Addendum to previous - map #2 is weird and apparently shows the wrong Belgorovka.

I'm just going to blame the forwarded post lol. This isn't my work.

By the time the forces doing the pinning were redeployed, the Mariupol saga was essentially over. In redeploying the North Front units, Russia was able to let them rest, but they did not take too long before being thrown back into warfare—indicating that there was no appreciable need for replenishment of personnel (confirming the relatively low casualties even in the North Front engagement—the major casualties for Russia were always going to come from the Donbass engagement), Ukraine is unable even to rotate its brigades for rest: The Ukrainian units are stuck at the front and have no option, but to fight without stop (the flood of relatives increasingly pleading with the Ukrainian authorities to allow their men to rest and rotate out of hot zones is becoming very pronounced).

The POW numbers tell their own story. It has been weeks (literally) since we last saw any video of Russian POWs in Ukrainian hands. Videos of Ukrainians surrendering to Russian forces are, on the other hand, a daily phenomenon. They surrender individually, in groups, and en masse. Some have even joined the DNR and LNR forces to fight against the Ukrainian army. Other have decided to stay in Donbass for good. Some help in Allied military and Donbass civilian hospitals. Still others eat, rest, smoke—perfectly safe in Russian captivity. I estimate in excess of 6,000 Ukrainian POW, and possibly as high as 8,000 in Russian hands. This speaks volume, considering the Russian MoD report that, once encircled, the Mariupol Ukrainian contingent numbered about 8,500 troops, and Russia assaulted it with about the same number. Whatever the number of Russian casualties, the number of Ukrainian POWs is likely higher than the entire group of those Russian soldiers that died.

3—Russia has lost so much armour and equipment, that it has to source new tanks from Iraq—Ukraine, by contrast, has been capturing Russian armoured vehicles in such numbers, that it has more now than it had before the conflict. Even farmers plow fields using Russian tanks.

Even the Ukrainian Goebbels Arestovich said, on April 26: "We do not have any heavy weaponry. We need it. The West will help us, and we will go on the offensive." The fairy tales of Ukrainian farmers towing Russian tanks and Ukrainian forces massively taking abandoned Russian equipment were always just that—fairy tales of the worst kind, the ones that have no truth, morale, or purpose, except to perpetuate a lie. The Russian army has been completely undeterred by any losses of any equipment—armoured vehicles, specialized vehicles, MLRS, aircraft, helicopters, and so on—that it may have suffered. On the contrary, its movements and redeployments continue being rapid, the pace of the offensive—considering the vast territory and the enormous length of the front—remain exemplary. All this indicates that all the Western and Ukrainian reporting on the topic of Russian losses of any kind has been one Big Lie, die große Lüge.

4—Ukraine forced the Russian troops from the areas near Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov—but Ukraine withdrew, in an organized fashion, from Severodonetsk, Popasnaya, and Izyum.

This one is complete gobbledygook and gibberish. Let's deal with the Ukrainian first. The Ukrainian forces have not—to date—conducted an organized retreat from any place, with the exception, possibly of the withdrawal of a brigade from Lisichansk. This could be considered organized retreat, but only if one ignores that the city was near to falling into a Cauldron, and their desperate comrades, across the Seversky Donets river, in Severodonetsk, were abandoned and left to die by the Ukrainian General Staff. Popasnaya was a monumental defeat, and the Ukrainian 24th Brigade may cease to exist as a result, as it suffered major losses even in withdrawal. Finally, Izyum, actually, is an example of the resilience and perseverence of Ukrainian troops, which managed, for nearly a month, if my memory serves me correctly, to defend in the southern peninsula-like district of the city, across the Seversky Donets river from the advancing Russian forces. They did not withdraw from there either, but died there.

As for Russians—where is the evidence, photographic or otherwise, that Ukrainians are so fond of, of them forcing Russians from Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy, and Kharkov? These were not fights or battles. The best Ukraine could hope for was shell with artillery and MLRS from within these cities at the Russian positions all around them. In Kiev, Chernigov, and Sumy, it was only on 2nd or 3rd day after the Russian armies left in an organized fashion, for redeployment to Donbass, that Ukrainians dared to poke their nose into the settlements around the previously-blockaded centres. In Kharkov, the same pattern repeats—the Allied forces withdrew in the face of the threat of operation encirclement, and Ukrainians moved in to take the empty settlements. The only examples of actual fighting—an attempted assault on Kazachya Lopan, for instance, cost the Ukrainians two villages and a complete failure, and, perhaps, only Rubezhnoye stands as an example of a pitched battle, but I do not have any further information about what happened there. The fighting for Liptsy continues, as far as I can tell. In other words, we are dealing with the Allied armies doing what they want, and the Ukrainians—what the Russian forces allow them to do. Why are the Ukrainians allowed to take back land—that's a question of politics, tactics, and strategy not suitable for this discussion, and better answered elsewhere.

