Iran’s economy is in serious trouble, but it is still a long way from collapse.

The rial has fallen to record lows, inflation is soaring, and the economy is contracting. But economic pain should not be confused with strategic capitulation.

If President Trump genuinely believes that Iran is on the verge of collapse and that additional economic pressure will force Tehran to surrender, he may soon discover the limits of that assumption.

Iran remains capable of imposing significant military and economic costs on U.S. interests and partners in the Gulf. Tehran has also made clear that it is prepared to escalate rather than simply absorb indefinite pressure.

But if Trump's rhetoric about Iran's economic weakness is instead intended to prepare the political ground for a deal, essentially arguing that American pressure worked and therefore Washington can now negotiate from a position of strength, that could create an opening. Iran has signaled that it wants a diplomatic exit, but not on the basis of surrender. Any agreement would almost certainly require Washington to address Tehran’s demand for a recognized role in the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

The danger is that Washington begins believing its own narrative. As long as Trump operates within a political reality in which Iran is “collapsing” and America is already “winning,” he risks adopting policies based on assumptions rather than conditions on the ground. Iran is wounded and under enormous pressure, but it is not defeated. More importantly, this is an Iran that appears increasingly willing to demonstrate its remaining military capabilities rather than keep them in reserve.

If Washington fails to recognize that distinction, sooner or later the virtual reality it has constructed will collide with the reality of the Gulfl, and that collision could be extremely costly.

#iran

The remarkable thing is that after nearly six months of direct conflict between the United States and Iran, senior administration officials still seem not to understand how Tehran thinks.

The more U.S. officials publicly talk about the collapse or overthrow of the Islamic Republic, the more they reinforce the conclusion in Tehran that Washington is not actually seeking a deal, it is seeking the regime’s end.

And if Iranian leaders believe there is no diplomatic off-ramp, their incentive is not to capitulate. It is to escalate.

Regime-change rhetoric may sound like pressure in Washington. In Tehran, it can sound like confirmation that the conflict is existential. That is precisely the kind of miscalculation that can turn economic pressure into a much wider war.

#iran

סיכום הראיון שלי @radio103fm אודות מערכת היחסים בין איראן לסין ארה"ב:

א. הכרזתו של שר האוצר סקוט בסנט אתמול על החרפה דרמטית של המערכה הכלכלית נגד איראן נשמעת מרשימה, אבל בשלב הזה משמעותה המעשית מוגבלת. הממשל אכן מבקש לנתק את טהראן מכל מקור הכנסה ומכל גורם שמסייע לה לעקוף את הסנקציות. אלא שבסנט עצמו נמנע בשלב זה מהטלת סנקציות שניוניות על שותפות הסחר המרכזיות של איראן, והבהיר שהוא מבקש לתת למדינות זמן לשנות את התנהלותן. השאלה האמיתית תהיה האם וושינגטון מוכנה להתעמת בנושא הזה עם סין, או אפילו עם שותפות ובעלות ברית כמו תורכיה.

ב. גם אם האכיפה תוחרף משמעותית, ייקח זמן עד שניתן יהיה להעריך את השפעתה. בינתיים, הכלי האפקטיבי והמידי ביותר שעומד לרשות הממשל נותר הלחץ הימי על יצוא הנפט האיראני.

ג. אבל מעל הכול מרחפת שאלה בסיסית יותר: מהי המטרה האסטרטגית של הממשל? לחץ כלכלי הוא אמצעי, לא מטרה. הבית הלבן מדבר על ניתוק כל "עורקי החיים" הכלכליים של המשטר ועל הבאת איראן למצב שבו היא מבודדת כלכלית, אבל הרבה פחות ברור מהו היעד המדיני שאליו אמור הלחץ הזה להוביל.

ד. אם ההנחה היא שהלחץ יביא את איראן לכניעה, זו הנחה בעייתית מאוד. מצבה הכלכלי של איראן קשה ביותר ולראיה המטבע הגיע לשפל חדש והאינפלציה גבוהה מאוד, אבל קושי כלכלי אינו שקול לקריסה של המשטר. וכאשר הבחירה מבחינת טהראן תהיה בין כניעה לבין הסלמה, סביר הרבה יותר שהיא תבחר בהסלמה.

