My interview @cnni #newsroom:

A. The current situation in the Gulf is inherently unstable. Even after CENTCOM’s operational successes and the administration’s efforts to move additional oil through the region, the current equilibrium can be sustained for long. President Trump clearly has little interest in returning to a large-scale war with Iran. But Tehran has already made its position clear: it will not accept a situation in which other regional producers can export their oil freely while Iranian exports remain constrained. That makes some form of Iranian escalation increasingly likely.

Timing matters as well. Tehran may calculate that President Trump will become increasingly sensitive to oil prices as the U.S. midterm elections approach. Iranian leaders could therefore conclude that they have leverage precisely because the White House wants to avoid another energy shock and another major Middle Eastern conflict. In any case Iran won't capitulate.

B. This also highlights an important gap between Washington and Jerusalem. Israel fundamentally opposes an agreement that would stabilize and strengthen the current Iranian regime, because Israel seek to topple this regime.

Israeli Defense Minister has publicly spoken about returning to military action. The logic behind this approach is that sustained strikes against Iran’s critical infrastructure could eventually turn Iran into a failed state with far less ability to threaten Israel.

The Trump administration appears to see the problem differently. Despite the president’s aggressive rhetoric, his behavior still suggests that he would prefer a diplomatic solution that avoids another prolonged war. In other words, Washington and Jerusalem increasingly disagree over the desired end state and how to achieve it.

C. And Iran is not the only issue where these differences are emerging. There are also meaningful gaps between Israel and the United States over Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and increasingly Turkey. These disagreements are compounded by President Trump’s reluctance, at least so far, to publicly embrace Prime Minister Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s elections.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that considerable maneuvering is taking place behind the scenes.

Israel’s immediate objective is to prevent Washington from returning to an agreement with Tehran. From Jerusalem’s perspective, once an American president signs a new agreement with Iran, it becomes much more difficult for an Israeli government to challenge it—particularly because there is no guarantee that Trump, or any future U.S. president, would be willing to return to another major military campaign against Iran.

That is the central strategic divergence: Israel increasingly sees renewed military pressure as necessary to fundamentally weaken Iran, while Trump still appears to be searching for an off-ramp that prevents the United States from being pulled back into a major war.

#iran

Told @FT that Iran will also adapt to the US moves, and likely to invest more in medium-range missiles capable of hitting Jordan and Israel, as they will alter their force build-up. They will continue hunting.

It is an irony of history that strategic failure in Iran will haunt [Trump] too. He never wanted to become Carter and now he is becoming him.

ft.com/content/6f664a…
https://t.co/aaJHeHcWsq

Iran’s economy is in serious trouble, but it is still a long way from collapse.

The rial has fallen to record lows, inflation is soaring, and the economy is contracting. But economic pain should not be confused with strategic capitulation.

If President Trump genuinely believes that Iran is on the verge of collapse and that additional economic pressure will force Tehran to surrender, he may soon discover the limits of that assumption.

Iran remains capable of imposing significant military and economic costs on U.S. interests and partners in the Gulf. Tehran has also made clear that it is prepared to escalate rather than simply absorb indefinite pressure.

But if Trump's rhetoric about Iran's economic weakness is instead intended to prepare the political ground for a deal, essentially arguing that American pressure worked and therefore Washington can now negotiate from a position of strength, that could create an opening. Iran has signaled that it wants a diplomatic exit, but not on the basis of surrender. Any agreement would almost certainly require Washington to address Tehran’s demand for a recognized role in the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

The danger is that Washington begins believing its own narrative. As long as Trump operates within a political reality in which Iran is “collapsing” and America is already “winning,” he risks adopting policies based on assumptions rather than conditions on the ground. Iran is wounded and under enormous pressure, but it is not defeated. More importantly, this is an Iran that appears increasingly willing to demonstrate its remaining military capabilities rather than keep them in reserve.

If Washington fails to recognize that distinction, sooner or later the virtual reality it has constructed will collide with the reality of the Gulfl, and that collision could be extremely costly.

#iran

The remarkable thing is that after nearly six months of direct conflict between the United States and Iran, senior administration officials still seem not to understand how Tehran thinks.

The more U.S. officials publicly talk about the collapse or overthrow of the Islamic Republic, the more they reinforce the conclusion in Tehran that Washington is not actually seeking a deal, it is seeking the regime’s end.

