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A somber farewell to Palestinian child Tamer Baraka, who was savagely killed this morning in a deadly Israeli strike on a car in Khan Younis.
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
The Economist reports US & Israeli forces are scaling software-driven targeting systems to accelerate strike decisions.
Automation speeds the kill chain—but introduces risk: flawed data, bias, and misclassification can turn bugs into casualties.
When targeting becomes code, errors aren’t just technical—they’re lethal.
@TheGhostITM
Automation speeds the kill chain—but introduces risk: flawed data, bias, and misclassification can turn bugs into casualties.
When targeting becomes code, errors aren’t just technical—they’re lethal.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
The Trump administration’s latest cybersecurity strategy signals an ambitious posture, but a closer examination reveals notable gaps between rhetoric and operational readiness.
While the increasing complexity of global cyber threats demands urgent attention, the strategy document itself is strikingly brief, offering limited detail on execution or prioritization. Critical threat actors—most notably China—are not explicitly mentioned, even though U.S. intelligence assessments consistently identify Beijing as the most persistent and capable cyber adversary. Campaigns such as “Salty Typhoon” have demonstrated the scale and depth of Chinese intrusion into U.S. infrastructure, yet the strategy leans heavily on vague assertions of American superiority rather than outlining concrete countermeasures.
The document also downplays the cyber implications of geopolitical tensions. Escalations involving Iran, for instance, have historically translated into increased cyber activity targeting U.S. assets and regional interests. Yet the strategy offers little indication of a coordinated plan to mitigate these risks or integrate cyber diplomacy into broader conflict management efforts.
Domestically, structural weaknesses further complicate the picture. Key cybersecurity leadership positions remain vacant, while agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have experienced staffing constraints. The dissolution of the State Department’s cyber-focused diplomatic functions has also reduced the United States’ ability to shape international cyber norms. Meanwhile, U.S. Cyber Command continues to grapple with personnel and experience gaps, constraining its ability to scale operations effectively.
Taken together, these issues highlight a disconnect between strategic ambition and institutional capacity. While the strategy signals intent, its lack of specificity, combined with organizational shortfalls, raises concerns about the United States’ preparedness to address rapidly evolving cyber threats in a contested global environment.
@TheGhostITM
While the increasing complexity of global cyber threats demands urgent attention, the strategy document itself is strikingly brief, offering limited detail on execution or prioritization. Critical threat actors—most notably China—are not explicitly mentioned, even though U.S. intelligence assessments consistently identify Beijing as the most persistent and capable cyber adversary. Campaigns such as “Salty Typhoon” have demonstrated the scale and depth of Chinese intrusion into U.S. infrastructure, yet the strategy leans heavily on vague assertions of American superiority rather than outlining concrete countermeasures.
The document also downplays the cyber implications of geopolitical tensions. Escalations involving Iran, for instance, have historically translated into increased cyber activity targeting U.S. assets and regional interests. Yet the strategy offers little indication of a coordinated plan to mitigate these risks or integrate cyber diplomacy into broader conflict management efforts.
Domestically, structural weaknesses further complicate the picture. Key cybersecurity leadership positions remain vacant, while agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have experienced staffing constraints. The dissolution of the State Department’s cyber-focused diplomatic functions has also reduced the United States’ ability to shape international cyber norms. Meanwhile, U.S. Cyber Command continues to grapple with personnel and experience gaps, constraining its ability to scale operations effectively.
Taken together, these issues highlight a disconnect between strategic ambition and institutional capacity. While the strategy signals intent, its lack of specificity, combined with organizational shortfalls, raises concerns about the United States’ preparedness to address rapidly evolving cyber threats in a contested global environment.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Hackers have compromised over 100 CCTV cameras across multiple locations in Israel, obtaining sensitive footage in the latest CCTV breach.
@TheGhostITM
@TheGhostITM
South Korean Buddhist monks performed full prostrations as they marched toward the U.S. embassy in Seoul in a protest against the war on Iran.
Photos | Palestinian barbers continue their work inside tents after losing their shops in Israei airstrikes, in Khan Younis, central Gaza Strip.
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
The Economist reports US & Israeli forces are scaling software-driven targeting systems to accelerate strike decisions.
Automation speeds the kill chain—but introduces risk: flawed data, bias, and misclassification can turn bugs into casualties.
When targeting becomes code, errors aren’t just technical—they’re lethal.
