1) We can see the Principal property, which determines what account the task runs as and the Actions property which determines what to run. I
2) n the Principal property we can see the Group to run as is Authenticated Users which really means it will run as the logged on user starting the task. We also see the RunLevel is set to Highest which means the Task Scheduler will try and elevate the task to administrator without any prompting.
3) Now look at the actions, it's specifying a path, but notice something interesting? It's using an environment variable as part of the path, and in UAC scenarios these can be influenced by a normal user by writing to the registry key
> HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Enviroment and specifying a REG_SZ value.
4) So stop beating around the bush, let's try and exploit it. I dropped a simple executable to c:\dummy\system32\cleanmgr.exe, set the windir environment variable to
> c:\dummy and started the scheduled task
5) immediately get administrator privileges. So let's automate the process, I'll use everyone's favourite language, BATCH as we can use the reg and schtasks commands to do all the work we need. Also as we don't want to drop a file to disk we can abuse the fact that the executable path isn't quoted by the Task Scheduler, meaning we can inject arbitrary command line arguments and just run a simple CMD shell.
> reg add hkcu\Environment /v windir /d "cmd /K reg delete hkcu\Environment /v windir /f && REM "
schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I
2) n the Principal property we can see the Group to run as is Authenticated Users which really means it will run as the logged on user starting the task. We also see the RunLevel is set to Highest which means the Task Scheduler will try and elevate the task to administrator without any prompting.
3) Now look at the actions, it's specifying a path, but notice something interesting? It's using an environment variable as part of the path, and in UAC scenarios these can be influenced by a normal user by writing to the registry key
> HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Enviroment and specifying a REG_SZ value.
4) So stop beating around the bush, let's try and exploit it. I dropped a simple executable to c:\dummy\system32\cleanmgr.exe, set the windir environment variable to
> c:\dummy and started the scheduled task
5) immediately get administrator privileges. So let's automate the process, I'll use everyone's favourite language, BATCH as we can use the reg and schtasks commands to do all the work we need. Also as we don't want to drop a file to disk we can abuse the fact that the executable path isn't quoted by the Task Scheduler, meaning we can inject arbitrary command line arguments and just run a simple CMD shell.
> reg add hkcu\Environment /v windir /d "cmd /K reg delete hkcu\Environment /v windir /f && REM "
schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I
6) The BATCH file first sets the windir environment variable to "cmd /K" with a following script which deletes the original windir enviroment variable then uses REM to comment the rest of the line out.
7) Executing this on Windows 10 Anniversary Edition and above as a split token admin will get you a shell running as an administrator. I've not tested it on any earlier versions of Windows so YMMV.
8) didn't send this to MSRC but through a friend confirmed that it should already be fixed in a coming version of RS3, so it really looks like MS are serious about trying to lock UAC back down, at least as far as it can be
9) If you want to mitigate now you should be able to reconfigure the task to not use environment variables using the following Powershell script run as administrator (doing this using the UAC bypass is left as an exercise for reader).
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute $env:windir\System32\cleanmgr.exe -Argument "/autoclean /d $env:systemdrive"
Set-ScheduledTask SilentCleanup -TaskPath \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup -Action $action
10) If you want to find other potential candidates the following Powershell script will find all tasks with
executable actions which will auto elevate. On my system there are 4 separate tasks, but only one (the SilentCleanup task) can be executed as a normal user, so the rest are not exploitable. Good thing I guess.
> $tasks = Get-ScheduledTask |
Where-Object { $_.Principal.RunLevel -ne "Limited" -and
$_.Principal.LogonType -ne "ServiceAccount" -and
$_.State -ne "Disabled" -and
$_.Actions[0].CimClass.CimClassName -eq "MSFT_TaskExecAction" }
powered by wikisources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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7) Executing this on Windows 10 Anniversary Edition and above as a split token admin will get you a shell running as an administrator. I've not tested it on any earlier versions of Windows so YMMV.
8) didn't send this to MSRC but through a friend confirmed that it should already be fixed in a coming version of RS3, so it really looks like MS are serious about trying to lock UAC back down, at least as far as it can be
9) If you want to mitigate now you should be able to reconfigure the task to not use environment variables using the following Powershell script run as administrator (doing this using the UAC bypass is left as an exercise for reader).
