A change of government in Israel would not necessarily mean a change in Israeli foreign policy.

That is one of the lessons of the Bennett-Lapid government, the coalition that briefly replaced Benjamin Netanyahu before his return to power. Israel may eventually have a new prime minister, but the strategic assumptions that have defined the Netanyahu era could survive him.

For years, Israeli policy has rested on the assumption that military pressure, covert operations, economic isolation and the credible threat of force can prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But the record deserves much closer scrutiny.

Since President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement, with strong encouragement from Netanyahu, Iran has dramatically expanded its nuclear capabilities. Whatever one thinks of the original agreement, the strategy that replaced it did not produce a stronger deal or a less capable Iran. Tehran moved closer, not farther, to the nuclear threshold.

That should force Israeli policymakers to confront an uncomfortable possibility: pressure intended to stop an Iranian bomb may ultimately strengthen Tehran's incentive to acquire one.

There is a similar problem with the recurring hope that outside pressure can produce regime change in Iran. Military strikes, cyber operations, covert action and information campaigns can weaken an adversary. They cannot manufacture a viable political alternative inside another country.

There is also a practical question that receives far too little attention in Israel: What is the endgame? Israel may be prepared to sustain a prolonged confrontation with Iran. It should not assume that future American administrations will be equally willing.

The American public has little appetite for another open-ended Middle Eastern war. Washington is simultaneously managing competition with China, Russia, commitments in Europe and challenges elsewhere. An Israeli strategy that ultimately depends on indefinite American military participation is therefore not much of an independent strategy at all.

The same problem applies to Israel's long-standing concept of "striking the head of the octopus" retaliating against Iran itself for attacks carried out by Tehran's regional partners.

Suppose Hezbollah launches another major attack on Israel. Would striking Iran deter Hezbollah and end the confrontation? Or could it transform another war in Lebanon into a broader regional conflict involving Iran and multiple armed groups?

Israel undoubtedly possesses the military capability to inflict enormous damage on Iran. But capability is not strategy. The relevant question is what happens afterward.

Is Israel prepared for months or years of attrition with Iran and its regional network if the United States declines to participate directly? And could repeated attacks on Iran ultimately persuade its leadership that acquiring a nuclear deterrent is necessary for the regime's survival?

The next Israeli government should therefore conduct a genuine reassessment of Iran policy rather than simply inherit Netanyahu's assumptions.

Diplomacy should be part of that reassessment. The nuclear agreement was deeply imperfect, but it demonstrated something military pressure has so far failed to demonstrate: that verifiable restrictions can place meaningful limits on Iran's nuclear program. A future diplomatic framework may look very different from the 2015 agreement. But dismissing diplomacy as weakness while treating perpetual military escalation as strategy is not a serious long-term policy.

Yet Iran may not even be the most consequential foreign-policy challenge facing Israel's next government. That distinction belongs to the Palestinian issue.

For Israeli leaders, focusing on Iran has always had a political advantage: it allows Israel to present itself to Washington and the West primarily as a strategic ally confronting a common external enemy. But Israel's international standing is increasingly shaped by Gaza, the West Bank and the absence of any credible political horizon for the Palestinians.

No Israeli government can indefinitely separate those issues from the country's relationship with the United States. Israel's standing among younger Americans and parts of the Democratic coalition has already become considerably more complicated. European governments face growing domestic pressure over their relationships with Israel. Investors and multinational companies also pay attention to political instability, prolonged warfare and international isolation.

That matters especially for any future Israeli leader who promises economic growth, foreign investment and deeper integration with Western markets.

You cannot indefinitely pursue regional escalation abroad, permanent conflict with the Palestinians at home and deeper international integration at the same time. Eventually those objectives collide.

The next Israeli government therefore needs something more ambitious than a different prime minister. It needs a foreign-policy review.

It should ask whether the assumptions that guided Israel over the past decade actually produced the outcomes they promised: Is Iran farther from a nuclear weapon? Are Iran's regional partners less dangerous? Is Israel's international position stronger? Is its relationship with the United States more sustainable? And is Israel closer to resolving, rather than merely managing, the Palestinian conflict?

If the answers are uncomfortable, changing the person in the prime minister's office will not be enough. Israel could enter the post-Netanyahu era while continuing to practice Netanyahu's foreign policy.

#iran

There will be no meaningful expansion of Arab-Israeli normalization without progress on the Palestinian issue. Israeli leaders should stop selling their public the illusion that the region can simply move on.

