“And if in fact it is greater and less and equal, it would be of
measures equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others; and since
of measures, also of parts.”—“Doubtless.”—“So, since it is of equal and more and
fewer measures, it would also be fewer and more than itself and the others in
number, and, correspondingly, equal to itself and the others.”—“How so?”—“It
would surely be of more measures than those things it is greater than, and of as
many parts as measures; and likewise it would be of fewer measures and parts
than those things it is less than; and correspondingly for the things it is
equal to.”—“Just so.”—“Since it is, then, greater and less than, and equal
to, itself, would it not be of measures more and fewer than, and equal to,
itself? And since of measures, also of parts?”—“Doubtless.”—“So, since it is of
parts equal to itself, it would be equal to itself in multitude, but since it is
of more and fewer parts, it would be more and fewer than itself in
number.”—“Apparently.”—“Now won’t the one be related in the same way also to the
others? Because it appears larger than they, it must also be more than they are
in number; and because it appears smaller, fewer; and because it appears equal
in largeness, it must also be equal to the others in
multitude.”—“Necessarily.”—“Thus, in turn, as it seems, the one will be
equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others in number.”—“It
will.”

“Does the one also partake of time? And, in partaking of time, is it
and does it come to be both younger and older than, and neither younger nor
older than, itself and the others?”—“How so?”—“If in fact one is, being surely
belongs to it.”—“Yes.”—“But is to be simply partaking of being with time present, just as was is communion with being
together with time past, and, in turn, will be is communion with being
together with time future?”—“Yes, it is.”—“So the one partakes of time, if in
fact it partakes of being.”—“Certainly.”

“Of time advancing?”—“Yes.”—“So the one always comes to be older
than itself, if in fact it goes forward in step with time.”—“Necessarily.”—“Do
we recall that the older comes to be older than something that comes to be
younger?”—“We do.”—“So, since the one comes to be older than itself, wouldn’t it
come to be older than a self that comes to be younger?”—“Necessarily.”—“Thus
it indeed comes to be both younger and older than itself.”—“Yes.”

“But it is older, isn’t it, whenever, in coming to be, it is
at the now time, between was and will be? For as it proceeds from
the past to the future, it certainly won’t jump over the now.”—“No, it
won’t.”—“Doesn’t it stop coming to be older when it encounters the now? It
doesn’t come to be, but is then already older, isn’t it? For if it were going
forward, it could never be grasped by the now. A thing going forward is able to
lay hold of both the now and the later – releasing the now and reaching for the
later, while coming to be between the two, the later and the now.”—“True.”—“But
if nothing that comes to be can sidestep the now, whenever a thing is at
this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever it may
have come to be.”—“Apparently.”—“So, too, the one: whenever, in coming to be
older, it encounters the now, it stops its coming-to-be and is then older.”—“Of
course.”—“So it also is older than that very thing it was coming to be older
than – and wasn’t it coming to be older than itself?”—“Yes.”—“And the older is
older than a younger?”—“It is.”—“So the one is then also younger than itself,
whenever, in its coming-to-be older, it encounters the now.”—“Necessarily.”—“Yet
the now is always present to the one throughout its being; for the one always is
now, whenever it is.”—“No doubt.”—“Therefore the one always both is and
comes to be older and younger than itself.”—“So it seems.”

“Is it or does it come to be for more time than itself or an equal
time?”—“An equal.”—“But if it comes to be or is for an equal time, it is the
same age.”—“Doubtless.”—“And that which is the same age is neither older nor
younger.”—“No, it isn’t.”—“So the one, since it comes to be and is for a time
equal to itself, neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself.”—“I
think not.”

“And again: what of the others?”—“I can’t say.”—“This much, surely,
you can say: things other than the one, if in fact they are
different things and not a different thing, are more than one. A
different thing would be one, but different things are more than one and would
have multitude.”—“Yes, they would.”—“And, being a multitude, they would partake
of a greater number than the one.”—“Doubtless.”—“Now, shall we say in connection
with number that things that are more or things that are less come to be and
have come to be earlier?”—“Things that are less.”—“So, the least thing first;
and this is the one. Isn’t that so?”—“Yes.”—“So of all the things that have
number the one has come to be first. And the others, too, all have number, if in
fact they are others and not an other.”—“Yes, they do.”—“But that which has come
to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things
that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. Thus
the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than they.”—“Yes, it
would.”

