β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Interesting hacking #SIM Specific Attacks :
- Rooting SIM-cards
- The Most Expensive Lesson Of My Life: Details of SIM port hack
- Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stack (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf)
- Hiding in Plain Signal:Physical Signal Overshadowing Attack on LTE
- LTE Security DisabledΓ’β¬βMisconfiguration in Commercial Network
- Shupeng-All-The-4G-Modules-Could-Be-Hacked
β 2020 git sources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Interesting hacking #SIM Specific Attacks :
- Rooting SIM-cards
- The Most Expensive Lesson Of My Life: Details of SIM port hack
- Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stack (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf)
- Hiding in Plain Signal:Physical Signal Overshadowing Attack on LTE
- LTE Security DisabledΓ’β¬βMisconfiguration in Commercial Network
- Shupeng-All-The-4G-Modules-Could-Be-Hacked
β 2020 git sources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Totally Automatic LFI Exploiter (+ Reverse Shell) and Scanner:
π¦Features
1) Works with Windows, Linux and OS X
2)Automatic Configuration
3) Automatic Update
4) Provides 8 different Local File Inclusion attack modalities:
/proc/self/environ
php://filter
php://input
/proc/self/fd
access log
phpinfo
data://
expect://
5) Provides a ninth modality, called Auto-Hack, which scans and exploits the target automatically by trying all the attacks one after the other without you having to do anything (except for providing, at the beginning, a list of paths to scan, which if you don't have you can find in this project directory in two versions, small and huge).
6) Tor proxy support
7) Reverse Shell for Windows, Linux and OS X
π¦REQUIRE :
>Python 2.7.x
>Python extra modules: termcolor, requests
>socks.py
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
CLONE https://github.com/D35m0nd142/LFISuite & GO DIR THEN
1οΈβ£Usage is extremely simple and LFI Suite has an easy-to-use user interface; just run it and let it lead you.
2οΈβ£Reverse Shell
> When you got a LFI shell by using one of the available attacks, you can easily obtain a reverse shell by entering the command "reverseshell" (obviously you must put your system listening for the reverse connection, for instance using "nc -lvp port")
( any doubt check this vid https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6sY1Skx8MBc )
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Totally Automatic LFI Exploiter (+ Reverse Shell) and Scanner:
π¦Features
1) Works with Windows, Linux and OS X
2)Automatic Configuration
3) Automatic Update
4) Provides 8 different Local File Inclusion attack modalities:
/proc/self/environ
php://filter
php://input
/proc/self/fd
access log
phpinfo
data://
expect://
5) Provides a ninth modality, called Auto-Hack, which scans and exploits the target automatically by trying all the attacks one after the other without you having to do anything (except for providing, at the beginning, a list of paths to scan, which if you don't have you can find in this project directory in two versions, small and huge).
6) Tor proxy support
7) Reverse Shell for Windows, Linux and OS X
π¦REQUIRE :
>Python 2.7.x
>Python extra modules: termcolor, requests
>socks.py
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
CLONE https://github.com/D35m0nd142/LFISuite & GO DIR THEN
1οΈβ£Usage is extremely simple and LFI Suite has an easy-to-use user interface; just run it and let it lead you.
2οΈβ£Reverse Shell
> When you got a LFI shell by using one of the available attacks, you can easily obtain a reverse shell by entering the command "reverseshell" (obviously you must put your system listening for the reverse connection, for instance using "nc -lvp port")
( any doubt check this vid https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6sY1Skx8MBc )
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
GitHub
GitHub - D35m0nd142/LFISuite: Totally Automatic LFI Exploiter (+ Reverse Shell) and Scanner
Totally Automatic LFI Exploiter (+ Reverse Shell) and Scanner - GitHub - D35m0nd142/LFISuite: Totally Automatic LFI Exploiter (+ Reverse Shell) and Scanner
Forwarded from UNDERCODE SECURITY
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦ discovering and attacking IoT devices based on web attacks by Undercode :
1οΈβ£The attack methods used are:
γ1-γDeceive the victim and induce them to visit the website controlled by the attacker.