@TheGhostITM
Automation speeds the kill chain—but introduces risk: flawed data, bias, and misclassification can turn bugs into casualties.
When targeting becomes code, errors aren’t just technical—they’re lethal.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
The Trump administration’s latest cybersecurity strategy signals an ambitious posture, but a closer examination reveals notable gaps between rhetoric and operational readiness.
While the increasing complexity of global cyber threats demands urgent attention, the strategy document itself is strikingly brief, offering limited detail on execution or prioritization. Critical threat actors—most notably China—are not explicitly mentioned, even though U.S. intelligence assessments consistently identify Beijing as the most persistent and capable cyber adversary. Campaigns such as “Salty Typhoon” have demonstrated the scale and depth of Chinese intrusion into U.S. infrastructure, yet the strategy leans heavily on vague assertions of American superiority rather than outlining concrete countermeasures.
The document also downplays the cyber implications of geopolitical tensions. Escalations involving Iran, for instance, have historically translated into increased cyber activity targeting U.S. assets and regional interests. Yet the strategy offers little indication of a coordinated plan to mitigate these risks or integrate cyber diplomacy into broader conflict management efforts.
Domestically, structural weaknesses further complicate the picture. Key cybersecurity leadership positions remain vacant, while agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have experienced staffing constraints. The dissolution of the State Department’s cyber-focused diplomatic functions has also reduced the United States’ ability to shape international cyber norms. Meanwhile, U.S. Cyber Command continues to grapple with personnel and experience gaps, constraining its ability to scale operations effectively.
Taken together, these issues highlight a disconnect between strategic ambition and institutional capacity. While the strategy signals intent, its lack of specificity, combined with organizational shortfalls, raises concerns about the United States’ preparedness to address rapidly evolving cyber threats in a contested global environment.
@TheGhostITM
While the increasing complexity of global cyber threats demands urgent attention, the strategy document itself is strikingly brief, offering limited detail on execution or prioritization. Critical threat actors—most notably China—are not explicitly mentioned, even though U.S. intelligence assessments consistently identify Beijing as the most persistent and capable cyber adversary. Campaigns such as “Salty Typhoon” have demonstrated the scale and depth of Chinese intrusion into U.S. infrastructure, yet the strategy leans heavily on vague assertions of American superiority rather than outlining concrete countermeasures.
The document also downplays the cyber implications of geopolitical tensions. Escalations involving Iran, for instance, have historically translated into increased cyber activity targeting U.S. assets and regional interests. Yet the strategy offers little indication of a coordinated plan to mitigate these risks or integrate cyber diplomacy into broader conflict management efforts.
Domestically, structural weaknesses further complicate the picture. Key cybersecurity leadership positions remain vacant, while agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have experienced staffing constraints. The dissolution of the State Department’s cyber-focused diplomatic functions has also reduced the United States’ ability to shape international cyber norms. Meanwhile, U.S. Cyber Command continues to grapple with personnel and experience gaps, constraining its ability to scale operations effectively.
Taken together, these issues highlight a disconnect between strategic ambition and institutional capacity. While the strategy signals intent, its lack of specificity, combined with organizational shortfalls, raises concerns about the United States’ preparedness to address rapidly evolving cyber threats in a contested global environment.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Hackers have compromised over 100 CCTV cameras across multiple locations in Israel, obtaining sensitive footage in the latest CCTV breach.
@TheGhostITM
@TheGhostITM
1❤1
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Cyber Attacks During "Operation Israel" (Feb 23 – Mar 17)
The trend continues into the 18th day of the operation, with a significant increase in the number of attacks.
Most of the attacks are DDoS attacks and significant data leaks.
@TheGhostITM
The trend continues into the 18th day of the operation, with a significant increase in the number of attacks.
Most of the attacks are DDoS attacks and significant data leaks.
@TheGhostITM
1❤1
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
מתקפות סייבר במהלך "מבצע ישראל" (23 בפברואר – 17 במרץ)
המגמה נמשכת גם ביום ה-18 למבצע, עם עלייה משמעותית במספר המתקפות.
רוב המתקפות הן מתקפות DDoS ודליפות מידע משמעותיות.
@TheGhostITM
המגמה נמשכת גם ביום ה-18 למבצע, עם עלייה משמעותית במספר המתקפות.
רוב המתקפות הן מתקפות DDoS ודליפות מידע משמעותיות.
