1024社区 | 1024.day
11.6K subscribers
377 photos
4 videos
3 files
1.03K links
这是一个分享VPS资讯以及Linux学习频道。
Download Telegram
x.com 又炸了…… 北京时间 22:27 - 22:47 已恢复
圈X支持Reality(xtls-rprx-vision)了,更新APP到1.5.5即可,也就是支持姥爷一键脚本上的reality了,具体配置写法如下:

- Add XTLS Vision for VLESS.


vless=192.168.1.1:443, method=none, password=23ad6b10-8d1a-40f7-8ad0-e3e35cd32291, obfs=over-tls, obfs-host=apple.com, reality-base64-pubkey=k4Uxez0sjl8bKaZH2Vgi8-WDFshML51QkxKFLWFIONk, reality-hex-shortid=0123456789abcdef, vless-flow=xtls-rprx-vision, tag=vless-tls-reality-vision-01
死了么?死了,还没死透……
Forwarded from zrj766的频道 (Banned Account)
DMIT在LAX Pro和LAX EB上线自助更换IP功能。
GitHub 的专属贡献证书生成器:
https://certificate.brendonmatos.com
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️RackNerd 2026新年VPS促销套餐来喽!其实不如上次黑五促销,无国内优化线路,购买请谨慎!

========
1GB 套餐
========
1 GB 内存
1 CPU 核心
24 GB SSD 存储
2 TB 月流量
1 Gbps 带宽
1个 IPv4 地址
$11.29 /年 (续费同价)
可选机房: 多机房可选
购买链接: https://my.racknerd.com/aff.php?aff=1866&pid=903

========
2GB 套餐
========
2 GB 内存
1 CPU 核心
40 GB SSD 存储
3.5 TB 月流量
1 Gbps 带宽
1个 IPv4 地址
$18.29 /年 (续费同价)
可选机房: 多机房可选
购买链接: https://my.racknerd.com/aff.php?aff=1866&pid=904

========
3.5GB 套餐
========
3.5 GB 内存
2 CPU 核心
65 GB SSD 存储
7 TB 月流量
1 Gbps 带宽
1个 IPv4 地址
$32.49 /年 (续费同价)
可选机房: 多机房可选
购买链接: https://my.racknerd.com/aff.php?aff=1866&pid=905

========
4GB 套餐
========
4 GB 内存
3 CPU 核心
105 GB SSD 存储
9 TB 月流量
1 Gbps 带宽
1个 IPv4 地址
$43.88 /年 (续费同价)
可选机房: 多机房可选
购买链接: https://my.racknerd.com/aff.php?aff=1866&pid=906

========
6GB 套餐
========
6 GB 内存
4 CPU 核心
140 GB SSD 存储
12 TB 月流量
1 Gbps 带宽
1个 IPv4 地址
$59.99 /年 (续费同价)
可选机房: 多机房可选
购买链接: https://my.racknerd.com/aff.php?aff=1866&pid=907
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
过年红包,🧧😂
Clowdbot更名为Moltbot

因发音与Claude相似,Anthropic以商标问题要求Clowdbot改名,该项目已更名为Moltbot

https://www.molt.bot
1024社区 | 1024.day
CloudCone被黑,服务器失联,黑客要求支付赎金恢复数据 https://www.nodeseek.com/post-600738-1
这份报告描述了一个安全事件,涉及到通过勒索病毒攻击特定平台上的虚拟机(VM)。以下是总结:

发生了什么:

初步观察: 监控系统检测到多个虚拟机失去网络连接,并在启动时显示勒索信息。

立即行动: 受影响的服务器被隔离,工程师开始调查。发现受影响虚拟机的启动扇区被勒索信息覆盖。正在通过检查原始块设备、重建分区表和寻找完整的文件系统等方式恢复数据。

攻击是如何发生的:

远程脚本执行: 攻击者通过一个远程的 bash 脚本在所有受影响节点上执行攻击。该脚本现在无法访问,且主机上的 shell 历史记录被清除。没有发现未经授权的 SSH 访问,因为所有用户的登录记录与已知的内部账户匹配。