ה. בהקשר הזה, ביקורו אתמול בטהראן של מפקד הצבא הפקיסטני, פילדמרשל מוניר, היה חשוב. מטרת הביקור הייתה לקדם מאמצי תיווך ולהחזיר את הצדדים למסלול של שיחות, אך בשלב הזה עדיין לא ברור אם נוצרה ממנו פריצת דרך כלשהי.

ו. הפרדוקס במדיניות האמריקנית הולך ומתחדד: הממשל אינו רוצה לחזור למלחמה רחבה, אבל המדיניות הכלכלית שהוא מקדם עלולה דווקא לקרב אותה. איראן כבר מאותתת שהיא אינה מוכנה לקבל לאורך זמן מציאות שבה היא אינה יכולה לייצא נפט בעוד שאר מדינות המפרץ ממשיכות לעשות זאת, ואף איימה שאם "המלחמה הכלכלית" תימשך, היא תפעל נגד יצוא הנפט מהמפרץ. לכן השאלה אינה רק האם הלחץ הכלכלי שמוביל בסנט יעבוד. השאלה החשובה הרבה יותר היא מה וושינגטון רוצה שיקרה.

@attaliami
@gidonucko1

maariv.co.il/news/military/…

The writing may indeed have been on the wall. But the failure was deeper than simply misjudging what Iran would do next.

Senior administration officials ,and President Trump above all, went into a war with Iran without sufficiently understanding the country they were confronting.

Iran is not Venezuela. Understanding Iranian behavior requires more than intelligence estimates about military capabilities or regime stability. It requires understanding Iran’s history, strategic culture, nationalism, revolutionary ideology, and the way all of these interact. These are not academic details. They shape how Tehran understands coercion, humiliation, deterrence, compromise, and ultimately war.

The same applies to Ali Khamenei. He was unquestionably a deeply ideological and radical leader. But he was also, paradoxically, a constraint on parts of the Iranian system. His caution, particularly about direct confrontation with the United States, repeatedly restrained more aggressive elements. Removing him was therefore never guaranteed to moderate Iranian behavior. It carried a very real possibility of producing a more risk-tolerant and dangerous leadership.

This is why the failure cannot be reduced to whether American intelligence correctly predicted scenario A or scenario B. The more fundamental question is whether the administration had developed a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of who Iran is before making decisions that would reshape the strategic environment for years.

Before undertaking a war of this magnitude, one intelligence briefing is not enough. It requires repeated, rigorous discussions that challenge assumptions and examine the adversary’s history, political system, decision-making culture, internal factions, ideology, and likely reactions under pressure. Israel conducted precisely this kind of intensive process before striking Syria’s nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor, as former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert later described.

Policymakers, of course, have every right to reject the recommendations of intelligence professionals. Intelligence advises; elected leaders decide. But decision-makers must first possess the analytical tools necessary to make such consequential choices.

That is where the deeper problem lies. The administration appears to have entered the conflict with extraordinary confidence in a particular picture of Iran, including the one Netanyahu presented at the White House on February 11, without sufficiently stress-testing its underlying assumptions. The dialogue of the deaf between Steve Witkoff and Abbas Araghchi has been another illustration of how differently Washington and Tehran understand coercion, negotiations, and acceptable outcomes.

And that leads to the most troubling question today: Did the war actually teach the White House anything about Iran? Judging by some of the statements coming from senior administration officials, it is far from clear that it did.

If Washington still believes that enough economic pain will eventually make Iran behave like a state willing to capitulate under pressure, then the problem is no longer simply a bad forecast. It is a fundamental failure to understand the adversary.

#iran

Told @FT that secondary sanctions were difficult to enforce.

The new campaign raised questions about Trump’s strategy as the administration has become locked in a battle of wills with the Islamic regime.

We had the maximum pressure campaign before, so the question is what is the endgame for the administration?

The administration would have to create political friction with countries like China and Turkey, and doubtful they are rushing to that.

The Iranians already know how to cope with secondary sanctions, building shell companies and things like that.

ft.com/content/b6009d…
https://t.co/aatnmfDjBl

Mi interview @AlArabiya_Eng

Israel has a strong strategic incentive to prevent Washington from reaching an agreement with Tehran. The reason goes beyond the specific terms of any potential deal.

