Work has been halted at the gas production platform in the "Leviathan" field, which is operated by the Israeli company "Chevron".
Al-Manar, the Lebanese satellite television station that serves as the official media arm of the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah, confirms that the building targeted in Haret Hreik a short while ago belongs to the network.
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Protesters took the streets of New York City, rallying in Times Square and other areas to demand an immediate end to the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
Forwarded from 𓂆 #OpIsrael
𓂆 #OpIsrael
A devastating war is at the doors. Join #OpIsrael
حرب طاحنة على الابواب#
Forwarded from 𓂆 #OpIsrael
To our Russian, Moroccan, Algerian, European, African, Chinese, Cuban, South American, and Asian brothers—Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and all.
Join #OpIsrael NOW!
Спасибо... شكراً... 谢谢... Terima Kasih... Cảm ơn... Gracias... Merci... Obrigado... Thank you...
اللهم احفظهم، كما كانوا لنا السند في كل زمان، و الوقفة في كل مكان.
(Oh God, protect them, as they have been our support in every time, and our stand in every place.)
In solidarity, forever.
Palestine Cyber Resistance
#OpIsraelTeam
Join #OpIsrael NOW!
Спасибо... شكراً... 谢谢... Terima Kasih... Cảm ơn... Gracias... Merci... Obrigado... Thank you...
اللهم احفظهم، كما كانوا لنا السند في كل زمان، و الوقفة في كل مكان.
(Oh God, protect them, as they have been our support in every time, and our stand in every place.)
In solidarity, forever.
Palestine Cyber Resistance
#OpIsraelTeam
❤🔥1
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
Mary Trump, the niece of the U.S. president, reshared a post about the Minab massacre in Iran, which occurred in a joint US-Israeli airstrike, writing: “I dare anyone to justify this.”
While Iran has explicitly announced that it is not willing to negotiate with the US, Trump, in a Truth Social post on Tuesday, claimed it was "Too Late" for talks and signaled no intention of ending US-Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic.
Forwarded from إعلام المقاومة الفلسطينية
#عاااااااجل …سلاح الجو القطري يقصف إيران.
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
How a $50,000 Iranian Drone Strategy Could Unravel the GCC and Its Western Allies
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
For decades, the military strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its American allies has focused on high-tech air superiority and massive conventional forces. They have prepared for tank battles in the desert and dogfights in the sky. But as the sun sets over the Arabian Peninsula, a terrifying new reality is setting in: the next war will not be won by the most advanced fighter jet, but by the cheapest drone, targeting the one thing this region cannot live without—water.
The strategic genius of Iran's playbook is its brutal simplicity. Tehran has identified the GCC's single point of failure. More than 60% of the freshwater across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain does not come from rains or rivers, but from the colossal, energy-consuming desalination plants that line the coast. These plants are the lifeblood of the Arab nations—vast industrial complexes that turn seawater into survival. They are also incredibly vulnerable.
A coordinated drone swarm—each unit costing as little as $50,000—descending on the desalination and sanitation plants that service the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These facilities do not supply one city alone; they sustain the life of an entire nation. From Riyadh to Jeddah, from Dammam to the smallest villages in the desert, the population of more than 35 million people depends on this infrastructure. Air defense systems, designed to stop sophisticated jets, are ill-equipped to handle a swarm of slow, low-flying, inexpensive drones. Once those turbines and reverse osmosis facilities are hit, the clock starts ticking for every Saudi citizen.
A kingdom of millions without a tap, a faucet, or a drop of clean water does not have weeks; it has days. Without water, sanitation fails, disease blooms, and civil order crumbles. Within two weeks, the population would face a biblical catastrophe. They would not be fighting an enemy; they would be fighting for a drink. The entire nation grinds to a halt.
But the water war is only phase one. Iran's strategy also targets the stomach. The majority of GCC states import up to 90% of their food, much of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran, as it has done in the now with tankers, closes the strait and interdicts supply lines, the food stops now. A population without water and without food is not a nation; it is a humanitarian disaster zone. The Gulf, for all its wealth, becomes a prison without provisions.
