Lebanese News and Updates
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Covering Lebanon and occasionally MENA's conflicts. And currently, the war in Palestine.
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After Israeli casualties, even while hiding in a bunker, Jewish media is nagging that their bunkers are old and from the gulf war era.

Jews nag a lot tbh.
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๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท Head of Ali Shamkhani's medical team says his condition has become relatively stable
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๐Ÿ“น Israel raids its own prison cells to punish inmates who celebrated Iranian missiles hitting Israel.

Lunatics and sadistic
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BMD working againt Iranian MRBMs:

- SM-3 (exo)
- SM-6 (endo)
- THAAD (high endo, low exo)
- Arrow-3 (exo)
- Arrow-2 (high endo)
- davidโ€™s sling (endo)

That's the Israeli army and the American military.

As usual, it's a battle where both defense and offense is at peak
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What you'd see in an exo interception
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The vivid colors seen during an SM-3 missileโ€™s ascent or exo-atmospheric interception arenโ€™t from combustion alone, they occur when sunlight illuminates the expanding exhaust plume at high altitudes, often above kรกrmรกn line, creating a glowing spectacle in the upper atmosphere
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Senator Wicker confirms that SM-3 Block IIA was used to target incoming Iranian ballistic missiles.

IIA facilitization is 24 missiles per year, with scheduled deliveries to the USN ranging from 12-24 depending on FMS orders.

SM-3 Block IB is produced at a rate of 48/year, with facilitization for 96, but the Department of Defense is terminating IB procurement in favor of IIA, over the objections of Congress.
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Back in October, the U.S. fired 12 interceptors during this engagement from the destroyers Bulkeley and Cole.

Assuming they were SM-3 interceptors, that represents the production run for an entire year, at a cost of about $400 million total.
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โœ Note: my coverage isn't as before and there is a lot of copy pasting happening because I neither have the time or ability now for an original paraphrased one.

In case anyone is bothered, drop a message where to correct and add origin in case I didn't

Usually my feed is offering a place where various types of details are available in one place
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๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ง Jewish enemies are moving concrete blocks to fortify the newly constructed military position inside Lebanese territory, along the road linking Houla and Markaba, which they has blocked with rocks.

The Lebanese army is trying to reopen the road.
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That exact post I took from a Hezbullah fighter from Twitter.

Calm down lol, it's not disrespectful to anyone

https://t.me/LebUpdate/53347?comment=1413195
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Morocco ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฆ says it is ready to offer humanitarian aid to Israel against Iran.

By Gilbert Collard on X
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The IDF releases footage showing airstrikes on trucks it says were ferrying weapons to Tehran.

Since this morning, the Israeli Air Force identified several trucks, carrying surface-to-air missile launchers and other weapons, moving from west Iran toward Tehran
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โ—๏ธThe Israeli Air Force has begun a new wave of airstrikes in central Iran
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โ—๏ธFor how long can Israel's BMD network be effective against consistent 50โ€“70 ballistic missiles launches by Iran per day?

A numbers-based breakdown by Mett project on X

Interceptor Inventory (best case scenario estimate):

- Arrow-2/3: 180โ€“220
- Davidโ€™s Sling: 450โ€“600
- THAAD (Negev): 48โ€“64
- SM-3/6 (US ships): 110โ€“140

Totaling ~950โ€“1120 BMD interceptors.
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Interceptor Usage Rate:

The average expenditure will be 1.2โ€“1.4 per intercept

Against 60 incoming iranian Ballistic missiles per day 72โ€“84 interceptors/day are needed

Endurance Estimates (assuming shared load):

- Arrow-2/3: 6โ€“9 days (handling ~20โ€“30% of targets)

- Davidโ€™s Sling: 10โ€“14 days (~50%)

- SM-3/6: 4โ€“6 days (strategic-range only)

- THAAD: 5โ€“7 days (upper-tier terminal role)

Resulting in full grid pressure breach beginning around Day 15โ€“18
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Confirmed Failures:

- 8+ missile leakers

- 3 known hits near BMD nodes (Haifa, Tel Aviv sector)

- Arrow and Stunner midcourse/terminal and after launch failures

Likely causes: older stocks, saturation, decoys, burnout-phase timing gaps
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Resupply + Logistics:

- SM-3/6: No reload at sea for the AEGIS BMD, and the System is under U.S. control

- Arrow restock: 2โ€“4 weeks

- THAAD/SM stocks in region: limited drawdown possible

- Battery fatigue will become notable after Day 10
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The Projection if Iran sustains 50โ€“70 Missiles/day is as follows:

๐Ÿ‘ Days 0โ€“10: Mostly contained(as evident by current events)

๐Ÿ˜“ Days 10โ€“15: Coverage gaps begin

๐Ÿ˜– Days 15โ€“20: Rationing, reduced priority zones

๐Ÿ˜ต Day 20+: Grid attrition, critical intercept success
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Meaning Israelโ€™s strategic BMD capacity caps out at ~15โ€“18 days under current pressure.
Interceptor depletion and system wear begin to outpace reload timelines.
Without emergency resupply, persistent Iranian salvos will produce daily and more numerous penetrations post-Day 18.

We are now at day 4. It's a race between Iran's launcher capacity and Israel's defense ability

However so far, Israel did not sustain any defense manufacturing damages
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โ€” ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท ุฅูู†ูŽู‘ุง ู„ูู„ูŽู‘ูฐู‡ู ูˆูŽุฅูู†ูŽู‘ุง ุฅูู„ูŽูŠู’ู‡ู ุฑูŽุงุฌูุนููˆู†ูŽ

We can now confirm the martyrdom of six zealous and self-sacrificing generals of the IRGC Aerospace Forces in the early stages of the Zionist aggression against Iran.

๐Ÿฅ€ Second Brigadier General Morteza Tayyeb Masoud

๐Ÿฅ€ Major General Mahmoud Baqeri

๐Ÿฅ€ Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Taherpour

๐Ÿฅ€ Brigadier General Davoud Sheikhian

๐Ÿฅ€ Brigadier General Khosrow Hassani

๐Ÿฅ€ Brigadier General Mansour Safarpour

By: @Middle_East_Spectator
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