Israel understands that once the United States enters into a diplomatic framework with Iran, it would become extremely difficult for Israel to resume significant military operations against Iran without at least tacit American support.

This helps explain why Israeli officials remain deeply skeptical of renewed U.S.–Iran diplomacy and continue to emphasize maintaining economic and military pressure on Tehran. From Israel’s perspective, almost any outcome short of an agreement that strengthens and stabilizes the Islamic Republic is preferable.

From Jerusalem’s perspective, the problem is therefore strategic: a U.S.–Iran accommodation could fundamentally change the balance created by the war.

In virtually any scenario in which Washington and Tehran move from confrontation toward a stable diplomatic arrangement, Israel risks becoming the first strategic lose, not necessarily because Iran has defeated Israel militarily, but because Israel’s freedom of action against Iran would be significantly reduced.

Israel retains the military capability to strike Iran today. But capability is not the same as strategic freedom of action.

Israel could potentially launch another operation against Iran without direct U.S. participation. Doing so without American political backing, intelligence and logistical support, missile-defense assistance, and broader regional cooperation, however, would be significantly more difficult—and considerably more risky.

That is precisely why a renewed U.S.–Iran agreement is so concerning from Israel’s perspective. Once Washington enters into a diplomatic arrangement with Tehran, the United States would have a strong interest in preserving that agreement and preventing another round of fighting. An Israeli strike could then be viewed in Washington not as part of a shared strategy toward Iran, but as an action that jeopardizes an American diplomatic achievement.

Israel would still retain the theoretical option of using force. But the political, operational, and strategic price of exercising that option would rise dramatically.

This is the deeper Israeli concern: a U.S.–Iran agreement would not simply provide Tehran with an off-ramp. It could substantially narrow Israel’s freedom of action and, as a result, weaken the credibility of Israel’s military threat against Iran.

For Israel, therefore, the question is not whether it can strike Iran without the United States. It can. The question is whether it can conduct a sustained and strategically effective campaign against Iran while Washington actively opposes renewed military action. That would be a very different and much more difficult proposition.

#IranWar‌

Told @TheMediaLine:

The scale of Iran’s losses means the drive for retaliation is unlikely to disappear even if diplomacy eventually reduces the military confrontation.

The Iranians are now in the revenge business. This is not something that is going away. The Iranians, regardless of what will happen in terms of an agreement, yes or no, will seek revenge for Khamenei, for the foreseeable future.

Their modus operandi is very unique. They are using third-party elements because they want to create a distance between them and the operation itself.

The good thing for them is that they’re distancing themselves from any activity that happens. The bad thing is that you’re hiring people that are not experienced in this kind of work, and the signature they create helps local authorities discover that

#IranWar‌
#iran
themedialine.org/top-stories/ir…
https://t.co/9myE29fcr2

מאמר שלי @Haaretz שמחדד את חוסר התועלת והתוחלת במדיניות הישראלית

haaretz.co.il/opinions/2026-…

ראיון שלי @N12News:

א. הלחץ הכלכלי מכאיב מאוד לאיראן. בסוף האיראנים לא ייכנעו לאור הלחץ הזה - הם לא יהיו מוכנים לקבל את הסטטוס קוו

ב. איראן עשויה לנסות לוודא שמצר הורמזו נשאר סגור, באמצעות טילים, כטב"מים, מוקשים או פעולות קומנדו.איראן יכולה להגביר את התיאום עם החות'ים, שהכריזו על מצור חלקי במצר באב אל-מנדב, ולשבש עוד יותר את התנועה הימית באזור. לחלופין, איראן יכולה לפגוע בנמלים במדינות המפרץ, ולמנוע ממכליות הנפט להטעין סחורה מלכתחילה.

ג. איראן גם יכולה לחזור לתקוף בסיסים אמריקניים במפרץ וקיימת גם האפשרות של תקיפה איראנית על הספינות האמריקניות שאוכפות את המצור על איראן.

mako.co.il/news-world/202…
https://t.co/anKXWOaCnq

My interview @cnni with @rosemaryCNN:

A. With all due respect to the emerging Iran-Oman agreement, the key question is not what Tehran and Muscat agree on. The real question is whether the Trump administration is prepared to accept the arrangement.