Egypt is not going to assume responsibility for governing Gaza. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to move toward full normalization with Israel without a credible political pathway for the Palestinians. And the regional map itself has changed: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey have significantly improved their relations, while Egypt and Turkey have undergone their own rapprochement.

So what regional reality is this strategy actually based on?

For years, Israeli policy has increasingly embraced the idea that the Palestinian question could be bypassed — that Israel could deepen its integration into the Middle East, expand the Abraham Accords and eventually normalize relations with Saudi Arabia without making consequential political choices on the Palestinian front. That assumption looks increasingly detached from reality.

The Abraham Accords were an important diplomatic achievement, but they should not be mistaken for proof that the Palestinian issue has become irrelevant. Saudi Arabia is not the UAE, and the political environment after the Gaza war is not the Middle East of 2020.

This matters for Washington as well. An American strategy built around a grand Israeli-Saudi bargain cannot succeed simply by offering Riyadh enough bilateral incentives while treating the Palestinian component as an obstacle to be managed. Saudi leaders have their own domestic, regional and Islamic considerations, and those cannot simply be wished away.

If this is also the foreign-policy doctrine of Israel's next government, then a change of leadership will produce remarkably little change in policy.

Israel needs a genuine foreign-policy reset. That means abandoning strategies based on assumptions that no longer correspond to the region as it exists today. It means recognizing that Israel cannot indefinitely separate regional integration from the Palestinian question.

A serious strategy begins with the region Israel actually lives in — not the region Israeli politicians would prefer to imagine.

Israel's problem is not primarily one of influence. It is a problem of strategy.

No new public-diplomacy operation, influence unit or communications campaign — whether Bennett calls it "Unit 8300" or "Unit 83000" — can solve the fundamental challenge Israel faces in Washington and across the West.

For years, Israeli leaders have increasingly treated the country's deteriorating international standing as a communications problem. If younger Americans are turning against Israel, the argument goes, Israel must be losing the information war. If criticism spreads across universities and social media, Qatar must be financing it. If Israel's image deteriorates, the answer is better messaging.

There is certainly foreign influence in American politics, and Qatar's activities deserve scrutiny like those of any other state. But focusing on influence operations can become a convenient way to avoid a much harder question: What if much of the damage to Israel's standing is being caused by Israeli policy itself?

Israel currently has no convincing diplomatic endgame for either Gaza or the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, its trajectory points toward recurring wars, permanent military control and an increasingly entrenched one-state reality.

That is not a messaging problem.
No communications strategy can indefinitely persuade Americans that a conflict has a political horizon when the government pursuing it offers none.

Israel risks misdiagnosing the problem. If policymakers convince themselves that international criticism is primarily the product of Qatari money, hostile algorithms or insufficient Israeli advocacy, the logical response will always be another influence campaign.

But, Israel's international position will not fundamentally improve until its strategy changes: until it can articulate a credible diplomatic objective, an alternative to perpetual war and a political future that does not simply lead toward permanent Israeli rule over millions of Palestinians. Public diplomacy can explain a strategy. It cannot substitute for one.

The question facing Israel is not how to persuade the world to accept its current trajectory. It is whether that trajectory serves Israel's own long-term security, democratic character and relationship with the United States.

Until Israeli leaders confront that question, blaming Qatar may be politically convenient. It will not solve Israel's problem.

בלי עתיד, בלי תקווה, בלי חזון

עוד ועוד סימנים מעידים שגם ממשלה חדשה בישראל לא בהכרח תוביל לשינוי משמעותי במדיניות החוץ והמדיניות הפלסטינית שלה, ללא קשר לזהות ראש הממשלה.

אכן, צריך לשפר את המצב הכלכלי בגדה המערבית. צריך להיאבק בתקיפות של פלסטינים בידי נוער הגבעות. צריך לחזק את המשילות ולמנוע הידרדרות נוספת. אבל כל אלה הם צעדים חשובים, הם אינם חזון לעתיד היחסים בין ישראלים לפלסטינים.

"ניהול הסכסוך" ו"שלום כלכלי" נוסו במשך שנים. הם לא פתרו את הסכסוך, לא מנעו את החרפתו ולא סיפקו לישראל אופק מדיני. אם הממשלה הבאה באמת רוצה לשנות את מעמדה של ישראל בעולם, לשקם את הלגיטימציה שלה ולשפר את יכולתה להשתלב באזור, היא תידרש להרבה יותר מכך.

