PROFILE DIGEST

🧨 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Links to Pakistan

📌 Real name: Ahmad Fadeel Nazal al-Khalayleh
🇯🇴 A Jordanian jihadist who later founded al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—the group that evolved into ISIS. But before Iraq, his path passed right through Pakistan.


🔹 First Arrival: 1989–1992
➡️ Arrived in 🇵🇰 Peshawar during the Afghan Jihad era
➡️ Adopted Salafi jihadist ideology
➡️ Trained at the Sada camp near the Afghan border—run by al-Qaeda & Egyptian commander Abu Hafs al-Masri
➡️ Met & was mentored by Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi
➡️ Initially inspired by Tablighi Jamaat (Lahore-based), but quickly shifted to militancy


🔹 Life in Peshawar
🏠 Settled in Hayatabad
🗣️ Learned Pashto, married a local Pashtun woman
📰 Worked for Islamist magazine Al-Bonian al-Marsous (Arabic/Urdu)
🤝 Built networks with Palestinian jihadists active in Pakistan



🔹 Return to Pakistan: 1999–2000
🛬 Came back with a 6-month visa after Jordanian prison
👵 Came with his mother (she died in Feb 2000)
🔗 Reconnected with al-Qaeda
📦 Helped organize training camps & logistics
❌ Pakistani authorities refused visa renewal, briefly detained him, then deported
➡️ Crossed into Afghanistan, set up camp in Herat


🔍 Why Mattered
⚔️ Built crucial ties with Arab, Afghan & Pakistani militants
🚚 Used these networks later to bring Pakistani fighters to Iraq


🧠 Strategic Legacy:
Zarqawi may not have led a Pakistani group, but his time in the country was foundational—ideologically, operationally, and strategically.

MONITORING

🔴 Internal Clashes in Baloch Separatist Landscape: UBA vs. Hyrbyair Marri Faction Clash

📍Kahan, Balochistan – August 2025

A violent internal conflict has erupted once again among Baloch separatist factions, as deep-rooted rivalries and leadership disputes continue to fracture the militant landscape in Balochistan.


🔻 Recent Clash: UBA vs. Hyrbyair Marri Group

According to Baloch sources, a serious armed confrontation broke out in the Kahan area of Balochistan—a stronghold of the Marri tribe—between fighters of the United Baloch Army (UBA) and militants loyal to Hyrbyair Marri, the current leader of the Baloch Liberation Army – Azad faction (BLA-Azad).

Two UBA fighters were reportedly killed in the initial ambush.

In retaliation, UBA forces killed two fighters from Hyrbyair Marri’s group—Mehmood Marri and Gul Bahar—and injured two others.


The incident has reignited accusations from Baloch social media circles against Hyrbyair Marri, blaming him for targeting fellow Baloch fighters in pursuit of political or tribal supremacy. Critics pointed to the past killings of notable commanders like Naseeb Khan Marri, Lala Marri, Commander Rab Nawaz, and Kamaash Rahmadil Marri, who were allegedly eliminated not by state forces, but by internal factional infighting.



❗ Who Are the "UBA" Fighters in 2025?

Although UBA officially dissolved in January 2022 after merging into the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), this did not include all factions.

The fighters involved in the August 2025 clash are believed to belong to the loyalist faction of UBA that:

Did not join the BNA merger.

Remained loyal to Mehran Marri, UBA’s founder.

Continued operating independently under the UBA banner.

Maintains a deep-rooted rivalry with Hyrbyair Marri stemming from family and political disputes.


In essence, while the name “UBA” was retired on paper, this residual faction never stopped its operations and remains active, particularly in areas like Kahan where the Marri tribal presence is dominant.



📚 Background: The Longstanding UBA-BLA Rivalry

The feud between UBA and the BLA-Azad faction goes back more than a decade. It originated from a personal and financial dispute between brothers Mehran Marri (UBA) and Hyrbyair Marri (BLA-Azad). Key flashpoints include:

November 2014: BLA fighters assassinated senior UBA commander Ali Sher.

June 2015: A violent clash in Dera Bugti between BLA and UBA resulted in 20 militants killed.