Why does this matter to the West? Because the GCC is not just an oil exporter anymore; it is the financial engine of the future. The Gulf states are primary investors in American AI data centers and cutting-edge technology. They supply the capital and the energy that fuels the next industrial revolution in the United States. If the Gulf's economy collapses under the weight of a water and food crisis, the funding stops. The data centers go dark. The AI projects that underpin Wall Street and the American defense industry would stall. The American economy, already in a dire situation, would face collapse.
This is the strategic trap. Iran does not need to defeat the US Navy in a naval battle. It simply needs to cut the hose. It needs to turn off the taps across the Arabian Peninsula. In a war of survival, where the enemy targets your ability to drink and eat, the most expensive missile defense system in the world is useless against a man dying of thirst. This is why, in this war, Iran holds all the cards. The United States will lose this war.
· UAE: Committed to invest $1.4 trillion in the United States over the next decade (2026-2036) . This builds on an existing $1 trillion economic relationship between the two countries .
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
For decades, the military strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its American allies has focused on high-tech air superiority and massive conventional forces. They have prepared for tank battles in the desert and dogfights in the sky. But as the sun sets over the Arabian Peninsula, a terrifying new reality is setting in: the next war will not be won by the most advanced fighter jet, but by the cheapest drone, targeting the one thing this region cannot live without—water.
The strategic genius of Iran's playbook is its brutal simplicity. Tehran has identified the GCC's single point of failure. More than 60% of the freshwater across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain does not come from rains or rivers, but from the colossal, energy-consuming desalination plants that line the coast. These plants are the lifeblood of the Arab nations—vast industrial complexes that turn seawater into survival. They are also incredibly vulnerable.
A coordinated drone swarm—each unit costing as little as $50,000—descending on the desalination and sanitation plants that service the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These facilities do not supply one city alone; they sustain the life of an entire nation. From Riyadh to Jeddah, from Dammam to the smallest villages in the desert, the population of more than 35 million people depends on this infrastructure. Air defense systems, designed to stop sophisticated jets, are ill-equipped to handle a swarm of slow, low-flying, inexpensive drones. Once those turbines and reverse osmosis facilities are hit, the clock starts ticking for every Saudi citizen.
A kingdom of millions without a tap, a faucet, or a drop of clean water does not have weeks; it has days. Without water, sanitation fails, disease blooms, and civil order crumbles. Within two weeks, the population would face a biblical catastrophe. They would not be fighting an enemy; they would be fighting for a drink. The entire nation grinds to a halt.
But the water war is only phase one. Iran's strategy also targets the stomach. The majority of GCC states import up to 90% of their food, much of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran, as it has done in the now with tankers, closes the strait and interdicts supply lines, the food stops now. A population without water and without food is not a nation; it is a humanitarian disaster zone. The Gulf, for all its wealth, becomes a prison without provisions.
Why does this matter to the West? Because the GCC is not just an oil exporter anymore; it is the financial engine of the future. The Gulf states are primary investors in American AI data centers and cutting-edge technology. They supply the capital and the energy that fuels the next industrial revolution in the United States. If the Gulf's economy collapses under the weight of a water and food crisis, the funding stops. The data centers go dark. The AI projects that underpin Wall Street and the American defense industry would stall. The American economy, already in a dire situation, would face collapse.
This is the strategic trap. Iran does not need to defeat the US Navy in a naval battle. It simply needs to cut the hose. It needs to turn off the taps across the Arabian Peninsula. In a war of survival, where the enemy targets your ability to drink and eat, the most expensive missile defense system in the world is useless against a man dying of thirst. This is why, in this war, Iran holds all the cards. The United States will lose this war.
· UAE: Committed to invest $1.4 trillion in the United States over the next decade (2026-2036) . This builds on an existing $1 trillion economic relationship between the two countries .
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
· Qatar: Has invested approximately $6.6 billion in U.S. universities alone over several decades .
· GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (combined): GCC SWFs collectively manage approximately $4.8–5.0 trillion in assets, with an estimated 65–75% of their capital deployment directed internationally toward North America, Europe, and Asia . In 2025 alone, 47% of all sovereign investments globally went to the United States .