γ2-γDiscover IoT devices on the victim's local network.
γ3-γControl devices through web-based attacks.
2οΈβ£Attack duration
1- Technically, this is not a new attack vector. The research report cited previous research and found that it takes an average of one minute for an attacker to use these attack vectors to obtain results. Strangely, the results of a famous study
2-γγ(What You Think You Know About the Web is Wrong) shows that 55% of users spend less than 15 seconds on the site. It seems that most users will not be affected by the IoT vulnerability.
γ3-γBut in studies conducted at Princeton University and the University of California, Berkeley, the researchers significantly shortened the duration of the attack. Researchers say that using the methods they discovered, they can discover and access devices on the local network faster than previous research. Except Chrome, because it caches DNS requests, if the TTL is below a certain threshold, the TTL is ignored. It should be noted that devices in the demilitarized zone (DMZ, internal network inside the firewall) are generally considered to be safe, because users assume that these devices cannot be accessed from outside. However, through the attack described here, the attacker can access the browser in the victim's internal network.
3οΈβ£Discover HTTP endpoints :
1-γThe researchers analyzed these devices by connecting them to the wireless access point of the Raspberry Pi. Observe and analyze the data packets sent and received from the device, and the data packets sent and received by the mobile application bound to each device. Through analysis, 35 GET request endpoints and 8 POST request endpoints were found. These endpoints are used to identify the IP address in the discovery phase.
γ2- Research phase
γγResearchers conduct research through two different stages, the discovery stage and the access stage:
3-γγThe goal of the discovery phase is to find Internet of Things devices containing HTML5 elements on the browser on the local network.
4-γγThe goal of the access phase is to use DNS rebinding and discovered IP addresses to access HTTP endpoints.
4οΈβ£ Discovery stage: Identify IoT devices
γ1-Use WebRTC to obtain the local IP address.
2-Send requests to all IP addresses in the IP range through port 81. Since port 81 is usually not occupied, the active device will immediately respond to a TCP RST packet. For inactive devices within the IP range, the request packet will time out.
3-Each active IP address receives requests for 35 GET endpoints collected using HTML5 at the initial stage. Based on the error message returned, the attack script will identify whether the IP address matches any of the seven devices.
4-The study plans to use three different operating systems (Windows 10,
MacOS, and Ubuntu) and four different browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, MicrosoftEdge). However, only Chrome and Firefox are suitable for this research. Therefore, Safari and Edge browsers are not used, because according to (Web-based attack on the discovery and control of local IoT devices):
> On Safari, all FETCH requests timed out, causing the attack script to identify all IP addresses as inactive. On the Edge browser, the script can use the FETCH request to correctly identify the active IP address, but Edge does not disclose a detailed HTML5 error message, so the attack script cannot identify any device on the Edge.
5οΈβ£Access stage: control of IoT devices
1-The victim accesses the domain name (domain.tld) ββββββcontrolled by the attacker, and the browser executes the malicious JavaScript code found on the attacker's site. The domain name is still resolved to the attacker's server IP.
2-The malicious script requests another resource on domain.tld, which only exists on the attacker's server.
π¦ discovering and attacking IoT devices based on web attacks by Undercode :
1οΈβ£The attack methods used are:
γ1-γDeceive the victim and induce them to visit the website controlled by the attacker.
γ2-γDiscover IoT devices on the victim's local network.
γ3-γControl devices through web-based attacks.
2οΈβ£Attack duration
1- Technically, this is not a new attack vector. The research report cited previous research and found that it takes an average of one minute for an attacker to use these attack vectors to obtain results. Strangely, the results of a famous study
2-γγ(What You Think You Know About the Web is Wrong) shows that 55% of users spend less than 15 seconds on the site. It seems that most users will not be affected by the IoT vulnerability.
