Over the past week, I had the opportunity to brief a delegation of journalists from the #Philippines on the current state of the confrontation between Iran and the United States.

The discussion reinforced an important point: for Asian countries, what happens in the Strait of Hormuz is not a distant Middle Eastern crisis. It is an immediate economic and energy-security concern.

The broader confrontation involving the United States, Iran, and Israel and, above all, Iran’s effective control over the Strait of Hormuz, has sent extraordinary shockwaves through Asian markets.

Many Asian economies remain deeply dependent on energy supplies originating in the Persian Gulf. It is therefore unsurprising that there is growing interest across the region in a fundamental question: Who will control the Strait, and under what conditions will normal commercial shipping resume?

My assessment was relatively pessimistic, for one central reason: there is no realistic return to the status quo of February 28.

Even under an optimistic scenario in which Washington and Tehran reach an agreement, restoring normal maritime traffic will take time. A political agreement is not the same thing as an operational return to normality. Iranian bureaucracy will have to translate political understandings into implementation, while shipping and insurance companies will need convincing evidence that hostilities will not resume before they are prepared to send tankers through the Strait at previous levels. And that is the optimistic scenario.

Under a more pessimistic scenario, the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement and disruption to shipping through Hormuz continues for many months. Even if some form of accommodation is eventually reached, Iran is unlikely to voluntarily surrender the strategic leverage it has gained over the Strait. Control of Hormuz has become not only a military asset, but also a central bargaining chip.

I also emphasized that proposals to simply “bypass Hormuz” need to be treated with caution. There are alternatives and they should certainly be developed, but geography imposes very real constraints. Building additional pipelines, terminals, storage capacity, and alternative export routes is possible; doing so at sufficient scale and speed to replace the volumes normally moving through Hormuz is another matter entirely. Infrastructure can mitigate geography, but it cannot eliminate it, certainly not in the short or medium term.

The key question, therefore, is no longer simply when the fighting ends. It is what regional order emerges afterward, what degree of leverage Iran retains over one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, and how quickly markets will believe that any new arrangement is durable.

For the United States, this means that reopening Hormuz and restoring confidence in freedom of navigation should be viewed not as a technical consequence of ending the conflict, but as a strategic objective in its own right. For Asia, the stakes could hardly be higher.

tribune.net.ph/2026/08/14/hor…
https://t.co/jVapYb0PiA

מאמר שלי @Haaretz בנוגע לצורך להימנע מהפיכת "מלחמת הנצח" למדיניותה הקבועה של מדינת ישראל
https://t.co/uOus2Z5qrj

As I wrote just last week, #Iran is changing the security doctrine adopted under Ali Khamenei.

That doctrine was built around keeping threats away from Iranian territory, relying heavily on proxies, and pursuing a policy of containment designed to avoid drawing Iran itself into direct wars.

What appears to be emerging instead is a more offensive, proactive, and strategically deceptive doctrine, one aimed at inflicting severe damage on the enemy rather than waiting for an attack to reach Iranian soil.

This latest report only reinforces that assessment.
#IranWar‌
x.com/citrinowicz/st…

My article @haaretzcom:
A recent report about two unnamed countries conspiring to attack Israel caused heightened alarm among Israelis. But fear and suspicion can't replace diplomacy, even in the aftermath of October 7
https://t.co/9MJOG8Uozg

התמריץ של איראן להסלמה גובר - הדילמה של טראמפ לא תיעלם

הדיונים בטהרן על מעבר ל"גישה
התקפית" משקפים שינוי בתפיסה האיראנית, שלפיה ככל שהלחץ הכלכלי יגבר - כך יעלה הצורך ליזום חיכוך • הסנקציות מכאיבות, אך לא צפויות להביא לכניעה פומבית של המשטר • בוושינגטון יצטרכו להכריע בין הסלמה יקרה ובלתי צפויה לבין קבלת התנאים האיראניים

מאמר שלי @israelha

israelhayom.co.il/news/world-new…
https://t.co/fuZbsxQqC9

Iran's growing incentive to escalate leaves Trump with no easy way out

Deliberations in Tehran over a shift to an "offensive approach" reflect a change in Iranian thinking: The greater the economic pressure, the stronger the incentive to initiate a new conflict. Sanctions are hurting, but they are unlikely to force the regime into a public surrender. Washington will have to choose between costly, unpredictable escalation and accepting Iran's terms. 

My Article @israelhayom

israelhayom.com/2026/08/18/ira…
https://t.co/I4WZRotlZM

My interview #newsroom @CNN:

A. Trump’s threats against #Oman reflect a deeper U.S. concern over the emerging regional order around the Strait of Hormuz. Washington fears that an Omani-Iranian arrangement could effectively legitimize a significant Iranian role in managing the Strait, while broader diplomatic pressure from Gulf staes could increase pressure on the United States to ease or remove its naval blockade.

