ملاحظة: الكتاب يشتمل على الأصل اللاتيني والترجمة الإنجليزية، فالصفحات الزوجية تحتوي على الأصل اللاتيني، والصفحات الفردية تحتوي على الترجمة الإنجليزية، كما في الصورتين، وقد اقتصرت في تصوير الكتاب على تصوير صفحات الترجمة الإنجليزية دون صفحات الأصل اللاتيني، مع تصوير المقدمة والملاحق.
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[أقسام التعريف بحسب الفاضل زاباريلا في كتاب المناهج]
[Types of Definition of Substance]
" Let us begin with the definition of substance. Consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics is of two types: one primary, the other secondary.
[1] The primary, in that it is the known beginning-principle of demonstrative method.
[2] And the secondary, in that it is the unknown end of resolutive method. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" Let us begin with the definition of substance. Consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics is of two types: one primary, the other secondary.
[1] The primary, in that it is the known beginning-principle of demonstrative method.
[2] And the secondary, in that it is the unknown end of resolutive method. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Substance] " Let us begin with the definition of substance. Consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics is of two types: one primary, the other secondary. [1] The primary, in that it is the known beginning-principle of demonstrative…
[First Type of Definition of Substance: Primary]
" Regarding this definition [primary], the Latins take the correct position, since they say that it is not considered correctly except as the middle [term] of a demonstration. For saying “in that it is a middle [term],” they say, “in that it is a beginning-principle.” Now in what possible way is it the beginning-principle of a demonstration except insofar as it is the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism?
Nevertheless, they were deceived in that they held that this definition, in that it is a middle [term], is treated only in the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], although Aristotle considers it in this way in the whole first book.
I do not see how they dare deny this, since Aristotle considers it in the first book in no way other than as the beginning-principle of demonstration. In text no. 42 of the second book, Aristotle said that this definition is immediate and indemonstrable and has the place of a beginning-principle known per se or supposed. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" Regarding this definition [primary], the Latins take the correct position, since they say that it is not considered correctly except as the middle [term] of a demonstration. For saying “in that it is a middle [term],” they say, “in that it is a beginning-principle.” Now in what possible way is it the beginning-principle of a demonstration except insofar as it is the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism?
Nevertheless, they were deceived in that they held that this definition, in that it is a middle [term], is treated only in the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], although Aristotle considers it in this way in the whole first book.
I do not see how they dare deny this, since Aristotle considers it in the first book in no way other than as the beginning-principle of demonstration. In text no. 42 of the second book, Aristotle said that this definition is immediate and indemonstrable and has the place of a beginning-principle known per se or supposed. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Substance] " Let us begin with the definition of substance. Consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics is of two types: one primary, the other secondary. [1] The primary, in that it is the known beginning-principle of demonstrative…
[Second Type of Definition of Substance: Secondary]
" Now when we give regard to the secondary treatment in these books, in which Aristotle conveys the way by which we are led to knowledge of beginning-principles, if they were hidden, [we see that] the definition of a substance is considered as the unknown end of resolutive method. And Aristotle speaks about this in the second book of the Posterior Analytics from text no. 69 up to no. 84. For there he teaches in what way we ought to search for a definition that is an indemonstrable beginning-principle, and he confutes the opinion of Plato, who searched for definition by division, not of course because he completely rejects the use of division, but because he thinks that, as something that does not have syllogistic power, it is not sufficient alone.
He prefers, therefore, a compositive way, which has the power to infer unknown from known. For if the definition of a genus, say animal, is set out to be investigated, Aristotle wants all species of that genus to be looked at as well as those [attributes] that are predicated essentially of the species themselves. Once everything predicated has been gathered and whatever is proper to each of the species has been excepted, the things remaining constitute the definition of the genus.
In a similar way, if we inquire after the definition of a species, we ought to consider the individuals and take everything that is predicated of them, by virtue of what each is; from these we will assemble the definition of the species.
Aristotle called this way compositive, because we gather the definition of the genus from a gathering of the species and a composition of attributes, and the definition of the species from a gathering of individuals.
But nevertheless, if we consider the issue well, this way is resolutive rather than compositive, because to proceed from the lower [species or individuals] to the higher [genus or species] is to go from posteriors to priors, as we demonstrated earlier.
