π#Ukraine
π#Leopard
To make up for the losses of the Leopard 2A4, Leopard 2A6, Leopard 2R (38 units destroyed total); will compensate for such losses by donating 20 outdated Leopard 1A5s. These tanks were produced in the 1970s.
With these donations; they will also donate some IFVs and engineering vehicles.
π Not really the 'large' package which they originally promised.
π#Leopard
To make up for the losses of the Leopard 2A4, Leopard 2A6, Leopard 2R (38 units destroyed total); will compensate for such losses by donating 20 outdated Leopard 1A5s. These tanks were produced in the 1970s.
With these donations; they will also donate some IFVs and engineering vehicles.
π Not really the 'large' package which they originally promised.
π Units of the RF Armed Forces entered the village of Torskoye in the Donetsk Region. Details to come later.
Nabrezhnye π·πΊ
π Units of the RF Armed Forces entered the village of Torskoye in the Donetsk Region. Details to come later.
π#Lyman
β‘οΈ#Offensive
I have received confirmation; RF Armed Forces embedded on the outskirts of the village (thus entering it;) and have begun attacking the village of N.P Torskoye directly.
The village is strategic as it is positioned on an important landing ground, and is close to the Oskli River. Taking the village could further jeopardize the AFU in the Serebryanskoye Forestry; but could also stage a future landing ground on Yampil.
The AFU have not yet transferred reserves from here; but they are beginning to run low on reserves; as they will have to make the decision; continue the offensive and jeopardise other areas, or cease the offensive and reinforce other areas.
πDid I mention it's only 32KM from Slavyansk? π
β‘οΈ#Offensive
I have received confirmation; RF Armed Forces embedded on the outskirts of the village (thus entering it;) and have begun attacking the village of N.P Torskoye directly.
The village is strategic as it is positioned on an important landing ground, and is close to the Oskli River. Taking the village could further jeopardize the AFU in the Serebryanskoye Forestry; but could also stage a future landing ground on Yampil.
The AFU have not yet transferred reserves from here; but they are beginning to run low on reserves; as they will have to make the decision; continue the offensive and jeopardise other areas, or cease the offensive and reinforce other areas.
πDid I mention it's only 32KM from Slavyansk? π
π#Avdeyevka
β‘οΈ#Offensive
It has been tense in Severnoye - the Armed Forces of Ukraine attempted to counterattack on positions of the RF Armed Forces, but were forced to retreat.
Under these backdrops, the RF Armed Forces conducted a counterattack immediately after the Ukrainian attack - there was incremental success, one height was captured.
The total advance was 300m on one of the landing grounds, 2 treelines were captured.
β‘οΈ#Offensive
It has been tense in Severnoye - the Armed Forces of Ukraine attempted to counterattack on positions of the RF Armed Forces, but were forced to retreat.
Under these backdrops, the RF Armed Forces conducted a counterattack immediately after the Ukrainian attack - there was incremental success, one height was captured.
The total advance was 300m on one of the landing grounds, 2 treelines were captured.
π#SMO
βοΈ#Statement
If the Ukrainian offensive continues at the pace of losses, they will diminish majority of their offensive capabilities within the next 4 to 7 weeks; meaning that they will fall just short of the 'November Deadline' which was set by the Pentagon if Ukraine wants to receive aid in future.
βοΈ#Statement
If the Ukrainian offensive continues at the pace of losses, they will diminish majority of their offensive capabilities within the next 4 to 7 weeks; meaning that they will fall just short of the 'November Deadline' which was set by the Pentagon if Ukraine wants to receive aid in future.
β‘οΈ Apologise for the inactivity, not much has been happening worth reporting and we've been busy! Back to normal schedule tonight.
π#Lugansk
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Units of the Russian Armed Forces liberated the village of Novoselovskoye; this has complicated the Ukrainian positions in the area.
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Units of the Russian Armed Forces liberated the village of Novoselovskoye; this has complicated the Ukrainian positions in the area.
π#Lugansk
β‘οΈ#Offensive
As a result of offensive actions on the settlement. Torskoye. The enemy was dislodged from the centre and upper area of the settlement, meaning they are likely opting to defend the areas around Yampil instead of defending the village itself. Around 40% of the settlement is under RF Armed Forces control.
β‘οΈ#Offensive
As a result of offensive actions on the settlement. Torskoye. The enemy was dislodged from the centre and upper area of the settlement, meaning they are likely opting to defend the areas around Yampil instead of defending the village itself. Around 40% of the settlement is under RF Armed Forces control.