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute $env:windir\System32\cleanmgr.exe -Argument "/autoclean /d $env:systemdrive"
Set-ScheduledTask SilentCleanup -TaskPath \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup -Action $action
10) If you want to find other potential candidates the following Powershell script will find all tasks with
executable actions which will auto elevate. On my system there are 4 separate tasks, but only one (the SilentCleanup task) can be executed as a normal user, so the rest are not exploitable. Good thing I guess.
> $tasks = Get-ScheduledTask |
Where-Object { $_.Principal.RunLevel -ne "Limited" -and
$_.Principal.LogonType -ne "ServiceAccount" -and
$_.State -ne "Disabled" -and
$_.Actions[0].CimClass.CimClassName -eq "MSFT_TaskExecAction" }
powered by wikisources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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Exploiting Environment Variables in Scheduled Tasks for UAC Bypass the Windows Task Scheduler full guide
FIND ANY EXPLOIT WITH ONE COMMAND.pdf
6.3 MB
Find Exploit written guide
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π¦Top #Networking(+vpn config) new resources :
#Cisco ASA IPsec VPN
- ASA IKEv2 RA VPN With Windows or Android VPN Clients and Certificate Authentication Configuration
#Additional GET VPN Resources
- GETVPN Deployment Guide
- GETVPN Sample Configurations
#IKEv2 :
- Configuring IKEv2 VRF aware SVTI
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Top #Networking(+vpn config) new resources :
#Cisco ASA IPsec VPN
- ASA IKEv2 RA VPN With Windows or Android VPN Clients and Certificate Authentication Configuration
#Additional GET VPN Resources
- GETVPN Deployment Guide
- GETVPN Sample Configurations
#IKEv2 :
- Configuring IKEv2 VRF aware SVTI
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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Cisco
ASA IKEv2 RA VPN With Windows 7 or Android VPN Clients and Certificate Authentication Configuration
This document describes how to configure ASA in order to allow Windows 7 and Android native RA VPN clients
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π¦Firepower Threat Defense Site-to-site VPN Guidelines and Limitations :
1) A VPN connection can only be made across domains by using an extranet peer for the endpoint not in the current domain.
2) A VPN topology cannot be moved between domains.
3) Network objects with a 'range' option are not supported in VPN
4) Firepower Threat Defense VPNs are only be backed up using the Firepower Management backup.
5) The Firepower Threat Defense VPNs do not currently support PDF export and policy comparison.
6) There is no per-tunnel or per-device edit option for Firepower Threat Defense VPNs, only the whole topology can be edited.
7) Device interface address verification will not be performed for Transport mode when Crypto ACL is selected.
8) All nodes in a topology must be configured with either Crypto ACL or Protected Network. A topology may not be configured with Crypto ACL on one node and Protected Network on another.
9) There is no support for automatic mirror ACE generation. Mirror ACE generation for the peer is a manual process on either side.
10) While using Crypto ACL, there is no support for tunnel health events for VPN topologies. With Crypto ACL, there is no support for Hub, Spoke, and Full Mesh topologies; only point to point VPN is supported.
11) Whenever IKE ports 500/4500 are in use or when there are some PAT translations that are active, the Site-to-Site VPN cannot be configured on the same ports as it fails to start the service on those ports.
12) Tunnel status is not updated in realtime, but at an interval of 5 minutes in the Firepower Management Center.
13) The character " (double quote) is not supported as part of pre-shared keys. If you have used " in a pre-shared key, ensure that you change the character after you upgrade to Firepower Threat Defense 6.30.
> vpnconfig source
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π¦Firepower Threat Defense Site-to-site VPN Guidelines and Limitations :
1) A VPN connection can only be made across domains by using an extranet peer for the endpoint not in the current domain.
2) A VPN topology cannot be moved between domains.
3) Network objects with a 'range' option are not supported in VPN
4) Firepower Threat Defense VPNs are only be backed up using the Firepower Management backup.
5) The Firepower Threat Defense VPNs do not currently support PDF export and policy comparison.
6) There is no per-tunnel or per-device edit option for Firepower Threat Defense VPNs, only the whole topology can be edited.