הדבר הראשון שמצופה מהנהגה הוא לומר לציבור את האמת: המשך המגמות הנוכחיות מקרב את ישראל למציאות של מדינה אחת בין הים לירדן. לכן גם מי שאינו מאמין שניתן להגיע בעתיד הקרוב להסכם קבע חייב לשאול כיצד משמרים לפחות את האפשרות להיפרדות עתידית מהפלסטינים. בלי האפשרות הזאת יהיה קשה מאוד לשמר לאורך זמן את ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית.

קל הרבה יותר למנהיגים בישראל לדבר על איראן. זהו אויב ברור שמאיים על ישראל, ולכן גם קל יותר לבנות סביבו קונצנזוס. אלא שאיראן אינה בעיה ישראלית בלבד. היא אתגר אזורי ובינלאומי, ויכולת ההשפעה הישראלית עליה, משמעותית ככל שתהיה, מוגבלת.

הסוגיה הפלסטינית, לעומת זאת, היא בראש ובראשונה בעיה ישראלית. מעבר לפרס האסטרטגי האפשרי של נורמליזציה עמוקה יותר עם מדינות ערב במקרה של התקדמות במסלול המדיני, לישראל עצמה יש אינטרס מובהק למנוע מציאות של מדינה אחת.

אפשר כמובן לבחור שוב ב"ניהול הסכסוך" ולקוות שהמציאות תהיה סלחנית יותר הפעם. אבל צריך להיות ישרים עם הציבור לגבי המחיר: המשך השחיקה במעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל, קושי גובר להשתלב באזור, היחלשות הרשות הפלסטינית והתקדמות למציאות שבה ההיפרדות הופכת קשה יותר ויותר.

לכן הממשלה הבאה אינה חייבת להבטיח שמדינה פלסטינית תקום מחר. היא כן חייבת לנקוט צעדים שישמרו את האפשרות להסדר מדיני בעתיד: לחזק את הרשות הפלסטינית תוך דרישה לרפורמות עמוקות מצדה; לפנות מאחזים בלתי חוקיים; לחדש דיאלוג מדיני ישיר וקבוע, לרבות קשר בין שרים; לקדם פרויקטים כלכליים משותפים; לחזק את המשילות בגדה; ולחתור להסדרה מדינית ארוכת טווח גם ברצועת עזה.

מעל לכל, ממשלה שמבקשת להציג עצמה כממשלת שינוי צריכה להחזיר לציבור הישראלי תקווה ואופק. עליה להבהיר שכוח צבאי הוא כלי הכרחי להגנת ישראל, אך הוא אינו יכול להיות התשובה היחידה לכל בעיה אסטרטגית.

אין בכך כדי להסיר אחריות מההנהגה הפלסטינית. הרשות הפלסטינית זקוקה לרפורמות עמוקות, ועל הפלסטינים מוטלת אחריות כבדה לעתידם. אבל המשך המדיניות הישראלית הנוכחית עלול להביא להתמוטטות הרשות והמחיר הביטחוני, המדיני והכלכלי לישראל עלול להיות חמור בהרבה.

אפשר להבין את הקושי של גדי איזנקוט לומר את הדברים הללו בצורה מפורשת. קשה עוד יותר יהיה ליישם מדיניות כזאת במסגרת קואליציה שבה צפויים להיות גורמים ימניים משמעותיים. אבל אם הוא מבקש להנהיג את מחנה השינוי בישראל, חזרה לתפיסה הישנה של "ניהול הסכסוך" תהיה החמצה אסטרטגית קשה.

איש אינו מצפה להקמת מדינה פלסטינית מחר בבוקר. השאלה המיידית היא אחרת: האם ישראל תפעל היום באופן שישאיר לה מחר את האפשרות להיפרד מהפלסטינים ולשמר את זהותה כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית.

אם הממשלה הבאה תבחר שלא לעשות זאת — זו כמובן זכותה. אבל אז היא גם אינה יכולה לצפות לשינוי משמעותי ביחסן של מדינות העולם לישראל, לשיקום הלגיטימציה הבינלאומית שלה או לפריצת דרך אמיתית ביחסיה עם האזור.

לכל בחירה אסטרטגית יש מחיר. גם להיעדר חזון.