· QIA (Qatar Investment Authority) and PIF (Saudi Public Investment Fund) are among the most active investors in U.S. technology and AI infrastructure .
The GCC has invested TRILLIONS in America:
UAE alone committed $1.4T over next decade. Qatar funds US universities. Saudi PIF backs American AI & tech.
If Iran cuts the water—GCC collapses. If GCC collapses, US economy follows. $50,000 drone. Trillion-dollar consequence.
#OpIsraelTeam
· GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (combined): GCC SWFs collectively manage approximately $4.8–5.0 trillion in assets, with an estimated 65–75% of their capital deployment directed internationally toward North America, Europe, and Asia . In 2025 alone, 47% of all sovereign investments globally went to the United States .
· QIA (Qatar Investment Authority) and PIF (Saudi Public Investment Fund) are among the most active investors in U.S. technology and AI infrastructure .
The GCC has invested TRILLIONS in America:
UAE alone committed $1.4T over next decade. Qatar funds US universities. Saudi PIF backs American AI & tech.
If Iran cuts the water—GCC collapses. If GCC collapses, US economy follows. $50,000 drone. Trillion-dollar consequence.
#OpIsraelTeam
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
#OpIsrael: A Decade of Evolution in Pro-Palestinian Hacktivism
By #TheGhostsITM
#OpIsrael first emerged in 2013 as an Anonymous-branded campaign, mobilizing loose collectives to target Israeli regime and commercial websites in response to military operations in Gaza. More than a decade later, the operation banner has become one node within a broader and more fragmented pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel hacktivist movement. Today's campaigns routinely target not only Israeli entities but also allied infrastructure, including U.S. assets and military installations across the Arab world.
More than 100 identifiable hacktivist crews have been observed conducting or supporting offensive operations tied to the Israel–Iran and Israel–Palestine conflict theaters. Their tactics include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements, data leaks, and opportunistic intrusions into less-hardened critical infrastructure and media targets.
Groups include DieNet, Mad Ghost, RuskiNet, UNIT 1948, Rippersec, IndoHaxSec, 313Team, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Moroccan Black Cyber Army, CyberDragonzz, Nation of Saviors, BlackEmber, AnonGhost, FADTeam, Handala Hack, StuxTeam, NoName057(16), Garuda Eye, and Keymous—among over 100 others. This growing roster illustrates how pro-Palestinian and pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystems have begun to overlap both tactically and narratively, pooling tools, botnets, and propaganda channels across Telegram and dark-social platforms.
In parallel, pro-Muslim and regional clusters in Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have joined this "cyber front," presenting their operations as a defense of Gaza and a rejection of what they describe as U.S.-backed regional hegemony. Today, these crews have also positioned themselves as defenders of Iran and Iranians against what they perceive as the empire, the Israeli regime, and Gulf and Arab allies aligned with imperial interests.
Motivation, Legality, and the 'Just War' Narrative
Hacktivist messaging consistently explains cyber operations against Israel, U.S. assets, and Gulf-based American infrastructure as a response to what they characterize as an illegal and aggressive war against Iran and systemic violations of Palestinian rights under occupation. These actors routinely invoke international humanitarian law (IHL)—specifically principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity—to argue that disrupting logistics, media, or regime systems constitutes a proportionate response when kinetic operations have caused sustained civilian harm and formal international accountability mechanisms have failed.
Legal scholars acknowledge that cyber operations can, under certain conditions, qualify as "methods of warfare" and are bound by the same IHL principles that govern kinetic force.
Activists who defend hacktivist operations argue that when states engage in disproportionate or indiscriminate digital coercion, non-state actors stepping in on behalf of affected civilians are morally justified—even if they operate in a legal gray zone.
State Sponsorship, Attribution, and the IRGC Question
Western, Indian, and Israeli threat intelligence reports frequently characterize pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel hacktivist crews as fronts or auxiliaries for Iranian state organs—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated units—citing shared targeting priorities and aligned narratives. However, attribution in cyberspace remains technically and legally complex. Under the Tallinn Manual and state responsibility doctrine, evidence of "effective control," direction, or substantial support is required before non-state conduct can be formally imputed to a government.