7) Device interface address verification will not be performed for Transport mode when Crypto ACL is selected.
8) All nodes in a topology must be configured with either Crypto ACL or Protected Network. A topology may not be configured with Crypto ACL on one node and Protected Network on another.
9) There is no support for automatic mirror ACE generation. Mirror ACE generation for the peer is a manual process on either side.
10) While using Crypto ACL, there is no support for tunnel health events for VPN topologies. With Crypto ACL, there is no support for Hub, Spoke, and Full Mesh topologies; only point to point VPN is supported.
11) Whenever IKE ports 500/4500 are in use or when there are some PAT translations that are active, the Site-to-Site VPN cannot be configured on the same ports as it fails to start the service on those ports.
12) Tunnel status is not updated in realtime, but at an interval of 5 minutes in the Firepower Management Center.
13) The character " (double quote) is not supported as part of pre-shared keys. If you have used " in a pre-shared key, ensure that you change the character after you upgrade to Firepower Threat Defense 6.30.
> vpnconfig source
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π¦Network Attack Tool-any Linux :
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ Enter the following commands on Terminal to download and install zarp:
- git clone https://github.com/hatRiot/zarp (Download zarp)
-cd zarp
-pip install -r requirements.txt (Install the required modules)
-python zarp.py
2οΈβ£bryan@devbox:~/zarp$ sudo ./zarp.py --help
3οΈβ£ Choose options via numbers :
1 Poisoners 5 Parameter
2 DoS Attacks 6 Services
3 Sniffers 7 Attacks
4 Scanners 8 Sessions
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Network Attack Tool-any Linux :
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ Enter the following commands on Terminal to download and install zarp:
- git clone https://github.com/hatRiot/zarp (Download zarp)
-cd zarp
-pip install -r requirements.txt (Install the required modules)
-python zarp.py
2οΈβ£bryan@devbox:~/zarp$ sudo ./zarp.py --help
3οΈβ£ Choose options via numbers :
1 Poisoners 5 Parameter
2 DoS Attacks 6 Services
3 Sniffers 7 Attacks
4 Scanners 8 Sessions
FOR LEARNING ONLY !!!@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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GitHub
GitHub - hatRiot/zarp: Network Attack Tool
Network Attack Tool. Contribute to hatRiot/zarp development by creating an account on GitHub.
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π¦#Resources about Zone-based Firewalls
#Deployment and Configuration Guides :
- Security Configuration Guide: Zone-Based Policy Firewall
- Zone-Based Policy Firewall Design and Application Guide
- Configuring ZBFW from GeeksforGeeks
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@UndercodeHacking
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π¦#Resources about Zone-based Firewalls
#Deployment and Configuration Guides :
- Security Configuration Guide: Zone-Based Policy Firewall
- Zone-Based Policy Firewall Design and Application Guide
- Configuring ZBFW from GeeksforGeeks
LEARN BEFORE BREAK
@UndercodeTesting@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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Cisco
Security Configuration Guide: Zone-Based Policy Firewall, Cisco IOS Release 15M&T - Zone-Based Policy
Firewalls [Cisco IOS 15.3M&T]
Firewalls [Cisco IOS 15.3M&T]
Hardcoded placeholder description!
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π¦#Rules For Applying Zone-Based Policy Firewall !!
- Router network interfacesΓ’β¬β’ membership in zones is subject to several rules that govern interface behavior, as is the traffic moving between zone member interfaces:
- A zone must be configured before interfaces can be assigned to the zone.
- An interface can be assigned to only one security zone.
- All traffic to and from a given interface is implicitly blocked when the interface is assigned to a zone, except traffic to and from other interfaces in the same zone, and traffic to any interface on the router.
- Traffic is implicitly allowed to flow by default among interfaces that are members of the same zone.
- In order to permit traffic to and from a zone member interface, a policy allowing or inspecting traffic must be configured between that zone and any other zone.
- The self zone is the only exception to the default deny all policy. All traffic to any router interface is allowed until traffic is explicitly denied.
- Traffic cannot flow between a zone member interface and any interface that is not a zone member. Pass, inspect, and drop actions can only be applied between two zones.
