#Announcement
🌐 On October 24-31, the Multinational Youth Geography Olympiad MY-GEO 2026 will be held at the Sirius Federal Territory of Russia.
During the competition, students will discuss the socio-economic development of territories in light of their natural potential, climate change and associated risks, transport and tourism, and comfortable urban environments.
✅ The Olympiad will be held in English and consist of three rounds: theoretical, practical and multimedia.
Students aged 15–18 can participate in teams of 2 to 6 members. Each team may be accompanied by two team leaders and up to two observers (aged 18 and above).
Each country may be represented only by one team.
👉 Registration is open until September 27 on the official website.
Any questions may be addressed via email: buksha.ay@talantiuspeh.ru.
#Sirius
#Geography
#Science
During the competition, students will discuss the socio-economic development of territories in light of their natural potential, climate change and associated risks, transport and tourism, and comfortable urban environments.
Students aged 15–18 can participate in teams of 2 to 6 members. Each team may be accompanied by two team leaders and up to two observers (aged 18 and above).
Each country may be represented only by one team.
Any questions may be addressed via email: buksha.ay@talantiuspeh.ru.
#Sirius
#Geography
#Science
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🎙️Комментарий Посольства России в Норвегии в связи со статьей в газете «Aftenposten» (10 августа 2026 г.)
В связи со статьей «Hun er Russlands rikeste kvinne. Nå brenner forretningsimperiet hennes» от 8 августа 2026 г. хотели бы обратить внимание на формулировку в подзаголовке статьи: «væpnede tsjetsjenske banditter» («вооруженные чеченские бандиты»). Показательно, что в самом тексте статьи используется более нейтральная формулировка - «væpnede tsjetsjenske menn» («вооруженные чеченские мужчины»).
То есть сама редакция, судя по всему, чувствовала разницу между этими двумя определениями, но оставила более хлесткий и негативно окрашенный вариант именно в резюме - том фрагменте, который читает наибольшее число людей и который формирует первое впечатление от материала.
Преступность не имеет национальности. В России проживает около 200 народов и этносов, и увязывание с их этнической принадлежностью криминального поведения конкретной группы лиц бросает тень на весь народ, а не только на причастных к конфликту лиц.
Хотели бы также напомнить, что в Норвегии проживает многотысячная чеченская диаспора - люди, многие из которых давно стали частью норвежского общества. Формулировка вроде «tsjetsjenske banditter» в заголовочном блоке крупной норвежской газеты читается и воспринимается этой аудиторией как ярлык, навешанный на весь народ по имени, а не по факту причастности к конкретному эпизоду. Хотелось бы верить, что редакция, дорожащая репутацией издания не стремилась сознательно задеть эту группу читателей, но результат от этого не меняется.
Отдельно хотели бы отметить фактическую асимметрию, которую, на мой взгляд, стоило бы иметь в виду. Сама героиня статьи, Татьяна Ким, - этническая кореянка, родившаяся в Грозном, тогдашней столице Чечено-Ингушской АССР. Об этом в статье не сказано ни слова, хотя это заметная и по-человечески интересная деталь её биографии. Получается, что этническая принадлежность упоминается только применительно к вооруженным людям, а собственное происхождение главной героини - как раз тесно связанное с Чечней - остается за кадром. Такая избирательность в использовании этнических маркеров, даже неумышленная, создает однобокое впечатление у читателя.
Предложили бы редакции рассмотреть возможность уточнения формулировки в подзаголовке и при последующих публикациях на эту тему воздерживаться от негативно окрашенных формулировок, связанных с этнической принадлежностью.
В связи со статьей «Hun er Russlands rikeste kvinne. Nå brenner forretningsimperiet hennes» от 8 августа 2026 г. хотели бы обратить внимание на формулировку в подзаголовке статьи: «væpnede tsjetsjenske banditter» («вооруженные чеченские бандиты»). Показательно, что в самом тексте статьи используется более нейтральная формулировка - «væpnede tsjetsjenske menn» («вооруженные чеченские мужчины»).
То есть сама редакция, судя по всему, чувствовала разницу между этими двумя определениями, но оставила более хлесткий и негативно окрашенный вариант именно в резюме - том фрагменте, который читает наибольшее число людей и который формирует первое впечатление от материала.
Преступность не имеет национальности. В России проживает около 200 народов и этносов, и увязывание с их этнической принадлежностью криминального поведения конкретной группы лиц бросает тень на весь народ, а не только на причастных к конфликту лиц.