Israel’s current policy toward Syria is a strategic mistake of the first order.

Israel’s presence in the buffer zone on the Golan Heights does little to enhance Israeli security and increasingly risks becoming a liability. The strategic objective should instead be to restore the 1974 disengagement framework and withdraw from the areas Israel occupied following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

That withdrawal should not come for free. It should be part of a broader security understanding with the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Such an arrangement should establish clear red lines regarding Syria’s military buildup and its security relationship with Ankara. It should strengthen Syrian efforts to prevent Iran from using Syrian territory to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. And it should deepen the direct channels that already exist between senior Syrian officials and Israel’s security establishment.

Holding Syrian territory indefinitely, without a clear operational necessity or political endgame, risks creating precisely the problems Israel should be trying to avoid. It could intensify tensions not only with Damascus, but also with Turkey, the United States, and key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Since October 7, Israel has increasingly treated the seizure and retention of territory as an instrument of deterrence against its adversaries. But territory without a diplomatic exit strategy eventually becomes a burden rather than an asset.

There is another contradiction in Israeli policy: Israel increasingly appears to be one of the few countries interested in weakening al-Sharaa’s government. Yet the collapse or severe weakening of that government could create the conditions for Iran and its regional network to rebuild their position in Syria, the exact opposite of Israel’s strategic interest.

Al-Sharaa’s past should certainly make Israel cautious. But policy should ultimately be based on what he does, not simply on who he once was. So far, his government has shown little interest in confrontation with Israel. On the contrary, the willingness of senior Syrian officials, including Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, to maintain direct contacts with Israeli counterparts suggests that Damascus is looking for an accommodation, not another war.

Israel therefore has an opportunity: turn Syria from a permanent military front into a managed security relationship, while preventing Iran from returning and establishing clear limits on Syria’s military cooperation with Turkey.

This is another major strategic issue that Israel’s next government will need to fundamentally reassess.

For a more detailed analysis, see m article with @ShiraEfron, where we examine in greater depth the strategic flaws in Israel’s current approach toward Syria.

foreignaffairs.com/israel/israels…

As I wrote just last week, Iran’s doctrinal shift will make Tehran more offensive, more proactive, and potentially far less predictable.

Rather than waiting for threats to materialize and then responding, Iran’s new leadership appears increasingly willing to seize the initiative, take greater risks, and potentially surprise its adversaries.

This is not the Iran Washington and the region grew accustomed to under Ali Khamenei. The assumptions that shaped U.S. policy toward Iran for year, particularly that Tehran would ultimately prioritize restraint and avoid actions that could trigger a major direct confrontation, may no longer hold.

That change needs to be factored into every assessment of how Iran is likely to respond to sustained military and economic pressure.

x.com/citrinowicz/st…

My interview @cnni #newsroom:

A. The current situation in the Gulf is inherently unstable. Even after CENTCOM’s operational successes and the administration’s efforts to move additional oil through the region, the current equilibrium can be sustained for long. President Trump clearly has little interest in returning to a large-scale war with Iran. But Tehran has already made its position clear: it will not accept a situation in which other regional producers can export their oil freely while Iranian exports remain constrained. That makes some form of Iranian escalation increasingly likely.

Timing matters as well. Tehran may calculate that President Trump will become increasingly sensitive to oil prices as the U.S. midterm elections approach. Iranian leaders could therefore conclude that they have leverage precisely because the White House wants to avoid another energy shock and another major Middle Eastern conflict. In any case Iran won't capitulate.

B. This also highlights an important gap between Washington and Jerusalem. Israel fundamentally opposes an agreement that would stabilize and strengthen the current Iranian regime, because Israel seek to topple this regime.

Israeli Defense Minister has publicly spoken about returning to military action. The logic behind this approach is that sustained strikes against Iran’s critical infrastructure could eventually turn Iran into a failed state with far less ability to threaten Israel.

The Trump administration appears to see the problem differently. Despite the president’s aggressive rhetoric, his behavior still suggests that he would prefer a diplomatic solution that avoids another prolonged war. In other words, Washington and Jerusalem increasingly disagree over the desired end state and how to achieve it.

C. And Iran is not the only issue where these differences are emerging. There are also meaningful gaps between Israel and the United States over Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and increasingly Turkey. These disagreements are compounded by President Trump’s reluctance, at least so far, to publicly embrace Prime Minister Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s elections.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that considerable maneuvering is taking place behind the scenes.

Israel’s immediate objective is to prevent Washington from returning to an agreement with Tehran. From Jerusalem’s perspective, once an American president signs a new agreement with Iran, it becomes much more difficult for an Israeli government to challenge it—particularly because there is no guarantee that Trump, or any future U.S. president, would be willing to return to another major military campaign against Iran.

That is the central strategic divergence: Israel increasingly sees renewed military pressure as necessary to fundamentally weaken Iran, while Trump still appears to be searching for an off-ramp that prevents the United States from being pulled back into a major war.

#iran

Told @FT that Iran will also adapt to the US moves, and likely to invest more in medium-range missiles capable of hitting Jordan and Israel, as they will alter their force build-up. They will continue hunting.

It is an irony of history that strategic failure in Iran will haunt [Trump] too. He never wanted to become Carter and now he is becoming him.

ft.com/content/6f664a…
https://t.co/aaJHeHcWsq

Iran’s economy is in serious trouble, but it is still a long way from collapse.

The rial has fallen to record lows, inflation is soaring, and the economy is contracting. But economic pain should not be confused with strategic capitulation.

If President Trump genuinely believes that Iran is on the verge of collapse and that additional economic pressure will force Tehran to surrender, he may soon discover the limits of that assumption.

Iran remains capable of imposing significant military and economic costs on U.S. interests and partners in the Gulf. Tehran has also made clear that it is prepared to escalate rather than simply absorb indefinite pressure.

But if Trump's rhetoric about Iran's economic weakness is instead intended to prepare the political ground for a deal, essentially arguing that American pressure worked and therefore Washington can now negotiate from a position of strength, that could create an opening. Iran has signaled that it wants a diplomatic exit, but not on the basis of surrender. Any agreement would almost certainly require Washington to address Tehran’s demand for a recognized role in the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

The danger is that Washington begins believing its own narrative. As long as Trump operates within a political reality in which Iran is “collapsing” and America is already “winning,” he risks adopting policies based on assumptions rather than conditions on the ground. Iran is wounded and under enormous pressure, but it is not defeated. More importantly, this is an Iran that appears increasingly willing to demonstrate its remaining military capabilities rather than keep them in reserve.

If Washington fails to recognize that distinction, sooner or later the virtual reality it has constructed will collide with the reality of the Gulfl, and that collision could be extremely costly.

#iran

The remarkable thing is that after nearly six months of direct conflict between the United States and Iran, senior administration officials still seem not to understand how Tehran thinks.

The more U.S. officials publicly talk about the collapse or overthrow of the Islamic Republic, the more they reinforce the conclusion in Tehran that Washington is not actually seeking a deal, it is seeking the regime’s end.

And if Iranian leaders believe there is no diplomatic off-ramp, their incentive is not to capitulate. It is to escalate.

Regime-change rhetoric may sound like pressure in Washington. In Tehran, it can sound like confirmation that the conflict is existential. That is precisely the kind of miscalculation that can turn economic pressure into a much wider war.

#iran

סיכום הראיון שלי @radio103fm אודות מערכת היחסים בין איראן לסין ארה"ב:

א. הכרזתו של שר האוצר סקוט בסנט אתמול על החרפה דרמטית של המערכה הכלכלית נגד איראן נשמעת מרשימה, אבל בשלב הזה משמעותה המעשית מוגבלת. הממשל אכן מבקש לנתק את טהראן מכל מקור הכנסה ומכל גורם שמסייע לה לעקוף את הסנקציות. אלא שבסנט עצמו נמנע בשלב זה מהטלת סנקציות שניוניות על שותפות הסחר המרכזיות של איראן, והבהיר שהוא מבקש לתת למדינות זמן לשנות את התנהלותן. השאלה האמיתית תהיה האם וושינגטון מוכנה להתעמת בנושא הזה עם סין, או אפילו עם שותפות ובעלות ברית כמו תורכיה.

ב. גם אם האכיפה תוחרף משמעותית, ייקח זמן עד שניתן יהיה להעריך את השפעתה. בינתיים, הכלי האפקטיבי והמידי ביותר שעומד לרשות הממשל נותר הלחץ הימי על יצוא הנפט האיראני.