- Interfaces that have not been assigned to a zone function as classical router ports and might still use classical stateful inspection/CBAC configuration.
- If it is required that an interface on the box not be part of the zoning/firewall policy. It might still be necessary to put that interface in a zone and configure a pass all policy (sort of a dummy policy) between that zone and any other zone to which traffic flow is desired.
- From the preceding it follows that, if traffic is to flow among all the interfaces in a router, all the interfaces must be part of the zoning model (each interface must be a member of one zone or another).
- The only exception to the preceding deny by default approach is the traffic to and from the router, which will be permitted by default. An explicit policy can be configured to restrict such traffic.
> git sources
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@UndercodeHacking
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π¦#Rules For Applying Zone-Based Policy Firewall !!
- Router network interfacesΓ’β¬β’ membership in zones is subject to several rules that govern interface behavior, as is the traffic moving between zone member interfaces:
- A zone must be configured before interfaces can be assigned to the zone.
- An interface can be assigned to only one security zone.
- All traffic to and from a given interface is implicitly blocked when the interface is assigned to a zone, except traffic to and from other interfaces in the same zone, and traffic to any interface on the router.
- Traffic is implicitly allowed to flow by default among interfaces that are members of the same zone.
- In order to permit traffic to and from a zone member interface, a policy allowing or inspecting traffic must be configured between that zone and any other zone.
- The self zone is the only exception to the default deny all policy. All traffic to any router interface is allowed until traffic is explicitly denied.
- Traffic cannot flow between a zone member interface and any interface that is not a zone member. Pass, inspect, and drop actions can only be applied between two zones.
- Interfaces that have not been assigned to a zone function as classical router ports and might still use classical stateful inspection/CBAC configuration.
- If it is required that an interface on the box not be part of the zoning/firewall policy. It might still be necessary to put that interface in a zone and configure a pass all policy (sort of a dummy policy) between that zone and any other zone to which traffic flow is desired.
- From the preceding it follows that, if traffic is to flow among all the interfaces in a router, all the interfaces must be part of the zoning model (each interface must be a member of one zone or another).
- The only exception to the preceding deny by default approach is the traffic to and from the router, which will be permitted by default. An explicit policy can be configured to restrict such traffic.
> git sources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Virus Total API Maltego Transform Set For Canari-
- New tool
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ Requires Canari https://github.com/allfro/canari/tree/c90ed9f0f0fb5075358d7a1a4c1080aac3d4e6bc
, specifically this branch/version
2οΈβ£ Install Malformity https://github.com/digital4rensics/Malformity
3οΈβ£sudo python setup.py install
4οΈβ£canari create-profile ripVT
5οΈβ£Import generated ripVT.mtz
6οΈβ£Import entities stored at:
src/ripVT/resources/external/entities.mtz
7οΈβ£Copy src/ripVT/resources/etc/ripVT.conf to ~/.canari/
Pivot
7οΈβ£Pivots
π¦FEATURES :
Multiple unique entities enable forward & reverse searches. Unique graphically-distinguished icons.
Search (Phrase Entity) ->
Generic Search
Behavioral
Engines
ITW
Generic
Hash -> Download to Repository
Hash -> VT File Report ->
Behavioral (Copied Files, Deleted, Downloaded, Moved, Mutex, Network, Opened, Read, Replaced, Written)
Imphash
Cert / Certs
Compile Time
Detections
Exports / Imports
File Names
In-The-Wild (ITW) Locations
Parents (Dropped / Created By)
PE Resources
PE Sections
SSDEEP
Similar-To
Domain -> VT Domain Report ->
Undetected/Detected Communicating Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Embedding Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Downloaded Samples
PCAP
Domain Resolutions
Siblings
Subdomains
Detected URLs
IP Address -> VT IP Report
Undetected/Detected Communicating Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Embedding Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Downloaded Samples
PCAP
Domain Resolutions
Siblings
Subdomains
Detected URLs
Detections ->
Search Detection Name (Engine Included)
Search Detection Name (No Engine
Cuckoo -> (Report ID)
Report -> Network
β git sources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Virus Total API Maltego Transform Set For Canari-
- New tool
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ Requires Canari https://github.com/allfro/canari/tree/c90ed9f0f0fb5075358d7a1a4c1080aac3d4e6bc
, specifically this branch/version
2οΈβ£ Install Malformity https://github.com/digital4rensics/Malformity
3οΈβ£sudo python setup.py install
4οΈβ£canari create-profile ripVT
5οΈβ£Import generated ripVT.mtz
6οΈβ£Import entities stored at:
src/ripVT/resources/external/entities.mtz
7οΈβ£Copy src/ripVT/resources/etc/ripVT.conf to ~/.canari/
Pivot
7οΈβ£Pivots
π¦FEATURES :
Multiple unique entities enable forward & reverse searches. Unique graphically-distinguished icons.