Хотели бы также напомнить, что в Норвегии проживает многотысячная чеченская диаспора - люди, многие из которых давно стали частью норвежского общества. Формулировка вроде «tsjetsjenske banditter» в заголовочном блоке крупной норвежской газеты читается и воспринимается этой аудиторией как ярлык, навешанный на весь народ по имени, а не по факту причастности к конкретному эпизоду. Хотелось бы верить, что редакция, дорожащая репутацией издания не стремилась сознательно задеть эту группу читателей, но результат от этого не меняется.
Отдельно хотели бы отметить фактическую асимметрию, которую, на мой взгляд, стоило бы иметь в виду. Сама героиня статьи, Татьяна Ким, - этническая кореянка, родившаяся в Грозном, тогдашней столице Чечено-Ингушской АССР. Об этом в статье не сказано ни слова, хотя это заметная и по-человечески интересная деталь её биографии. Получается, что этническая принадлежность упоминается только применительно к вооруженным людям, а собственное происхождение главной героини - как раз тесно связанное с Чечней - остается за кадром. Такая избирательность в использовании этнических маркеров, даже неумышленная, создает однобокое впечатление у читателя.
Предложили бы редакции рассмотреть возможность уточнения формулировки в подзаголовке и при последующих публикациях на эту тему воздерживаться от негативно окрашенных формулировок, связанных с этнической принадлежностью.
🎙️Statement by the Embassy of Russia in Norway regarding an article in the «Aftenposten» newspaper (10 August 2026)
In response to the article ‘Hun er Russlands rikeste kvinne. Nå brenner forretningsimperiet hennes’, published on 8 August 2026, we would like to draw attention to the wording in the article’s subheading: ‘væpnede tsjetsjenske banditter’ (‘armed Chechen bandits’). It is telling that the body of the article itself uses a more neutral phrase – ‘armed Chechen men’. In other words, the editorial team itself apparently recognised the difference between these two terms, but retained the more inflammatory and negatively charged version specifically in the summary – the section read by the greatest number of people and which forms the first impression of the article.
Crime has no nationality. Around 200 nationalities and ethnic groups live in Russia, and linking the criminal behaviour of a specific group of individuals to their ethnic background casts a shadow over the entire people, not just those involved in the conflict.
We would also like to point out that Norway is home to a Chechen diaspora numbering many thousands — people, many of whom have long since become part of Norwegian society. A phrase such as ‘tsjetsjenske banditter’ in the headline of a major Norwegian newspaper is read and perceived by this audience as a label applied to the entire people by name, rather than on the basis of actual involvement in a specific incident. One would like to believe that the editorial team, which values the publication’s reputation, did not set out to deliberately offend this group of readers, but the outcome remains the same.
We would also like to highlight a factual asymmetry which, in my view, is worth bearing in mind. The article’s subject, Tatyana Kim, is an ethnic Korean born in Grozny, then the capital of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Not a word is said about this in the article, although it is a notable and, on a human level, interesting detail of her biography. It appears that ethnic background is mentioned only in relation to armed individuals, whilst the main protagonist’s own origins – which are, in fact, closely linked to Chechnya – remain unmentioned. Such selectivity in the use of ethnic markers, even if unintentional, creates a one-sided impression for the reader.
We would suggest that the editorial team consider clarifying the wording in the subheading and, in future publications on this topic, refrain from using negatively connoted language relating to ethnic background.
In response to the article ‘Hun er Russlands rikeste kvinne. Nå brenner forretningsimperiet hennes’, published on 8 August 2026, we would like to draw attention to the wording in the article’s subheading: ‘væpnede tsjetsjenske banditter’ (‘armed Chechen bandits’). It is telling that the body of the article itself uses a more neutral phrase – ‘armed Chechen men’. In other words, the editorial team itself apparently recognised the difference between these two terms, but retained the more inflammatory and negatively charged version specifically in the summary – the section read by the greatest number of people and which forms the first impression of the article.
Crime has no nationality. Around 200 nationalities and ethnic groups live in Russia, and linking the criminal behaviour of a specific group of individuals to their ethnic background casts a shadow over the entire people, not just those involved in the conflict.
We would also like to point out that Norway is home to a Chechen diaspora numbering many thousands — people, many of whom have long since become part of Norwegian society. A phrase such as ‘tsjetsjenske banditter’ in the headline of a major Norwegian newspaper is read and perceived by this audience as a label applied to the entire people by name, rather than on the basis of actual involvement in a specific incident. One would like to believe that the editorial team, which values the publication’s reputation, did not set out to deliberately offend this group of readers, but the outcome remains the same.