And if Iranian leaders believe there is no diplomatic off-ramp, their incentive is not to capitulate. It is to escalate.

Regime-change rhetoric may sound like pressure in Washington. In Tehran, it can sound like confirmation that the conflict is existential. That is precisely the kind of miscalculation that can turn economic pressure into a much wider war.

#iran

סיכום הראיון שלי @radio103fm אודות מערכת היחסים בין איראן לסין ארה"ב:

א. הכרזתו של שר האוצר סקוט בסנט אתמול על החרפה דרמטית של המערכה הכלכלית נגד איראן נשמעת מרשימה, אבל בשלב הזה משמעותה המעשית מוגבלת. הממשל אכן מבקש לנתק את טהראן מכל מקור הכנסה ומכל גורם שמסייע לה לעקוף את הסנקציות. אלא שבסנט עצמו נמנע בשלב זה מהטלת סנקציות שניוניות על שותפות הסחר המרכזיות של איראן, והבהיר שהוא מבקש לתת למדינות זמן לשנות את התנהלותן. השאלה האמיתית תהיה האם וושינגטון מוכנה להתעמת בנושא הזה עם סין, או אפילו עם שותפות ובעלות ברית כמו תורכיה.

ב. גם אם האכיפה תוחרף משמעותית, ייקח זמן עד שניתן יהיה להעריך את השפעתה. בינתיים, הכלי האפקטיבי והמידי ביותר שעומד לרשות הממשל נותר הלחץ הימי על יצוא הנפט האיראני.

ג. אבל מעל הכול מרחפת שאלה בסיסית יותר: מהי המטרה האסטרטגית של הממשל? לחץ כלכלי הוא אמצעי, לא מטרה. הבית הלבן מדבר על ניתוק כל "עורקי החיים" הכלכליים של המשטר ועל הבאת איראן למצב שבו היא מבודדת כלכלית, אבל הרבה פחות ברור מהו היעד המדיני שאליו אמור הלחץ הזה להוביל.

ד. אם ההנחה היא שהלחץ יביא את איראן לכניעה, זו הנחה בעייתית מאוד. מצבה הכלכלי של איראן קשה ביותר ולראיה המטבע הגיע לשפל חדש והאינפלציה גבוהה מאוד, אבל קושי כלכלי אינו שקול לקריסה של המשטר. וכאשר הבחירה מבחינת טהראן תהיה בין כניעה לבין הסלמה, סביר הרבה יותר שהיא תבחר בהסלמה.

ה. בהקשר הזה, ביקורו אתמול בטהראן של מפקד הצבא הפקיסטני, פילדמרשל מוניר, היה חשוב. מטרת הביקור הייתה לקדם מאמצי תיווך ולהחזיר את הצדדים למסלול של שיחות, אך בשלב הזה עדיין לא ברור אם נוצרה ממנו פריצת דרך כלשהי.

ו. הפרדוקס במדיניות האמריקנית הולך ומתחדד: הממשל אינו רוצה לחזור למלחמה רחבה, אבל המדיניות הכלכלית שהוא מקדם עלולה דווקא לקרב אותה. איראן כבר מאותתת שהיא אינה מוכנה לקבל לאורך זמן מציאות שבה היא אינה יכולה לייצא נפט בעוד שאר מדינות המפרץ ממשיכות לעשות זאת, ואף איימה שאם "המלחמה הכלכלית" תימשך, היא תפעל נגד יצוא הנפט מהמפרץ. לכן השאלה אינה רק האם הלחץ הכלכלי שמוביל בסנט יעבוד. השאלה החשובה הרבה יותר היא מה וושינגטון רוצה שיקרה.

@attaliami
@gidonucko1

maariv.co.il/news/military/…

The writing may indeed have been on the wall. But the failure was deeper than simply misjudging what Iran would do next.

Senior administration officials ,and President Trump above all, went into a war with Iran without sufficiently understanding the country they were confronting.

Iran is not Venezuela. Understanding Iranian behavior requires more than intelligence estimates about military capabilities or regime stability. It requires understanding Iran’s history, strategic culture, nationalism, revolutionary ideology, and the way all of these interact. These are not academic details. They shape how Tehran understands coercion, humiliation, deterrence, compromise, and ultimately war.