γ3-γBut in studies conducted at Princeton University and the University of California, Berkeley, the researchers significantly shortened the duration of the attack. Researchers say that using the methods they discovered, they can discover and access devices on the local network faster than previous research. Except Chrome, because it caches DNS requests, if the TTL is below a certain threshold, the TTL is ignored. It should be noted that devices in the demilitarized zone (DMZ, internal network inside the firewall) are generally considered to be safe, because users assume that these devices cannot be accessed from outside. However, through the attack described here, the attacker can access the browser in the victim's internal network.
3οΈβ£Discover HTTP endpoints :
1-γThe researchers analyzed these devices by connecting them to the wireless access point of the Raspberry Pi. Observe and analyze the data packets sent and received from the device, and the data packets sent and received by the mobile application bound to each device. Through analysis, 35 GET request endpoints and 8 POST request endpoints were found. These endpoints are used to identify the IP address in the discovery phase.
γ2- Research phase
γγResearchers conduct research through two different stages, the discovery stage and the access stage:
3-γγThe goal of the discovery phase is to find Internet of Things devices containing HTML5 elements on the browser on the local network.
4-γγThe goal of the access phase is to use DNS rebinding and discovered IP addresses to access HTTP endpoints.
4οΈβ£ Discovery stage: Identify IoT devices
γ1-Use WebRTC to obtain the local IP address.
2-Send requests to all IP addresses in the IP range through port 81. Since port 81 is usually not occupied, the active device will immediately respond to a TCP RST packet. For inactive devices within the IP range, the request packet will time out.
3-Each active IP address receives requests for 35 GET endpoints collected using HTML5 at the initial stage. Based on the error message returned, the attack script will identify whether the IP address matches any of the seven devices.
4-The study plans to use three different operating systems (Windows 10,
MacOS, and Ubuntu) and four different browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, MicrosoftEdge). However, only Chrome and Firefox are suitable for this research. Therefore, Safari and Edge browsers are not used, because according to (Web-based attack on the discovery and control of local IoT devices):
> On Safari, all FETCH requests timed out, causing the attack script to identify all IP addresses as inactive. On the Edge browser, the script can use the FETCH request to correctly identify the active IP address, but Edge does not disclose a detailed HTML5 error message, so the attack script cannot identify any device on the Edge.
5οΈβ£Access stage: control of IoT devices
1-The victim accesses the domain name (domain.tld) ββββββcontrolled by the attacker, and the browser executes the malicious JavaScript code found on the attacker's site. The domain name is still resolved to the attacker's server IP.
2-The malicious script requests another resource on domain.tld, which only exists on the attacker's server.
Forwarded from UNDERCODE SECURITY
3-If the victim's local DNS cache is still resolved to the attacker's remote IP, the request for /hello.php will return the string "hello" and repeat step
4-But if the domain.tld in the victim's cache expires, a new DNS query will be sent to the attacker.
5-Finally, the local IP obtained from the discovery phase will be returned instead of the attacker's remote IP. /hello.php will not respond with the string "hello", but will use different content, such as a 404 error, which tells the malicious script The DNS rebinding attack has been successful.
6-Through this attack, the malicious script bypassed the browser's Same-Origin Policy and gained access to Web applications running on the device. Attackers can now perform restarts or start video/audio files on Google Chromecast, Google Home, smart TVs, and smart switch devices.
6οΈβ£How to prevent DNS rebinding attacks against IoT devices
1-Users can disable WebRTC on the browser and prevent the disclosure of private IP. The attacker will be able to discover the user's private IP by sending a request to all *.1 addresses (router addresses) within the private IP range.
2-The attacker assumes that all IP devices have the same IP range as the victim's PC. Users can assign IP addresses on another subnet (such as /16) by configuring the router's DHCP server.
3-Users can install dnsmasq to prevent DNS rebinding attacks by removing RFC 1918 addresses from DNS responses. Users can also use dnsmasq's OpenWRT router.
4-IoT vendors can control the Host header in requests sent to the Web interface. If there is no private IP that complies with RFC 1918, you can block access.
5-DNS providers can use mechanisms like dnswall to filter private IPs from DNS responses.
