3/🧵

The area of the Ukrainian 2023 Velyka Novosilka counteroffensive.
De-facto, Russia's line "0.5". It was designed to absorb the first blow of Ukraine's counteroffensive and soften the Ukrainians for the first line of defense.

4/🧵

Russia's 1st and 2nd defensive lines, with intermediary lines in between.
The 1st line was designed to absorb the main blow from Ukraine's attacks in the 2023 counteroffensive.
Where it failed, an intermediary line would replicate line "0.5"'s job, softening up Ukrainian attacks before reaching the 2nd line, where they definitely intended to stop the Ukrainians definitively.

5/🧵

2nd line and 3rd line (town rings and individual strongpoints), with intermediary lines in between.
In case the 2nd line was broken, a series of weaker and separated backup trenches and firing positions was built behind it.

6/🧵

4th and 5th lines, and intermediary lines in between.
These two lines are incomplete, very weak, and designed as a last-ditch effort to contain a possible Ukrainian offensive that reached this point. Also, it would've slightly softened Ukrainian attacks further to receive them on the last defensive lines near the Azov Sea.

7/🧵

6th, 7th and 8th lines (city and POI strongpoints).
The 6th and 7th lines are similar to the 4th and 5th lines, made up of separated and generally weak systems of trenches and firing positions, while the 8th line is composed of trench systems guarding towns and points of special interest, like Berdyansk, its airport, or Osypenko.

8/🧵

Berdyansk Airport's circular defense ring and particulars.

9/🧵

1st line and particulars.

10/🧵

2° line and particulars.

11/🧵

Individual strongpoints and particulars.