Search (Phrase Entity) ->
Generic Search
Behavioral
Engines
ITW
Generic
Hash -> Download to Repository
Hash -> VT File Report ->
Behavioral (Copied Files, Deleted, Downloaded, Moved, Mutex, Network, Opened, Read, Replaced, Written)
Imphash
Cert / Certs
Compile Time
Detections
Exports / Imports
File Names
In-The-Wild (ITW) Locations
Parents (Dropped / Created By)
PE Resources
PE Sections
SSDEEP
Similar-To
Domain -> VT Domain Report ->
Undetected/Detected Communicating Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Embedding Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Downloaded Samples
PCAP
Domain Resolutions
Siblings
Subdomains
Detected URLs
IP Address -> VT IP Report
Undetected/Detected Communicating Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Embedding Samples
Undetected/Detected Domain-Downloaded Samples
PCAP
Domain Resolutions
Siblings
Subdomains
Detected URLs
Detections ->
Search Detection Name (Engine Included)
Search Detection Name (No Engine
Cuckoo -> (Report ID)
Report -> Network
β git sources
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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GitHub
GitHub - allfro/canari at c90ed9f0f0fb5075358d7a1a4c1080aac3d4e6bc
Local and Remote Maltego Rapid Transform Development Framework - GitHub - allfro/canari at c90ed9f0f0fb5075358d7a1a4c1080aac3d4e6bc
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π¦Intel processor reveals two new SGX vulnerabilities attackers can easily extract sensitive data :
1) While Intel is working to eliminate the negative effects of multiple processor vulnerabilities, security researchers at the three universities once again relentlessly exposed two other flaws in the SGX software protection extension instructions.
2) For attackers, this allows them to extract sensitive data fairly easily. Fortunately, new issues can be fixed through active remedies, and there is currently no evidence that new vulnerabilities have been exploited in the wild.
3) Researchers from three universities in Michigan, Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Adelaide, Australia disclosed that attackers can use the multi-core architecture to work to gain access to sensitive data on infected systems.
4) It has developed corresponding attack methods for the two vulnerabilities, and gave proofs of concept for SGAxe and CrossTalk.
5) The former appears to be an advanced version of the CacheOut attack exposed earlier this year, and hackers can extract content from the CPU's L1 cache.
6) The researchers explained that SGAxe is a failed attempt by Intel to mitigate the bypass attack against the software protection extension (SGX). As a dedicated area on the CPU, SGX originally intended to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the code and data being processed.
7) With the help of a transient execution attack, a hacker can essentially recover the encryption key stored in the SGX area and use it to decrypt the long storage area to obtain the machine's EPID key. The latter is used to ensure the security of transactions, such as financial transactions and DRM-protected content.
8) As for the second CrossTalk vulnerability, which is a derivative of Microarchitecture Data Sampling (MDS), it can attack data processed by the Line Fill Buffer (LBF) of the CPU.
9) t originally wanted to provide a "staging buffer" for CPU core access, but hackers were able to use specially-made software running on a separate core to destroy the software code and data private key that protected it.
10) It is reported that the new vulnerability affects many Intel processors released from 2015 to 2019, including some Xeon E3 SKUs (E5 and E7 series have been proven to be resistant to this new type of attack).
11) Intel said in a June security bulletin that only a very small number of people can launch these attacks in a laboratory environment, and there are currently no reports of exploits in the wild.
12) Even so, the company will still release microcode updates as soon as possible, while invalidating previously issued certification keys.
