2026_06_x33fcon_Bring_Your_Own_Everything_The_Final_Approach.pdf
35.3 MB
2026_06_x33fcon_Bring_Your_Own_Everything_-_The_Final_Approach.pdf
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Forwarded from SecLog (Redteam)
Malware - The Misunderstood Industry.pdf
237.5 KB
Malware - The Misunderstood Industry.pdf
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SecLog
Malware - The Misunderstood Industry.pdf
This article said everything I had been telling my buddies
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Forwarded from Malware, Cats and Cryptography
bsidesprishtina-cocomelonc-2026.pdf
10 MB
BSides Prishtina 2026 slides.
Full PoC code will be published in my blog soon. Enjoy!
#conference #hacking #malware #math #physics #programming #threatintel #cybersecurity #research
Full PoC code will be published in my blog soon. Enjoy!
#conference #hacking #malware #math #physics #programming #threatintel #cybersecurity #research
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Forwarded from Proxy Bar
LACUNA Chain: Ghost Frames Defeat Every Layer of EDR Call-Stack Detection
Original text: “LACUNA Chain: Ghost Frames — defeats all EDR layers of call-stack-based detection” — Mohamed Alzhrani (@0xmaz), 0xmaz.me (Jun 20, 2026). Licensed CC BY 4.0. Tables, code listings, diagrams and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Modern endpoint detection has moved its trustworthiness anchor from userland hooks to kernel-mode telemetry:…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/lacuna-chain-ghost-frames-defeat-edr-call-stack-detection/
Original text: “LACUNA Chain: Ghost Frames — defeats all EDR layers of call-stack-based detection” — Mohamed Alzhrani (@0xmaz), 0xmaz.me (Jun 20, 2026). Licensed CC BY 4.0. Tables, code listings, diagrams and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Modern endpoint detection has moved its trustworthiness anchor from userland hooks to kernel-mode telemetry:…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/lacuna-chain-ghost-frames-defeat-edr-call-stack-detection/
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Forwarded from 1N73LL1G3NC3
PhantomCtx
A tool that automates Activation Context hijacking with the objective of loading an arbitrary DLL into the vast majority of signed executables (e.g. Microsoft, Adobe, Mozilla).
The loader is presented as a modern alternative to traditional DLL Hijacking & Sideloading: unlike conventional approaches, it does not require a vulnerable binary. The technique can be performed as long as the target executable resolves a DLL through its Import Address Table (IAT) or, in the worst case, via LoadLibrary without an absolute path.
For a deeper dive into how it works internally and how it evades aggressive EDR solutions, check out the post on my technical blog.
A tool that automates Activation Context hijacking with the objective of loading an arbitrary DLL into the vast majority of signed executables (e.g. Microsoft, Adobe, Mozilla).
The loader is presented as a modern alternative to traditional DLL Hijacking & Sideloading: unlike conventional approaches, it does not require a vulnerable binary. The technique can be performed as long as the target executable resolves a DLL through its Import Address Table (IAT) or, in the worst case, via LoadLibrary without an absolute path.
For a deeper dive into how it works internally and how it evades aggressive EDR solutions, check out the post on my technical blog.
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AMSI/ETW Evasion for PowerShell, without patching amsi.dll, by manipulating the CLR/JIT and using a Tail Jump patch for ETW 🔥
#etw #amsi
#etw #amsi
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Do you even know what you're bypassing? Don't be that guy who throws direct syscalls at everything and calls it an AV bypass.
https://www.hackmosphere.fr/bypass-windows-defender-antivirus-2025-part-1/
https://www.hackmosphere.fr/bypass-windows-defender-antivirus-2025-part-1/
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Forwarded from Orca Cyber Weapons
Post-Build PE Obfuscation
Obfusk8 includes a post-build script to further harden the compiled binary by removing forensic artifacts.
* Script Location: `Obfusk8/Obfusk8/SCRIPTS/obfuscate_pe.ps1 at main · x86byte/Obfusk8`
* What it does:
1. Strips the Rich Header — removes the MSVC build-environment fingerprint that reveals compiler version and toolchain details.
2. Spoofs the TimeDateStamp — replaces the PE header timestamp with a fixed value to obscure build time.
3. Clears the Debug Directory — wipes debug directory entries that could leak PDB paths or build metadata.
* Usage:
Run as a post-build step after compiling:
The script modifies the binary in-place. No backup is created.
@OrcaCyberWeapons
Obfusk8 includes a post-build script to further harden the compiled binary by removing forensic artifacts.
* Script Location: `Obfusk8/Obfusk8/SCRIPTS/obfuscate_pe.ps1 at main · x86byte/Obfusk8`
* What it does:
1. Strips the Rich Header — removes the MSVC build-environment fingerprint that reveals compiler version and toolchain details.
2. Spoofs the TimeDateStamp — replaces the PE header timestamp with a fixed value to obscure build time.
3. Clears the Debug Directory — wipes debug directory entries that could leak PDB paths or build metadata.
* Usage:
Run as a post-build step after compiling:
powershell PowerShell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File Obfusk8/SCRIPTS/obfuscate_pe.ps1 -Path "path\to\Obfusk8.exe"The script modifies the binary in-place. No backup is created.
@OrcaCyberWeapons
GitHub
GitHub - x86byte/Obfusk8: Obfusk8: lightweight Obfuscation library based on C++17 / Header Only for windows binaries
Obfusk8: lightweight Obfuscation library based on C++17 / Header Only for windows binaries - x86byte/Obfusk8
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Forwarded from Orca Cyber Weapons
We’re building a small community around binary security research, focused on things like:
- Reverse Engineering
- Binary Obfuscation / Deobfuscation
- Exploit Development
- Compiler / interpreters...
- Malware Analysis
- Binary Hardening research
we also work on open source tools and experiments here:
GitHub → BinaryHardening GitHub
Discord → BinaryHardening Discord
If low level stuff and weird binaries are ur thing, come join us
Always happy to meet more RE people
- Reverse Engineering
- Binary Obfuscation / Deobfuscation
- Exploit Development
- Compiler / interpreters...
- Malware Analysis
- Binary Hardening research
we also work on open source tools and experiments here:
GitHub → BinaryHardening GitHub
Discord → BinaryHardening Discord
If low level stuff and weird binaries are ur thing, come join us
Always happy to meet more RE people
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SpotifyC2 — Cloud-Based Command Channel Research
Execute commands through a Spotify playlist and receive command output through Telegram.
#c2
Execute commands through a Spotify playlist and receive command output through Telegram.
#c2
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Sec Note
SpotifyC2 — Cloud-Based Command Channel Research Execute commands through a Spotify playlist and receive command output through Telegram. #c2
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Forwarded from vx-underground
tl;dr
really effective malware multi-staged, multiple programming languages, use as many dependencies as possible. AI making this easier to do. AVs struggling
Historically, in regards to malware development, the end goal was minimalism. It was in your best interest to strip as many dependencies, shred the file size down, and make it position independent.
I think, as of ... now ... we need to take a different approach.
I think instead of stripping binaries, we (Red Team, Threat Emulation, malware developers) should intentionally introduce dependencies.
I have witnesses two unique things in the malware landscape since the AI boom.
1. Increase in malware slop. I continue to see stagers which contain notes in them. This is not intentional and this does not "trick" the analyst. This is a colossal mistake on the malware developers part. However, despite it being slop, AI has made malware more diverse. I am seeing more and more malware in Lua, Node JS (including SEA and nexe), Java, and Python. I am seeing more and more malware doing inter-process communication across multiple programming languages. Of course all of these have existed prior to AI, but I am seeing an explosion in these languages. This also has resulted in malware researchers creating new tools to combat this malware diversity.
2. Anti-malware services struggling. When I encounter a binary that is a Node JS SEA blob (Electron JS .exe, self-contained using SEA), which extracts a .JS payload, which uses obfuscated Java or heavily obfuscated Lua, all of these languages require a VM (PVM, LVM, JVM, whatever) for interpretation. Thus, with heavy obfuscation and multistaging, static analysis fails and the heavy abstraction makes it difficult for traditional hooking or minifilters to be effective, in essence there is too much noise. Many of these payloads with heavy dependencies easily avoid static analysis and even some emulation systems because they fail to account for the necessary dependencies which are required to emulate it correctly.
pic maybe related idk
really effective malware multi-staged, multiple programming languages, use as many dependencies as possible. AI making this easier to do. AVs struggling
Historically, in regards to malware development, the end goal was minimalism. It was in your best interest to strip as many dependencies, shred the file size down, and make it position independent.
I think, as of ... now ... we need to take a different approach.
I think instead of stripping binaries, we (Red Team, Threat Emulation, malware developers) should intentionally introduce dependencies.
I have witnesses two unique things in the malware landscape since the AI boom.
1. Increase in malware slop. I continue to see stagers which contain notes in them. This is not intentional and this does not "trick" the analyst. This is a colossal mistake on the malware developers part. However, despite it being slop, AI has made malware more diverse. I am seeing more and more malware in Lua, Node JS (including SEA and nexe), Java, and Python. I am seeing more and more malware doing inter-process communication across multiple programming languages. Of course all of these have existed prior to AI, but I am seeing an explosion in these languages. This also has resulted in malware researchers creating new tools to combat this malware diversity.
2. Anti-malware services struggling. When I encounter a binary that is a Node JS SEA blob (Electron JS .exe, self-contained using SEA), which extracts a .JS payload, which uses obfuscated Java or heavily obfuscated Lua, all of these languages require a VM (PVM, LVM, JVM, whatever) for interpretation. Thus, with heavy obfuscation and multistaging, static analysis fails and the heavy abstraction makes it difficult for traditional hooking or minifilters to be effective, in essence there is too much noise. Many of these payloads with heavy dependencies easily avoid static analysis and even some emulation systems because they fail to account for the necessary dependencies which are required to emulate it correctly.
pic maybe related idk
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Forwarded from club1337
The EU just sanctioned the operators behind Lumma Stealer.
“Daugn0” and “Lummaseller” have been officially designated for their roles in developing, distributing, and selling the LummaC2 infostealer.
Also added:
• BPH MediaLand LLC and its owner
• Two members of Cyber Army of Russia Reborn
• Bentley/Stern (CONTI ransomware)
• Two members of GRU Unit 29155
The inclusion of the Lumma operators is particularly notable. Looks like the “lummakrysy” drama wasn’t entirely off the mark after all.
cc g0njxa, Gi7w0rm
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/1714/oj/eng
Telegram✉️ @club1337
X (Twitter)🕊 @club31337
“Daugn0” and “Lummaseller” have been officially designated for their roles in developing, distributing, and selling the LummaC2 infostealer.
Also added:
• BPH MediaLand LLC and its owner
• Two members of Cyber Army of Russia Reborn
• Bentley/Stern (CONTI ransomware)
• Two members of GRU Unit 29155
The inclusion of the Lumma operators is particularly notable. Looks like the “lummakrysy” drama wasn’t entirely off the mark after all.
cc g0njxa, Gi7w0rm
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/1714/oj/eng
Telegram
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