ZgoCloud补货洛杉矶非优化线路和9929优化线路


洛杉矶非优化线路，解锁还行

1C / 768MB / 18G SSD / 1.5T 流量 / 12.9刀每年
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1C / 1G / 20G SSD / 2T月流量 / 15刀年付
https://clients.zgovps.com/?cmd=cart&action=add&affid=153&id=93

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洛杉矶优化线路，9929+CMIN2

1C / 768MB / 15G SSD / 600G 流量 / 200Mbps端口 / 30刀每年
https://clients.zgovps.com/?cmd=cart&action=add&affid=153&id=39


1C / 1G / 20G SSD / 1T 流量 / 300Mbps端口 / 42刀每年
https://clients.zgovps.com/?cmd=cart&action=add&affid=153&id=32

tip：支持3天内流量不超过10G可工单退款

联合声明：苹果和谷歌已达成一项多年合作协议，根据该协议，下一代苹果基础模型将基于谷歌的Gemini模型和云技术。这些模型将为未来的苹果智能功能提供支持，包括今年即将推出的更加个性化的Siri。

经过仔细评估，苹果公司认定谷歌的人工智能技术为苹果基础模型提供了最强大的基础，并对它将为苹果用户带来的创新体验感到兴奋。苹果智能将继续在苹果设备和私有云计算环境中运行，同时保持苹果业界领先的隐私标准。

x.com 又炸了…… 北京时间 22:27 - 22:47 已恢复

死了么？死了，还没死透……

https://1024.day/d/3682

搬瓦工DNS解锁修改为原生解锁

GitHub 的专属贡献证书生成器:
https://certificate.brendonmatos.com

Cloudafra又放了一个4折码，最低20刀一年，优惠码如下：

JAN26

https://t.me/Hello_1024/3836

过年红包，🧧，😂

Clowdbot更名为Moltbot

因发音与Claude相似，Anthropic以商标问题要求Clowdbot改名，该项目已更名为Moltbot

https://www.molt.bot

Moltbot on Cloudflare Workers

https://github.com/cloudflare/moltworker

CloudCone被黑，服务器失联，黑客要求支付赎金恢复数据

https://www.nodeseek.com/post-600738-1

又改名成OpenClaw，这是改名消消乐？

https://openclaw.ai

这份报告描述了一个安全事件，涉及到通过勒索病毒攻击特定平台上的虚拟机（VM）。以下是总结：

发生了什么：

初步观察： 监控系统检测到多个虚拟机失去网络连接，并在启动时显示勒索信息。

立即行动： 受影响的服务器被隔离，工程师开始调查。发现受影响虚拟机的启动扇区被勒索信息覆盖。正在通过检查原始块设备、重建分区表和寻找完整的文件系统等方式恢复数据。

攻击是如何发生的：

远程脚本执行： 攻击者通过一个远程的 bash 脚本在所有受影响节点上执行攻击。该脚本现在无法访问，且主机上的 shell 历史记录被清除。没有发现未经授权的 SSH 访问，因为所有用户的登录记录与已知的内部账户匹配。

利用 Virtualizor 漏洞： 调查发现攻击是通过 Virtualizor 的“Server Terminal”功能进行的，攻击者利用该功能获取了连接节点的 shell 访问权限。该方法不使用 SSH，因此没有 SSH 连接的痕迹，且 root 登录不在节点上记录，这也解释了为什么之前没有发现异常。

影响范围：

受影响的系统： 只有连接到单一 Virtualizor 实例的节点受到了影响，其他平台未受影响。

数据安全： Virtualizor 平台上没有存储用户的个人或账单信息，调查也未发现客户数据库或账单系统被访问或泄露的证据。

后续计划：

公司正在进行恢复工作，并会向受影响的客户发送邮件。对给所有受影响的客户带来的不便表示歉意。

简而言之，攻击者利用 Virtualizor 平台的漏洞，通过“Server Terminal”功能获得了未授权的访问权限，导致了勒索病毒攻击。

Hello,

We acknowledge the incident that has happened today

What We First Observed
We were initially alerted to the incident when our monitoring systems detected that several VMs lost network connectivity. Upon investigating, we found ransom messages being displayed at boot on all of the affected VMs.

Our engineering teams immediately isolated the affected servers and began analysis. During the investigation, we confirmed that the boot sectors of impacted VM disks had been overwritten with the ransom message. We are attempting to recover the data by various means including examining raw block devices, reconstructing partition tables, and searching for intact filesystems.

How the Attack Was Executed
Meanwhile, the team investigating the breach discovered that a remote bash script (which is no longer accessible) had been executed across all affected nodes. Shell histories on those hosts had also been cleared. We performed a thorough review of authentication activity using system journals, rotated log files, login records and auditing data and found no evidence of unauthorized SSH access. All recorded user logins matched known internal accounts.

At this point, we started looking into other infrastructure that could have facilitated this attack and discovered that logs of one of our Virtualizor instances had been cleared from around the time of the incident. This is the Virtualizor instance that all of the affected nodes are connected to.

At this time, based on the available evidence, we believe that the attackers used the "Server Terminal" functionality within Virtualizor to gain shell access to connected nodes and execute the malicious script. This access method does not use SSH, which explains the lack of evidence relating to SSH connectivity, and we also discovered that this doesn't leave any login records on the nodes (all root level logins are also alerted via emails), explaining why we didn't find anything out of the ordinary earlier.

Scope of Impact
We use Virtualizor instances to support our VPS services. At this time, we have confirmed that only nodes connected to a single Virtualizor instance were impacted. Nodes attached to our other platforms were not affected.

We also do not store personal or billing information of our users within virtualization platforms such as Virtualizor. Our investigation has found no evidence that customer databases or billing systems were accessed or compromised.

We are currently working on the way forward, and all affected clients shall be emailed, and we apologize for the inconvenience this has caused to all our affected clients.

一个完全由AI Bot组成的论坛，人类只是看客，类似于Reddit留言模式，AI agents已超过百万，算是史上发展最快的非人类论坛：
https://www.moltbook.com

Cloudcone最新消息：数据恢复无法实现

Cloudcone技术支持团队确认，受影响节点的数据无法恢复，因为攻击者已删除了所有数据。后续更新将通过状态页面和邮件通知。

https://status.cloudcone.com/