利用 Virtualizor 漏洞: 调查发现攻击是通过 Virtualizor 的“Server Terminal”功能进行的,攻击者利用该功能获取了连接节点的 shell 访问权限。该方法不使用 SSH,因此没有 SSH 连接的痕迹,且 root 登录不在节点上记录,这也解释了为什么之前没有发现异常。

影响范围:

受影响的系统: 只有连接到单一 Virtualizor 实例的节点受到了影响,其他平台未受影响。

数据安全: Virtualizor 平台上没有存储用户的个人或账单信息,调查也未发现客户数据库或账单系统被访问或泄露的证据。

后续计划:

公司正在进行恢复工作,并会向受影响的客户发送邮件。对给所有受影响的客户带来的不便表示歉意。

简而言之,攻击者利用 Virtualizor 平台的漏洞,通过“Server Terminal”功能获得了未授权的访问权限,导致了勒索病毒攻击。

Hello,

We acknowledge the incident that has happened today

What We First Observed
We were initially alerted to the incident when our monitoring systems detected that several VMs lost network connectivity. Upon investigating, we found ransom messages being displayed at boot on all of the affected VMs.

Our engineering teams immediately isolated the affected servers and began analysis. During the investigation, we confirmed that the boot sectors of impacted VM disks had been overwritten with the ransom message. We are attempting to recover the data by various means including examining raw block devices, reconstructing partition tables, and searching for intact filesystems.

How the Attack Was Executed
Meanwhile, the team investigating the breach discovered that a remote bash script (which is no longer accessible) had been executed across all affected nodes. Shell histories on those hosts had also been cleared. We performed a thorough review of authentication activity using system journals, rotated log files, login records and auditing data and found no evidence of unauthorized SSH access. All recorded user logins matched known internal accounts.

At this point, we started looking into other infrastructure that could have facilitated this attack and discovered that logs of one of our Virtualizor instances had been cleared from around the time of the incident. This is the Virtualizor instance that all of the affected nodes are connected to.

At this time, based on the available evidence, we believe that the attackers used the "Server Terminal" functionality within Virtualizor to gain shell access to connected nodes and execute the malicious script. This access method does not use SSH, which explains the lack of evidence relating to SSH connectivity, and we also discovered that this doesn't leave any login records on the nodes (all root level logins are also alerted via emails), explaining why we didn't find anything out of the ordinary earlier.

Scope of Impact
We use Virtualizor instances to support our VPS services. At this time, we have confirmed that only nodes connected to a single Virtualizor instance were impacted. Nodes attached to our other platforms were not affected.

We also do not store personal or billing information of our users within virtualization platforms such as Virtualizor. Our investigation has found no evidence that customer databases or billing systems were accessed or compromised.

We are currently working on the way forward, and all affected clients shall be emailed, and we apologize for the inconvenience this has caused to all our affected clients.
一个完全由AI Bot组成的论坛,人类只是看客,类似于Reddit留言模式,AI agents已超过百万,算是史上发展最快的非人类论坛:
https://www.moltbook.com
1024社区 | 1024.day
CloudCone被黑,服务器失联,黑客要求支付赎金恢复数据 https://www.nodeseek.com/post-600738-1
Cloudcone最新消息:数据恢复无法实现

Cloudcone技术支持团队确认,受影响节点的数据无法恢复,因为攻击者已删除了所有数据。后续更新将通过状态页面和邮件通知。

https://status.cloudcone.com/
⚠️据报道,HostSlick成为与Virtualizor相关的攻击目标

LowEndTalk上的报道显示,HostSlick是近期受影响于针对Virtualizor基础设施的持续安全事件的最新服务商。出现在HostSlick VNC控制台的勒索信息,使用了与Cloudcone数据泄露事件中相同的Telegram联系人账号。

HostSlick与Cloudcone、OuiHeberg和ColoCrossing一道,成为近期使用Virtualizor服务时受影响的服务商。这进一步佐证了该软件存在直接漏洞的说法。

以下服务商也使用Virtualizor提供VPS服务:

- Virtono
- SolidSEOVPS
- Naranjatech
- LittleCreek
- DediRock
- Chunkserv
- RareCloud

如果您在这些或其他由Virtualizor管理的服务商处有正在运行的服务,请确保在其基础设施之外存储了最新的备份数据。
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
感觉离上次的12w也没几天呀?😂,腰斩了!