In practice, the ecosystem defies easy categorization. Some crews operate with clear ideological proximity to state actors like Iran or Russia and may benefit from tool leaks, training, or tacit tolerance. Others tell a different story.
By #TheGhostsITM
#OpIsrael first emerged in 2013 as an Anonymous-branded campaign, mobilizing loose collectives to target Israeli regime and commercial websites in response to military operations in Gaza. More than a decade later, the operation banner has become one node within a broader and more fragmented pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel hacktivist movement. Today's campaigns routinely target not only Israeli entities but also allied infrastructure, including U.S. assets and military installations across the Arab world.
More than 100 identifiable hacktivist crews have been observed conducting or supporting offensive operations tied to the Israel–Iran and Israel–Palestine conflict theaters. Their tactics include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements, data leaks, and opportunistic intrusions into less-hardened critical infrastructure and media targets.
Groups include DieNet, Mad Ghost, RuskiNet, UNIT 1948, Rippersec, IndoHaxSec, 313Team, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Moroccan Black Cyber Army, CyberDragonzz, Nation of Saviors, BlackEmber, AnonGhost, FADTeam, Handala Hack, StuxTeam, NoName057(16), Garuda Eye, and Keymous—among over 100 others. This growing roster illustrates how pro-Palestinian and pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystems have begun to overlap both tactically and narratively, pooling tools, botnets, and propaganda channels across Telegram and dark-social platforms.
In parallel, pro-Muslim and regional clusters in Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have joined this "cyber front," presenting their operations as a defense of Gaza and a rejection of what they describe as U.S.-backed regional hegemony. Today, these crews have also positioned themselves as defenders of Iran and Iranians against what they perceive as the empire, the Israeli regime, and Gulf and Arab allies aligned with imperial interests.
Motivation, Legality, and the 'Just War' Narrative
Hacktivist messaging consistently explains cyber operations against Israel, U.S. assets, and Gulf-based American infrastructure as a response to what they characterize as an illegal and aggressive war against Iran and systemic violations of Palestinian rights under occupation. These actors routinely invoke international humanitarian law (IHL)—specifically principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity—to argue that disrupting logistics, media, or regime systems constitutes a proportionate response when kinetic operations have caused sustained civilian harm and formal international accountability mechanisms have failed.
Legal scholars acknowledge that cyber operations can, under certain conditions, qualify as "methods of warfare" and are bound by the same IHL principles that govern kinetic force.
Activists who defend hacktivist operations argue that when states engage in disproportionate or indiscriminate digital coercion, non-state actors stepping in on behalf of affected civilians are morally justified—even if they operate in a legal gray zone.
State Sponsorship, Attribution, and the IRGC Question
Western, Indian, and Israeli threat intelligence reports frequently characterize pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel hacktivist crews as fronts or auxiliaries for Iranian state organs—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated units—citing shared targeting priorities and aligned narratives. However, attribution in cyberspace remains technically and legally complex. Under the Tallinn Manual and state responsibility doctrine, evidence of "effective control," direction, or substantial support is required before non-state conduct can be formally imputed to a government.
In practice, the ecosystem defies easy categorization. Some crews operate with clear ideological proximity to state actors like Iran or Russia and may benefit from tool leaks, training, or tacit tolerance. Others tell a different story.
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
They are sympathetic volunteers, cybersecurity students, or veteran hacktivists with long histories in the scene—small collectives with no formal ties to any state, driven instead by the Palestinian people's liberation struggle. Many of the newer crews, however, lack deep knowledge of geopolitics. The inexperienced among them borrow the same exploit kits and DDoS platforms used by state-aligned groups, while the more experienced ones operate across shared Telegram infrastructure. This creates an ecosystem where ideological motivations, borrowed tooling, and narrative alignment often blur the lines between grassroots solidarity and state-adjacent activity.
Intelligence products sometimes blur this nuance, collapsing all pro-Iran or pro-Palestinian hacktivism into a monolithic "Iranian APT proxy" narrative. Such simplifications overlook internal rivalries, fabricated claims, and reputation-driven exaggerations that have long characterized the scene.