“What about the following? Could the one have come to be in a way
contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?”—“Impossible.”—“Yet
the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, a beginning, an end, and a
middle.”—“Yes.”—“Well, in the case of all things – the one itself and each of
the others – doesn’t a beginning come to be first, and after the beginning all
the others up to the end?”—“To be sure.”—“Furthermore, we shall say that all
these others are parts of some one whole, but that it itself has come to be one
and whole at the same time as the end.”—“Yes, we shall.”—“An end, I take it,
comes to be last, and the one naturally comes to be at the same time as it.
And so if in fact the one itself must not come to be contrary to nature, it
would naturally come to be later than the others, since it has come to be at the
same time as the end.”—“Apparently.”—“Therefore the one is younger than the
others, and the others are older than it.”—“That, in turn, appears to me to be
so.”

“But again: must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of
anything else, if in fact it is a part and not parts, be one, since it is a part?”—“Necessarily.”—“Accordingly, the one would come to be at the
same time as the first part that comes to be, and at the same time as the
second; and it is absent from none of the others that come to be – no matter
what is added to what – until, upon arriving at the last part, it comes to be
one whole, having been absent at the coming-to-be of neither the middle nor the
first nor the last nor any other part.”—“True.”—“Therefore the one is the same
age as all the others. And so, unless the one itself is naturally contrary to
nature, it would have come to be neither earlier nor later than the
others, but at the same time. And according to this argument the one would be
neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others older or younger than
it. But according to our previous argument, it was both older and younger than
they, and likewise they were both older and younger than it.”—“Of course.”

“That’s how it is and has come to be. But what about its
coming-to-be both older and younger, and neither older nor younger, than the
others and they than it? Is the case with coming-to-be just as it is with being,
or is it different?”—“I can’t say.”—“But I can say this much, at least: if
something is indeed older than another thing, it could not come to be still
older by an amount greater than the original difference in age. Nor, in turn,
could the younger come to be still younger. For equals added to unequals, in
time or anything else at all, always make them differ by an amount equal to that
by which they differed at first.”—“No doubt.”—“So what is older or younger
could never come to be older or younger than what is older or younger, if in
fact they always differ in age by an equal amount. On the contrary, something is
and has come to be older, and something younger, but they do not come to be
so.”—“True.”—“So also the one, since it is older or younger, never comes to be
older or younger than the others that are older or younger than it.”—“Yes,
you’re quite right.”

“But consider whether it comes to be older and younger in this
way.”—“In what way?”—“In the way that the one was shown to be older than the
others and they older than it.”—“What of that?”—“When the one is older than
the others, it has surely come to be for more time than they.”—“Yes.”—“Go back
and consider: if we add an equal time to more and less time, will the more
differ from the less by an equal or a smaller fraction?”—“A smaller.”—“So the one’s difference in age in
relation to the others will not be in the future just what it was at first. On
the contrary, by getting an increment of time equal to the others, it will
differ from them in age always less than it did before. Isn’t that
so?”—“Yes.”—“Wouldn’t that which differs from anything in age less than
before come to be younger than before in relation to those things it was
previously older than?”—“Younger.”—“And if the one comes to be younger, don’t
those others, in turn, come to be older than before in relation to
it?”—“Certainly.”—“So what is younger comes to be older in relation to what has
come to be earlier and is older, but it never is older. On the contrary, it
always comes to be older than that thing. For the older advances toward the
younger, while the younger advances toward the older. And, in the same way, the
older, in its turn, comes to be younger than the younger. For both,
by going toward their opposites, come to be each other’s opposite, the younger
coming to be older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But
they could not come to be so. For if they came to be, they would no
longer come to be, but would be so. But as it is they come to be older
and younger than each other. The one comes to be younger than the others,
because it was shown to be older and to have come to be earlier, whereas the
others come to be older than the one, because they have come to be later.

“And by the same argument the others, too, come to be younger in
relation to the one, since in fact they were shown to be older than it and to
have come to be earlier.”—“Yes, it does appear so.”

“Well then, insofar as nothing comes to be older or younger than a
different thing, owing to their always differing from each other by an equal
number, the one would not come to be older or younger than the others, and they
would not come to be older or younger than it. But insofar as things that came
to be earlier must differ from things that come to be later by a fraction that
is always different, and vice versa, in this way they must come to be older
and younger than each other – both the others than the one and the one than the
others.”—“Of course.”—“To sum up all this, the one itself both is and comes to
be older and younger than itself and the others, and it neither is nor comes to
be older or younger than itself or the others.”—“Exactly.”