6-Browser vendors can develop extensions that restrict public network access to private IP ranges.
WRITTEN BY UNDERCODE
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
4-But if the domain.tld in the victim's cache expires, a new DNS query will be sent to the attacker.
5-Finally, the local IP obtained from the discovery phase will be returned instead of the attacker's remote IP. /hello.php will not respond with the string "hello", but will use different content, such as a 404 error, which tells the malicious script The DNS rebinding attack has been successful.
6-Through this attack, the malicious script bypassed the browser's Same-Origin Policy and gained access to Web applications running on the device. Attackers can now perform restarts or start video/audio files on Google Chromecast, Google Home, smart TVs, and smart switch devices.
6οΈβ£How to prevent DNS rebinding attacks against IoT devices
1-Users can disable WebRTC on the browser and prevent the disclosure of private IP. The attacker will be able to discover the user's private IP by sending a request to all *.1 addresses (router addresses) within the private IP range.
2-The attacker assumes that all IP devices have the same IP range as the victim's PC. Users can assign IP addresses on another subnet (such as /16) by configuring the router's DHCP server.
3-Users can install dnsmasq to prevent DNS rebinding attacks by removing RFC 1918 addresses from DNS responses. Users can also use dnsmasq's OpenWRT router.
4-IoT vendors can control the Host header in requests sent to the Web interface. If there is no private IP that complies with RFC 1918, you can block access.
5-DNS providers can use mechanisms like dnswall to filter private IPs from DNS responses.
6-Browser vendors can develop extensions that restrict public network access to private IP ranges.
WRITTEN BY UNDERCODE
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦ discovering and attacking IoT devices based on web attacks full guide by Undercode
4 K hd- java Objects & Classes Detailed
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84hGoR9HjAY
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π¦WARNING #HackersToday
> Hackers use graphical verification to flicker real people download malicious files and evade automated detection
1) The Microsoft security intelligence team recently exposed the new trend of the hacker organization CHIMBORAZO.
2) As the behind-the-scenes hands of Dudear and GraceWire, the information theft Trojan, it once again looked at the CAPTCHA graphic verification code used by major websites for real-person detection .
3) Compared with fuzzy, distorted numbers or letters, the graphic verification codes that have been online for more than ten years can block many people with ulterior
4) The Microsoft Security Intelligence team pointed out that their tracking analysis from January this year found that the organization has distributed malicious Excel documents on sites that require users to complete CAPTCHA verification.
@UndercodeNews
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦WARNING #HackersToday
> Hackers use graphical verification to flicker real people download malicious files and evade automated detection
1) The Microsoft security intelligence team recently exposed the new trend of the hacker organization CHIMBORAZO.
2) As the behind-the-scenes hands of Dudear and GraceWire, the information theft Trojan, it once again looked at the CAPTCHA graphic verification code used by major websites for real-person detection .
3) Compared with fuzzy, distorted numbers or letters, the graphic verification codes that have been online for more than ten years can block many people with ulterior
4) The Microsoft Security Intelligence team pointed out that their tracking analysis from January this year found that the organization has distributed malicious Excel documents on sites that require users to complete CAPTCHA verification.
@UndercodeNews
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦MAKE YOUR SITE APPEARS ON GOOGLE #REQUESTED :
- Simple random DNS, HTTP/S internet traffic noise generator
1οΈβ£git clone https://github.com/1tayH/noisy.git
2οΈβ£cd noisy
3οΈβ£pip install requests
4οΈβ£python noisy.py --config config.json
5οΈβ£$ python noisy.py --help
usage: noisy.py [-h] [--log -l] --config -c [--timeout -t]
π¦optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--log -l logging level
--config -c config file
--timeout -t for how long the crawler should be running, in seconds
π¦Build Using Docker
Build the image
1οΈβ£docker build -t noisy .
Or if you'd like to build it for a Raspberry Pi (running Raspbian stretch):
2οΈβ£docker build -f Dockerfile.pi -t noisy .
Create the container and run:
3οΈβ£docker run -it noisy --config config.json
β topic 2020 git
@UndercodeTesting
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β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦MAKE YOUR SITE APPEARS ON GOOGLE #REQUESTED :
- Simple random DNS, HTTP/S internet traffic noise generator
1οΈβ£git clone https://github.com/1tayH/noisy.git
2οΈβ£cd noisy
3οΈβ£pip install requests
4οΈβ£python noisy.py --config config.json
5οΈβ£$ python noisy.py --help
usage: noisy.py [-h] [--log -l] --config -c [--timeout -t]
π¦optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--log -l logging level
--config -c config file
--timeout -t for how long the crawler should be running, in seconds
π¦Build Using Docker
Build the image
1οΈβ£docker build -t noisy .
Or if you'd like to build it for a Raspberry Pi (running Raspbian stretch):
2οΈβ£docker build -f Dockerfile.pi -t noisy .
Create the container and run:
3οΈβ£docker run -it noisy --config config.json
β topic 2020 git
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
GitHub
GitHub - 1tayH/noisy: Simple random DNS, HTTP/S internet traffic noise generator
Simple random DNS, HTTP/S internet traffic noise generator - 1tayH/noisy
Again whatsapp face new issue online-offline & status starting in india and now all contries : error not determined till now
Forwarded from UNDERCODE SECURITY
π¦ As Russians Say: Why whatsapp have issue now :
1) New feature, users will be able to choose the date of sending or receiving a message by clicking on the calendar icon in search mode. According to WABetaInfo, now the innovation is at the alpha testing stage.
2) At the end of April, WhatsApp doubled the number of people who can simultaneously participate in audio and video calls. Thus, the number of possible participants in group calls increased from four to eight
.....
1) New feature, users will be able to choose the date of sending or receiving a message by clicking on the calendar icon in search mode. According to WABetaInfo, now the innovation is at the alpha testing stage.
2) At the end of April, WhatsApp doubled the number of people who can simultaneously participate in audio and video calls. Thus, the number of possible participants in group calls increased from four to eight
.....
UNDERCODE SECURITY
π¦ As Russians Say: Why whatsapp have issue now : 1) New feature, users will be able to choose the date of sending or receiving a message by clicking on the calendar icon in search mode. According to WABetaInfo, now the innovation is at the alpha testingβ¦
In April corona comes, and they work on this now
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Share five free enterprise network intrusion detection (IDS) tools
1οΈβ£Security Onion
Security Onion is an Ubuntu-based Linux distribution for network monitoring and intrusion detection. The image can be distributed as a sensor in the network to monitor multiple VLANs and subnets, which is very suitable for VMware and virtual environments. This configuration can only be used as an IDS and cannot currently be operated as an IPS. However, you can choose to use it as a network and host intrusion detection deployment, and use Squil, Bro IDS, and OSSEC services to perform the IDS function of the service. The tool's wiki information and documentation information is very rich, and vulnerabilities and errors are also recorded and reviewed. Although Security Onion is powerful, it still needs to continue to develop, of course, it takes time.
2οΈβ£OSSEC
OSSEC is an open source host intrusion detection system (HIDS), its function is not just intrusion detection. Like most open source IDS products, there are a variety of additional modules that can combine the core functions of the IDS. In addition to network intrusion detection, the OSSEC client can perform file integrity monitoring and rootkit detection, and has real-time alarms. These functions are all centralized management, and can create different policies according to the needs of enterprises. The OSSEC client runs locally on most operating systems, including Linux versions, Mac OSX, and Windows. It also provides commercial support through Trend Microβs global support team, which is a very mature product.
3οΈβ£OpenWIPS-NG
OpenWIPS-NG is a free wireless IDS/IPS, which relies on servers, sensors and interfaces. It can run on ordinary hardware. Its creator is the developer of Aircrack-NG. The system uses many of Aircrack-NG's built-in functions and services for scanning, detection, and intrusion prevention. OpenWIPS-NG is modular and allows administrators to download plug-ins to add functionality. Its documentation is not as detailed as some systems, but it allows companies to execute WIPS under tight budgets.