This way, therefore, is nothing other than induction. For from the fact that these predicates appertain to all the species, we gather that the same [predicates] appertain to the genus, and from the fact that they appertain to all individuals, we prove that they appertain to the species.
This compositive way, therefore, has the power of induction, and Aristotle wanted to indicate that in searching for definitions, neither is division alone to be used, nor a compositive way alone without division. Because if we use a compositive way without division, we will gather all those predicates confusedly and without order, for division makes it that we maintain the correct order in laying out the parts of a definition. But for reason of efficacy in proving that which is inquired after, Aristotle prefers a compositive way and ascribes first place to it. For since it has syllogistic power, we get, thanks to it, the whole clarification of the unknown thing, but with division we have no proof, only a disposition of parts. And so if we thus search for a definition, such that by using division we take up all of the parts of the definition in order, and we show by means of induction that they belong to what is being defined because they appertain to all the particulars, this will be the best way of searching for such a definition; it pleased Aristotle wonderfully well. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" Now when we give regard to the secondary treatment in these books, in which Aristotle conveys the way by which we are led to knowledge of beginning-principles, if they were hidden, [we see that] the definition of a substance is considered as the unknown end of resolutive method. And Aristotle speaks about this in the second book of the Posterior Analytics from text no. 69 up to no. 84. For there he teaches in what way we ought to search for a definition that is an indemonstrable beginning-principle, and he confutes the opinion of Plato, who searched for definition by division, not of course because he completely rejects the use of division, but because he thinks that, as something that does not have syllogistic power, it is not sufficient alone.
He prefers, therefore, a compositive way, which has the power to infer unknown from known. For if the definition of a genus, say animal, is set out to be investigated, Aristotle wants all species of that genus to be looked at as well as those [attributes] that are predicated essentially of the species themselves. Once everything predicated has been gathered and whatever is proper to each of the species has been excepted, the things remaining constitute the definition of the genus.
In a similar way, if we inquire after the definition of a species, we ought to consider the individuals and take everything that is predicated of them, by virtue of what each is; from these we will assemble the definition of the species.
Aristotle called this way compositive, because we gather the definition of the genus from a gathering of the species and a composition of attributes, and the definition of the species from a gathering of individuals.
But nevertheless, if we consider the issue well, this way is resolutive rather than compositive, because to proceed from the lower [species or individuals] to the higher [genus or species] is to go from posteriors to priors, as we demonstrated earlier.
This way, therefore, is nothing other than induction. For from the fact that these predicates appertain to all the species, we gather that the same [predicates] appertain to the genus, and from the fact that they appertain to all individuals, we prove that they appertain to the species.
This compositive way, therefore, has the power of induction, and Aristotle wanted to indicate that in searching for definitions, neither is division alone to be used, nor a compositive way alone without division. Because if we use a compositive way without division, we will gather all those predicates confusedly and without order, for division makes it that we maintain the correct order in laying out the parts of a definition. But for reason of efficacy in proving that which is inquired after, Aristotle prefers a compositive way and ascribes first place to it. For since it has syllogistic power, we get, thanks to it, the whole clarification of the unknown thing, but with division we have no proof, only a disposition of parts. And so if we thus search for a definition, such that by using division we take up all of the parts of the definition in order, and we show by means of induction that they belong to what is being defined because they appertain to all the particulars, this will be the best way of searching for such a definition; it pleased Aristotle wonderfully well. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Substance] " Let us begin with the definition of substance. Consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics is of two types: one primary, the other secondary. [1] The primary, in that it is the known beginning-principle of demonstrative…
" From all this it is patent that in the Analytics books the definition of a substance is considered by Aristotle in no other way than:
[1] As the beginning-principle of demonstrative method.
[2] And as the end of resolutive method, if it happens to be unknown and inquired after.
That first consideration is, of course, primary and the latter is secondary, as Aristotle indicated in text no. 42 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], speaking about this definition, when he said, it is a known beginning-principle, or, if it happens to be unknown, it is made manifest not by demonstration but in some other way. He wanted to discourse on this other way afterward, in that part which is titled On the Search for Definition. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
[1] As the beginning-principle of demonstrative method.
[2] And as the end of resolutive method, if it happens to be unknown and inquired after.