π#SMO
π#Supplies
The enemy's rate of fire has steadily decreased - at its highest, on June 7th 2023, firing around 25k shells a day, to July 15th , where the enemy only fired around 6k-9k shells. This symbolises that the enemy's rate of artillery has steadily been chewed through since the beginning of the "Second Counteroffensive". This also impacts the enemy's ability to support their offensives.
Additionally, since June 4th, the enemy has lost nearly 700 artillery and MLRS systems, including 3 long-ranged HIMARS MLRS systems.
π#Supplies
The enemy's rate of fire has steadily decreased - at its highest, on June 7th 2023, firing around 25k shells a day, to July 15th , where the enemy only fired around 6k-9k shells. This symbolises that the enemy's rate of artillery has steadily been chewed through since the beginning of the "Second Counteroffensive". This also impacts the enemy's ability to support their offensives.
Additionally, since June 4th, the enemy has lost nearly 700 artillery and MLRS systems, including 3 long-ranged HIMARS MLRS systems.
π#Ugledar
β οΈ#Counteroffensive
The enemy has opened a new area of attack - Pavlivka, near Ugledarisky, they attacked in relative formation last night, had some success, but were pushed back to their original positions in the morning. They suffered considerable losses, including 1 Australian Bushmaster APC.
πThe unnecessary broadening of the areas of the 'counteroffensive' by the enemy is showing frustration and desperation for success, as they enemy struggles to have success in the existing areas where he is pushing.
β οΈ#Counteroffensive
The enemy has opened a new area of attack - Pavlivka, near Ugledarisky, they attacked in relative formation last night, had some success, but were pushed back to their original positions in the morning. They suffered considerable losses, including 1 Australian Bushmaster APC.
πThe unnecessary broadening of the areas of the 'counteroffensive' by the enemy is showing frustration and desperation for success, as they enemy struggles to have success in the existing areas where he is pushing.
π#Kharkov
π#Wagner
Recent deployments of the PMC Wagner have been very timely - they are not just deploying onto Belarus, but, in Belgorod, around the Kharkov Region. It is not to speculate, but to wonder, is this Wagner's next destination? A week ago, a DRG of our side intruded in the Sumy Region, and destroyed an outpost of the AFU - the men responsible turned out to be from PMC "Wagner".
A new front in Kharkov would be a big thorn for the AFU - they would have to divert men from their counteroffensive to keep PMC "Wagner" away from Kharkov, and would give Russia some advantage over the AFU. To put it lightly, there are practically no AFU defenders around the Kharkov Region. They are all on the frontline operations elsewhere.
Considering the size of PMC Wagner after the mutiny (only around 50,000), a theoretical frontline would be small, but still, enough to divert the enemy's attention. In theory, if we consider that PMC Wagner has around 55,000 employees, the enemy would want to divert 60,000 or more men to keep them at bay.
This is all speculative, based on the movements on the PMC "Wagner".
π#Wagner
Recent deployments of the PMC Wagner have been very timely - they are not just deploying onto Belarus, but, in Belgorod, around the Kharkov Region. It is not to speculate, but to wonder, is this Wagner's next destination? A week ago, a DRG of our side intruded in the Sumy Region, and destroyed an outpost of the AFU - the men responsible turned out to be from PMC "Wagner".
A new front in Kharkov would be a big thorn for the AFU - they would have to divert men from their counteroffensive to keep PMC "Wagner" away from Kharkov, and would give Russia some advantage over the AFU. To put it lightly, there are practically no AFU defenders around the Kharkov Region. They are all on the frontline operations elsewhere.
Considering the size of PMC Wagner after the mutiny (only around 50,000), a theoretical frontline would be small, but still, enough to divert the enemy's attention. In theory, if we consider that PMC Wagner has around 55,000 employees, the enemy would want to divert 60,000 or more men to keep them at bay.
This is all speculative, based on the movements on the PMC "Wagner".
π#Crimea
π«#Strike
To comment lightly on the strike on Kerch Bridge - the damage is insignificant compared to what was achieved last year. The enemy was unable to put explosives on the bridge, so they had to use outdated soviet missiles to attack the bridge. They attacked in formations, 14 missiles total - only 2 reached their target. Unlike last year, the bridge is stable, and there are alternative routes.
The military logistical rail route on the bridge is uneffected - military equipment and supplies continue to steamroll through Crimea.