Time and again, we see Russia implementing a strategy—pinning Ukrainians in the north, then withdrawing, once that mission had run its court, to be redeployed to the second phase of the operation in Donbass. Pinning the Ukrainians in Kharkov, while the new battlegroups rip down the eastern bank of the Oskol river and the Northern command of the Russian forces takes Izyum and spreads the tentacles of its units to Velikaya Kamyshevakha (onwards to Lozovaya, and, possibly, Pavlograd, with time), Barvenkovo, and Slavyansk. Breaking through the defences around Rubezhnoye and piercing toward Yampol and Lyman. Taking Shandrigolovo and Novoselovka to split the Ukrainian side. Grinding down Popasnaya and then splitting the offensive west and north to Artyomovsk and Kamyshevakha. Ukrainians are reacting to this strategy, on the defensive, and largerly dancing to the Russian fiddle (the modest attempts at Zmeiny island and around Kharkov notwithstanding, though, allowed to be emboldened, the Ukrainian forces may take this germs of strategy to the next level).

Flip the narrative and the picture becomes clear.

I thought the crossing at Belgorovka was unsuccessful... /sarcasm

🇷🇺🇺🇦⚡AFU are preparing for two big Russian offensives - on Severodonetsk and on the Lisichansk-Artemovsk highway from Popasna and Belogorivka, - Gauleiter of Lugansk region

The M777 and its, uh, "adventurous" towing setup lol

The Americans were in such a hurry that they flipped a vehicle.

The Russian-Allied Offensive from Popasnaya, SitRep as of May 19, 2022

1—Within a mere ten days after the fall of Popasnay—the most important and most fortified stronghold of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Donbass—the Allied forces have breached the Ukrainian defences in multiple directions along four separate vectors fanning out of Popasnaya to the north, northwest, west, and south. The Ukrainian front is crumbling.

(continued in the next two posts)

2—After the mop-up of Popasnaya, units of PMC Wagner continued the offensive in the northwestern direction, along the railway lines toward the settlement Druzhba and onward to Soledar. The forward advance of the Wagner units pinned and blockaded the Ukrainian Army and territorial defence troops in Tripolye and opened the path for the Russian elite VDV (paratrooper) units to progress to Vladimirovka.

3—Where it took several days to move beyond Druzhba, the settlements of Tripolye and Vladimirovka fell in rapid succession on May 19, 2022. First success came from the VDV units that bypassed Tripolye and secured Vladimirovka by the morning of May 19. The Wagner troops took control of Tripolye by the evening on the same day. Finally, advance units of the Allied offensive are reported to have taken Novaya Kamenka, putting them essentially on the outskirts of Soledar.

4—A key section of the Soledar-Lisichansk lifeline supplying the Ukrainian troops in the northeastern corner of the forming Donbass cauldron is now under barrage fire control of the Allied troops. The Ukrainian military grouping in the Severodonetsk-Lisichansk urban agglomeration is in operational encirclement. To secure the rapid success of the offensive, the Allied troops have to take control over reinforced position on the strategic heights neighbouring Vladimirovka and Tripolye to the north. After this objective is achieved, the only supply line remaining to the trapped Ukrainian troops will run along the Lisichansk-Seversk path—a route that is already under artillery fire control by the Russian forces from the north bank of the Seversky Donets river that weaves through the area.

5—The second direction of the offensive being conducted by the Wagner units is to the south, in the direction of Troitskoye, and, from there, to the Svetlodarsk arc and the city of Svetlodarsk itself. As of the end of May 19, 2022, Troitskoye fell to the advancing Allied forces. This objective could not be achieved by the Donbass armies in the Battle for Debaltsevo in 2015, which left the Ukrainian army in control of the key defensive Svetlodarsk arc wedged between the DNR stronghold of Gorlovka and the LNR administrative border with its sister Republic. Just like the Ukrainian salient in Debaltsevo (eliminated as a result of the Donbass armies victory in the Battle of Debaltsevo), the Ukrainian presence Svetlodarsk arc, in the years that followed, created a clear and present danger of Ukrainian forces splitting the communication lines between the Republics in a future offensive.

6—The offensive to the north of Popasnaya, in the direction of Kamyshevakha and Vrubovka, is an area of responsibility that was assigned to regular Russian units. The intention here is to secure Vrubovka with a view to securing an additional zone of control over the Lisichansk-Soledar Ukrainian supply line, as well as to close the lid on the mini-cauldron containing the Ukrainian stronghold in the area of Zolotoye-Gorskoye. The early reports of Vrubovka having been taken were premature. However, by the end of May 19, 2022, Kamyshevakha had been taken into a semi-circle by the Russian units, with heavy fighting ongoing in its southern part. The Allied units that bypassed Kamyshevakha from the west took co0ntrol of the small village of Viktorovka and the Kamyshevakha railroad station, and then proceeded to Vrubovka. The mop-up operations in Vrubovka are now underway.

