The Grid of Death

Ukraine has accelerated the construction of defensive lines, shifting from a linear concept to a layered, depth-oriented system. The focus remains on key defensive nodes, but these are no longer isolated points. Instead, each node is now embedded within a grid of fortifications - dense blocks of varying size that collectively extend defensive depth and increase overall resilience and capacity.

This transformation marks a doctrinal change. Rather than relying on a single continuous line, the defense is structured as interconnected zones. Such a grid complicates enemy planning, disrupts momentum, and reduces the effectiveness of breakthrough tactics designed for linear defenses.

On top of this fortified grid, almost every settlement is now encircled by wire barriers. These obstacles are not intended to stop an advancing force outright, but to slow movement, canalize units, and increase exposure to fire, reconnaissance, and strike assets.

The fortification network relies heavily - though not exclusively on terrain. Natural features are integrated where available, but artificial obstacles and engineered positions compensate where terrain offers little defensive advantage. This reduces predictability and limits the attacker’s ability to exploit geographic weaknesses.

The grid itself will not completely halt an enemy advance. Its purpose is operational rather than absolute: to delay, degrade, and disperse attacking forces while providing the defender with critical operational depth. By funneling enemy assaults across a broader and deeper area, the system increases attrition, buys time for maneuver and reserves, and improves the defender’s capacity to absorb pressure without catastrophic collapse.

Notable Ukrainian engineering structures built in the period 19/01 - 23/01.

1. +470m of barbed wire in the Collective Gardens west of Richne (47.676282, 35.307912) on the northern shore of the Kinska River, building direction is southwest. This denies claims of Russian consolidation, at least in the northernmost part of Prymorske.

2. +170m of barbed wire northeast of Hai (47.928535, 36.303977), building direction is south.
This denies claims of Russian control over Hai and Novooleksandrivka.
Furthermore, in December 2025, a second strand of barbed wire was placed south and east of Vidradne, denying claims of Russian control over Vidradne and consolidation in Danylivka.

3. +340m of barbed wire south of Tykhe (47.96533, 36.363458), building direction is south.
This denies claims of Russian control over Tykhe and Vovche.

4. +70m of barbed wire west of Iskra on the western shore of the Vovcha River (48.050775, 36.563787). The building direction is east. This denies claims of Russian control over central and western Iskra.

5. +270m of barbed wire north of Novyi Donbas (48.458878, 37.177112). The building direction is likely west. This denies claims of Russian control over Novyi Donbas.

6. +200m of barbed wire south of Yarova on the southern shore of the Siverskyi Donets River (49.035814, 37.637572). The building direction is east. This denies claims of Russian consolidation over eastern and central Yarova.