That first consideration is, of course, primary and the latter is secondary, as Aristotle indicated in text no. 42 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], speaking about this definition, when he said, it is a known beginning-principle, or, if it happens to be unknown, it is made manifest not by demonstration but in some other way. He wanted to discourse on this other way afterward, in that part which is titled On the Search for Definition. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[أقسام التعريف بحسب الفاضل زاباريلا في كتاب المناهج]
[Discriminating Difference between Definition of Substance and Definition of Accident]
" As with substances, though in another way, all accidents have to be defined by means of form and matter.
Now the genus of an accident holds the place of form and the proper subject is in the place of matter and is taken in the definition as the differentia, as, for instance, the definition of thunder is noise in a cloud; noise, of course, is the genus and form, because every accident is some sort of form, and then cloud is the subject matter that is taken as the differentia separating thunder from other noises.
It would happen otherwise with substances; in them genus has the place of matter and the differentia [the place] of form.
And in substances the matter out of which the thing is composed is internal, but in accidents the matter in which [they] inhere is external.
This definition, composed out of matter and form, is said to be essential or quidditative [after demonstrated, nominal before demonstrated], because the whole essence of the accident is expressed by means of it, that is, by means of the genus restricted by the proper subject performing the function of differentia. For indeed, what is an eclipse other than some sort of privation of the light of the moon? What is thunder other than some sort of noise made in a cloud?
But there is another discriminating difference of great moment between this definition of an accident and the definition of a substance. It pertains especially to the contemplation set out before us, that the definition of a substance by means of matter and form is perfect and lacks nothing, as the definition of man as rational animal is a definition both essential and perfect, because it makes the essence of man so clear that nothing remains to be inquired after. And the reason for this is that since that form belongs in that matter without a middle, it does not depend on any external cause, but is at the same time the essence and cause of the thing. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" As with substances, though in another way, all accidents have to be defined by means of form and matter.
Now the genus of an accident holds the place of form and the proper subject is in the place of matter and is taken in the definition as the differentia, as, for instance, the definition of thunder is noise in a cloud; noise, of course, is the genus and form, because every accident is some sort of form, and then cloud is the subject matter that is taken as the differentia separating thunder from other noises.
It would happen otherwise with substances; in them genus has the place of matter and the differentia [the place] of form.
And in substances the matter out of which the thing is composed is internal, but in accidents the matter in which [they] inhere is external.
This definition, composed out of matter and form, is said to be essential or quidditative [after demonstrated, nominal before demonstrated], because the whole essence of the accident is expressed by means of it, that is, by means of the genus restricted by the proper subject performing the function of differentia. For indeed, what is an eclipse other than some sort of privation of the light of the moon? What is thunder other than some sort of noise made in a cloud?
But there is another discriminating difference of great moment between this definition of an accident and the definition of a substance. It pertains especially to the contemplation set out before us, that the definition of a substance by means of matter and form is perfect and lacks nothing, as the definition of man as rational animal is a definition both essential and perfect, because it makes the essence of man so clear that nothing remains to be inquired after. And the reason for this is that since that form belongs in that matter without a middle, it does not depend on any external cause, but is at the same time the essence and cause of the thing. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[أقسام التعريف بحسب الفاضل زاباريلا في كتاب المناهج]
[Types of Definition of Accident]
" Now the definition of accident is of multiple types.
[1] One is perfect and on all counts complete; this is a demonstration differing in position.
The other is imperfect and deficient; this can be either:
[2] The beginning-principle of a demonstration.
[3] Or the conclusion [of a demonstration].
All this will be easily understood if we clarify what a perfect definition of accident is. For what is highest and perfect in any genus is, normally, the norm by which others of the genus are distinguished. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" Now the definition of accident is of multiple types.
[1] One is perfect and on all counts complete; this is a demonstration differing in position.
The other is imperfect and deficient; this can be either:
[2] The beginning-principle of a demonstration.
[3] Or the conclusion [of a demonstration].
All this will be easily understood if we clarify what a perfect definition of accident is. For what is highest and perfect in any genus is, normally, the norm by which others of the genus are distinguished. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Accident] " Now the definition of accident is of multiple types. [1] One is perfect and on all counts complete; this is a demonstration differing in position. The other is imperfect and deficient; this can be either: [2] The beginning…
[First Type of Definition of Accident: Perfect]
" But now that definition of accident that we spoke of [that is composed out of matter and form] is essential, of course, but nevertheless not perfect, because the essence of an accident depends on an external cause different from the essence itself. And so, when such an essential definition is given in response to the question of what [something] is (quid est), the soul of the one inquiring, especially the soul of a wise man, does not rest, as Averroes noted in a most learned way at the end of the sixth commentary to the second book of the Posterior [Analytics].
