ראיון שלי @radio103fm על מצב היחסים בין וושינגטון לטהראן:

א. הממשל האמריקני נמצא בצומת דרכים אסטרטגי מול איראן. סוגיית המיירטים היא בהחלט אילוץ משמעותי, במיוחד לאור הפגיעות שנרשמו בסבב הנוכחי, אך הבעיה רחבה הרבה יותר ונוגעת בראש ובראשונה להעדר אסטרטגיה ברורה ביחס לאופן שבו ניתן להשפיע על התנהלות המשטר בטהראן. המשך הפעלת אותו סל כלים לא צפוי לשנות את דפוס הפעולה האיראני.

ב. במקביל, נראה כי קיים מחסור מסוים במלאי המיירטים, כאשר היקף הפגיעות האיראניות בסבב הנוכחי מחזק את ההערכה כי ארצות הברית מנהלת בזהירות את משאבי החימוש שלה ואינה יכולה להתייחס למלאים כאל משאב בלתי מוגבל.

ג. הדילמה האמריקנית מול איראן מורכבת במיוחד. מצד אחד, החרפת המערכה אינה מבטיחה שאיראן תהפוך לכנועה יותר או שתסכים לוויתורים משמעותיים יותר. מצד שני, כל הסכם עם טהראן יחייב בהכרח פשרות משמעותיות, ובוודאי יעניק למשטר האיראני הישגים כלכליים שיחזקו את יציבותו.

ד. לכך מצטרפים אילוצים נוספים, בהם ההתפתחויות בערוץ העומאני–איראני והמאמצים המדיניים שמתרחבים סביב המשבר. ייתכן כי שילוב של שיקולים אלה, לצד ההבנה הגוברת בוושינגטון כי הרחבת המערכה אינה בהכרח משרתת את האינטרסים האמריקניים, תרם לעצירת התקיפות האחרונות.

בסופו של דבר, הדילמה האמריקנית נותרת בעינה: אין כיום אופציה טובה. חזרה להסכם עלולה לחזק את המשטר האיראני ולהעניק לו מרחב נשימה כלכלי, בעוד שהחרפת המלחמה עלולה להוביל להסלמה רחבה מבלי להבטיח שיפור בעמדת המיקוח מול טהראן. השאלה המרכזית אינה כיצד להפעיל יותר כוח, אלא כיצד להגדיר יעד אסטרטגי בר-השגה.

@gidonucko1
@attaliami

My interview @NewsNation Ahead of Prime Ministet Netanyahu's Meeting with President Trump:

A. Netanyahu arrives in Washington with two central objectives. Domestically, he needs to preserve Trump's political backing amid growing political challenges at home. Strategically, he is expected to argue that Iran has continued rebuilding key military capabilities and will likely present intelligence intended to convince President Trump that any renewed nuclear agreement would ultimately fail to prevent Iran from becoming a long-term strategic threat.

B. At the same time, quiet diplomacy, primarily through Omani mediation, continues in an effort to find a formula for reducing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. The current ceasefire suggests that neither Washington nor Tehran has abandoned diplomacy. Despite President Trump's tough rhetoric, both sides still appear interested in keeping the door open for a negotiated settlement.

C. One of the most important strategic developments is inside Iran itself. Ali Khamenei had long resisted crossing the threshold to nuclear weapons, preferring to preserve strategic ambiguity. Today's leadership, led by Mojtaba Khamenei and senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures, is increasingly shaped by the lesson they draw from North Korea: only a nuclear deterrent can guarantee regime survival. Although Operation Midnight Hammer significantly damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Tehran still retains the scientific expertise and industrial foundation to move toward a weapon if it chooses. Focusing exclusively on Hormuz risks overlooking the more consequential nuclear challenge.

D. The maritime situation remains deeply concerning. With shipping through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb severely disrupted, the consequences extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting global energy markets and the international economy. Geography cannot be changed, and the Houthis appear determined to break the Saudi-led pressure campaign. Supporting regional partners in restoring maritime security is therefore essential, not only for regional stability but also for protecting the global economy and limiting Iran's ability to leverage energy markets as a strategic tool.

E. Regardless of whether the recent attack in Germany is linked to Iran, it highlights a broader security concern. The greatest terrorist threat following Ali Khamenei's death may not come from organized networks but from self-radicalized lone actors inspired by Iranian propaganda and motivated by revenge. That possibility deserves close attention from Western security services.

#IranWar‌

אין מה להיות מופתעים...
@israelhay

My interview @nytimes:

The irony, is that Mr. Netanyahu told Mr. Trump that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s former supreme leader, “had to be killed” to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Now there is a new Ayatollah Khamenei, and Israel is saying Iran has to be stopped from obtaining nuclear weapons again.

@IKershner
nytimes.com/2026/07/27/wor…
nytimes.com/2026/07/27/wor…

With all due respect to Washington's efforts to shape the policies of Iraq's new government, one reality remains unchanged: Iran maintains a deep and active presence inside Iraq, both directly and through its network of armed partners.

Recent reports suggest that the actors involved may not necessarily be the well-known groups such as Kataib Hezbollah or al-Nujaba. It is entirely plausible that some operations are being conducted by networks working directly under the guidance of IRGC officers inside Iraq, allowing Tehran greater deniability while preserving operational control.

At the same time, there is growing evidence of close coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite armed groups. It is therefore possible that Yemeni operatives based in Iraq also played a role in planning or facilitating recent attacks, including target selection.

The attack launched from Iraq toward Jordan reinforces a broader trend: Iraq has become one of Iran's most important platforms for projecting power through proxies beyond Iranian territory.

The picture that emerges is not of isolated actors, but of an increasingly coordinated network linking Iran, the Houthis, and Iraqi armed groups in pursuit of shared strategic objectives.

The Houthis show no sign of backing down. They appear determined to continue targeting Saudi energy infrastructure until Riyadh lifts the blockade they believe is being imposed against them.

In this context, attacks originating from both Yemen and Iraq could intensify, further increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia. Riyadh may soon face a difficult strategic choice: absorb continued attacks in the hope of avoiding a broader regional war, or respond militarily despite the risk of significant escalation.

From the Houthis' perspective, the calculus appears straightforward. They seem convinced they have little left to lose and are therefore unlikely to be deterred from continuing to strike strategic Saudi targets if they believe doing so advances their objectives.

#IranWar‌

ההחלטה שתעצב את המזרח התיכון: טראמפ צריך להכריע בין הסלמה להסדרה
נשיא ארצות הברית, דונלד טראמפ, ניצב בפני הכרעה אסטרטגית בין הרחבת המערכה מול איראן לבין חזרה למסלול של הסדרה • להחלטתו עשויות להיות השלכות מרחיקות לכת על ישראל, מדינות המפרץ והיציבות האזורית

מאמר שלי @israelhayom israelhayom.co.il/news/world-new…
israelhayom.co.il/news/world-new…

בהמשך לאזהרות ראש השב"כ ולאור ההתרעה שכתבנו עליה לפני כשמונה חודשים - מאמר נוסף שכתבתי
@IsraelHayomHeb
על הסכנה האיראנית לקראת הבחירות בישראל

התרחיש שמדאיג את מערכת הביטחון: כך טהרן נערכת להשפיע על הבחירות בישראל
מבצעי ההשפעה האיראניים כבר החלו, ובמערכת הביטחון מזהירים מפני ניסיון להעמיק את השסע בחברה הישראלית • מומחים מזהים שימוש גובר בבינה מלאכותית, חשבונות פיקטיביים וגיוס ישראלים להפצת מסרים - במטרה לפגוע באמון הציבור ובהליך הדמוקרטי

israelhayom.co.il/news/geopoliti…

It was a real honor and privilege to be interviewed for David Remnick outstanding article, during his visit to Israel @NewYorker

A. Israel, in its wounded rage after October 7th, lost its strategic mind. The joint Trump-Netanyahu military campaign ended in an absolute disaster. The bombing on the first day killed the aging Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was succeeded by his even more hard-line son, Mojtaba, and left the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more radicalized and empowered than ever. The hope that bombing might inspire a rapid popular uprising was preposterous from the start.