🧨 UBA’s Internal Collapse and Splits

The UBA also suffered internal turmoil over time:

In October 2021, a split occurred when spokesman Sarfraz Bangalzai (alias Mureed Baloch) was expelled by the leadership. A rival statement issued by Mazar Baloch accused Sarfraz of violating organizational rules.

Sarfraz, however, claimed he was ousted because he wanted UBA to join the BRAS alliance, a position that Mehran Marri strongly opposed.



🤝 UBA-BRA Merger and the Birth of BNA

Following this rift:

On January 11, 2022, the Sarfraz-led faction of UBA merged with the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) under Gulzar Imam to form the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA).

Both UBA and BRA announced their dissolution and shifted resources, fighters, and command into BNA.

The new group formally joined the BRAS alliance, aligning with BLA and BLF.


However, this merger did not involve the UBA faction loyal to Mehran Marri, which explains the presence of fighters using the UBA name in 2025.


⚠️ Arrests and the Decline of UBA and BNA

The separatist movement suffered major setbacks with the arrests of key leaders:

2017: UBA’s founder Mehran Marri was arrested and permanently banned from Switzerland due to alleged terrorism links. His absence weakened the leadership of the loyalist UBA group.

April 2023: Pakistani intelligence arrested Gulzar Imam, leader of BNA (formerly BRA), sparking turmoil and suspicion within the Baloch insurgency.

💥 BNA’s Breakdown Post-2023

The arrest of Gulzar Imam triggered deep divisions within BNA:

BNA (Sarfaraz): Led by Sarfraz Bangulzai, this faction left the BRAS alliance, accusing BLA-J and BLF of manipulation and failing to investigate Imam’s arrest.

BNA (Anwar): Led by Anwar Chakar, this group remained aligned with BRAS, but internal disagreements persisted.

By September 2024, a third group, BNA (Beebarg), emerged, showing the ongoing fragmentation of the BNA.

MILITANT PROFILE

🛑 Omar Khalid Khurasani (Abdul Wali Mohmand)

🔺 Senior TTP Commander | Founder of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) | Al-Qaeda Ally

🧾 Basic Information

Full Name: Abdul Wali Mohmand

Alias(es): Omar Khalid Khurasani

Born: c. July 18, 1980 (some sources say 1977)

Hometown: Qandharo village, Safi Tehsil, Mohmand District, KP, Pakistan

Tribe: Mohmand

Died: Aug 7–8, 2022 – Bermal District, Paktika, Afghanistan

Cause of Death: Roadside IED blast

🧠 Early Life & Background

Education:
▪️ Village school in Mohmand
▪️ Religious madrassas in Karachi (1980s–90s)

Early Career:
▪️ Worked as a journalist and poet
▪️ Used media skills for jihadist propaganda

Militant Entry:
▪️ Joined Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in 1996
▪️ Fought in Kunar (Afghanistan) and Kashmir
▪️ Took over a shrine in 2007, renamed it the “Red Mosque” after Lal Masjid
▪️ Became Taliban commander in Mohmand (July 2008) after defeating rival Shah Sahib group (linked to LeT)

🏴 Militant Group Affiliations

TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan):
▪️ Senior commander, Central Shura member
▪️ Chief of Mohmand chapter
▪️ Led TTP judicial commission and operations

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA):
▪️ Founded in Aug 2014 after breaking from TTP
▪️ Served as Emir (chief)
▪️ Known for suicide attacks & sectarian violence

ISIS-K (Islamic State – Khorasan):
▪️ Brief allegiance (2014–15), later returned to TTP

Al-Qaeda:
▪️ Strong ideological and operational ties
▪️ Aligned with Ayman al-Zawahiri
▪️ Allegedly sheltered AQ leadership
▪️ Supported AQIS (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent)

Other Allied Groups:
▪️ Afghan Taliban
▪️ Haqqani Network
▪️ Qari Zia-ur-Rehman
▪️ Punjabi Taliban
▪️ Ahrar-ul-Hind

🔱 Leadership & Military Roles

Commander of Mohmand Agency (2008–2013):
▪️ Took control after defeating Shah Sahib group
▪️ Held ground until Pakistani military drove him underground