We would also like to highlight a factual asymmetry which, in my view, is worth bearing in mind. The article’s subject, Tatyana Kim, is an ethnic Korean born in Grozny, then the capital of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Not a word is said about this in the article, although it is a notable and, on a human level, interesting detail of her biography. It appears that ethnic background is mentioned only in relation to armed individuals, whilst the main protagonist’s own origins – which are, in fact, closely linked to Chechnya – remain unmentioned. Such selectivity in the use of ethnic markers, even if unintentional, creates a one-sided impression for the reader.
We would suggest that the editorial team consider clarifying the wording in the subheading and, in future publications on this topic, refrain from using negatively connoted language relating to ethnic background.
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Forwarded from Russian MFA 🇷🇺
🎙 Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a media question regarding Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement on a proposal for Russia and Ukraine to introduce a moratorium on military activities in the Black Sea (August 14, 2026)
❓ Question: Has the Russian Side received Turkiye’s proposal to introduce a moratorium on military activities in the Black Sea, and is it prepared to consider such an option?
💬 Maria Zakharova: We traditionally give careful consideration to all peace initiatives put forward by our foreign partners, especially by Turkiye, which is an important regional player and our neighbour on the Black Sea.
Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently said in a media interview that Ankara had conveyed proposals to the Russian and Ukrainian sides on introducing a moratorium on military activities in the Black Sea.
❌ The Russian Side has not received through official channels any formal Turkiye’s proposal setting out the specific terms of this initiative.
If this refers to a one-sided arrangement along the lines of the 2022-2023 scheme, better known as the Black Sea Initiative, under which Moscow suspended military activities in the Black Sea – more precisely, retaliatory measures to protect Russian port infrastructure and energy facilities – then returning to that format would be inadvisable.
☝️ The arrangement was conditional on reciprocal measures by the other side. Those measures never followed.
At the time, as you may recall, we agreed to the moratorium in exchange for access for Russian agricultural products to global markets.
However, the West demonstrated a bad-faith approach: the humanitarian corridor we provided came to be widely used for terrorist attacks against Russian civilian and military facilities, while Russian agricultural products remained under sanctions. This ultimately led to the termination of the Black Sea Initiative.
Today, we regularly face brazen acts of terrorism carried out by Ukrainian drones in the Black Sea against civilian vessels from coastal states, several times a month. We regard these attacks as a deliberate policy aimed at destabilising civilian shipping in the Black Sea region, further escalating tensions and prolonging the conflict, with the open acquiescence of neighbouring countries in the region.
At the same time, we see no prerequisites for the situation to improve and, consequently, no grounds for half-measures that merely give the Kiev regime a temporary respite.
We have recently seen a growing number of international calls for a ceasefire and for settling the situation around Ukraine through familiar short-term arrangements.
Our position on these proposals and on the issue as a whole remains unchanged 👉 A sustainable and long-term settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is possible only if its root causes are eliminated.
❗️ First and foremost, this means removing the security threats created by #NATO’s eastward expansion and attempts to draw Kiev into the alliance.
It is equally important to secure guarantees for the restoration and observance of the legitimate rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in the territories that remain under the control of the Kiev regime.
❓ Question: Has the Russian Side received Turkiye’s proposal to introduce a moratorium on military activities in the Black Sea, and is it prepared to consider such an option?
💬 Maria Zakharova: We traditionally give careful consideration to all peace initiatives put forward by our foreign partners, especially by Turkiye, which is an important regional player and our neighbour on the Black Sea.
Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently said in a media interview that Ankara had conveyed proposals to the Russian and Ukrainian sides on introducing a moratorium on military activities in the Black Sea.
❌ The Russian Side has not received through official channels any formal Turkiye’s proposal setting out the specific terms of this initiative.
If this refers to a one-sided arrangement along the lines of the 2022-2023 scheme, better known as the Black Sea Initiative, under which Moscow suspended military activities in the Black Sea – more precisely, retaliatory measures to protect Russian port infrastructure and energy facilities – then returning to that format would be inadvisable.
☝️ The arrangement was conditional on reciprocal measures by the other side. Those measures never followed.
At the time, as you may recall, we agreed to the moratorium in exchange for access for Russian agricultural products to global markets.
However, the West demonstrated a bad-faith approach: the humanitarian corridor we provided came to be widely used for terrorist attacks against Russian civilian and military facilities, while Russian agricultural products remained under sanctions. This ultimately led to the termination of the Black Sea Initiative.