@TheGhostITM
⚡1
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
More than 150 different hacker groups and lone-wolf operatives are active in the cyber space against Israel. The main and most significant attacks are carried out by pro-Palestinian hacktivist groups and their affiliates, as well as pro-Iranian groups.
The government and financial sectors are the most targeted sectors, primarily through DDoS attacks and similar methods.
@TheGhostITM
The government and financial sectors are the most targeted sectors, primarily through DDoS attacks and similar methods.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
יותר מ-150 קבוצות האקרים שונות ופועלים בודדים פועלים במרחב הסייבר נגד ישראל. המתקפות המרכזיות והמשמעותיות ביותר מבוצעות על ידי קבוצות האקטיביסטיות פרו-פלסטיניות ושותפיהן, וכן קבוצות פרו-איראניות.
המגזר הממשלתי והמגזר הפיננסי הם המגזרים המותקפים ביותר, בעיקר באמצעות מתקפות DDoS ושיטות דומות.
@TheGhostITM
המגזר הממשלתי והמגזר הפיננסי הם המגזרים המותקפים ביותר, בעיקר באמצעות מתקפות DDoS ושיטות דומות.
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Satellites as Cyberattack Vectors: Entry Points, Targets, and Disruption Tools
Can satellites enable cyberattacks on companies? Short answer: Not as kinetic weapons—but as hacked systems, digital gateways, and service disruptors.
Satellites themselves can be hacked via uplink command injection, software vulnerabilities in onboard systems, or ground station compromise. Once inside, attackers can alter orbits, disable payloads, or exfiltrate data. More commonly, they target ground segments—terminals, gateways, Network Control Centers—as entry points into corporate IT/OT networks.
Distinguish jamming/spoofing (signal denial/interception) from network intrusion:
- Jamming: Overwhelm satellite frequencies to blackout comms (seen in maritime GPS disruptions).
- Spoofing: Fake signals (e.g., GPS position falsification) to mislead navigation/autonomous systems.
- Intrusion: Pivot from satellite links into enterprise networks via unsegmented hybrid architectures.
Hybrid satellite networks (LEO/MEO/GEO + terrestrial 5G/fiber) amplify risks. Industries like shipping (Inmarsat/Iridium), aviation (SATCOM), oil/gas (remote SCADA), and energy (grid timing) treat satellites as "invisible pipes"—rarely segmented, often unmonitored. A single VSAT terminal breach cascades to HQ systems.
Real attacks confirm this: 2024 Viasat hack crippled Ukrainian military comms; merchant vessels report spoofed AIS positions in high-risk zones. Dependency = attack surface.
Fix now: Encrypt uplinks/downlinks, segment satellite traffic, monitor ground stations as critical assets. Satellite security isn't optional—it's mission-critical.
#Cybersecurity #SatelliteSecurity #SpaceCyber #OTSecurity #HybridNetworks
@TheGhostITM
Can satellites enable cyberattacks on companies? Short answer: Not as kinetic weapons—but as hacked systems, digital gateways, and service disruptors.
Satellites themselves can be hacked via uplink command injection, software vulnerabilities in onboard systems, or ground station compromise. Once inside, attackers can alter orbits, disable payloads, or exfiltrate data. More commonly, they target ground segments—terminals, gateways, Network Control Centers—as entry points into corporate IT/OT networks.
Distinguish jamming/spoofing (signal denial/interception) from network intrusion:
- Jamming: Overwhelm satellite frequencies to blackout comms (seen in maritime GPS disruptions).
- Spoofing: Fake signals (e.g., GPS position falsification) to mislead navigation/autonomous systems.
- Intrusion: Pivot from satellite links into enterprise networks via unsegmented hybrid architectures.
Hybrid satellite networks (LEO/MEO/GEO + terrestrial 5G/fiber) amplify risks. Industries like shipping (Inmarsat/Iridium), aviation (SATCOM), oil/gas (remote SCADA), and energy (grid timing) treat satellites as "invisible pipes"—rarely segmented, often unmonitored. A single VSAT terminal breach cascades to HQ systems.
Real attacks confirm this: 2024 Viasat hack crippled Ukrainian military comms; merchant vessels report spoofed AIS positions in high-risk zones. Dependency = attack surface.
Fix now: Encrypt uplinks/downlinks, segment satellite traffic, monitor ground stations as critical assets. Satellite security isn't optional—it's mission-critical.
#Cybersecurity #SatelliteSecurity #SpaceCyber #OTSecurity #HybridNetworks
@TheGhostITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