B. we ended up giving even greater legitimacy to the Iranian regime and strengthening them.The Gulf states, which had been drawing closer to Israel and the United States, would now seek an accommodation with Iran. Trump had imagined that he could replicate the ease of the American operation in Venezuela. Instead, he launched an air campaign against a country of more than ninety million people and found himself in a quagmire that was fracturing the MAGA coalition and threatening the global economy. Netanyahu, who had sold the plan to Trump after failing to do so with American Presidents going back to George W. Bush, now faced an Iranian leadership with a stronger motive to acquire a nuclear weapon. And U.S. support for Israel had cratered across the political spectrum, a development that most Israelis had yet to grasp fully

C. Most Israelis cannot bear to hear Israeli policy criticized abroad, and so many of them turn around and assume it is antisemitism. Antisemitism exists, but you can’t be so defensive to think that any and all criticism comes from that place.

newyorker.com/magazine/2026/…
https://t.co/u1nQUWJCdF

עיראק - אחת הזירות המרכזיות במאבק מול איראן

א. האירועים האחרונים בעיראק מתחברים באופן ישיר למה שהתרחש בזירה העיראקית במהלך מערכת "שאגת הארי". לאורך השנים הצליחה איראן לבסס בעיראק אחיזה עמוקה באמצעות משמרות המהפכה ורשת של מיליציות שיעיות הנתמכות על ידה. ארגונים כמו כתאיב חיזבאללה, א-נוג'באא וגורמים נוספים עברו הכשרה, מימון והכוונה ישירה מצד טהראן, במטרה לשמש מנוף לחץ איראני נגד ישראל, ירדן ומדינות המפרץ בעת עימות אזורי.

ב. האתגר כיום אף חמור יותר, משום שבישראל ובוושינגטון היו מי שתלו תקוות בכך שראש הממשלה העיראקי החדש, עלי א-זיידי, יוכל להוביל מהלך לצמצום כוחן של המיליציות במסגרת אל-חשד א-שעבי, ובכך לפגוע באחד מעמודי התווך המרכזיים של ההשפעה האיראנית בעיראק.

ג. אלא שהמציאות בשטח מורכבת הרבה יותר. ההיענות הרחבה להלווייתו של עלי ח'אמנהאי בעיראק, לצד המשך המעורבות העמוקה של משמרות המהפכה ושלוחותיה במדינה, המחישו את מגבלות הכוח של ממשלה עיראקית ושל לחץ אמריקני. א-זיידי אולי יוכל להיפגש בבית הלבן, לדבר על השקעות אמריקניות ועל חיזוק הכלכלה העיראקית, אך הרעיון שניתן יהיה "להוציא" את עיראק מהאחיזה האיראנית באמצעות לחץ מדיני או כלכלי בלבד רחוק מאוד מהמציאות.

ד. הבעיה המרכזית היא שההשפעה האיראנית בעיראק אינה נשענת רק על קשרים עם גורמים פוליטיים, אלא על תשתית ביטחונית, חברתית ופוליטית שנבנתה במשך שנים. המיליציות השיעיות הפכו לחלק אינטגרלי מהמערכת העיראקית, ולא ניתן פשוט לפרק אותן גם בהנתן החלטה ממשלתית.

ה. גם ראש ממשלה עיראקי שמעוניין לחזק את הריבונות העיראקית נאלץ לפעול בתוך המציאות הזו. א-זיידי עצמו לא היה מגיע לתפקידו ללא תמיכה או לכל הפחות הסכמה מצד חלק מהמערכת הפוליטית השיעית והמיליציות המזוהות עמה.

ו. המסקנה עבור ישראל היא שעיראק אינה זירה שבה ניתן לצפות לשינוי מהיר באמצעות לחץ אמריקני או החלפת הנהגה. כל ניסיון לצמצם את ההשפעה האיראנית במדינה חייב להתבסס על אסטרטגיה ארוכת טווח: חיזוק מוסדות המדינה העיראקית, צמצום הדרגתי של עצמאות המיליציות, והבנה שאיראן לא תוותר בקלות על אחת הזירות החשובות ביותר שבנתה לעצמה במזרח התיכון.

ההתפתחויות האחרונות ממחישות פעם נוספת כי המאבק מול איראן אינו מתנהל רק בגבולותיה, אלא בעיקר דרך רשת השלוחות שבנתה ברחבי האזור. עיראק היא אחת החוליות החשובות ביותר ברשת הזו.