π«#Strike
To comment lightly on the strike on Kerch Bridge - the damage is insignificant compared to what was achieved last year. The enemy was unable to put explosives on the bridge, so they had to use outdated soviet missiles to attack the bridge. They attacked in formations, 14 missiles total - only 2 reached their target. Unlike last year, the bridge is stable, and there are alternative routes.
The military logistical rail route on the bridge is uneffected - military equipment and supplies continue to steamroll through Crimea.
π#Rabotino
β οΈ#Counteroffensive
After almost a week of inactivity on the Rabotino sector, the enemy went on the offensive - supported by tanks and in large columns, our artillery has begun working. Preliminary data suggests the involvement of Leopard 2A4s and Bradleys'.
β οΈ#Counteroffensive
After almost a week of inactivity on the Rabotino sector, the enemy went on the offensive - supported by tanks and in large columns, our artillery has begun working. Preliminary data suggests the involvement of Leopard 2A4s and Bradleys'.
π#Marinka
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Footage as of recent shows Russian Forces attacking a mine complex nearby to Marinka - Krasnogoreevsky; our sources confirm that the complex was captured by our forces. This mine complex is in a difficult position, but our valiant fighters work.
The total advance was 800m; additional assaults are ongoing to reach the road.
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Footage as of recent shows Russian Forces attacking a mine complex nearby to Marinka - Krasnogoreevsky; our sources confirm that the complex was captured by our forces. This mine complex is in a difficult position, but our valiant fighters work.
The total advance was 800m; additional assaults are ongoing to reach the road.
Nabrezhnye π·πΊ
π#Marinka β‘οΈ#Offensive Footage as of recent shows Russian Forces attacking a mine complex nearby to Marinka - Krasnogoreevsky; our sources confirm that the complex was captured by our forces. This mine complex is in a difficult position, but our valiant fightersβ¦
πRF Armed Forces took the mine complex and advanced to the highway; the entire field is almost taken. This is likely down to mount more successful assaults to the northeast of Marinka but also to mount assaults on Krasnogoreevska.
π Since their involvement in combat, the enemy has lost 65 Leopards (incl. 2A4, 2A6, 2R, 2RM). The rate of their destruction has decreased slightly as the enemy isn't using them as much.
Nabrezhnye π·πΊ pinned Β«π Since their involvement in combat, the enemy has lost 65 Leopards (incl. 2A4, 2A6, 2R, 2RM). The rate of their destruction has decreased slightly as the enemy isn't using them as much.Β»
π#Serebryanskoye
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Under the backdrop of our offensive within the Lugansk and the Kharkov Region, the enemy withdrew some forces from the the "Serebryanskoye Forestry"; forces from here were transferred to areas around Kharkov but also to reconsolidate the Lymanskye frontline; this action jeopardized the AFU positions within the forested area.
Slowly; our forces have been levelling out the frontline around the Serebryanskoye Forestry; in the past week, an advance was recorded 400m deep and 3km wide. The enemy holds only around 15% of the forestry at this time.
The enemy continues to jeopardise its manpower and readiness within the forestry by constantly going on the counterattack. Their counterattacks are usually followed up by artillery preparations and subsequent offensives by our guys.
β‘οΈ#Offensive
Under the backdrop of our offensive within the Lugansk and the Kharkov Region, the enemy withdrew some forces from the the "Serebryanskoye Forestry"; forces from here were transferred to areas around Kharkov but also to reconsolidate the Lymanskye frontline; this action jeopardized the AFU positions within the forested area.
Slowly; our forces have been levelling out the frontline around the Serebryanskoye Forestry; in the past week, an advance was recorded 400m deep and 3km wide. The enemy holds only around 15% of the forestry at this time.
The enemy continues to jeopardise its manpower and readiness within the forestry by constantly going on the counterattack. Their counterattacks are usually followed up by artillery preparations and subsequent offensives by our guys.
Nabrezhnye π·πΊ
π#Serebryanskoye β‘οΈ#Offensive Under the backdrop of our offensive within the Lugansk and the Kharkov Region, the enemy withdrew some forces from the the "Serebryanskoye Forestry"; forces from here were transferred to areas around Kharkov but also to reconsolidateβ¦
π On June 2nd, a-lot of professional fighters of the APU were withdrew from Serebryanskoye and sent to Artemovsk and Zaporozhye (Vremenska). They were replaced by mobilised. This is a likely explanation as to why the enemy is often caught within traps, and why there is a-lot of prisoners of war within this sector.