For when the quiddity depends on another, external cause, our soul does not rest in knowledge of the quiddity, unless it also knows the cause of that quiddity.
And so for the definition of an accident to be rendered perfect, a little third part, besides matter and form, is required; namely the cause of that form's inherence in that matter.
The perfect definition of an eclipse, therefore, is: A privation of light in the moon on account of interposition of the earth.
And the perfect definition of thunder is: A noise in a cloud on account of the extinction of fire, if in reality this is its cause, as Aristotle supposes. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" But now that definition of accident that we spoke of [that is composed out of matter and form] is essential, of course, but nevertheless not perfect, because the essence of an accident depends on an external cause different from the essence itself. And so, when such an essential definition is given in response to the question of what [something] is (quid est), the soul of the one inquiring, especially the soul of a wise man, does not rest, as Averroes noted in a most learned way at the end of the sixth commentary to the second book of the Posterior [Analytics].
For when the quiddity depends on another, external cause, our soul does not rest in knowledge of the quiddity, unless it also knows the cause of that quiddity.
And so for the definition of an accident to be rendered perfect, a little third part, besides matter and form, is required; namely the cause of that form's inherence in that matter.
The perfect definition of an eclipse, therefore, is: A privation of light in the moon on account of interposition of the earth.
And the perfect definition of thunder is: A noise in a cloud on account of the extinction of fire, if in reality this is its cause, as Aristotle supposes. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Accident] " Now the definition of accident is of multiple types. [1] One is perfect and on all counts complete; this is a demonstration differing in position. The other is imperfect and deficient; this can be either: [2] The beginning…
[Second Type of Definition of Accident: Causal]
" This perfect definition is divided into two imperfect ones, as Averroes notes in commentary 64 to the first book of the Posterior [Analytics]. Of the two, one is the beginning-principle of a demonstration, and the other the conclusion.
For just as both taken together make an intact demonstration, since it contains at the same time the conclusion and the beginning-principles, so, if it is divided into two, one will be only the beginning-principle of the demonstration and the other will be only the conclusion.
For the former, which is conveyed by means of cause alone, is the beginning-principle of the demonstration, as if [for example] we were to say, an eclipse is the interposition of the earth; this, of course, is said to be the definition [only] improperly, since it says what [something] is on account of (propter quid) rather than what [something] is (quid est).
And so, the definition is called causal and is referred to demonstration in no other way than as its beginning-principle, as even Themistius asserts, commenting on text no. 46 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics]. For it is the beginning-principle because it is the middle [term] of a demonstration.
And so, when Aristotle says that some definition is the beginning-principle of a demonstration, he, of course, means principally the definition of the subject; but that definition of the affection that is called causal is directed to that branch [of the division] also, as Themistius would have it in this passage. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" This perfect definition is divided into two imperfect ones, as Averroes notes in commentary 64 to the first book of the Posterior [Analytics]. Of the two, one is the beginning-principle of a demonstration, and the other the conclusion.
For just as both taken together make an intact demonstration, since it contains at the same time the conclusion and the beginning-principles, so, if it is divided into two, one will be only the beginning-principle of the demonstration and the other will be only the conclusion.
For the former, which is conveyed by means of cause alone, is the beginning-principle of the demonstration, as if [for example] we were to say, an eclipse is the interposition of the earth; this, of course, is said to be the definition [only] improperly, since it says what [something] is on account of (propter quid) rather than what [something] is (quid est).
And so, the definition is called causal and is referred to demonstration in no other way than as its beginning-principle, as even Themistius asserts, commenting on text no. 46 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics]. For it is the beginning-principle because it is the middle [term] of a demonstration.