@Liorbenari1

ynet.co.il/news/article/b…

My interview @cnni @BeckyCNN Ahead of Netanyahu’s Meeting with President Trump

A. Pm Netanyahu will likely try to convince President Trump that there is little value in negotiations with Iran as long as Tehran continues to advance both its nuclear capabilities and its conventional military posture. He would also welcome an expansion of the campaign against Iran.

B. Netanyahu’s challenge, however, is that there are influential voices inside the Trump administration , including Vice President J.D. Vance and others, who are concerned that Netanyahu could once again pull the United States into an open-ended and potentially inconclusive conflict with Iran.

C. Netanyahu will also seek to leverage Trump’s political support at a time when his standing in Israeli public opinion remains complicated. He will likely argue against Israeli withdrawals from Syria or Lebanon, warning that such moves could undermine his security credentials ahead of Israel’s next elections.

D. It is important to remember that none of the leading figures who could potentially replace Netanyahu are currently proposing a dramatic shift in Israel’s foreign and security policy. The recent comments by Naftali Bennet regarding toppling the Iranian regime are another example of this broader consensus.

E. If there is a political transition in Israel, its most significant impact is likely to be on domestic issues, such as the relationship between the state and the ultra-Orthodox community, rather than on major foreign policy questions. Expectations of a fundamentally different Israeli approach under a future government should therefore be tempered.

F. Gulf states do not trust Iran, but they also understand that pushing Tehran into a corner carries significant risks. Their highest priority is restoring a sense of security in the Gulf in order to rebuild their economies and maintain stability, even if that requires preserving working relationships with Iran.

G. This does not mean that Gulf countries are abandoning their desire to deepen ties with Israel. Rather, it reflects a broader reality: their foreign policy approach is not binary. They are willing to pursue relationships with multiple actors simultaneously based on their national interests, security needs, and economic priorities.

#IranWar‌

My interview @SkyNews @SkyYaldaHakim:

A. The growing tensions between Ukraine and Iran are another reminder that today's conflicts are deeply interconnected. Iran's military support for Russia has made it a direct stakeholder in the war in Ukraine, while Ukraine's reported actions against the emerging logistical corridor across the Caspian Sea demonstrate that Kyiv is increasingly willing to challenge Iran directly. Although the foreign ministers recently held talks, the fact that each side issued very different readouts suggests that the diplomatic gap remains wide. If Tehran decides it must restore deterrence, another round of escalation cannot be ruled out.

B. Prime Minister Netanyahu arrived in Washington politically weaker than at any point in recent years. Beyond his domestic challenges, he faces growing skepticism within President Trump's inner circle. Senior figures, including Vice President J.D. Vance, reportedly worry that Netanyahu could once again draw the United States into a broader confrontation with Iran. That concern is reinforced by a broader perception in Washington among lawmakers and parts of the public that Israel pushed the United States into a costly campaign that ultimately failed to achieve its central strategic objective: changing the Iranian regime.

C. Netanyahu also needs Trump's political backing. Netanyahu also depends on Trump because he is arguably the last major world leader on whom the Israeli prime minister can truly rely. Trump is well aware of that political reality and is likely to use it as leverage in managing the relationship and advancing his own priorities. With polls suggesting his political future is increasingly uncertain, he has a strong incentive to demonstrate a close relationship with the White House while arguing against any Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon or Syria and keeping the option of renewed military action against Iran on the table. From his perspective, these issues are closely tied to his domestic political standing. That is why it was hardly surprising that he portrayed the meeting as highly successful, despite the absence of a separate one-on-one meeting or any major public announcements afterward. Still, based on past experience, we cannot rule out the possibility that Netanyahu was able to influence Trump's thinking on Iran. It remains entirely possible that the president could ultimately decide to expand the military campaign if he concludes that diplomacy has reached its limits.

D. At the same time, rising tensions in the West Bank underscore a broader strategic reality: Israel's security challenges will not disappear even if the Iranian regime eventually falls. Escalating violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians points to a deteriorating situation that the next Israeli government will have to confront. It will eventually need to make fundamental decisions about the future of the West Bank—whether that means pursuing a two-state framework, moving toward annexation, or accepting the implications of a one-state reality. Continuing to postpone those decisions carries significant costs, including making normalization with Saudi Arabia increasingly difficult to achieve.