“And since the one partakes of time and of coming to be older and
younger, must it not also partake of time past, future, and present – if in
fact it partakes of time?”—“Necessarily.”—“Therefore, the one was and is and
will be, and was coming to be and comes to be and will come to be.”—“To be
sure.”—“And something could belong to it and be of it, in the past, present, and
future.”—“Certainly.”—“And indeed there would be knowledge and opinion and
perception of it, if in fact even now we are engaging in all those activities
concerning it.”—“You’re right.”—“And a name and an account belong to it, and it
is named and spoken of. And all such things as pertain to the others also
pertain to the one.”—“That’s exactly so.”

What do these 6 kids have in common ? They all completed our 50 yard challenge by mowing 50 FREE lawns in their cities for the elderly,disabled, single parents & veterans . Every 10 lawns they received a new color shirt & once they mow 50 they received their black shirt(like a black belt in karate) along with brand new mowers, weed eaters & blowers . Will your child be next to take on the 50 yard challenge ?

Raking leaves & snow shoveling included .

Kids can take part in any city/state . Raking leaves & snow shoveling counts too in the fall & winter.

Sign up https://weareraisingmen.com/the-50-yard-challenge/

(Kids that finished from previous years)

In our own country, too, Swarmery has played a great part for many years past; and especially is now playing, in these very days and months. Our accepted axioms about “Liberty,” Constitutional Government,” “Reform,” and the like objects, are of truly wonderful texture: venerable by antiquity, many of them, and written in all manner of Canonical Books; or else, the newer part of them, celestially clear as perfect unanimity of all tongues, and Vox populi vox Dei, can make them: axioms confessed, or even inspirations and gospel verities, to the general mind of man. To the mind of here and there a man, it begins to be suspected that perhaps they are only conditionally true; that taken unconditionally, or under changed conditions, they are not true, but false and even disastrously and fatally so. Ask yourself about “Liberty,” for example; what you do really mean by it, what in any just and rational soul is that Divine quality of liberty? That a good man be “free,” as we call it, be permitted to unfold himself in works of goodness and nobleness, is surely a blessing to him, immense and indispensable;—to him and to those about him. But that a bad man be “free,”—permitted to unfold himself in his particular way, is contrariwise, the fatallest curse you could inflict on him; curse and nothing else, to him and all his neighbours. Him the very Heavens call upon you to persuade, to urge, induce, compel, into something of well-doing; if you absolutely cannot, if he will continue in ill-doing, — then for him (I can assure you, though you will be shocked to hear it), the one “blessing” left is the speediest gallows you can lead him to. Speediest, that at least his ill-doing may cease quàm primùm. Oh, my friends, whither are you buzzing and swarming, in this extremely absurd manner? Expecting a Millennium from “extension of the suffrage,” laterally, vertically, or in whatever way?

All the Millenniums I ever heard of heretofore were to be preceded by a “chaining of the Devil for a thousand years,”—laying him up, tied neck and heels, and put beyond stirring, as the preliminary. You too have been taking preliminary steps, with more and more ardour, for a thirty years back; but they seem to be all in the opposite direction: a cutting asunder of straps and ties, wherever you might find them; pretty indiscriminate of choice in the matter: a general repeal of old regulations, fetters, and restrictions (restrictions on the Devil originally, I believe, for most part, but now fallen slack and ineffectual), which had become unpleasant to many of you,—with loud shouting from the multitude, as strap after strap was cut, “Glory, glory, another strap is gone!”— this, I think, has mainly been the sublime legislative industry of Parliament since it became “Reform Parliament;” victoriously successful, and thought sublime and beneficent by some. So that now hardly any limb of the Devil has a thrum, or tatter of rope or leather left upon it:—there needs almost superhuman heroism in you to “whip” a Garotter; no Fenian taken with the reddest hand is to be meddled with, under penalties; hardly a murderer, never so detestable and hideous, but you find him “insane,” and board him at the public expense, a very peculiar British Prytaneum of these days! And in fact, THE DEVIL (he, verily, if you will consider the sense of words) is likewise become an Emancipated Gentleman; lithe of limb as in Adam and Eve’s time, and scarcely a toe or finger of him tied any more. And you, my astonishing friends, you are certainly getting into a millennium, such as never was before,—hardly even in the dreams of Bedlam.