4οΈβ£Suricata
Of all the currently available IDS/IPS systems, Suricata is best able to compete with Snort. The system has a Snort-like architecture that relies on signatures like Snort, and can even use the same set of Emerging Threat rules as VRT Snort rules and Snort itself. Suricata is newer than Snort and it will have a chance to overtake Snort. If Snort is not your business choice, this free tool is best for running on your business network.
5οΈβ£Bro IDS
Bro IDS is similar to Security Onion, it uses more IDS rules to determine the source of the attack. Bro IDS uses a combination of tools. It used to convert Snort-based signatures to Bro signatures, but this is no longer the case. Now users can write custom signatures for Bro IDS. The system has a lot of detailed document information and has a history of more than 15 years.
π¦ In most IDS/IPS markets (including free software and open source IDS/IPS), Snort is undoubtedly the most influential tool. The systems described in this undercode tutorial implement IDS/IPS a bit differently, but they are all practical and free tools. Cost-saving companies can use these tools to better protect their networks
Written @UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Share five free enterprise network intrusion detection (IDS) tools
1οΈβ£Security Onion
Security Onion is an Ubuntu-based Linux distribution for network monitoring and intrusion detection. The image can be distributed as a sensor in the network to monitor multiple VLANs and subnets, which is very suitable for VMware and virtual environments. This configuration can only be used as an IDS and cannot currently be operated as an IPS. However, you can choose to use it as a network and host intrusion detection deployment, and use Squil, Bro IDS, and OSSEC services to perform the IDS function of the service. The tool's wiki information and documentation information is very rich, and vulnerabilities and errors are also recorded and reviewed. Although Security Onion is powerful, it still needs to continue to develop, of course, it takes time.
2οΈβ£OSSEC
OSSEC is an open source host intrusion detection system (HIDS), its function is not just intrusion detection. Like most open source IDS products, there are a variety of additional modules that can combine the core functions of the IDS. In addition to network intrusion detection, the OSSEC client can perform file integrity monitoring and rootkit detection, and has real-time alarms. These functions are all centralized management, and can create different policies according to the needs of enterprises. The OSSEC client runs locally on most operating systems, including Linux versions, Mac OSX, and Windows. It also provides commercial support through Trend Microβs global support team, which is a very mature product.
3οΈβ£OpenWIPS-NG
OpenWIPS-NG is a free wireless IDS/IPS, which relies on servers, sensors and interfaces. It can run on ordinary hardware. Its creator is the developer of Aircrack-NG. The system uses many of Aircrack-NG's built-in functions and services for scanning, detection, and intrusion prevention. OpenWIPS-NG is modular and allows administrators to download plug-ins to add functionality. Its documentation is not as detailed as some systems, but it allows companies to execute WIPS under tight budgets.
4οΈβ£Suricata
Of all the currently available IDS/IPS systems, Suricata is best able to compete with Snort. The system has a Snort-like architecture that relies on signatures like Snort, and can even use the same set of Emerging Threat rules as VRT Snort rules and Snort itself. Suricata is newer than Snort and it will have a chance to overtake Snort. If Snort is not your business choice, this free tool is best for running on your business network.
5οΈβ£Bro IDS
Bro IDS is similar to Security Onion, it uses more IDS rules to determine the source of the attack. Bro IDS uses a combination of tools. It used to convert Snort-based signatures to Bro signatures, but this is no longer the case. Now users can write custom signatures for Bro IDS. The system has a lot of detailed document information and has a history of more than 15 years.
π¦ In most IDS/IPS markets (including free software and open source IDS/IPS), Snort is undoubtedly the most influential tool. The systems described in this undercode tutorial implement IDS/IPS a bit differently, but they are all practical and free tools. Cost-saving companies can use these tools to better protect their networks
Written @UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦New features of V12 version of the computer file anti-leakage system are as follows:
1οΈβ£The function of automatically isolating unauthorized computers to prevent external computers or mobile devices from accessing the Internet;
2οΈβ£ The function of only allowing intranet whitelist MAC addresses to access each other to prevent external computers from privately accessing intranet computers;
3οΈβ£All online host scans on the LAN Function, and support the function of exporting and importing MAC addresses
4οΈβ£ The administrator can manually set the function that no longer isolates the external computer
5οΈβ£The administrator can add/delete the MAC address of the intranet white list;
6οΈβ£ The administrator can set the permission Unauthorized computer access to intranet
Written @UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦New features of V12 version of the computer file anti-leakage system are as follows:
1οΈβ£The function of automatically isolating unauthorized computers to prevent external computers or mobile devices from accessing the Internet;
2οΈβ£ The function of only allowing intranet whitelist MAC addresses to access each other to prevent external computers from privately accessing intranet computers;
3οΈβ£All online host scans on the LAN Function, and support the function of exporting and importing MAC addresses
4οΈβ£ The administrator can manually set the function that no longer isolates the external computer
5οΈβ£The administrator can add/delete the MAC address of the intranet white list;
6οΈβ£ The administrator can set the permission Unauthorized computer access to intranet
Written @UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦ why should hackers suppress router DNS?
1) After the router is controlled, the DNS location of the router can be changed, so that the user's homepage can be controlled, so that he can actively jump and pull out the pop-up window confession and other certain confession fees and traffic fees;
2) After controlling the router, it can monitor the application status of users connected to the wireless network, so as to steal user account information, especially bank account information;
3) The user should take the initiative to jump off the link implanted with the Trojan virus when reading the web page. The user should be recruited to stop the billing or hacking;
π¦How to invent routers in real time can be suppressed?
1) Introspect the DNS location of the router and reflect the location pointed to by the DNS. If the DNS setting in the router's DHCP is 66.102.*.* or 207.254.*.*, it means that it has been suppressed;
2) Reflect the number of access equipment, log in to the router management interface, and reflect on the number of equipment connected to the wireless network. If there is rusty equipment, it may be suppressed;
3) When you read the webpage, it starts to show active jumps, pop-ups and more confession;
4) Introspect whether the manual setting of DNS server option in the high-end settings of router settings can be checked, if it is checked, it has been stated that it has been suppressed;
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦ why should hackers suppress router DNS?
1) After the router is controlled, the DNS location of the router can be changed, so that the user's homepage can be controlled, so that he can actively jump and pull out the pop-up window confession and other certain confession fees and traffic fees;
2) After controlling the router, it can monitor the application status of users connected to the wireless network, so as to steal user account information, especially bank account information;
3) The user should take the initiative to jump off the link implanted with the Trojan virus when reading the web page. The user should be recruited to stop the billing or hacking;
π¦How to invent routers in real time can be suppressed?
1) Introspect the DNS location of the router and reflect the location pointed to by the DNS. If the DNS setting in the router's DHCP is 66.102.*.* or 207.254.*.*, it means that it has been suppressed;
2) Reflect the number of access equipment, log in to the router management interface, and reflect on the number of equipment connected to the wireless network. If there is rusty equipment, it may be suppressed;
3) When you read the webpage, it starts to show active jumps, pop-ups and more confession;
4) Introspect whether the manual setting of DNS server option in the high-end settings of router settings can be checked, if it is checked, it has been stated that it has been suppressed;
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦ How to protect against router DNS control?
1) Change the initial password and set the password to be more complicated;
2) Real-time upgrade router firmware patch to repair bare flaws;
3) Initialize the router completely, after clearing the previous settings and equipment, change the password and upgrade the firmware of the router, etc.;
4) Device security software monitors network security
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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1) Change the initial password and set the password to be more complicated;
2) Real-time upgrade router firmware patch to repair bare flaws;
3) Initialize the router completely, after clearing the previous settings and equipment, change the password and upgrade the firmware of the router, etc.;
4) Device security software monitors network security
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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