The same applies to Ali Khamenei. He was unquestionably a deeply ideological and radical leader. But he was also, paradoxically, a constraint on parts of the Iranian system. His caution, particularly about direct confrontation with the United States, repeatedly restrained more aggressive elements. Removing him was therefore never guaranteed to moderate Iranian behavior. It carried a very real possibility of producing a more risk-tolerant and dangerous leadership.

This is why the failure cannot be reduced to whether American intelligence correctly predicted scenario A or scenario B. The more fundamental question is whether the administration had developed a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of who Iran is before making decisions that would reshape the strategic environment for years.

Before undertaking a war of this magnitude, one intelligence briefing is not enough. It requires repeated, rigorous discussions that challenge assumptions and examine the adversary’s history, political system, decision-making culture, internal factions, ideology, and likely reactions under pressure. Israel conducted precisely this kind of intensive process before striking Syria’s nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor, as former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert later described.

Policymakers, of course, have every right to reject the recommendations of intelligence professionals. Intelligence advises; elected leaders decide. But decision-makers must first possess the analytical tools necessary to make such consequential choices.

That is where the deeper problem lies. The administration appears to have entered the conflict with extraordinary confidence in a particular picture of Iran, including the one Netanyahu presented at the White House on February 11, without sufficiently stress-testing its underlying assumptions. The dialogue of the deaf between Steve Witkoff and Abbas Araghchi has been another illustration of how differently Washington and Tehran understand coercion, negotiations, and acceptable outcomes.

And that leads to the most troubling question today: Did the war actually teach the White House anything about Iran? Judging by some of the statements coming from senior administration officials, it is far from clear that it did.

If Washington still believes that enough economic pain will eventually make Iran behave like a state willing to capitulate under pressure, then the problem is no longer simply a bad forecast. It is a fundamental failure to understand the adversary.

#iran

Told @FT that secondary sanctions were difficult to enforce.

The new campaign raised questions about Trump’s strategy as the administration has become locked in a battle of wills with the Islamic regime.

We had the maximum pressure campaign before, so the question is what is the endgame for the administration?

The administration would have to create political friction with countries like China and Turkey, and doubtful they are rushing to that.

The Iranians already know how to cope with secondary sanctions, building shell companies and things like that.

ft.com/content/b6009d…
https://t.co/aatnmfDjBl

Mi interview @AlArabiya_Eng

Israel has a strong strategic incentive to prevent Washington from reaching an agreement with Tehran. The reason goes beyond the specific terms of any potential deal.

Israel understands that once the United States enters into a diplomatic framework with Iran, it would become extremely difficult for Israel to resume significant military operations against Iran without at least tacit American support.

This helps explain why Israeli officials remain deeply skeptical of renewed U.S.–Iran diplomacy and continue to emphasize maintaining economic and military pressure on Tehran. From Israel’s perspective, almost any outcome short of an agreement that strengthens and stabilizes the Islamic Republic is preferable.

From Jerusalem’s perspective, the problem is therefore strategic: a U.S.–Iran accommodation could fundamentally change the balance created by the war.

In virtually any scenario in which Washington and Tehran move from confrontation toward a stable diplomatic arrangement, Israel risks becoming the first strategic lose, not necessarily because Iran has defeated Israel militarily, but because Israel’s freedom of action against Iran would be significantly reduced.

Israel retains the military capability to strike Iran today. But capability is not the same as strategic freedom of action.

Israel could potentially launch another operation against Iran without direct U.S. participation. Doing so without American political backing, intelligence and logistical support, missile-defense assistance, and broader regional cooperation, however, would be significantly more difficult—and considerably more risky.

That is precisely why a renewed U.S.–Iran agreement is so concerning from Israel’s perspective. Once Washington enters into a diplomatic arrangement with Tehran, the United States would have a strong interest in preserving that agreement and preventing another round of fighting. An Israeli strike could then be viewed in Washington not as part of a shared strategy toward Iran, but as an action that jeopardizes an American diplomatic achievement.

Israel would still retain the theoretical option of using force. But the political, operational, and strategic price of exercising that option would rise dramatically.

This is the deeper Israeli concern: a U.S.–Iran agreement would not simply provide Tehran with an off-ramp. It could substantially narrow Israel’s freedom of action and, as a result, weaken the credibility of Israel’s military threat against Iran.

For Israel, therefore, the question is not whether it can strike Iran without the United States. It can. The question is whether it can conduct a sustained and strategically effective campaign against Iran while Washington actively opposes renewed military action. That would be a very different and much more difficult proposition.

#IranWar‌