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Intel processor reveals two new SGX vulnerabilities attackers can easily extract sensitive data :
1) While Intel is working to eliminate the negative effects of multiple processor vulnerabilities, security researchers at the three universities once again relentlessly exposed two other flaws in the SGX software protection extension instructions.
2) For attackers, this allows them to extract sensitive data fairly easily. Fortunately, new issues can be fixed through active remedies, and there is currently no evidence that new vulnerabilities have been exploited in the wild.
3) Researchers from three universities in Michigan, Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Adelaide, Australia disclosed that attackers can use the multi-core architecture to work to gain access to sensitive data on infected systems.
4) It has developed corresponding attack methods for the two vulnerabilities, and gave proofs of concept for SGAxe and CrossTalk.
5) The former appears to be an advanced version of the CacheOut attack exposed earlier this year, and hackers can extract content from the CPU's L1 cache.
6) The researchers explained that SGAxe is a failed attempt by Intel to mitigate the bypass attack against the software protection extension (SGX). As a dedicated area on the CPU, SGX originally intended to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the code and data being processed.
7) With the help of a transient execution attack, a hacker can essentially recover the encryption key stored in the SGX area and use it to decrypt the long storage area to obtain the machine's EPID key. The latter is used to ensure the security of transactions, such as financial transactions and DRM-protected content.
8) As for the second CrossTalk vulnerability, which is a derivative of Microarchitecture Data Sampling (MDS), it can attack data processed by the Line Fill Buffer (LBF) of the CPU.
9) t originally wanted to provide a "staging buffer" for CPU core access, but hackers were able to use specially-made software running on a separate core to destroy the software code and data private key that protected it.
10) It is reported that the new vulnerability affects many Intel processors released from 2015 to 2019, including some Xeon E3 SKUs (E5 and E7 series have been proven to be resistant to this new type of attack).
11) Intel said in a June security bulletin that only a very small number of people can launch these attacks in a laboratory environment, and there are currently no reports of exploits in the wild.
12) Even so, the company will still release microcode updates as soon as possible, while invalidating previously issued certification keys.
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
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π¦Practice Your Skills :
> WebGoat is a deliberately insecure web application maintained by OWASP designed to teach web application security lessons.
> This program is a demonstration of common server-side application flaws. The exercises are intended to be used by people to learn about application security and penetration testing techniques.
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ git clone https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat.git
2οΈβ£-run-using-docker
> docker run -p 8080:8080 -p 9090:9090 -e TZ=Europe/Amsterdam webgoat/goatandwolf
3οΈβ£WebGoat will be located at: http://127.0.0.1:8080/WebGoat WebWolf will be located at: http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf
Important:
> Choose the correct timezone, so that the docker container and your host are in the same timezone. As it important for the validity of JWT tokens used in certain exercises.
4οΈβ£Using docker stack deploy
> Another way to deply WebGoat and WebWolf in a more advanced way is to use a compose-file in a docker stack deploy. You can define which containers should run in which combinations and define all of this in a yaml file. An example of such a file is: goat-with-reverseproxy.yaml
5οΈβ£This sets up an nginx webserver as reverse proxy to WebGoat and WebWolf. You can change the timezone by adjusting the value in the yaml file.
6οΈβ£docker stack init
> docker stack deploy --compose-file goat-with-reverseproxy.yaml webgoatdemo
7οΈβ£Add the following entries in your local hosts file:
127.0.0.1 www.webgoat.local www.webwolf.localhost
You can use the overall start page: http://www.webgoat.local or:
8οΈβ£WebGoat will be located at: http://www.webgoat.local/WebGoat
WebWolf will be located at: http://www.webwolf.local/WebWolf
Important:
> the current directory on your host will be mapped into the container for keeping state.
π¦Another way :
Standalone
1οΈβ£Download the latest WebGoat and WebWolf release from https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat/releases
java -jar webgoat-server-8.1.0.jar [--server.port=8080] [--server.address=localhost]
java -jar webwolf-8.1.0.jar [--server.port=9090] [--server.address=localhost]
The latest version of WebGoat needs Java 11 or above. By default WebGoat and WebWolf start on port 8080 and 9090 with --server.port you can specify a different port. With server.address you can bind it to a different address (default localhost)
π¦Or
> Run from the sources
1οΈβ£Prerequisites:
-Java 11
-Maven > 3.2.1
-Your favorite IDE
-Git, or Git support in your IDE
2οΈβ£Open a command shell/window:
git clone git@github.com:WebGoat/WebGoat.git
Now let's start by compiling the project.