(concluded in the next post)

7—To the east and northeast of the Zolotoye-Gorskoye stronghold of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the units of the LNR People’s Militia advanced along two lines of the offensive, seeking to take control of and Orekhovo and Toshkovka. While Orekhovo was reported to have been taken some days ago, the battle for Toshkovka is currently still ongoing, despite early reports of the fall of the Ukrainian defences in the settlement. Success in this sector will cut off the direct lines of retreat to Lisichansk for the Ukrainian grouping in the Zolotoye-Gorskoye area. The Ukrainian units could still break out of the forming mini-cauldron by using rural and bypass roads and then moving through the fields to Lisichansk, but any such retreat would simply bring them to yet another trap.

8—The Allied forces are grinding out the last remaining reserves available to the Ukrainian army in the area: the territorial defence reinforcements brought in from Western Ukraine and the remnants of the 24th Ukrainian brigade, which was crushed and retreated from Popasnaya with significant losses. As of the end of May 19, 2022, the Allied forces had established artillery fire control over the Soledar-Lisichansk supply line and are close to cutting off the communications between Zolotoye-Gorskoye and Lisichansk. The only direction of the offensive where success has been limited is the attack to the west on Pilipchatino—along the main route from Popasnaya to Artyomovsk (Bakhmut)—the reports of early success in which were premature.

9—Altogether, between 5,000 and 8,000 Ukrainian troops may be trapped in the Zolotoye-Gorskoye mini-cauldron once it is close shut. The estimates of the total Ukrainian military presence in the Severodonetsk-Popasnaya corner of the Donbass operational cauldron range between 15,000 and 20,000, according to various reports and estimates.

Russians appear to be exploiting a large breach in Ukrainian lines they have created over the last week at Popasnaya, which already threatens to cut off Severodonetsk-Lisichansk from its southern lines of communication.

While this breach is unlikely to collapse the Ukrainian position in the Donbass outright given their defenses at Slavyansk, it certainly compromises the eastern salient.

This also suggests UAF troops in the Donbass have been attributed to the point where they are losing combat effectiveness. This is indicated by their lateral (!) transfer of multiple brigades from the Kharkov sector to the Donbass in an attempt to stabilize the front line - a maneuver which has now also seen them lose significant ground north of Kharkov.

Ironically the Ukrainians seem to have played themselves with the "Kharkov counteroffensive" - in seeking to draw off Russian forces in the Donbass they instead compromised their own defenses in the region when the Russians refused to take the bait.

Gleb, by the way, doesn't think the Russians have a bridgehead at Belgorovka. As I have detailed on Twitter, it is likely that they are now well-established north of town and are thus even closer to severing the S-L position's western line of communications than Gleb's analysis would indicate.

I'm just imagining the aneurisms range control would have had if we'd done something like this in training.

Catching lunch. Looks like a fisherman's dream

They actually held out for Eurovision.

(screaming) (window breaking)

All I can do is shake my head in disbelief. The Kiev regime is some kind of kindergarten at the edge of an abyss. I mean, whatever, they can lie however much they want—it’s war, after all, and though lying works against you, eventually, it’s not verboten. But why make fools of themselves in the process?

“The office of the President asked the defenders [of Azovstal] to hold out for the last few days so that we could win Eurovision and raise this topic in front of the West, after which the process of surrender began.”

@Rezident_UA claims: “The Russian troops in Mariupol knew about the situation at Azovstal, that there was a minimum of food, there was no water and the BC was running out, as well as about the psychological state of the fighters, who were covered every day with constant bombardments and artillery strikes. The days before the complete capture of the plant were numbered, resistance was minimal, and the cleanup of one of the two main workshops had already begun. The office of the President asked the defenders to hold out for the last few days so that we could win Eurovision and raise this topic in front of the West, after which the process of surrender began. Telegram channels belonging to Vova Petrov’s network began to write to the propagandist that all this was staged and no one would give up. None of the LOMs close to Bankova was informed so that the information would be airtight. Negotiations with Putin were mediated by Erdogan and were not completed at the time of the surrender of the defenders of Azovstal, this is the reason for the silence of the President and the speakers of the Presidential Office, who do not understand how the case with the exchange of prisoners will be implemented.”

Odd phrasing considering the allied forces are here the Russians and DPR/LNR. Does this mean the Russians have already taken Soledar?