Fragmentation of Anonymous and the Rise of New Banners
The original Anonymous-aligned OpIsrael campaigns have lost much of their operational weight—not only due to improved Israeli cyber defenses, but also because of internal fragmentation, trolling, and ideological drift toward more Western-centric positions among residual Anonymous channels. This vacuum has been filled by new pro-Palestinian and pro-Muslim formations, particularly from Southeast Asia and North Africa.
These emerging groups have launched successor operations targeting Israel that explicitly reject what they view as co-opted or diluted Western hacktivism. AnonGhost now operates the OpIsrael campaign under its own brand, while other groups have emerged, effectively changing the landscape of the OpIsrael banner. Key offensives include OpsBedil (2021), OpsBedil Reloaded (2022), and OpsPetir (2023). Since Anonymous became largely inactive on the OpIsrael front, hacktivists have since joined campaigns such as Al-Aqsa Flood (2023)—led by groups like Toffan, known as the cyber army of Palestine and operating under the banner #طوفان_الأقصى_الإلكتروني—as well as OpIsrael 2025 (June) and, in a show of solidarity with Iran, OpIsrael February 2026. These operations present themselves as part of a sustained "cyber resistance" rather than one-off protest actions.
Implications for Analysts
Threat intelligence vendors and media outlets sometimes miss this generational shift, continuing to focus on the Anonymous brand while underestimating the capabilities and resilience of newer collectives. For practitioners and analysts, understanding this landscape requires moving beyond simplistic state-sponsorship narratives and engaging with hacktivists' own self-conception: as decentralized actors waging asymmetric digital warfare in defense of Palestinian rights and against what they perceive as unlawful aggression toward Iran and broader regional self-determination.
@TheGhostsITM
Intelligence products sometimes blur this nuance, collapsing all pro-Iran or pro-Palestinian hacktivism into a monolithic "Iranian APT proxy" narrative. Such simplifications overlook internal rivalries, fabricated claims, and reputation-driven exaggerations that have long characterized the scene.
Fragmentation of Anonymous and the Rise of New Banners
The original Anonymous-aligned OpIsrael campaigns have lost much of their operational weight—not only due to improved Israeli cyber defenses, but also because of internal fragmentation, trolling, and ideological drift toward more Western-centric positions among residual Anonymous channels. This vacuum has been filled by new pro-Palestinian and pro-Muslim formations, particularly from Southeast Asia and North Africa.
These emerging groups have launched successor operations targeting Israel that explicitly reject what they view as co-opted or diluted Western hacktivism. AnonGhost now operates the OpIsrael campaign under its own brand, while other groups have emerged, effectively changing the landscape of the OpIsrael banner. Key offensives include OpsBedil (2021), OpsBedil Reloaded (2022), and OpsPetir (2023). Since Anonymous became largely inactive on the OpIsrael front, hacktivists have since joined campaigns such as Al-Aqsa Flood (2023)—led by groups like Toffan, known as the cyber army of Palestine and operating under the banner #طوفان_الأقصى_الإلكتروني—as well as OpIsrael 2025 (June) and, in a show of solidarity with Iran, OpIsrael February 2026. These operations present themselves as part of a sustained "cyber resistance" rather than one-off protest actions.
Implications for Analysts
Threat intelligence vendors and media outlets sometimes miss this generational shift, continuing to focus on the Anonymous brand while underestimating the capabilities and resilience of newer collectives. For practitioners and analysts, understanding this landscape requires moving beyond simplistic state-sponsorship narratives and engaging with hacktivists' own self-conception: as decentralized actors waging asymmetric digital warfare in defense of Palestinian rights and against what they perceive as unlawful aggression toward Iran and broader regional self-determination.
@TheGhostsITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
RedAlert Trojan: Fake Emergency App Targets Israel
By #TheGhostITM
Executive Summary
A sophisticated SMS spoofing campaign is distributing a trojanized version of Israel's official "Red Alert" emergency app. As Iranian retaliatory strikes target Israeli territory, Hackers are weaponizing civilian panic by masquerading as the Home Front Command to deploy advanced mobile spyware.
