— So now we know what concessions the U.S. offered Iran:

Iran owns the Strait of Hormuz from now on, like Egypt with the Suez Canal.

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷/🇴🇲 NEW: If Iran charges $2 Million in tolls for every ship that passes the Strait of Hormuz — which it has been doing for the past month — it would generate approximately $8 Billion in monthly revenue, or about $96 Billion annually

This would increase Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from $475 Billion to $571 Billion, a 20% increase.

@Middle_East_Spectator

Wikipedia is fast

— Just imagine for a second if Iran, during this war, had captured, for example, an certain amount of land or piece of territory.

Everyone would call it a resounding strategic victory, and rightfully so.

Instead, it now controls the single most important waterway in the world, through which 20% of the world’s oil flows — of immense strategic value.

That is infinitely more desirable than conquering a piece of land, inflicting mass casualties, or destroying an enemy army. It’s a lasting impact that changes the strategic equation in the region for decades and centuries to come. This is a nation-altering event.

@Middle_East_Spectator

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷/🇮🇱 MES Analysis: Does a 2-week ceasefire with Iran give the U.S. and Israel the ability to rebuild and reorganize?

1. First, it must be understood that interceptor stockpiles in both Israel and the Gulf states are critically low. Even if the U.S. wanted to replenish these stockpiles, they exist in such limited capacities that they would have to relocate some of their stockpiles located in other theatres (Asia / Europe / North America). Israel would get priority for this; the Gulf will likely be forced to fend for itself. Even if this is done, the existing U.S. stockpiles, especially THAAD interceptors, are so limited that production must be massively scaled up, which is both practically impossible and extremely costly in the short to medium term.

2. If, as stated, the U.S. wanted to replenish the Israeli interceptor stockpiles, they could already do so during the war, logistics is not the issue; the ceasefire makes no difference. Military airbases in Israel are currently already operational and U.S. cargo aircrafts are going back and forth uninterrupted, even during the intense barrages fired from Iran. So the argument that a ceasefire would help Israel rearm is false. They could rearm now if they wanted to, but they don’t have the material.

3. In fact, during a temporary ceasefire, if the situation is handled properly, Iran would have a military advantage when it comes to rebuilding. A two weeks pause in the fighting would allow Iran to clear the entrances to its ballistic missile bases, putting several of them including those in the Western parts of the country back into operation, while simultaneously allowing the covert relocation and dispersal of drones and missiles to more remote and difficult to monitor parts of the country for use in further escalation. For example, drones from warehouses could be further dispersed to decentralized ‘launch alleys’ between mountains and valleys which are almost impossible to detect, allowing for sustained operations over a period of months. In short, this means that Iran could decide to resume the war after two weeks and launch much larger and coordinated waves of missiles and drones at the enemy.

4. During the pause in fighting, when negotiations take place, Iran’s position in these talks will be greatly strengthened compared to previous rounds. The threat of a military intervention is a card that has already been played, and the U.S. holds much less leverage over the situation than it did prior to the war, as military intervention has been tried and failed to achieve its objectives. Iran, on the other hand, has demonstrated that it can cripple the world’s oil supply by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, and this is a much more powerful card to play.

5. A two week pause in the fighting would allow Iranian commanders and decision-makers to reorganize and recalibrate their plans. Also, if security conditions allow, and utmost safety measures are exercised, it would allow for the first televised appearance of the new Supreme Leader, which would project confidence domestically while legitimizing the continuity of the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

6. Within these two weeks, internal pressure against President Trump to hold off on further escalation against Iran would continue to mount, and the pressure for a diplomatic settlement would increase significantly compared to any point in the past.

7. While taking all of the above points into consideration, the ceasefire can only work in Iran’s advantage if the leadership goes into the talks with complete awareness of the enemy’s deceitful plans and the likelihood of betrayal, they must have complete distrust in the Americans, which is appropriate considering that both previous times Iran negotiated it was attacked. No gatherings of senior commanders should take place, leaders should avoid moving and becoming targets in assassinations, and overall they must not act naive.

@Middle_East_Spectator

> Middle East Spectator returns
> Iranian strategic victory happens

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷 Sen. Chris Murphy (D) of the Foreign Relations Committee to CNN:

‘Donald Trump has essentially agreed to give Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz. That is extraordinary.

If this agreement indeed gives Iran the right to control the Strait, that is cataclysmic for the world.

Donald Trump took a military action that has apparently, at least for the time being, given Iran control over a critical waterway they did not have control over before the war began.’

@Middle_East_Spectator

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷/🇮🇶 NEW: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq announces it will adhere to the 2-week ceasefire

@Middle_East_Spectator

Taking suggestions for new names for the Strait of Hormuz

So far I’ve got:

– Strait of Khamenei
– Strait of Ali
– Islamic Revolutionary Toll Corps
– The Ayatollah Canal

Any suggestions are welcome.

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷 President Trump: ‘The uranium will be perfectly taken care of’

@Middle_East_Spectator

—❗️🇮🇱/🇱🇧 BREAKING: ‘We won’t include Lebanon in the two weeks ceasefire’ – Benjamin Netanyahu

@Middle_East_Spectator

Well that didn’t take long.

Pakistan and Iran both clearly said Lebanon is included, Israel now backtracks within hours.

Anyways, that will conclude my coverage for today (unless something happens in the next 15 minutes)

My assessment is that America and Israel will both backtrack on their committments, demand that Iran give up its missile program and enrichment, and thus the war will restart again.

And I believe Iran is very aware of this.

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷 President Trump: ‘Now I’ve ended 9 wars. Isn’t that incredible?’

@Middle_East_Spectator

Regarding the Israeli attack on a car in Lebanon; this is unfortunately part of ‘ordinary’ attacks (albeit illegal and a violation) that were already happening during the ceasefire in Lebanon which went into effect in 2024.

I wouldn’t expect Israel to abstain from striking some targets inside Lebanon completely, they didn’t abide by that during the previous ceasefire and they likely won’t be abiding by that now due to their evil and wicked nature.

What will give an indication whether Israel is ‘complying’ with the current ceasefire (in a relative sense) is if they stop their advance in the villages, stop the the bombing of major urban centers most importantly Beirut, and the assassination of senior staff.

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷 NEW: Apparently, based on some well-placed sources, only about 10-20 ships will be allowed to pass the Strait of Hormuz daily during the next two weeks (unconfirmed however)

@Middle_East_Spectator

—❗️🇮🇷/🇧🇭 BREAKING: Missile sirens in Bahrain

@Middle_East_Spectator