#IranWar‌

Why Did Iran Strike Jordan?

A. Iran's current leadership is determined to set the pace of the confrontation rather than simply react to decisions made in Washington. Tehran wants to demonstrate that it retains the initiative and can shape the escalation on its own terms.

B. Iranian leaders increasingly interpret Washington's caution as a sign of hesitation and a lack of political will to sustain a prolonged confrontation. In Tehran's assessment, that creates an opportunity to test American resolve.

C. From Iran's perspective, the maritime blockade itself constitutes an act of war. Unlike previous crises, the current leadership appears unwilling to accept restrictions on its maritime access without responding militarily.

D. Today's strikes should also be viewed in the broader regional context. They are closely linked to the activities of Iran-backed militias in Iraq against Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Tehran sees these fronts as part of a single campaign aimed at reshaping the regional balance of power while exploiting what it views as the strategic vulnerabilities of the Gulf states and the United States.

E. The attack also reflects the doctrinal shift that has taken place in Iran since the death of Ali Khamenei. The new leadership is not content with deterrence through retaliation alone; it increasingly favors proactive military initiatives while relying heavily on its missile, drone, and proxy capabilities. Tehran believes the current crisis presents an opportunity to redefine the security order in the Persian Gulf in its favor.

F. The pressure now shifts back to Washington. Iranian decision-makers appear to believe that a limited U.S. response will not alter the strategic equation. Their expectation is that the United States will eventually face a choice between accepting a broader escalation or making significant strategic adjustments.

The broader message from Tehran is clear: Iran is not signaling surrender, nor is it seeking negotiations from a position of weakness. On the contrary, the leadership appears prepared to accept considerable risks because it views this as a defining strategic confrontation over Iran's regional role and long-term security.

#IranWar‌

On the Brink of Uncontrolled Escalation? The Middle East Is Leaving the United States and Its Allies With Two Increasingly Unattractive Options

The latest developments in the Middle East, including Iran's strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan and the joint U.S.-Saudi response against Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq following attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, underscore how rapidly the region is moving toward a broader confrontation. They also highlight the extent to which the recent U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran has further destabilized an already fragile regional balance.

The central challenge facing Washington and its Gulf partners is that neither Iran nor its regional allies appear willing to retreat from what they now define as core strategic objectives. Tehran continues to insist on maintaining its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis have made clear that they will not end their campaign unless the Saudi-led restrictions imposed on them are lifted. Military pressure alone has shown little indication of changing these positions.

As a result, the United States and its regional partners are approaching a strategic crossroads. One option would be to accommodate at least some of Iran's and the Houthis' demands in order to reduce tensions. The alternative is to continue applying military pressure, accepting the growing likelihood of a prolonged regional confrontation in which attacks on shipping, energy infrastructure, and critical trade routes become increasingly frequent.

Against this backdrop, further retaliation by Iraqi Shiite militias and the Houthis appears increasingly likely despite the latest U.S.-Saudi strikes. If Washington responds with additional military escalation, Tehran is unlikely to remain passive. Instead, it would probably seek to raise the costs by expanding the conflict through its regional network, increasing pressure on global energy markets and raising the risk of a wider military confrontation that could eventually draw in additional Gulf states and Israel.

From Tehran's perspective, American hesitation reflects strategic weakness rather than restraint. This perception creates a dangerous dynamic: the more Washington attempts to restore deterrence through limited military action, the more Iran may feel compelled to demonstrate that escalation will impose unacceptable costs on the United States and its partners. The result is an increasingly unstable cycle in which each side believes that backing down would undermine its credibility.

In practical terms, the region may already be approaching a point where limited, calibrated strikes are no longer sufficient to contain the crisis. At the same time, a negotiated solution remains difficult because the core demands of Iran and the Houthis are viewed in Washington and among its regional allies as fundamentally unacceptable.

Unless an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough emerges, one that involves meaningful compromises from all sides, the coming days are likely to be characterized by continued escalation, growing risks to global energy markets, and an increasing possibility that the conflict expands beyond its current boundaries.

#iran