Today, we regularly face brazen acts of terrorism carried out by Ukrainian drones in the Black Sea against civilian vessels from coastal states, several times a month. We regard these attacks as a deliberate policy aimed at destabilising civilian shipping in the Black Sea region, further escalating tensions and prolonging the conflict, with the open acquiescence of neighbouring countries in the region.
At the same time, we see no prerequisites for the situation to improve and, consequently, no grounds for half-measures that merely give the Kiev regime a temporary respite.
We have recently seen a growing number of international calls for a ceasefire and for settling the situation around Ukraine through familiar short-term arrangements.
Our position on these proposals and on the issue as a whole remains unchanged 👉 A sustainable and long-term settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is possible only if its root causes are eliminated.
❗️ First and foremost, this means removing the security threats created by #NATO’s eastward expansion and attempts to draw Kiev into the alliance.
It is equally important to secure guarantees for the restoration and observance of the legitimate rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in the territories that remain under the control of the Kiev regime.
🎙️Комментарий Посольства России в Норвегии для газеты «Афтенпостен» о референдуме в Исландии (19 августа 2026 г.)
Россия не вмешивается во внутренние дела суверенных государств. С полным уважением относимся к суверенному праву исландского народа на волеизъявление. Россия ничего не выигрывает от любого возможного исхода этого голосования.
Спекуляции о «российском вмешательстве» активно тиражируются проевропейскими силами в Исландии для эксплуатации русофобии и продвижения курса на вступление в ЕС, создавая искусственную дихотомию «Россия или ЕС».
Реальное давление на исландскую аудиторию оказывают представители Евросоюза. Власти Исландии официально просили Еврокомиссию воздержаться от вмешательства в предвыборную кампанию, однако высокопоставленные чиновники ЕС продолжают искать обходные пути. 20 июля Исландию посетил глава МИД Франции Жан-Ноэль Барро, заявивший, что стране «абсолютно нечего терять» в переговорах о вступлении.
Показателен промежуточный доклад Комитета по судебной системе Палаты представителей США от 3 февраля, где описано, как Еврокомиссия под видом борьбы с дезинформацией давила на онлайн-платформы в ряде стран (Словакия, Нидерланды, Франция, Румыния, Молдавия, Ирландия). При этом в том же докладе не найдено доказательств российского вмешательства в выборы в Румынии.
Что касается Норвегии, то 2/3 норвежцев стабильно против вступления в ЕС. Большинство не видит смысла в присоединении к объединению с внутренними проблемами. России не на что влиять, да и незачем – Норвегия все равно поддерживает все антироссийские санкции.
Призываем обратить внимание на тех, кто объективно заинтересован в расширении ЕС, – на евробюрократию, а не искать российский след там, где его нет.
Ссылка на статью
Россия не вмешивается во внутренние дела суверенных государств. С полным уважением относимся к суверенному праву исландского народа на волеизъявление. Россия ничего не выигрывает от любого возможного исхода этого голосования.
Спекуляции о «российском вмешательстве» активно тиражируются проевропейскими силами в Исландии для эксплуатации русофобии и продвижения курса на вступление в ЕС, создавая искусственную дихотомию «Россия или ЕС».
Реальное давление на исландскую аудиторию оказывают представители Евросоюза. Власти Исландии официально просили Еврокомиссию воздержаться от вмешательства в предвыборную кампанию, однако высокопоставленные чиновники ЕС продолжают искать обходные пути. 20 июля Исландию посетил глава МИД Франции Жан-Ноэль Барро, заявивший, что стране «абсолютно нечего терять» в переговорах о вступлении.
Показателен промежуточный доклад Комитета по судебной системе Палаты представителей США от 3 февраля, где описано, как Еврокомиссия под видом борьбы с дезинформацией давила на онлайн-платформы в ряде стран (Словакия, Нидерланды, Франция, Румыния, Молдавия, Ирландия). При этом в том же докладе не найдено доказательств российского вмешательства в выборы в Румынии.
Что касается Норвегии, то 2/3 норвежцев стабильно против вступления в ЕС. Большинство не видит смысла в присоединении к объединению с внутренними проблемами. России не на что влиять, да и незачем – Норвегия все равно поддерживает все антироссийские санкции.
Призываем обратить внимание на тех, кто объективно заинтересован в расширении ЕС, – на евробюрократию, а не искать российский след там, где его нет.