ג. אבל מעל הכול מרחפת שאלה בסיסית יותר: מהי המטרה האסטרטגית של הממשל? לחץ כלכלי הוא אמצעי, לא מטרה. הבית הלבן מדבר על ניתוק כל "עורקי החיים" הכלכליים של המשטר ועל הבאת איראן למצב שבו היא מבודדת כלכלית, אבל הרבה פחות ברור מהו היעד המדיני שאליו אמור הלחץ הזה להוביל.

ד. אם ההנחה היא שהלחץ יביא את איראן לכניעה, זו הנחה בעייתית מאוד. מצבה הכלכלי של איראן קשה ביותר ולראיה המטבע הגיע לשפל חדש והאינפלציה גבוהה מאוד, אבל קושי כלכלי אינו שקול לקריסה של המשטר. וכאשר הבחירה מבחינת טהראן תהיה בין כניעה לבין הסלמה, סביר הרבה יותר שהיא תבחר בהסלמה.

ה. בהקשר הזה, ביקורו אתמול בטהראן של מפקד הצבא הפקיסטני, פילדמרשל מוניר, היה חשוב. מטרת הביקור הייתה לקדם מאמצי תיווך ולהחזיר את הצדדים למסלול של שיחות, אך בשלב הזה עדיין לא ברור אם נוצרה ממנו פריצת דרך כלשהי.

ו. הפרדוקס במדיניות האמריקנית הולך ומתחדד: הממשל אינו רוצה לחזור למלחמה רחבה, אבל המדיניות הכלכלית שהוא מקדם עלולה דווקא לקרב אותה. איראן כבר מאותתת שהיא אינה מוכנה לקבל לאורך זמן מציאות שבה היא אינה יכולה לייצא נפט בעוד שאר מדינות המפרץ ממשיכות לעשות זאת, ואף איימה שאם "המלחמה הכלכלית" תימשך, היא תפעל נגד יצוא הנפט מהמפרץ. לכן השאלה אינה רק האם הלחץ הכלכלי שמוביל בסנט יעבוד. השאלה החשובה הרבה יותר היא מה וושינגטון רוצה שיקרה.

@attaliami
@gidonucko1

maariv.co.il/news/military/…

The writing may indeed have been on the wall. But the failure was deeper than simply misjudging what Iran would do next.

Senior administration officials ,and President Trump above all, went into a war with Iran without sufficiently understanding the country they were confronting.

Iran is not Venezuela. Understanding Iranian behavior requires more than intelligence estimates about military capabilities or regime stability. It requires understanding Iran’s history, strategic culture, nationalism, revolutionary ideology, and the way all of these interact. These are not academic details. They shape how Tehran understands coercion, humiliation, deterrence, compromise, and ultimately war.

The same applies to Ali Khamenei. He was unquestionably a deeply ideological and radical leader. But he was also, paradoxically, a constraint on parts of the Iranian system. His caution, particularly about direct confrontation with the United States, repeatedly restrained more aggressive elements. Removing him was therefore never guaranteed to moderate Iranian behavior. It carried a very real possibility of producing a more risk-tolerant and dangerous leadership.

This is why the failure cannot be reduced to whether American intelligence correctly predicted scenario A or scenario B. The more fundamental question is whether the administration had developed a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of who Iran is before making decisions that would reshape the strategic environment for years.

Before undertaking a war of this magnitude, one intelligence briefing is not enough. It requires repeated, rigorous discussions that challenge assumptions and examine the adversary’s history, political system, decision-making culture, internal factions, ideology, and likely reactions under pressure. Israel conducted precisely this kind of intensive process before striking Syria’s nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor, as former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert later described.

Policymakers, of course, have every right to reject the recommendations of intelligence professionals. Intelligence advises; elected leaders decide. But decision-makers must first possess the analytical tools necessary to make such consequential choices.

That is where the deeper problem lies. The administration appears to have entered the conflict with extraordinary confidence in a particular picture of Iran, including the one Netanyahu presented at the White House on February 11, without sufficiently stress-testing its underlying assumptions. The dialogue of the deaf between Steve Witkoff and Abbas Araghchi has been another illustration of how differently Washington and Tehran understand coercion, negotiations, and acceptable outcomes.

And that leads to the most troubling question today: Did the war actually teach the White House anything about Iran? Judging by some of the statements coming from senior administration officials, it is far from clear that it did.

If Washington still believes that enough economic pain will eventually make Iran behave like a state willing to capitulate under pressure, then the problem is no longer simply a bad forecast. It is a fundamental failure to understand the adversary.

#iran