Technical Analysis
The malicious APK (com.red.alertx) employs multi-stage evasion techniques, including signature spoofing that returns a hardcoded 2014 Israeli certificate to bypass integrity checks. The malware extracts a hidden asset ("umgdn") to load secondary payloads while appearing legitimate—delivering real rocket alerts to maintain disguise while harvesting sensitive data.
Dynamic Behavior: Upon installation, the app aggressively requests permissions for SMS, contacts, and location—justified as "emergency requirements." Once granted, it silently exfiltrates complete SMS inboxes, contact lists, and real-time GPS coordinates to api[.]ra-backup[.]com via HTTP POST.
Strategic Impact
This campaign transcends typical hacking—real-time location tracking of infected devices during active air raids enables adversary mapping of civilian shelters, population movements, and potential IDF reservist concentrations. SMS interception bypasses 2FA protections while enabling psychological warfare operations.
Indicators of Compromise
· URLs: bit[.]ly/3Ozydsn, shirideitch[.]com/RedAlert.apk
@TheGhostsITM
By #TheGhostITM
Executive Summary
A sophisticated SMS spoofing campaign is distributing a trojanized version of Israel's official "Red Alert" emergency app. As Iranian retaliatory strikes target Israeli territory, Hackers are weaponizing civilian panic by masquerading as the Home Front Command to deploy advanced mobile spyware.
Technical Analysis
The malicious APK (com.red.alertx) employs multi-stage evasion techniques, including signature spoofing that returns a hardcoded 2014 Israeli certificate to bypass integrity checks. The malware extracts a hidden asset ("umgdn") to load secondary payloads while appearing legitimate—delivering real rocket alerts to maintain disguise while harvesting sensitive data.
Dynamic Behavior: Upon installation, the app aggressively requests permissions for SMS, contacts, and location—justified as "emergency requirements." Once granted, it silently exfiltrates complete SMS inboxes, contact lists, and real-time GPS coordinates to api[.]ra-backup[.]com via HTTP POST.
Strategic Impact
This campaign transcends typical hacking—real-time location tracking of infected devices during active air raids enables adversary mapping of civilian shelters, population movements, and potential IDF reservist concentrations. SMS interception bypasses 2FA protections while enabling psychological warfare operations.
Indicators of Compromise
· URLs: bit[.]ly/3Ozydsn, shirideitch[.]com/RedAlert.apk
@TheGhostsITM
🇵🇸 IFTAR POUR LA PALESTINE 🇵🇸
📆VENDREDI 6 MARS - 18H
📍BOBIGNY - Salle Maurice Niles, 11 rue du 8 mai
1945
✨Urgence Palestine 93 vous invite à partager un iftar autour de la place de l'Islam dans la lutte pour la Palestine !
AU PROGRAMME
🎤Temps d'échange avec :
- Ehmad Ibrahym (Boussole Palestine, UP)
- Bouna Mbaye (Brigade Panafricaine pour la Palestine, UP94)
- Elias d'Imzalène (conseiller politique d'organisations)
- Mehdi Meftah (PIR, UP94)
- Un membre de Jeune Palestine
📖Accueil pour les enfants et lectures de contes
💚Espace de prière disponible sur place
Lien pour les inscriptions (repas adultes 15€, prix libre pour les enfants) : framaforms.org/iftar-pour-la-palestine-urgence-palestine-93-1772179476
📆VENDREDI 6 MARS - 18H
📍BOBIGNY - Salle Maurice Niles, 11 rue du 8 mai
1945
✨Urgence Palestine 93 vous invite à partager un iftar autour de la place de l'Islam dans la lutte pour la Palestine !
AU PROGRAMME
🎤Temps d'échange avec :
- Ehmad Ibrahym (Boussole Palestine, UP)
- Bouna Mbaye (Brigade Panafricaine pour la Palestine, UP94)
- Elias d'Imzalène (conseiller politique d'organisations)
- Mehdi Meftah (PIR, UP94)
- Un membre de Jeune Palestine
📖Accueil pour les enfants et lectures de contes
💚Espace de prière disponible sur place
Lien pour les inscriptions (repas adultes 15€, prix libre pour les enfants) : framaforms.org/iftar-pour-la-palestine-urgence-palestine-93-1772179476
Forwarded from إعلام المقاومة الفلسطينية
Iran says its Air Defence System shot down an Israeli F-35 Stealth Aircraft over Tehran.
