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https://undercodenews.com/firefox-133-a-leap-forward-in-web-browsing/

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⚡️ #GitHub Strengthens Security Posture with New SOC 2 Reports for Enterprise Cloud, #Copilot, and More

https://undercodenews.com/github-strengthens-security-posture-with-new-soc-2-reports-for-enterprise-cloud-copilot-and-more/

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#GitHub Actions: A Deeper Dive into Runner Labels

https://undercodenews.com/github-actions-a-deeper-dive-into-runner-labels/

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https://undercodenews.com/microsoft-expands-windows-recall-ai-feature-a-measured-approach/

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💻 Evernote: A #Digital Notebook for Your Thoughts

https://undercodenews.com/evernote-a-digital-notebook-for-your-thoughts/

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https://undercodenews.com/informative-the-rise-of-vk-a-social-media-giant-in-russia-and-beyond/

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https://undercodenews.com/informative-navigating-tumblrs-login-process-a-step-by-step-guide/

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🦑Exploitation of the Microsoft Exchange Vulnerability:

During the IR investigation, the Nocturnus Team was able to identify the initial compromise vector, in which the attackers exploited the recently discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange server, which allowed them to perform remote code execution by exploiting the following CVEs: CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858.

The attackers used this vulnerability to install and execute the China Chopper webshell via the following commands:

Once the attackers gained access to the network, they deleted the .aspx webshell file to cover their tracks:

cmd.exe /c del "C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\\frontend\httpproxy\owa\auth\<file_name>.aspx"

Using the webshell, the attackers launched a PowerShell that was then used to download a payload from the following URL:

http://178.21.164[.]68/dwn.php?b64=1&d=nethost64C.exe&B=_AMD64,<machine_name>

The payload is then saved as C:\windows\zsvc.exe and executed. This is the start of the Prometei botnet execution:

The Prometei Botnet :

When the first module of the botnet, zsvc.exe, is executed, it starts to “prepare the ground” for the other modules:

It copies itself into C:\Windows with the name “sqhost.exe”
It uses Netsh commands to add a firewall rule that will allow sqhost.exe to create connections over HTTP
It checks if there is a registry key named “UPlugPlay”, and if present it deletes it
It sets a registry key for persistence as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UPlugPlay with the image path and command line c:\windows\sqhost.exe Dcomsvc
It creates several registry keys under SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Fax\ and SOFTWARE\Intel\support\ with the names MachineKeyId, EncryptedMachineKeyId and CommId, for later use by the different components for C2 communication.

Sqhost.exe:

Sqhost.exe is the main bot module, complete with backdoor capabilities that support a wide range of commands. Sqhost.exe is able to parse the prometei.cgi file from 4 different hardcoded command and control servers. The file contains the command to be executed on the machine. The commands can be used as “stand-alone” native OS commands (cmd commands, WMI, etc.) or can be used to interact with the other modules of the malware located under C:\Windows\dell

Sqhost supports the following commands:

Call - Execute a program or a file
Start_mining - launch SearchIndexer.exe (the miner) with the file C:\windows\dell\Desktop.dat as its parameters
Start_mining1 - request C:\windows\dell\Desktop.dat from the C2, and then launch SearchIndexer.exe (the miner) with the file C:\windows\dell\Desktop.dat as its parameters
Stop_mining - runs cmd.exe with command: “/c taskkill -f -im SearchIndexer.exe”
Wget - download a file
Xwget - download a file, save it, and use XOR to decrypt it
Quit - terminate the bot execution using TerminateProcess
Quit2 - terminate the bot execution without using TerminateProcess
Sysinfo - collect information about the machine (using native APIs and WMIC)
Exec - execute a command
Ver - return the bot version
Enc - get/set the RC4 encryption key
Extip - return the bot's external IP address
Chkport - check if a specific port is open
Search - search for files by name (potentially crypto currency wallets)
Set_timeout - set a period of time for connecting to C2 server
Touch - open a file
Touch_internal - edit a file with a single byte to change access times
Touch_stop - close a file
Update - update the bot version
Set_Autoexec2 - set an automatic execution
Set_Autoexec1 - set an automatic execution
Set_cc1 - set a C2 server
Set_cc0 - set a C2 server

The execution of the malware encountered in the investigation shows activities performed by the attackers which included tree processes: cmd.exe, sqhost.exe and wmic.exe:

CMD.exe: was used to execute the following commands (some of the commands are broken into individual commands for readability):

the attackers attempted to execute C:\Windows\svchost.exe, which is the same file as sqhost.exe, and the attackers named it as svchost in earlier versions, but it wasn’t downloaded in the attack or in existence by this name. The reference for “svchost.exe” resides in different components of the malware, sometimes even in addition to “sqhost”. Our assumption is that it is used either for backwards-compatibility or it is the case that the attackers didn’t bother to change it in some places after renaming the main bot module to “sqhost.exe”.

Sqhost.exe: executed with “-watchdog” parameter, to make sure that it will keep running on the system.
Wmic.exe: was used to perform reconnaissance commands:
- wmic ComputerSystem get Model
- wmic OS get lastbootuptime
- wmic baseboard get product
- wmic os get caption


ExchDefender.exe
Exchdefender tries to masquerade as a “Microsoft Exchange Defender”, a non-existent program that masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft product.

When first executed, it creates a service named “Microsoft Exchange Defender” [MSExchangeDefenderPL] that is set to execute the binary (from C:\Windows) with the same command line as seen used with sqhost.exe - “Dcomsvc”: