’t deterrence,” even suggesting that it might be “the opposite.” Rep. Doug Lamborn, ranking member of the HASC strategic forces subcommittee, went further. By issuing this unilateral moratorium, Lamborn tweeted, the Biden administration “is abandoning its responsibility to maintain United States space superiority” and “creates more opportunities for China and Russia to hold our assets in space at risk while they continue to field ASAT technologies and create hazardous space debris.”
These lawmakers, likely reflecting the sentiment of many hawks, are right to emphasize the importance of deterring Chinese and Russian aggression in space. New ASAT systems are on track to achieve operational status over the next several years, each with distinct threat characteristics and use cases.
However, Rogers and Lamborn are wrong to suggest that this testing moratorium undercuts deterrence. Instead, it illustrates exactly the nuanced, threat-specific, case-by-case approach — tailoring specific solutions to specific problems — that the U.S. must adopt more widely to counter these emerging 21st-century challenges.
While much media coverage has referred to this as a ban on ASAT testing, that is deliberately not the case. Vice President Harris’s words were carefully chosen: only “destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing” is prohibited. As John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, subsequently noted, the ban in no way disadvantages the U.S. because it does not limit “any technological capability” but seeks only to constrain one specific “behavior that we want to dissuade”: namely, debris-generating tests of direct-ascent ASAT missiles. As Hill put it, “this is not just about space security, but … underpinning the long-term ability to continue human exploration … and … economic uses of space.”
This moratorium was specifically designed to address the threat of debris generation from destructive DA-ASAT testing without disadvantaging the United States or any other actor who follows suit. Therefore, it does not impose limits of any kind on development or operational use. It also does not limit any DA-ASAT missile testing deemed non-“destructive,” including flight tests and deliberate near-miss “fly-bys” of orbital targets. Such tests are sufficient to enable DA-ASAT development. Indeed, this has been China’s consistent approach since 2007, and Russia conducted numerous non-destructive tests of the Nudol anti-satellite missile system before conducting a test in November 2021 that destroyed the Soviet-era Cosmos-1408 satellite.
Additionally, as openly acknowledged by Eric Desautels, the acting U.S. deputy assistant secretary for arms control, verification, and compliance, the moratorium “doesn’t cover all ASAT threats, including space-based ASAT systems.” In other words, it does not limit testing of any ASAT or non-ASAT system other than direct-ascent ASAT missiles: active defenses, co-orbital systems, lasers, jammers, and more remain unaffected. Far from undercutting the ban’s efficacy, this nuance is precisely what makes this a potential watershed moment.
The Biden administration has already alluded to the DA-ASAT testing ban as the first of many measures. These measures, taken in combination, will address the space sustainability concerns of the doves and the space security concerns of the hawks. For example, Desautels announced that the U.S. plans to seek consensus regarding a variety of nonbinding international rules of the road, including limits on “purposeful interference” with nuclear command-and-control satellites, limits on testing in the direction of or in close proximity to another country’s satellites, and more. This week, the United States began to lay the groundwork for such measures at the first substantive session of the U.N. Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats. Discussions will continue on these measures and others at a second five-day session in 2023, culminating in a report to the U.N. General Assembly in Fall 2023.
These multilateral efforts are lau
These lawmakers, likely reflecting the sentiment of many hawks, are right to emphasize the importance of deterring Chinese and Russian aggression in space. New ASAT systems are on track to achieve operational status over the next several years, each with distinct threat characteristics and use cases.
However, Rogers and Lamborn are wrong to suggest that this testing moratorium undercuts deterrence. Instead, it illustrates exactly the nuanced, threat-specific, case-by-case approach — tailoring specific solutions to specific problems — that the U.S. must adopt more widely to counter these emerging 21st-century challenges.
While much media coverage has referred to this as a ban on ASAT testing, that is deliberately not the case. Vice President Harris’s words were carefully chosen: only “destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing” is prohibited. As John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, subsequently noted, the ban in no way disadvantages the U.S. because it does not limit “any technological capability” but seeks only to constrain one specific “behavior that we want to dissuade”: namely, debris-generating tests of direct-ascent ASAT missiles. As Hill put it, “this is not just about space security, but … underpinning the long-term ability to continue human exploration … and … economic uses of space.”
This moratorium was specifically designed to address the threat of debris generation from destructive DA-ASAT testing without disadvantaging the United States or any other actor who follows suit. Therefore, it does not impose limits of any kind on development or operational use. It also does not limit any DA-ASAT missile testing deemed non-“destructive,” including flight tests and deliberate near-miss “fly-bys” of orbital targets. Such tests are sufficient to enable DA-ASAT development. Indeed, this has been China’s consistent approach since 2007, and Russia conducted numerous non-destructive tests of the Nudol anti-satellite missile system before conducting a test in November 2021 that destroyed the Soviet-era Cosmos-1408 satellite.
Additionally, as openly acknowledged by Eric Desautels, the acting U.S. deputy assistant secretary for arms control, verification, and compliance, the moratorium “doesn’t cover all ASAT threats, including space-based ASAT systems.” In other words, it does not limit testing of any ASAT or non-ASAT system other than direct-ascent ASAT missiles: active defenses, co-orbital systems, lasers, jammers, and more remain unaffected. Far from undercutting the ban’s efficacy, this nuance is precisely what makes this a potential watershed moment.
The Biden administration has already alluded to the DA-ASAT testing ban as the first of many measures. These measures, taken in combination, will address the space sustainability concerns of the doves and the space security concerns of the hawks. For example, Desautels announced that the U.S. plans to seek consensus regarding a variety of nonbinding international rules of the road, including limits on “purposeful interference” with nuclear command-and-control satellites, limits on testing in the direction of or in close proximity to another country’s satellites, and more. This week, the United States began to lay the groundwork for such measures at the first substantive session of the U.N. Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats. Discussions will continue on these measures and others at a second five-day session in 2023, culminating in a report to the U.N. General Assembly in Fall 2023.
These multilateral efforts are lau
dable but must be coupled with unilateral defenses, and those defenses must be specific and tailored. The U.S. remains hard at work on one-size-fits-all defensive measures, such as operationally responsive space and proliferated constellations of smaller satellites. Still, certain emerging threats cannot be sufficiently countered by generalized defenses alone. The U.S.’s opening National Submission to the U.N. Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) lays out a clear vision regarding objectives and approach. However, it lacks detail regarding specific threats or specific measures to counter said threats. For example, the document flags on-orbit servicing capabilities as a potential dual-use threat and identifies space-to-space as an important ASAT category. It also flags the principles of “due regard” and “safe separation” — including, in particular, avoidance of “interference with security-related space systems” — as important “starting points” and “areas for further consideration.” However, the U.S. submission does not lay out the unique characteristics and potential impacts of this threat, nor does it address what kinds of specific legal and policy measures might counter it effectively. Similarly, the 2022 assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency submitted to the OEWG affirms that the space-to-space ASAT threat is growing, but goes no further.
Such vagueness runs the risk of either derailing consensus or producing agreement only on principles so broad and flexible as to be meaningless. Even worse, a lack of specificity would deprive the U.S. Defense Department and other parties of critical guidance on developing doctrine and capabilities. More generally, multilateral approaches can only resolve one piece of the puzzle and must complement rather than drive or substitute for U.S. adoption of appropriate unilateral and security measures.
Vice President Harris’s ASAT test ban was specifically designed to address the hawkish and dovish concerns — to reduce space debris and preserve sustainability while avoiding any elements which would undermine security. The U.S. must adopt similarly nuanced approaches to deal with the security concerns of the hawks. For example, whereas the current U.S. position speaks generically of “safe separation,” “space-to-space ASATs,” and “harmful interference,” the specific threat vectors in this category must instead be named and dealt with one by one. One major concern in this area is the potential pre-positioning of dual-use spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) near vulnerable, high-value targets in high orbits during crisis or peacetime. Such pre-positioning would be highly destabilizing: a proverbial Sword of Damocles looming over critical systems which have thus far been mostly safe, including GPS in medium Earth orbits and early warning and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) in geostationary orbits. In a potential Taiwan conflict later this decade, for example, China might be tempted to leverage such threats to deter U.S. intervention, or even decide to attack these assets in a miscalculated effort to force the U.S. to back down or simply to hamper the U.S.’s strategic and operational capabilities. This threat can be defused almost entirely, but only if dealt with well in advance and only by adopting a properly calibrated two-track approach.
On the one hand, diplomatic engagement is necessary and appropriate — both coordinating with our allies and engaging with potential adversaries. On the other hand, the U.S. should not be afraid to make unilateral declarations to elucidate our perspective on relevant norms of behavior and the contours of international law. Most importantly, these diplomatic efforts must occur contemporaneously with the U.S. adoption of unilateral measures designed to give teeth to these rules and norms and ensure adequate deterrence and de-escalation tools. Measures might include the fielding and deployment of “bodyguards” to protect these high-value assets; clear articulation of policy contours and a strong legal foundation
Such vagueness runs the risk of either derailing consensus or producing agreement only on principles so broad and flexible as to be meaningless. Even worse, a lack of specificity would deprive the U.S. Defense Department and other parties of critical guidance on developing doctrine and capabilities. More generally, multilateral approaches can only resolve one piece of the puzzle and must complement rather than drive or substitute for U.S. adoption of appropriate unilateral and security measures.
Vice President Harris’s ASAT test ban was specifically designed to address the hawkish and dovish concerns — to reduce space debris and preserve sustainability while avoiding any elements which would undermine security. The U.S. must adopt similarly nuanced approaches to deal with the security concerns of the hawks. For example, whereas the current U.S. position speaks generically of “safe separation,” “space-to-space ASATs,” and “harmful interference,” the specific threat vectors in this category must instead be named and dealt with one by one. One major concern in this area is the potential pre-positioning of dual-use spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) near vulnerable, high-value targets in high orbits during crisis or peacetime. Such pre-positioning would be highly destabilizing: a proverbial Sword of Damocles looming over critical systems which have thus far been mostly safe, including GPS in medium Earth orbits and early warning and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) in geostationary orbits. In a potential Taiwan conflict later this decade, for example, China might be tempted to leverage such threats to deter U.S. intervention, or even decide to attack these assets in a miscalculated effort to force the U.S. to back down or simply to hamper the U.S.’s strategic and operational capabilities. This threat can be defused almost entirely, but only if dealt with well in advance and only by adopting a properly calibrated two-track approach.
On the one hand, diplomatic engagement is necessary and appropriate — both coordinating with our allies and engaging with potential adversaries. On the other hand, the U.S. should not be afraid to make unilateral declarations to elucidate our perspective on relevant norms of behavior and the contours of international law. Most importantly, these diplomatic efforts must occur contemporaneously with the U.S. adoption of unilateral measures designed to give teeth to these rules and norms and ensure adequate deterrence and de-escalation tools. Measures might include the fielding and deployment of “bodyguards” to protect these high-value assets; clear articulation of policy contours and a strong legal foundation
for “warning/self-defense zones” around such assets; and readying a comprehensive set of graduated-response options. Such actions would ensure that the U.S. can always deter and respond to violations of these internationally agreed-upon rules in a credible and proportionate manner.
Vice President Harris’s ban is a rare example of synthesis between the views of both hawks and doves. It is nuanced, specific, timely, and harnesses both unilateral and multilateral processes. It is also only the first step among many. If the right lessons are learned from it, and if they are then adopted consistently across a range of other threats, the result may be an optimal combination of measures, enabling the U.S. to ensure both peace and prosperity in space and on Earth.
Brian Chow (Ph.D. in physics, MBA with distinction, Ph.D. in finance) is an independent policy analyst with over 160 publications. He can be reached at brianchow.sp@gmail.com. Brandon Kelley is the director of debate at Georgetown University, and a graduate student in the Security Studies Program. He can be reached at bwk9@georgetown.edu.
Vice President Harris’s ban is a rare example of synthesis between the views of both hawks and doves. It is nuanced, specific, timely, and harnesses both unilateral and multilateral processes. It is also only the first step among many. If the right lessons are learned from it, and if they are then adopted consistently across a range of other threats, the result may be an optimal combination of measures, enabling the U.S. to ensure both peace and prosperity in space and on Earth.
Brian Chow (Ph.D. in physics, MBA with distinction, Ph.D. in finance) is an independent policy analyst with over 160 publications. He can be reached at brianchow.sp@gmail.com. Brandon Kelley is the director of debate at Georgetown University, and a graduate student in the Security Studies Program. He can be reached at bwk9@georgetown.edu.
Melting Arctic ice opens new front in strategic power competition
by Sandra Erwin — May 12, 2022
The northern lights glow above a U.S. Army Avenger Air Defense System during Exercise Arctic Edge 2022 at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, in March. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joseph P. Leveille
Warming seas and thinning polar ice caps promise to turn the Arctic into a hub of greater economic activity — and a new hotspot for military competition.
That prospect is shaping U.S. military strategy for Arctic operations and is drawing attention to the importance of space systems to keep watch over the region, monitor the climate and maintain constant communications.
“This is a region of immense geostrategic significance and a key location for global power projection,” said the Department of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy published in 2020.
The Arctic region surrounding the North Pole is more than twice the size of the continental United States. The area is particularly reliant on air and space assets due to its size, inhospitable weather and lack of infrastructure.
The U.S. Air Force and Space Force provide about 80% of all Defense Department resources in the Arctic region, including military bases, training complexes, satellites, command and control stations, and early warning and missile defense radars.
“The Arctic is really key terrain for us,” the Space Force chief of space operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, told SpaceNews in a recent interview.
“We have invested, and we continue to invest in the Arctic. It’s of strategic importance to us, and it’s only going to continue to grow in importance to our nation,” says Chief of Space Operations Gen. John Raymond, shown above shaking hands with an airman at Thule Air Base, Greenland. Credit: DoD
At Clear Space Force Station near Fairbanks, Alaska, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency last year completed construction of a long-range discrimination radar, designed to track ballistic missiles. Space Force units will start operating the radar in 2023.
Raymond noted that the Pentagon’s 2023 budget request includes $68 million to build dormitories for troops expected to be permanently based at Clear. Thule Air Base in Greenland also is home to missile warning, space tracking, and satellite command-and-control units.
“We have invested, and we continue to invest in the Arctic,” said Raymond. “It’s of strategic importance to us, and it’s only going to continue to grow in importance to our nation.”
Clear Space Force Station is one of five major installations the U.S. military operates in Alaska. The others are Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Eielson Air Force Base, Fort Wainwright and Fort Greely.
In its Arctic strategy, last updated in 2019, the Defense Department described the region as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S. homeland and a part of the world where Russia and China are operating more freely. The strategy said DoD “must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the future.”
In 2021, the U.S. Army and Navy published visions for how to posture for the Arctic. These documents highlight the potential for conflict over maritime boundary claims and economic rights.
Russia, for example, requires foreign vessels to obtain permission and be escorted during transit of the Northern Sea Route that runs along the Russian Arctic coast to the Bering Strait, noted the Army’s strategy. “The decreasing amount of sea ice will lead to new routes opening in the future and may become an area of contention as Arctic nations attempt to exert control over key sea lanes.”
For the Navy, the issue is what all this could mean for maritime security. Despite containing the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic region has the potential to connect nearly 75% of the world’s population — linking Asia, Europe and North America, said the Navy’s vision document.
ARCTIC SHOULD REMAIN ‘PEACEFUL’
Overseeing U.S. military operations in the Arctic
by Sandra Erwin — May 12, 2022
The northern lights glow above a U.S. Army Avenger Air Defense System during Exercise Arctic Edge 2022 at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, in March. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joseph P. Leveille
Warming seas and thinning polar ice caps promise to turn the Arctic into a hub of greater economic activity — and a new hotspot for military competition.
That prospect is shaping U.S. military strategy for Arctic operations and is drawing attention to the importance of space systems to keep watch over the region, monitor the climate and maintain constant communications.
“This is a region of immense geostrategic significance and a key location for global power projection,” said the Department of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy published in 2020.
The Arctic region surrounding the North Pole is more than twice the size of the continental United States. The area is particularly reliant on air and space assets due to its size, inhospitable weather and lack of infrastructure.
The U.S. Air Force and Space Force provide about 80% of all Defense Department resources in the Arctic region, including military bases, training complexes, satellites, command and control stations, and early warning and missile defense radars.
“The Arctic is really key terrain for us,” the Space Force chief of space operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, told SpaceNews in a recent interview.
“We have invested, and we continue to invest in the Arctic. It’s of strategic importance to us, and it’s only going to continue to grow in importance to our nation,” says Chief of Space Operations Gen. John Raymond, shown above shaking hands with an airman at Thule Air Base, Greenland. Credit: DoD
At Clear Space Force Station near Fairbanks, Alaska, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency last year completed construction of a long-range discrimination radar, designed to track ballistic missiles. Space Force units will start operating the radar in 2023.
Raymond noted that the Pentagon’s 2023 budget request includes $68 million to build dormitories for troops expected to be permanently based at Clear. Thule Air Base in Greenland also is home to missile warning, space tracking, and satellite command-and-control units.
“We have invested, and we continue to invest in the Arctic,” said Raymond. “It’s of strategic importance to us, and it’s only going to continue to grow in importance to our nation.”
Clear Space Force Station is one of five major installations the U.S. military operates in Alaska. The others are Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Eielson Air Force Base, Fort Wainwright and Fort Greely.
In its Arctic strategy, last updated in 2019, the Defense Department described the region as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S. homeland and a part of the world where Russia and China are operating more freely. The strategy said DoD “must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the future.”
In 2021, the U.S. Army and Navy published visions for how to posture for the Arctic. These documents highlight the potential for conflict over maritime boundary claims and economic rights.
Russia, for example, requires foreign vessels to obtain permission and be escorted during transit of the Northern Sea Route that runs along the Russian Arctic coast to the Bering Strait, noted the Army’s strategy. “The decreasing amount of sea ice will lead to new routes opening in the future and may become an area of contention as Arctic nations attempt to exert control over key sea lanes.”
For the Navy, the issue is what all this could mean for maritime security. Despite containing the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic region has the potential to connect nearly 75% of the world’s population — linking Asia, Europe and North America, said the Navy’s vision document.
ARCTIC SHOULD REMAIN ‘PEACEFUL’
Overseeing U.S. military operations in the Arctic
is Gen. Glen VanHerck, head of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
VanHerck told lawmakers during a hearing this spring on Capitol Hill that military efforts in the Arctic are meant to ensure the area remains “peaceful, stable and cooperative.” He noted that the United States is one of eight nations that in 1996 formed the Arctic Council. The other seven members are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.
There are now concerns that as Russia becomes more isolated following its invasion of Ukraine, it could take a more aggressive posture in the Arctic. Russia’s eastern border is only 90 kilometers across the Bering Strait from the coast of Alaska.
VanHerck noted that 25 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product comes from oil, minerals and other natural resources extracted in the Arctic. “So they absolutely have a vested interest in the Arctic, and they also want to ensure that it is secure for their efforts.”
Over the past several years, Russia has revitalized a dozen or so military installations in the Arctic that had sat dormant after the Cold War, said VanHerck. “Not only are they placing defensive capabilities that they state are obviously for defensive purposes, they are putting offensive capabilities into the Arctic,” he said, including missiles that could strike North America.
Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 to coordinate efforts in the Arctic. Since then, DoD said in its strategy document, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure, and establishing military bases along its Arctic coastline.
Russia also has been working to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars and rescue centers, the DoD strategy said. In February 2021, Russia launched the Arktika-M satellite to monitor the climate and environment in the region.
The United States is also watching China’s moves in the Arctic. “China calls itself a near-Arctic nation and wants to be influential in the Arctic as well,” said VanHerck.
Concerning U.S. capabilities, “I would assess that we’re in the game plan development,” he told the House Armed Services Committee. “We’re not able to have the persistence that I need to compete day-to-day in the Arctic.”
Another looming concern for DoD is how climate change could impact U.S. military infrastructure in the Arctic. The issue was investigated recently by the department’s inspector general, who concluded in a report last month that DoD will need to invest billions of dollars to make military installations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic more resilient to climate change.
The IG evaluated Thule Air Base in Greenland and DoD’s five military bases in Alaska.
“Officials from all six installations identified current climate and energy challenges, such as cracked runways, sunken foundations, and multiple power outages,” said the IG report. At most of these installations, the “day-to-day focus was on reacting to immediate problems or reducing risk to existing hazards, rather than planning for future hazards.”
The report said some construction projects at Army, Air Force and Space Force installations are already being funded to support increased Arctic operations.
MORE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
There is a huge need in the Arctic for reliable surveillance and communications systems because miscommunications could trigger unintended conflict, Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, deputy chief of staff for Air Force Futures, said at a Wilson Center panel discussion.
“Awareness about what is going on in the Arctic is a key part of preserving peace,” he said.
For example, in military wargames, the “avenues of approaches over the Arctic” for enemy missiles or bombers are a major concern. “The Arctic is the shortest route between our competitors and us.”
The U.S. Air Force has operated in the Arctic for decades, Hinote said. “But our use of the Arctic as a strategic buffer is eroding for all the reasons that have been
VanHerck told lawmakers during a hearing this spring on Capitol Hill that military efforts in the Arctic are meant to ensure the area remains “peaceful, stable and cooperative.” He noted that the United States is one of eight nations that in 1996 formed the Arctic Council. The other seven members are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.
There are now concerns that as Russia becomes more isolated following its invasion of Ukraine, it could take a more aggressive posture in the Arctic. Russia’s eastern border is only 90 kilometers across the Bering Strait from the coast of Alaska.
VanHerck noted that 25 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product comes from oil, minerals and other natural resources extracted in the Arctic. “So they absolutely have a vested interest in the Arctic, and they also want to ensure that it is secure for their efforts.”
Over the past several years, Russia has revitalized a dozen or so military installations in the Arctic that had sat dormant after the Cold War, said VanHerck. “Not only are they placing defensive capabilities that they state are obviously for defensive purposes, they are putting offensive capabilities into the Arctic,” he said, including missiles that could strike North America.
Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 to coordinate efforts in the Arctic. Since then, DoD said in its strategy document, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure, and establishing military bases along its Arctic coastline.
Russia also has been working to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars and rescue centers, the DoD strategy said. In February 2021, Russia launched the Arktika-M satellite to monitor the climate and environment in the region.
The United States is also watching China’s moves in the Arctic. “China calls itself a near-Arctic nation and wants to be influential in the Arctic as well,” said VanHerck.
Concerning U.S. capabilities, “I would assess that we’re in the game plan development,” he told the House Armed Services Committee. “We’re not able to have the persistence that I need to compete day-to-day in the Arctic.”
Another looming concern for DoD is how climate change could impact U.S. military infrastructure in the Arctic. The issue was investigated recently by the department’s inspector general, who concluded in a report last month that DoD will need to invest billions of dollars to make military installations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic more resilient to climate change.
The IG evaluated Thule Air Base in Greenland and DoD’s five military bases in Alaska.
“Officials from all six installations identified current climate and energy challenges, such as cracked runways, sunken foundations, and multiple power outages,” said the IG report. At most of these installations, the “day-to-day focus was on reacting to immediate problems or reducing risk to existing hazards, rather than planning for future hazards.”
The report said some construction projects at Army, Air Force and Space Force installations are already being funded to support increased Arctic operations.
MORE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
There is a huge need in the Arctic for reliable surveillance and communications systems because miscommunications could trigger unintended conflict, Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, deputy chief of staff for Air Force Futures, said at a Wilson Center panel discussion.
“Awareness about what is going on in the Arctic is a key part of preserving peace,” he said.
For example, in military wargames, the “avenues of approaches over the Arctic” for enemy missiles or bombers are a major concern. “The Arctic is the shortest route between our competitors and us.”
The U.S. Air Force has operated in the Arctic for decades, Hinote said. “But our use of the Arctic as a strategic buffer is eroding for all the reasons that have been
talked about, especially climate change, and especially with some of the activities that we see Russia and China engaging in.”
The Long Range Discrimination Radar at Clear Space Force Station, Alaska, includes a multi-face radar designed to provide search, track and discrimination capability in support of homeland defense. The complex also includes a mission control facility, power plant and maintenance facility. Credit: Missile Defense Agency
As the Arctic melts, “competition for resources and influence in the region will increase,” he said.
Hinote said the U.S. Air Force in recent years has intercepted and warned away a growing number of Russian military planes flying near the edge of Alaska’s restricted airspace. These security concerns “drove our focus on the Arctic and the release of a strategy.”
Wargames organized by the U.S. military and allies typically have focused on “countering great powers specifically in Europe and in the Asia Pacific,” Hinote said. “And one of the things that we felt like we did not understand as well was how that competition would spill over into the Arctic.”
Live military exercises like NATO’s Cold Response, NORAD’s Operation Noble Defender, and Northern Command’s Arctic Edge are helping the U.S. and allies “understand the nature of the competition,” he said. The submarine-focused Ice Exercise (ICEX) has been held since the 1960s, making it the longest-running Arctic exercise.
To bolster the U.S. posture in the Arctic, the Air Force is stationing 54 F-35 advanced fighter aircraft at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska.
“Alaska is an incredibly well-positioned base of operations for defending the northern approaches to the United States, and this is why so many of the intercepts that happen when an adversary’s aircraft is coming from the north are done with assets that are stationed in Alaska,” Hinote said.
The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy also recommends greater use of space assets to support military and homeland defense efforts.
“Space capabilities are tailor-made to support a region where there is sparse ground infrastructure,” Lt. Gen. William Liquori, deputy chief of space operations for strategy, plans and programs for the U.S. Space Force, said at the Wilson Center panel.
“The satellite command-and-control capabilities that we have at Thule, those are there because military operations are going to happen in the Arctic,” said Liquori. “And that means we’re going to need to have satellite coverage in the Arctic.”
To fill gaps in satellite communications coverage over the Arctic, the Air Force worked out a deal with the Norwegian Space Agency subsidiary Space Norway to launch two U.S. military communications payloads on Norwegian satellites. The payloads, developed by Northrop Grumman, will be integrated into the Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission satellites, projected to launch on a SpaceX rocket in 2023.
Any Arctic strategy has to consider the importance of the space domain, said Mir Sadat, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
The United States is not doing enough to “prepare for the new frontier.” In contrast, Russia and China, by increasing their activities in the region, are positioning to one day take advantage of shorter sea lanes, Sadat said. A key goal for China and Russia is to “reach global markets or military targets faster and much more cheaply,” he said.
Satellites to watch what Russia and others are doing on the ground is another critical capability that the United States might need to expand, said Scott Herman, CEO of Cognitive Space.
The company participated in the recent Arctic Edge 2022 exercise as a military contractor, orchestrating collection opportunities across commercial satellite operators.
Today, many commercial remote-sensing constellations can’t support Arctic activities because they can’t reach those high latitudes, said Herman. But if the Arctic becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, “you may see some adjustments to some of the satellite constellation plans to make sure they’ve
The Long Range Discrimination Radar at Clear Space Force Station, Alaska, includes a multi-face radar designed to provide search, track and discrimination capability in support of homeland defense. The complex also includes a mission control facility, power plant and maintenance facility. Credit: Missile Defense Agency
As the Arctic melts, “competition for resources and influence in the region will increase,” he said.
Hinote said the U.S. Air Force in recent years has intercepted and warned away a growing number of Russian military planes flying near the edge of Alaska’s restricted airspace. These security concerns “drove our focus on the Arctic and the release of a strategy.”
Wargames organized by the U.S. military and allies typically have focused on “countering great powers specifically in Europe and in the Asia Pacific,” Hinote said. “And one of the things that we felt like we did not understand as well was how that competition would spill over into the Arctic.”
Live military exercises like NATO’s Cold Response, NORAD’s Operation Noble Defender, and Northern Command’s Arctic Edge are helping the U.S. and allies “understand the nature of the competition,” he said. The submarine-focused Ice Exercise (ICEX) has been held since the 1960s, making it the longest-running Arctic exercise.
To bolster the U.S. posture in the Arctic, the Air Force is stationing 54 F-35 advanced fighter aircraft at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska.
“Alaska is an incredibly well-positioned base of operations for defending the northern approaches to the United States, and this is why so many of the intercepts that happen when an adversary’s aircraft is coming from the north are done with assets that are stationed in Alaska,” Hinote said.
The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy also recommends greater use of space assets to support military and homeland defense efforts.
“Space capabilities are tailor-made to support a region where there is sparse ground infrastructure,” Lt. Gen. William Liquori, deputy chief of space operations for strategy, plans and programs for the U.S. Space Force, said at the Wilson Center panel.
“The satellite command-and-control capabilities that we have at Thule, those are there because military operations are going to happen in the Arctic,” said Liquori. “And that means we’re going to need to have satellite coverage in the Arctic.”
To fill gaps in satellite communications coverage over the Arctic, the Air Force worked out a deal with the Norwegian Space Agency subsidiary Space Norway to launch two U.S. military communications payloads on Norwegian satellites. The payloads, developed by Northrop Grumman, will be integrated into the Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission satellites, projected to launch on a SpaceX rocket in 2023.
Any Arctic strategy has to consider the importance of the space domain, said Mir Sadat, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
The United States is not doing enough to “prepare for the new frontier.” In contrast, Russia and China, by increasing their activities in the region, are positioning to one day take advantage of shorter sea lanes, Sadat said. A key goal for China and Russia is to “reach global markets or military targets faster and much more cheaply,” he said.
Satellites to watch what Russia and others are doing on the ground is another critical capability that the United States might need to expand, said Scott Herman, CEO of Cognitive Space.
The company participated in the recent Arctic Edge 2022 exercise as a military contractor, orchestrating collection opportunities across commercial satellite operators.
Today, many commercial remote-sensing constellations can’t support Arctic activities because they can’t reach those high latitudes, said Herman. But if the Arctic becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, “you may see some adjustments to some of the satellite constellation plans to make sure they’ve
got sufficient northern exposure.”
In its strategy, the Department of the Air Force said there is a need for “domain awareness through new technologies ranging from over the horizon radar to space assets.”
FEARS OF ‘MISCOMMUNICATION’
Michael Sfraga, chair and distinguished fellow of the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, said an imminent war in the Arctic is unlikely.
“I think that’s a low probability,” said Sfraga, who is based in Alaska. But he believes the risk will increase as countries step up activities.
“The higher probability, unfortunately, is a miscommunication: An exercise gone wrong, a missile fired by mistake, Russian bombers are escorted out of our airspace and there’s a miscommunication between pilots,” he said.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now casts things in a different light, he added. “No one thought something like Ukraine would actually happen. If anybody would have told you 20 years ago that China would have built islands in the South China Sea and claimed that territory, I would have said that seems pretty far-fetched.” The lesson for the United States is to remain “vigilant and diligent.”
It’s well known that Russia derives a significant portion of its GDP from natural resource development in the Arctic, Sfraga said. It’s also continuing to expand its military presence and capabilities in the region. “China, which sometimes forgets that it’s not actually an Arctic state, is doing everything it can to establish its own influence in Arctic governance and economic development.”
“While there’s no imminent threat of conflict in the Arctic, the increasing activity and proximity of these aggressive powers requires the U.S. to maintain situational awareness and operational capacity,” he said.
The United States has to be better prepared to operate in the Arctic, Sfraga said, and noted that satellite-based services are sorely needed in the area.
“Satellite communications, imagery, all of those things are very important to our national and civil security, search and rescue,” he said. “There’s just limited capacity.”
“Presence equals influence,” he said. “Showing potential adversaries that you can actually conduct operations and protect your own interests in a landscape like the Arctic serves as a deterrent and is incredibly important.”
This article originally appeared in the May 2022 issue of SpaceNews magazine.
In its strategy, the Department of the Air Force said there is a need for “domain awareness through new technologies ranging from over the horizon radar to space assets.”
FEARS OF ‘MISCOMMUNICATION’
Michael Sfraga, chair and distinguished fellow of the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, said an imminent war in the Arctic is unlikely.
“I think that’s a low probability,” said Sfraga, who is based in Alaska. But he believes the risk will increase as countries step up activities.
“The higher probability, unfortunately, is a miscommunication: An exercise gone wrong, a missile fired by mistake, Russian bombers are escorted out of our airspace and there’s a miscommunication between pilots,” he said.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now casts things in a different light, he added. “No one thought something like Ukraine would actually happen. If anybody would have told you 20 years ago that China would have built islands in the South China Sea and claimed that territory, I would have said that seems pretty far-fetched.” The lesson for the United States is to remain “vigilant and diligent.”
It’s well known that Russia derives a significant portion of its GDP from natural resource development in the Arctic, Sfraga said. It’s also continuing to expand its military presence and capabilities in the region. “China, which sometimes forgets that it’s not actually an Arctic state, is doing everything it can to establish its own influence in Arctic governance and economic development.”
“While there’s no imminent threat of conflict in the Arctic, the increasing activity and proximity of these aggressive powers requires the U.S. to maintain situational awareness and operational capacity,” he said.
The United States has to be better prepared to operate in the Arctic, Sfraga said, and noted that satellite-based services are sorely needed in the area.
“Satellite communications, imagery, all of those things are very important to our national and civil security, search and rescue,” he said. “There’s just limited capacity.”
“Presence equals influence,” he said. “Showing potential adversaries that you can actually conduct operations and protect your own interests in a landscape like the Arctic serves as a deterrent and is incredibly important.”
This article originally appeared in the May 2022 issue of SpaceNews magazine.
The Sun is about 150 million kilometers ( 1 AU, or 93 million miles ) from Earth. Astronomers originally measured its distance by triangulation, but they now use radar, bounced either directly from the Sun or from other bodies whose distance is known in AU from Kepler's third law. knowing the Sun's distance, we can find its radius form its angular size.