Ссылка на статью
🎙️Comment of the Embassy of Russia in Norway to “Aftenposten” regarding alleged Russian influence on the referendum in Iceland (19 August 2026)
👆🏻It is futile to look for evidence where none exists. Russia has no intention to influence the outcome of the referendum in Iceland, nor does it seek to influence domestic political processes in other countries.
We treat with the utmost respect the sovereign right of the Icelandic people to express their will. Russia has nothing to gain from any possible outcome of this vote.
It is noted that "Russian interference" narrative is being most actively employed by pro-European forces in Iceland. In doing so, they seek to exploit the Russophobic sentiments of the electorate in order to secure greater support for the country's accession to the European Union, thereby de facto presenting voters with an artificial and contrived choice between Russia and the EU.
At the same time, one cannot underestimate the influence that representatives of the European Union and its institutions exert on the Icelandic public. According to available information, on the eve of the vote, a large amount of EU officials arrived in Iceland, openly advocating for the country’s accession to the EU. The situation has reached the point where Icelandic authorities have officially asked the European Commission to refrain from interfering in the election campaign. However, high-ranking EU officials are still seeking ways to support those in favor of membership without provoking Reykjavik’s displeasure. For example, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barro recently visited Iceland and stated that the country has absolutely nothing to lose in negotiations on EU accession. It is precisely such overt attempts to exert pressure that should be cause for concern.
Attention should be focused on those who have a genuine stake in a specific outcome namely, the entities that stand to benefit directly from EU enlargement. In this context, the interim report by the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, published on February 3 of this year, is highly indicative. It describes in detail how the European Commission, under the pretext of combating disinformation, exerted pressure on online platforms under the Digital Services Act (DSA), demanding that they remove or restrict political content ahead of national elections in Slovakia (2023), the Netherlands (2023 and 2025), France (2024), Romania (2024), Moldova (2024), Ireland (2024 and 2025), as well as ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. It is noteworthy that the same report concludes that there is no evidence of Russian interference in the 2024 presidential election in Romania.
As for a possible referendum on Norway’s EU membership, according to the latest poll conducted by the polling agency Verian for TV2, 65.9% of Norwegians oppose accession , and this figure has remained stable for a long time. It is clear that the majority of Norwegians see no point in joining an integration bloc that is losing influence in the global economy, facing a whole range of internal problems, and yet constantly encroaching on the sovereignty of its member states. Given these public sentiments, Norway’s leading political forces have repeatedly confirmed that they will not initiate a new referendum in the foreseeable future . Russia has no leverage in this matter, nor would there be any reason to seek it, given that Norway, despite remaining outside the EU, nonetheless aligns itself with most of the bloc’s illegal restrictive measures against Russia.
We suggest that anyone expressing concern about “Russian interference” take a closer look at those who have an objective interest in Iceland and Norway joining the EU as soon as possible. In addition to the pro-EU political forces in these countries, the Eurocracy clearly has a vested interest in expansion.
Read in full
👆🏻It is futile to look for evidence where none exists. Russia has no intention to influence the outcome of the referendum in Iceland, nor does it seek to influence domestic political processes in other countries.
We treat with the utmost respect the sovereign right of the Icelandic people to express their will. Russia has nothing to gain from any possible outcome of this vote.
It is noted that "Russian interference" narrative is being most actively employed by pro-European forces in Iceland. In doing so, they seek to exploit the Russophobic sentiments of the electorate in order to secure greater support for the country's accession to the European Union, thereby de facto presenting voters with an artificial and contrived choice between Russia and the EU.
At the same time, one cannot underestimate the influence that representatives of the European Union and its institutions exert on the Icelandic public. According to available information, on the eve of the vote, a large amount of EU officials arrived in Iceland, openly advocating for the country’s accession to the EU. The situation has reached the point where Icelandic authorities have officially asked the European Commission to refrain from interfering in the election campaign. However, high-ranking EU officials are still seeking ways to support those in favor of membership without provoking Reykjavik’s displeasure. For example, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barro recently visited Iceland and stated that the country has absolutely nothing to lose in negotiations on EU accession. It is precisely such overt attempts to exert pressure that should be cause for concern.
Attention should be focused on those who have a genuine stake in a specific outcome namely, the entities that stand to benefit directly from EU enlargement. In this context, the interim report by the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, published on February 3 of this year, is highly indicative. It describes in detail how the European Commission, under the pretext of combating disinformation, exerted pressure on online platforms under the Digital Services Act (DSA), demanding that they remove or restrict political content ahead of national elections in Slovakia (2023), the Netherlands (2023 and 2025), France (2024), Romania (2024), Moldova (2024), Ireland (2024 and 2025), as well as ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. It is noteworthy that the same report concludes that there is no evidence of Russian interference in the 2024 presidential election in Romania.