B. Trump’s approach toward Oman risks further eroding U.S. credibility among Gulf partners. For Gulf states, the question is increasingly whether Washington remains a predictable security guarantor or whether even long-standing partners and mediators can suddenly become targets of American coercion. Those doubts were already intensified by the war with Iran, and threats against Oman could reinforce the perception that U.S. commitments and relationships are increasingly transactional and unpredictable

C. Economic pressure alone is unlikely to produce Iranian capitulation. Tehran appears to believe that it can absorb substantial economic pain as long as it can impose significant costs on the United States and its regional partners in return. That creates a dangerous asymmetry: Washington may view sanctions and military pressure as tools for forcing concessions, while Tehran may view escalation itself as a source of leverage. If Iranian leaders ultimately conclude that they face a choice between strategic capitulation and another round of escalation, they are more likely to escalate than surrende, particularly as control over Hormuz gives them an unusually powerful instrument for imposing economic costs beyond Iran itself.

D. On Gaza, the core obstacle is that the political incentives of Netanyahu and Hamas remain fundamentally incompatible. Netanyahu has little domestic political room to accept an arrangement that could be portrayed as leaving Hamas militarily intact, while Hamas has little incentive to accept genuine and irreversible disarmament. Its preference would be to preserve enough military capability, or at least the ability to regenerate it, to remain a relevant actor in Gaza. As a result, the most consequential decisions over Gaza’s political and security architecture may ultimately be postponed until after Israel’s elections, when the Israeli government has greater political latitude to make compromises that would currently carry prohibitive domestic costs.

#IranWar‌

Israeli Actions in Syria Are Bringing It Closer to a Military Confrontation with Turkey

A. Israel–Turkey relations have deteriorated dramatically since October 7. The Turkish government’s support for Hamas and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Israel have deepened the crisis and brought bilateral relations to one of their lowest points in decades.

B. But contrary to claims increasingly heard from some Israeli politicians, Turkey is not Iran. It continues to allow Azerbaijani oil to reach Israel, has not completely closed its airspace to Israeli aircraft, and maintains diplomatic representation in Israel. Moreover, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın are well known to their Israeli counterparts. The relationship is deeply troubled, but channels of communication have not disappeared.

C. Israel’s strategic challenge, therefore, is to prevent Turkey from moving from a rival to an outright enemy. Turkey is a NATO member, Erdoğan maintains a close relationship with President Trump, and its military capabilities exceed those of any state adversary Israel has confronted in recent decades. A direct confrontation with Ankara would represent an entirely different level of strategic risk.

D. Israeli military activity in Syria is putting this already fragile relationship at greater risk, particularly in the absence of an effective mechanism to manage tensions and prevent military incidents. Rather than relying primarily on threats and strikes near areas of Turkish interest, Israel should establish a direct channel with Ankara aimed at reaching understandings over the rules of the game in Syria. It is also important to recognize that, contrary to a common perception in Israel, Ahmed al-Sharaa is not simply a Turkish proxy. He depends heavily on Ankara’s support, but there are also significant differences and tensions between the two sides.

E. Continued threats and military operations in Syria risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Israeli fears of hostile Turkish entrenchment could produce actions that lead Ankara itself to increasingly view Israel as a threat and deepen its military involvement. This does not mean Israel should accommodate every Turkish demand or compromise vital security interests. Restoring bilateral relations will be a long process and will depend significantly on the future of Israeli policy in Gaza. But military action without a parallel diplomatic track could unnecessarily accelerate the confrontation.

F. When the choice is between striking a handful of aircraft with limited operational value and seeking understandings with Turkey over the nature of its involvement in Syria, relying exclusively on military power risks undermining Israel’s own interests. Turkey is not going to disappear from Syria. If Ankara decides to arm al-Sharaa’s forces, it has the ability to do so whether Israel approves or not. The more important question is whether Turkish involvement develops within an understood framework and established red lines, or through an escalating cycle in which each side interprets the other’s actions as preparation for confrontation.

G. Contrary to another increasingly common argument in Israel, Turkey is not necessarily constructing a new “Sunni axis” designed to replace the Iranian-led Shiite axis. Ankara has substantial regional ambitions of its own, some of which clearly conflict with Israeli interests. But Israel and Turkey also share an important strategic interest: neither wants to see the return of a powerful, regionally dominant Iran. Israeli policy should recognize not only the areas of competition with Ankara but also the interests the two countries continue to share.

The bottom line is the need to think before acting. Precisely because Turkey is a major regional power, Israel needs to combine military deterrence with diplomacy and effective deconfliction mechanisms. In Syria, the distance between demonstrating strength and stumbling into a confrontation that neither country actually wants may be dangerously short.