B. The Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to fully reopen unless Washington accepts a framework that gives Iran at least some role, and therefore some degree of leverage, over what happens in the Strait. That may be uncomfortable for the United States, but it is increasingly the strategic reality it has to confront.

C. If Washington rejects the emerging arrangement, the risk of escalation will rise significantly. Iranian officials have made clear that Tehran will not indefinitely accept a situation in which other Gulf producers continue exporting oil while Iranian exports remain constrained. Iran may be under considerable economic pressure, but that does not mean it will simply absorb that pressure without responding.

D. Oil prices are currently benefiting in part from American signals that Washington does not want to return to a major military confrontation. But avoiding war is not a unilateral decision. It takes two sides to prevent escalation. If the United States rejects the diplomatic framework being developed by Oman and Iran, Washington could still find itself drawn back into a confrontation it clearly prefers to avoid.

E. That is also why the recent regional diplomatic activity matters, including the visits by Pakistan's military leadership and the Qatari prime minister. Regional actors understand how unstable the current situation is and are trying to bridge the gap between Washington and Tehran before the escalation cycle resumes.

F. On the nuclear issue, Iran is using the return of international inspectors as leverage against both Washington and Israel. For that reason, I would be very surprised to see meaningful IAEA access restored before Tehran receives significant sanctions relief from the United States.

G. Until then, the United States and Israel will have to rely heavily on their own intelligence capabilities to understand what is happening at Iran's nuclear sites. And that matters because there are indications of activity at some of these locations, including developments around the so-called Pickaxe Mountain site. The longer inspectors remain outside Iran, the greater the uncertainty surrounding the actual status and direction of the Iranian nuclear program.

#IranWar‌

You cannot build influence without a strategy. Israel’s core problem is not a lack of better messaging or more sophisticated influence tools. It is that the country increasingly operates without a coherent long-term vision or strategy, while pursuing policies that put it at odds with much of the international community.

No Unit 9200, or any other influence operation, can solve that problem. Better technology cannot compensate for the absence of a credible policy.

It is similar to arguing that if Iranians had greater access to Starlink, the regime would somehow collapse. Technology and influence tools can create opportunities, but they cannot substitute for the political and strategic conditions required to achieve the desired outcome.

Israel keeps trying to treat the symptoms instead of confronting the underlying problem. Until it defines what it actually wants to achieve and aligns its policies accordingly, no amount of investment in strategic communications or influence operations will fundamentally change its international standing.

My podcast @TheNationalNews with @_NadaAlTaher regarding the recent escalation between Israel and #turkey
https://t.co/phWb8SpBDe

Do you really want to go down this road? Because we can easily go back and compare what each of us has been saying since the beginning of the war. For you, it would take a second. For me, it would take an entire year to go through all the mistakes you’ve made.

My friend, if we actually read through your assessments from the start of this conflict, I’m afraid the record looks far closer to political cheerleading than serious analysis.

As I’ve told you before, unlike you - I don’t evaluate developments through the lens of someone whose professional future depends on defending conclusions that were decided in advance. I look at what is actually happening on the ground and adjust my assessment accordingly.

And no — the President saying that the Strait is open does not make it open. Moving tankers through at night, with their transponders switched off and under U.S. military protection, is not the same thing as controlling the Strait or restoring the prewar status quo.

But there is probably little point in continuing this argument. I try to analyze Iran as it is, not as I would like it to be. Your understanding of Iran, judging by what you have written throughout this war, is about as deep as my understanding of ballet.

What I find truly remarkable is that people still invite you on air to offer your analysis after you’ve been wrong about virtually every major assessment since the beginning of this war. It really is astonishing.

But as I said, there is no point comparing our assessments. We are not playing in the same league. You’re an amateur whose understanding of Iran is so limited that I’m not entirely sure you could find it on a map. I’ve spent my professional career studying Iran and the region.

So continuing this debate is pointless. Frankly, I’d rather debate my sixth-grade son. I suspect he understands more about Iran and the Middle East than you do.

My suggestion is that you spend a little less time appearing on television networks that apparently haven’t figured out they’re interviewing an amateur, and a little more time actually learning something about Iran and the Middle East. It certainly wouldn’t hurt.

Stay safe.

Stay safe