Key Leadership Roles:
▪️ Head of TTP Judicial Commission
▪️ Military Chief of JuA

Propaganda Role:
▪️ Produced videos, threats, and martyrdom narratives
▪️ Threatened the US and Pakistan in statements

📢 Ideology & Objectives

Goals:
▪️ Overthrow of the Pakistani state
▪️ Establish Islamic Caliphate
▪️ Enforce strict Sharia
▪️ Seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
▪️ Promote global jihad

Stance on Events:
▪️ Celebrated 9/11 attacks
▪️ Revered bin Laden & Zawahiri
▪️ Opposed Pakistani democracy
▪️ Rejected peace talks with the state

🪖 Geographical Base & Safe Havens

Main Base: Mohmand Agency, KP

Other Areas: Darra Adamkhel, Khyber, Punjab

Afghanistan: Operated in Paktika, Kunar, Nangarhar

Safe Havens:
▪️ Haqqani-controlled Bermal (Paktika)
▪️ Possibly linked to Al-Qaeda camps in Shorabak (Kandahar) and Kunar

💣 Major Attacks Claimed

-Wagah Border Bombing (Nov 2014):
▪️ Suicide attack killed ~60, injured ~100

-Mohmand Bombings (Nov 2014):
▪️ Twin blasts killed 6

-Lahore Church Bombings (Mar 2015):
▪️ Twin blasts in Youhanabad killed 15, injured 70

-Easter Park Attack – Lahore (Mar 2016):
▪️ Suicide blast in -Gulshan-e-Iqbal killed 72, injured 300+ (mostly Christians)

-Rawalpindi Imambargah Attack (Jan 2015):
▪️ 5 killed, 17 wounded

-Quetta Civil Hospital Bombing (Aug 2016):
▪️ 72+ killed, 90+ injured (also claimed by ISIS)

-Mohmand IED Attack (Mar 2016):
▪️ Targeted U.S.-linked DEA staff – 2 killed

-Shabqadar Court Bombing (Mar 2016):
▪️ 14 dead, 52 injured

-Warsak Colony Blast – Peshawar (Sep 2016):
▪️ 5 killed

-Lahore Mall Road Attack (Feb 2017):
▪️ 18+ killed, 90+ injured

-Charsadda Court Attack (Feb 2017):
▪️ Triple suicide bombing – 7+ killed, 20+ injured

-Parachinar Market Bombing (Mar 2017):
▪️ Car bomb killed 22, wounded ~70

-Punjab Assembly Attack (Feb 2017):
▪️ 10+ killed in suicide blast

-Targeted Killings (2015):
▪️ Punjab Home Minister assassinated
▪️ Lawyer of Dr. Shakil Afridi murdered

☠️ Death & Aftermath

Date: Aug 7–8, 2022

Location: Bermal, Paktika, Afghanistan

Cause: Roadside IED blast

Killed Alongside:
▪️ Mufti Hassan Swati (ex-JuA & ISIS-K)
▪️ Hafiz Dawlat Orakzai (ex-Kurram ISIS-K chief)
▪️ Ali Hassan Mohmand (Khurasani’s son-in-law)
▪️ Abdul Rashid aka Uqabi Bajauri

Buried In: Sarkano District, Kunar Province

Responsibility:
▪️ No group claimed responsibility
▪️ TTP blamed Pakistani intelligence
▪️ Possible internal rift over peace talks

📌 Legacy & Significance

Strategic Role:
▪️ Key figure in linking TTP, Al-Qaeda, ISIS-K
▪️ Central to sectarian attacks and civilian massacres
▪️ Promoted global jihad ideology

Impact of Death:
▪️ Blow to TTP hardliners & JuA
▪️ Happened amid crucial TTP–Pakistan negotiations
▪️ Shifted internal power dynamics in TTP

MILITANT GROUP PROFILE
📢

Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK)
(جبهة أنصار المهدي خراسان)

Alias: Gurbaz Karwan
Founded: Late 2022
Main Base Areas:

Primary: Bannu District – Jani Khel, Baka Khel

Secondary: North Waziristan, Lakki Marwat



👥 Strength

-120–150 fighters active in North Waziristan & Jani Khel

-50–60 fighters in Afghanistan (excluding Afghan nationals)

-Fighters divided into Tashkeel cells (10–15 members each) – often use different names to avoid tracking.



