them and the operation itself.

The good thing for them is that they’re distancing themselves from any activity that happens. The bad thing is that you’re hiring people that are not experienced in this kind of work, and the signature they create helps local authorities discover that

#IranWar‌
#iran
themedialine.org/top-stories/ir…
https://t.co/9myE29fcr2

מאמר שלי @Haaretz שמחדד את חוסר התועלת והתוחלת במדיניות הישראלית

haaretz.co.il/opinions/2026-…

ראיון שלי @N12News:

א. הלחץ הכלכלי מכאיב מאוד לאיראן. בסוף האיראנים לא ייכנעו לאור הלחץ הזה - הם לא יהיו מוכנים לקבל את הסטטוס קוו

ב. איראן עשויה לנסות לוודא שמצר הורמזו נשאר סגור, באמצעות טילים, כטב"מים, מוקשים או פעולות קומנדו.איראן יכולה להגביר את התיאום עם החות'ים, שהכריזו על מצור חלקי במצר באב אל-מנדב, ולשבש עוד יותר את התנועה הימית באזור. לחלופין, איראן יכולה לפגוע בנמלים במדינות המפרץ, ולמנוע ממכליות הנפט להטעין סחורה מלכתחילה.

ג. איראן גם יכולה לחזור לתקוף בסיסים אמריקניים במפרץ וקיימת גם האפשרות של תקיפה איראנית על הספינות האמריקניות שאוכפות את המצור על איראן.

mako.co.il/news-world/202…
https://t.co/anKXWOaCnq

My interview @cnni with @rosemaryCNN:

A. With all due respect to the emerging Iran-Oman agreement, the key question is not what Tehran and Muscat agree on. The real question is whether the Trump administration is prepared to accept the arrangement.

B. The Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to fully reopen unless Washington accepts a framework that gives Iran at least some role, and therefore some degree of leverage, over what happens in the Strait. That may be uncomfortable for the United States, but it is increasingly the strategic reality it has to confront.

C. If Washington rejects the emerging arrangement, the risk of escalation will rise significantly. Iranian officials have made clear that Tehran will not indefinitely accept a situation in which other Gulf producers continue exporting oil while Iranian exports remain constrained. Iran may be under considerable economic pressure, but that does not mean it will simply absorb that pressure without responding.

D. Oil prices are currently benefiting in part from American signals that Washington does not want to return to a major military confrontation. But avoiding war is not a unilateral decision. It takes two sides to prevent escalation. If the United States rejects the diplomatic framework being developed by Oman and Iran, Washington could still find itself drawn back into a confrontation it clearly prefers to avoid.

E. That is also why the recent regional diplomatic activity matters, including the visits by Pakistan's military leadership and the Qatari prime minister. Regional actors understand how unstable the current situation is and are trying to bridge the gap between Washington and Tehran before the escalation cycle resumes.

F. On the nuclear issue, Iran is using the return of international inspectors as leverage against both Washington and Israel. For that reason, I would be very surprised to see meaningful IAEA access restored before Tehran receives significant sanctions relief from the United States.

G. Until then, the United States and Israel will have to rely heavily on their own intelligence capabilities to understand what is happening at Iran's nuclear sites. And that matters because there are indications of activity at some of these locations, including developments around the so-called Pickaxe Mountain site. The longer inspectors remain outside Iran, the greater the uncertainty surrounding the actual status and direction of the Iranian nuclear program.

#IranWar‌

You cannot build influence without a strategy. Israel’s core problem is not a lack of better messaging or more sophisticated influence tools. It is that the country increasingly operates without a coherent long-term vision or strategy, while pursuing policies that put it at odds with much of the international community.

No Unit 9200, or any other influence operation, can solve that problem. Better technology cannot compensate for the absence of a credible policy.

It is similar to arguing that if Iranians had greater access to Starlink, the regime would somehow collapse. Technology and influence tools can create opportunities, but they cannot substitute for the political and strategic conditions required to achieve the desired outcome.

Israel keeps trying to treat the symptoms instead of confronting the underlying problem. Until it defines what it actually wants to achieve and aligns its policies accordingly, no amount of investment in strategic communications or influence operations will fundamentally change its international standing.

My podcast @TheNationalNews with @_NadaAlTaher regarding the recent escalation between Israel and #turkey
https://t.co/phWb8SpBDe

Do you really want to go down this road? Because we can easily go back and compare what each of us has been saying since the beginning of the war. For you, it would take a second. For me, it would take an entire year to go through all the mistakes you’ve made.

My friend, if we actually read through your assessments from the start of this conflict, I’m afraid the record looks far closer to political cheerleading than serious analysis.

As I’ve told you before, unlike you - I don’t evaluate developments through the lens of someone whose professional future depends on defending conclusions that were decided in advance. I look at what is actually happening on the ground and adjust my assessment accordingly.

And no — the President saying that the Strait is open does not make it open. Moving tankers through at night, with their transponders switched off and under U.S. military protection, is not the same thing as controlling the Strait or restoring the prewar status quo.

But there is probably little point in continuing this argument. I try to analyze Iran as it is, not as I would like it to be. Your understanding of Iran, judging by what you have written throughout this war, is about as deep as my understanding of ballet.

What I find truly remarkable is that people still invite you on air to offer your analysis after you’ve been wrong about virtually every major assessment since the beginning of this war. It really is astonishing.

But as I said, there is no point comparing our assessments. We are not playing in the same league. You’re an amateur whose understanding of Iran is so limited that I’m not entirely sure you could find it on a map. I’ve spent my professional career studying Iran and the region.

So continuing this debate is pointless. Frankly, I’d rather debate my sixth-grade son. I suspect he understands more about Iran and the Middle East than you do.

My suggestion is that you spend a little less time appearing on television networks that apparently haven’t figured out they’re interviewing an amateur, and a little more time actually learning something about Iran and the Middle East. It certainly wouldn’t hurt.

Stay safe.

Stay safe