3οΈβ£cd WebGoat
4οΈβ£git checkout <<branch_name>>
mvn clean install
5οΈβ£Now we are ready to run the project. WebGoat 8.x is using Spring-Boot.
mvn -pl webgoat-server spring-boot:run
... you should be running webgoat on localhost:8080/WebGoat momentarily
6οΈβ£To change IP address add the following variable to WebGoat/webgoat-container/src/main/resources/application.properties file
>server.address=x.x.x.x
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
π¦Practice Your Skills :
> WebGoat is a deliberately insecure web application maintained by OWASP designed to teach web application security lessons.
> This program is a demonstration of common server-side application flaws. The exercises are intended to be used by people to learn about application security and penetration testing techniques.
πΈπ½π π π°π»π»πΈπ π°π πΈπΎπ½ & π π π½ :
1οΈβ£ git clone https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat.git
2οΈβ£-run-using-docker
> docker run -p 8080:8080 -p 9090:9090 -e TZ=Europe/Amsterdam webgoat/goatandwolf
3οΈβ£WebGoat will be located at: http://127.0.0.1:8080/WebGoat WebWolf will be located at: http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf
Important:
> Choose the correct timezone, so that the docker container and your host are in the same timezone. As it important for the validity of JWT tokens used in certain exercises.
4οΈβ£Using docker stack deploy
> Another way to deply WebGoat and WebWolf in a more advanced way is to use a compose-file in a docker stack deploy. You can define which containers should run in which combinations and define all of this in a yaml file. An example of such a file is: goat-with-reverseproxy.yaml
5οΈβ£This sets up an nginx webserver as reverse proxy to WebGoat and WebWolf. You can change the timezone by adjusting the value in the yaml file.
6οΈβ£docker stack init
> docker stack deploy --compose-file goat-with-reverseproxy.yaml webgoatdemo
7οΈβ£Add the following entries in your local hosts file:
127.0.0.1 www.webgoat.local www.webwolf.localhost
You can use the overall start page: http://www.webgoat.local or:
8οΈβ£WebGoat will be located at: http://www.webgoat.local/WebGoat
WebWolf will be located at: http://www.webwolf.local/WebWolf
Important:
> the current directory on your host will be mapped into the container for keeping state.
π¦Another way :
Standalone
1οΈβ£Download the latest WebGoat and WebWolf release from https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat/releases
java -jar webgoat-server-8.1.0.jar [--server.port=8080] [--server.address=localhost]
java -jar webwolf-8.1.0.jar [--server.port=9090] [--server.address=localhost]
The latest version of WebGoat needs Java 11 or above. By default WebGoat and WebWolf start on port 8080 and 9090 with --server.port you can specify a different port. With server.address you can bind it to a different address (default localhost)
π¦Or
> Run from the sources
1οΈβ£Prerequisites:
-Java 11
-Maven > 3.2.1
-Your favorite IDE
-Git, or Git support in your IDE
2οΈβ£Open a command shell/window:
git clone git@github.com:WebGoat/WebGoat.git
Now let's start by compiling the project.
3οΈβ£cd WebGoat
4οΈβ£git checkout <<branch_name>>
mvn clean install
5οΈβ£Now we are ready to run the project. WebGoat 8.x is using Spring-Boot.
mvn -pl webgoat-server spring-boot:run
... you should be running webgoat on localhost:8080/WebGoat momentarily
6οΈβ£To change IP address add the following variable to WebGoat/webgoat-container/src/main/resources/application.properties file
>server.address=x.x.x.x
@UndercodeTesting
@UndercodeSecurity
@UndercodeHacking
β β β ο½ππ»βΊπ«Δπ¬πβ β β β
GitHub
GitHub - WebGoat/WebGoat: WebGoat is a deliberately insecure application
WebGoat is a deliberately insecure application. Contribute to WebGoat/WebGoat development by creating an account on GitHub.