📜 Origins & First Appearance

Roots trace back to US–Taliban war era under Abdur Rehman Wazir.

Formally organized: Late 2022

First attack: December 2022

Public debut: January 2023 – sermon in Bannu mosque by senior member Umar Mansoor Haqqani.



🛡 Leadership

Amir (Leader): Siddiqullah Siddique – aka Gurbaz (Wazir tribe, Baka Khel, Bannu)

Military Commander: Maulvi Umar Mansoor Haqqani

Spokesperson: Zubair Waziristani

Other Commanders: Taj Maidani, Mullah Omer Mansoor, Tariq Jameel (Hamad,NW)



---

🏛 Structure – 5 Core Departments:

1. Al-Nusra Department – Ideological outreach & da’wah


2. Institute of Research & Publication – Produces literature, sermons, ideology


3. Department of War – Plans & executes militant ops


4. Department of Intelligence – Reconnaissance, surveillance, planning


5. Central Shura – Supreme council for strategy



🤝 Affiliations

-Operates under Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) network

-Pledged allegiance to Hibatullah Akhundzada (Afghan Taliban leader)

-Flag inscriptions carries:

1. "Amir al-Mu’minin Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada"


2. "Leader of Jihad in Pakistan – Hafiz Gul Bahadur"




🎥 Media & Propaganda

Media arm: Al-Mansoor Media (launched Nov 2023)

Focus:

Training footage

Sniper attacks

Suicide unit preps

Ideological sermons

Patrol & ambush videos

Raids on security posts




⚔ Tactics & Units

Suicide bombings (Istishhadi)

Sniper attacks

VBIEDs

Ambushes/patrol raids

Abductions

Targeted killings

Police station assaults

Sermon-based propaganda patrols


Special Wing: Al-Badr Istishhadi Force – elite suicide commando unit.
Operations offensives often given distinct names.


🤝 Joint Attacks

-Late Dec 2024 – Early Jan 2025: Coordinated videos with Majlis-e-Askari – attacks in Lakki Marwat, Bannu, North Waziristan.

-June 2023: Joint Bannu attack with:
Ansar al-Mahdi faction
Mohsin faction
Fikarman faction

-Also carried out joint op with TTP in June 2023

-March 2025: Attack on Bannu Cantonment – JAMK’s Al-Badr Istishhadi Force + Jaish al-Fursan (Hamza Istishhadi Commando).



📍 Operational Focus
Regular activity in Jani Khel & Baka Khel , targeting security forces, checkposts, and installations.

🚨🇵🇰/🏴: Zhob, Balochistan 🚨

An operation launched at 0500 hours today concluded recently with security forces neutralizing atleast 33 Pakistani Taliban militants in a decisive clash.

Around 40 militants, divided into three groups, attempted to infiltrate Balochistan from Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Acting on credible intelligence, forces swiftly intercepted and engaged them

MONITORING

Through its media wing, Sada-e-Ghawat-ul-Hind, the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) has released a new video featuring the newly emerged militant faction, Harakat Inqilab Islami Pakistan, marking the group’s third public appearance.

Harakat Inqilab Islami Pakistan had earlier announced its formation on March 17, 2025, and there has since been speculation about its potential links to al-Qaeda. On April 11, 2025, the group declared its alliance with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Lashkar-e-Islam, formally joining the umbrella organization IMP.

The video is laden with jihadist symbolism, displaying the group’s flag, masked militants assembling IEDs, and a voiceover commentary by the group’s leader, Ghazi Shahabuddin.

In the footage, a group,Khalid bin Waleed Group, from Wana, South Waziristan, declares allegiance to Harakat Inqilab Islami Pakistan. The group leader appears surrounded by armed fighters, delivering a message calling for the establishment of an ‘Islamic system’ in Pakistan, with a clear anti-state narrative targeting national security institutions.

The video also includes previously unseen footage of the IED attack on SHO Usman Mehsud, which took place on May 28, 2024, along Sarkikhel Road in Azam Warsak, South Waziristan. Usman Mehsud miraculously survived the explosion. Interestingly, this attack occurred before the group had publicly announced its existence, raising questions about its actual origins and timeline.

The video ends with a scene showing masked individuals placing their hands on the group leader's in a symbolic gesture of allegiance, signaling their commitment to the group’s agenda.

BAJAUR JIRGA

About six weeks ago, several TTP factions, primarily consisting of Afghan militants, infiltrated Bajaur district from Afghanistan’s Kunar province. These groups were led by Maulana Malang Badshah, the TTP Bajaur military commander and head of the Darul Hijra Wal Jihad Madrasa in Kunar. Upon entering the area, the militants established checkpoints across multiple villages, carried out attacks against security forces, and circulated videos among the local population. In response, security forces imposed a curfew in 16 villages of Loi Mamund tehsil on July 29 and began preparations for a military operation.

After one day of the operation, a civilian jirga intervened to broker a ceasefire between the TTP and security forces, urging the militants to either withdraw back to Afghanistan or relocate to the mountains to avoid civilian casualties. However, despite eight days of negotiations, the jirga was unable to reach a lasting agreement, raising the likelihood of an imminent military offensive.

"Jirga faces a deadlock", head of the Jirga Sahibzada Haroon Ur Rashid said. Haroon did not explain the deadlock but said statements from both sides in the conflict have created hurdles

The Bajaur jirga has now announced plans to meet with the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Peshawar tomorrow to explore peaceful solutions. Sahibzada Haroon Rasheed, the jirga’s head, informed reporters that following seven rounds of talks with both the Pakistani Taliban and security officials, they have appealed to both sides to protect the lives and property of locals in any potential conflict. The Chief Minister has invited the jirga to Peshawar for further discussions aimed at fostering peace.

MONITORING

TTP Magazine (Mujalla Taliban), Issue 38

The 38th issue of Mujallah Taliban,monthly publication, released in July 15th, 2025 by the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), continues to push the group’s agenda of undermining trust in the Pakistani state. It blends selective religious interpretations, economic complaints, and ethnic narratives to present itself as an alternative authority, mainly targeting people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

The magazine portrays Pakistan as deeply unstable, exaggerating the scale of militant activity and claiming the military is ineffective. It also tries to discourage support for pro-state militias, portraying them as unsafe and unreliable. Religious arguments are used to justify violence, while mainstream scholars who criticise the group are dismissed as biased. Accusations of corruption and misuse of resources are made, all to erode public trust in government.

Education is presented as one of their key initiatives, with claims of running schools that combine religious and modern subjects. In reality, these efforts appear aimed at promoting their ideology and building loyalty, rather than improving learning opportunities. The group also criticises Pashtun political movements for being divided, while pushing armed struggle as the only viable path. Historical comparisons to colonial-era conflicts are used to weaken confidence in the military.

Overall, the publication’s goal is to deepen divisions, radicalise communities, and legitimise militant action. While many operational claims are exaggerated or unverified, the content reflects a consistent attempt to recruit and influence vulnerable groups. Countering such messaging requires not just strong security measures, but also credible community engagement, effective counter-narratives, and visible improvements in governance and services.

🇵🇰/🏴: ZHOB, UPDATE

The Pakistan military, through its media wing ISPR, stated that following operations conducted by security forces in the general area of Sambaza, Zhob District, on 7–8 August 2025 — during which thirty-three militants were killed — a follow-up sanitization operation was carried out on the night of 8/9 August in surrounding areas along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.

According to ISPR, fourteen additional militants were killed during this operation. Weapons, ammunition, and explosives were recovered from those killed.

This brings the total number of militants killed in the two-day anti-infiltration operation to forty-seven.

The statement added that security forces remain committed to securing Pakistan’s borders and preventing attempts to undermine peace and stability in the country.

TTP Presence and Peace Talks in Bajaur District


Background and Entry of Militants (Mid-June 2025)

Around the middle of June 2025, several formations of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) entered Pakistan’s Bajaur district from Afghanistan’s Kunar province.

Composition of Forces:
The infiltrating units were mostly Afghan militants, but also included Pakistani fighters and a smaller number from other foreign countries.

Leadership:
They were led by Maulana Malang Badshah— the military commander of TTP Bajaur, head of the Darul Hijra Wal Jihad Madrasa in Kunar, and a former emir of TTP’s Bajaur chapter. Currently, he is a senior member of TTP’s leadership council and has substantial influence over policy decisions.

Upon arrival, the militants:

-Established checkpoints on local roads in multiple villages.

-Conducted attacks against security forces.

-Distributed videos to local residents as propaganda.

One such video claimed that:

-The total TTP strength across Bajaur district was in the hundreds.

-In Mamund Tehsil alone, the force numbered around 85–90 fighters.

-The Mamund Tehsil concentration was due to its adjacency to Kunar province, which served as the entry route.

-The fighters were mainly based in mountainous areas, but some had also infiltrated civilian zones.

Security Forces’ Response (July 29, 2025)

On July 29, security forces responded to the growing threat:

-Imposed a curfew in 16 villages of Loi Mamund Tehsil.

-Began preparations for a military operation against the militants.

Initial Jirga Mediation Efforts

After one day of operations, a civilian tribal jirga (traditional council) attempted to negotiate a ceasefire.

Jirga’s Proposal to TTP:

1. Return to Afghanistan, or

2. Move into the mountains to avoid harm to civilians.

TTP’s Response:
The militants rejected both options outright.

Security Agencies’ Directives to Tribal Elders:

1. Remove the terrorists from the area immediately.

2. If that was not possible, evacuate civilians for 1–2 days so operations could proceed.

3. If neither was feasible, ensure civilian safety during any military engagement.

TTP’s Local Demands (August 1, 2025)

On August 1, a meeting was held at Jama Masjid Zagai in Bajaur between the jirga and a TTP delegation led by Maulana Malang Badshah.

TTP’s key points:

1.They will not leave Bajaur — they did not come to withdraw.

2. They will not attack first, but will retaliate if attacked.

3. Ration supplies to security forces should be monitored by the jirga, and no weapons should be transported.

4.Both sides should avoid traveling in convoys.

Military’s Position:
These demands were unacceptable to the security forces.

Statements by Senior TTP Religious Leader (August 6, 2025)

On August 6, via encrypted TTP social media channels, Sheikh Gul Muhammad Bajauri publicly backed religious leader involvement in mediation, but listed major ideological and political conditions for ending the conflict:

1.Formal apology by the Pakistani military to both militants and the public.

2.Implementation of Sharia law in the tribal areas and Malakand Division.

3.Establishment of Amr bil Ma’ruf wa Nahi anil Munkar (promotion of virtue and prevention of vice) under militant supervision.

4.Structured debate to determine which side was at fault in the conflict.

5. Broad national-level negotiations addressing TTP’s core demands.

These demands essentially sought to create a parallel state structure under TTP’s ideological control.

Stalemate and Jirga Deadlock (August 8, 2025)

-For several days after August 6, the jirga withheld public statements.

-Security officials downplayed their involvement, claiming it was a provincial government initiative giving local peace efforts a chance.

-On August 8, the jirga officially announced a deadlock after seven rounds of talks with both TTP and security officials.

Jirga Head Sahibzada Haroon Ur Rashid:

-Said conflicting statements from both sides created obstacles.

-Stated they had urged both sides to protect civilian lives and property.

-Mentioned the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa invited them to Peshawar for further peace discussions.

Warned that the lack of progress increased the likelihood of military action.

TTP’s Pashto-Language Statement (August 8, 2025)

TTP issued a detailed written statement addressed to Sahibzada Haroon al-Rashid and other elders.

Key points:

-Appreciated jirga’s peace efforts but said most fighters present are young men there for fighting, not for talks.

-Stated meaningful negotiations could only be held at the Pakistan-wide level, not at the district level.

-Claimed they were not enemies of Pakistan, and wanted stability for all nations.

-Set a condition for district-level peace:

The army must withdraw to pre-2002 positions.

-Promised to avoid civilian harm and shift fighting to mountains if necessary.

-Called the jirga’s other proposals premature, to be discussed only during nationwide negotiations.

Collapse of Ceasefire and Renewed Clashes (August 9, 2025)

-On August 9, the Bajaur jirga planned to meet the Chief Minister in Peshawar to explore peaceful solutions, the results of which had not been made public at the time of writing this report.

-Ceasefire broke between security forces and militants, with exchange of fire reported in multiple areas.

-Civilians began mass migration, with large-scale evacuations from villages near conflict zones

-🇵🇰/🏴: MONITORING

In the past two days, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGB/TTG), part of the IMP umbrella, has announced the merger of three groups:

-9 August: Commander Ali Banochi, aka "Pashtun," a millitant leader from Bannu Division since 2001

-9 August: Commander Umar Asim (Khitab) from Tor Bakhil, Mir Ali Tehsil, North Waziristan

-10 August: Commander Hanzullah from Momand Khelo, Bannu Division

Commander Ali Banochi (Pashtun) -Left

Commander Umar Asim (Khitab) - Right

OBSERVATION

It is important to note that also on 23 June 2025, HGB announced the merger of Commander Hanzullah, a figure from Lakki Marwat according to them.However, there is growing speculation that HGB may be exaggerating or even fabricating such mergers as a strategy to boost its image and draw the attention of smaller militant groups toward itself.

In their official statement regarding the 23 June merger, HGB emphasized:
"The rapid joining of sincere individuals and mujahideen reflects the ideological stability, organizational prestige, and leadership confidence of the TTG . In this regard, an important development has taken place."

This language appears carefully crafted to project strength and unity, likely aimed at influencing and attracting other factions to align with them. Such statements suggest that HGB is actively trying to consolidate its position by showcasing growing support, even if the reality on the ground may be less certain.

-🇵🇰/🏴: MONITORING

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has released a biographical video on Saifullah through Umar Media, the group’s official media wing. The 10-minute and 39-second video, presented in Urdu, is the 22nd installment of Umar Media’s “Rasm-e-Mohabbat” (“Ritual of Love”) series. It provides an overview of Saifullah’s background, militant activities, and the circumstances of his death.

According to the video, Saifullah was a senior commander within the TTP. He was born in 2002 in Amir Hamza Town, Ahmadpur Sharqia, located in southern Punjab. The video states that Saifullah was a Hafiz of the Quran and completed the initial five levels of religious education at a madrassa. It also highlights his social media activities, including Facebook posts through which he promoted the group’s ideology.

The video reports that Saifullah joined the TTP in 2022 and received militant training. Following his initial arrest and subsequent release, he rejoined militant activities and reportedly brought two students from Dar-ul-Uloom institutions with him. The footage includes scenes of Saifullah delivering speeches critical of the Pakistani military and participating in the execution of a person accused of being a government informant.

According to the video, Saifullah sustained serious injuries during a taskheel in 2024 and was later killed in an ambush while attempting to attack a security checkpoint in Basti Likhani, Tunisia Sharif. Another militant was also killed in the encounter. The video features multiple scenes of Saifullah operating in rural and mountainous terrain, often traveling by motorcycle. It additionally mentions that he authored a book titled Royal Indian Army, which focuses on the Pakistan Army.

PakPulse Intel identify Habib-ur-Rahman alias Saifullah, also known by his nom de guerre Abdul Basir Al-Shami, as the head of TTP intelligence for its South Punjab chapter. He is reported to be from Amir Hamza Town, Ahmadpur Sharqia, District Bahawalpur, and was involved in the group’s propaganda efforts on social media.

Saifullah's father, Maulana Sulaiman, serves as a Sheikh al-Hadith at a madrassa in Ahmadpur Sharqia and is affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) political party. Maulana Sulaiman was detained by security agencies in January, leading to protests by JUI members demanding his release, which was eventually granted.

Saifullah was previously considered missing by Government of Pakistan until authorities confirmed his death. Initial reports of his death surfaced during an intelligence-based operation in 2024 in Zhob, Balochistan, where he was believed to have been killed along with two others; however, these reports were later found to be inaccurate. His death was finally confirmed following a clash on June 1, 2025, during which militants were retreating after attacking the Lakhani checkpoint. The encounter also resulted in the death of another militant, Muhammad Anas. The TTP publicly confirmed Saifullah’s death on June 2 via its Rasm-e-Mohabbat media outlet.