As for a possible referendum on Norway’s EU membership, according to the latest poll conducted by the polling agency Verian for TV2, 65.9% of Norwegians oppose accession , and this figure has remained stable for a long time. It is clear that the majority of Norwegians see no point in joining an integration bloc that is losing influence in the global economy, facing a whole range of internal problems, and yet constantly encroaching on the sovereignty of its member states. Given these public sentiments, Norway’s leading political forces have repeatedly confirmed that they will not initiate a new referendum in the foreseeable future . Russia has no leverage in this matter, nor would there be any reason to seek it, given that Norway, despite remaining outside the EU, nonetheless aligns itself with most of the bloc’s illegal restrictive measures against Russia.
We suggest that anyone expressing concern about “Russian interference” take a closer look at those who have an objective interest in Iceland and Norway joining the EU as soon as possible. In addition to the pro-EU political forces in these countries, the Eurocracy clearly has a vested interest in expansion.
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🇷🇺 On August 22, Russia marks National Flag Day, established by a Presidential Decree in 1994.
On this day, we pay tribute to one of Russia’s official state symbols, which, together with the national emblem and anthem, represents the country’s sovereignty and independence and reflects the continuity of generations of its multinational people.
Today, the Russian flag is also a visible symbol of protection and the future. In the special military operation zone, servicemen raise the tricolour over liberated settlements.
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The history of the Russian tricolour spans more than three centuries. In 1693, the young Peter the Great raised it as his personal standard in Arkhangelsk, and in 1705 he ordered the white-blue-red flag to be flown on merchant ships. Until the 19th century, Russian sailors would erect a commemorative cross on the shores of newly acquired territories.
In 1806, a new tradition emerged. A Russian expedition explored the coast of southern Sakhalin and raised two flags on shore. The St Andrew’s Flag symbolised the role of the Russian Navy, while the white-blue-red flag marked the territory as a new Russian possession. The tricolour became the national flag in 1896, on the eve of the coronation of Nicholas II.
⚪️🔵🔴 On December 25, 2000, the Federal Constitutional Law “On the State Flag of the Russian Federation” was adopted. Under the law, the State Flag of Russia is a rectangular cloth consisting of three equal horizontal stripes: white on top, blue in the middle, and red on the bottom.
💬 President of Russia Vladimir Putin:
#NationalFlagDay
On this day, we pay tribute to one of Russia’s official state symbols, which, together with the national emblem and anthem, represents the country’s sovereignty and independence and reflects the continuity of generations of its multinational people.
Today, the Russian flag is also a visible symbol of protection and the future. In the special military operation zone, servicemen raise the tricolour over liberated settlements.
***
The history of the Russian tricolour spans more than three centuries. In 1693, the young Peter the Great raised it as his personal standard in Arkhangelsk, and in 1705 he ordered the white-blue-red flag to be flown on merchant ships. Until the 19th century, Russian sailors would erect a commemorative cross on the shores of newly acquired territories.
In 1806, a new tradition emerged. A Russian expedition explored the coast of southern Sakhalin and raised two flags on shore. The St Andrew’s Flag symbolised the role of the Russian Navy, while the white-blue-red flag marked the territory as a new Russian possession. The tricolour became the national flag in 1896, on the eve of the coronation of Nicholas II.
⚪️🔵🔴 On December 25, 2000, the Federal Constitutional Law “On the State Flag of the Russian Federation” was adopted. Under the law, the State Flag of Russia is a rectangular cloth consisting of three equal horizontal stripes: white on top, blue in the middle, and red on the bottom.
💬 President of Russia Vladimir Putin:
Russia is a thousand-year-old country and civilisation, and our national flag is a symbol of our unity.
I am confident that the national flag will always inspire us to move only forward — towards victory — and to uphold the glory of Russia.
#NationalFlagDay
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This year’s Forum will combine high-level strategic discussions, a dedicated programme for the engineering and technical community, and a major industry exhibition.
The business agenda will include a plenary session attended by the President of the Russian Federation, thematic sessions on key areas of energy development, and award ceremonies recognising achievements in the sector.
🌐 In 2025, Russian Energy Week brought together more than 7,000 delegates from around 100 countries.
The Forum is held with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Energy of Russia and the Government of Moscow, and is organised by the Roscongress Foundation.
🔗 Official website
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