And so, when Aristotle says that some definition is the beginning-principle of a demonstration, he, of course, means principally the definition of the subject; but that definition of the affection that is called causal is directed to that branch [of the division] also, as Themistius would have it in this passage. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
[Types of Definition of Accident] " Now the definition of accident is of multiple types. [1] One is perfect and on all counts complete; this is a demonstration differing in position. The other is imperfect and deficient; this can be either: [2] The beginning…
[Third Type of Definition of Accident: Quidditative]
" But now the other part of a perfect definition, which contains form and matter without cause, is that which is said to be the conclusion of a demonstration, as if [for example] we were to say: an eclipse is the privation of the light of the moon, thunder is noise in a cloud. And it is called a conclusion because, since it has a cause outside itself, it can be demonstrated. We said this is called a quidditative or an essential or also a formal definition, for it expresses the internal nature and essence of the thing.
Aristotle, in text no. 44 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], called this same thing a nominal definition, because, advancing as it does an essence that depends on an external cause without expression of the cause, it does not well clarify the essence itself, for that which has some cause on account of which it is, is not known well except by means of that. To distinguish, therefore, this latter from the former, which makes the essence clear using the cause of the essence and is a perfect definition, he called it nominal, because it expresses only the signification of the name; it does not well clarify the essence.
But afterward, in text no. 46, gathering all species of definition from that which he had said earlier, he calls it the conclusion of a demonstration, because it has a cause outside itself, by means of which it can demonstrated.
That is, therefore, the number of definitions of accident there are. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
" But now the other part of a perfect definition, which contains form and matter without cause, is that which is said to be the conclusion of a demonstration, as if [for example] we were to say: an eclipse is the privation of the light of the moon, thunder is noise in a cloud. And it is called a conclusion because, since it has a cause outside itself, it can be demonstrated. We said this is called a quidditative or an essential or also a formal definition, for it expresses the internal nature and essence of the thing.
Aristotle, in text no. 44 of the second book of the Posterior [Analytics], called this same thing a nominal definition, because, advancing as it does an essence that depends on an external cause without expression of the cause, it does not well clarify the essence itself, for that which has some cause on account of which it is, is not known well except by means of that. To distinguish, therefore, this latter from the former, which makes the essence clear using the cause of the essence and is a perfect definition, he called it nominal, because it expresses only the signification of the name; it does not well clarify the essence.
But afterward, in text no. 46, gathering all species of definition from that which he had said earlier, he calls it the conclusion of a demonstration, because it has a cause outside itself, by means of which it can demonstrated.
That is, therefore, the number of definitions of accident there are. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
"... He [Aristotle] executed that treatment [on Logic] so well and, if it is appropriate to say, so divinely, that I will never cease to admire the excellence of these books and do not doubt that by correctly understanding them the easiest and optimal knowledge of philosophy as a universal whole is established. "
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
Jacopo Zabarella | On Methods
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Anatomy Class at University of Padua (16th Century)
Scene from GALILEO 1968
Scene from GALILEO 1968
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
Anatomy Class at University of Padua (16th Century) Scene from GALILEO 1968
يظهر في المشهد الأستاذ أندرياس فيزاليوس (Andreas Vesalius) الطبيب وعالم التشريح، والأسقف باولو ساربي (Paolo Sarpi)، وغاليليو غاليلي (Galileo Galilei)، وقيصر القرموني (Cesare Cremonini) المدافع عن أرسطو وقرين غاليليو.
لِـوَاءُ الـھُـدَىٰ فِـي الـلَّـيْـلِ والـدُّجَـىٰ
مقال حول القصة المشهورة عن الفاضل قَيصَر القَرَمُونِيّ (Caesar Cremonius) وغاليليو غاليلي (Galileo Galilei)، من أن غاليليو لمّا اكتشف جبالًا على القمر عبر المنظار الفلكي، عرض على القرموني التثبّت من صحة هذا الاكتشاف بأن ينظر إلى القمر من خلال المنظار، لكن…
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Scene of Cremonini trying to look through Galileo's telescope and the refusal of the rest of the scholars
" Being deprived and possessing are not privation and possession. For sight is a possession and blindness a privation, but having sight is not sight nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a particular privation but being blind is being deprived, not a privation. Moreover, if blindness were the same as being blind both would be predicated of the same thing. But though a man is called blind a man is certainly not called blindness. "
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لواء الهدى في الليل والدجى.pdf
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لواء الهدى في الليل والدجى
تأليف: ملا غلام يحيى البهاري (تـ1180)
تأليف: ملا غلام يحيى البهاري (تـ1180)