This will be the 1st ever F-35 kill by any Air Force in the world.
This will be the 1st ever F-35 kill by any Air Force in the world.
Forwarded from إعلام المقاومة الفلسطينية
إعلام المقاومة الفلسطينية
Iran says its Air Defence System shot down an Israeli F-35 Stealth Aircraft over Tehran. This will be the 1st ever F-35 kill by any Air Force in the world.
An F-35 moments before this happened, it was flying over Tehran.
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
The Strategic Depth of the Islamic Republic of Iran: From Historical Sovereignty to Decentralized Warfare
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
Introduction
The current confrontation between Iran and the US-Israeli axis is not merely a military engagement but a clash of strategic civilizations. Unlike state actors whose legitimacy hinges on artificial mandates or colonial charters, the Islamic Republic of Iran represents a nation with 5,000 years of continuous history and civilization . This historical depth provides a strategic resilience that artificially created states—such as those reliant on foreign patronage—cannot replicate. In the current theater of operations, Iran has activated a decentralized command philosophy that fundamentally alters the traditional calculus of war, shifting from a reliance on unity of command to a superior model of unity of effort.
The Historical Context of Sovereignty
Iran is not a colonial construct. Archaeological evidence confirms urban settlements and sophisticated governance on the Iranian plateau dating to the third millennium BCE . This deep civilizational identity stands in stark contrast to states like the United States (a 300-year-old colonial project) or Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies—entities whose current geopolitical existence is tethered to external security guarantees and financial subsidies . For Iran, this is a war of national survival rooted in millennia of collective identity; for its adversaries, it is a war of choice. Consequently, the strategic stakes are asymmetrical: Iran fights for existential continuity, while its adversaries calculate the costs of imperial overreach.
The Decentralized Command Doctrine: Mosaic Defense
In anticipation of decapitation strikes targeting the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has transitioned to a decentralized command structure. This doctrine, developed over two decades following observations of the Iraqi military’s collapse in 2003, has now been fully activated . The IRGC has been restructured into 31 autonomous operational units—one for Tehran and 30 distributed at the provincial level—creating what strategists term a "Mosaic Defense" .
Under this model, each unit commander holds independent tactical authority to launch retaliatory strikes, deploy drones, and execute guerrilla operations without requiring real-time approval from central command in Tehran . This is the military application of a decentralized collective: like the anonymous collective, each node operates autonomously toward a shared objective. The death of a Supreme Leader or a general does not paralyze the system; rather, it triggers an immediate succession protocol where each command echelon has pre-identified successors spanning three ranks . This ensures that operational tempo is maintained even as communications are disrupted.
Unity of Effort Versus Unity of Command
In a war of survival, unity of command is a liability; unity of effort is the objective. Iran’s strategy rejects the centralized model that proved fatal for conventional armies facing technologically superior foes. Instead, it leverages "unity of efficiency"—coordinated action among distributed commanders who understand the strategic end state without needing micro-management . The martyrdom of leadership figures does not demoralize the force; it serves as a catalyst for Jihad within the ranks, transforming grief into operational momentum.
The Nationalist Paradigm and Ummah Solidarity
The current conflict has catalyzed a profound shift in Iran’s societal cohesion. While the Islamic identity remains foundational, the response to external aggression has galvanized a secular nationalist unity. Mass rallies following recent strikes demonstrate that citizens are rallying around the national flag, transcending individual political figures .
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
Introduction
The current confrontation between Iran and the US-Israeli axis is not merely a military engagement but a clash of strategic civilizations. Unlike state actors whose legitimacy hinges on artificial mandates or colonial charters, the Islamic Republic of Iran represents a nation with 5,000 years of continuous history and civilization . This historical depth provides a strategic resilience that artificially created states—such as those reliant on foreign patronage—cannot replicate. In the current theater of operations, Iran has activated a decentralized command philosophy that fundamentally alters the traditional calculus of war, shifting from a reliance on unity of command to a superior model of unity of effort.
The Historical Context of Sovereignty
Iran is not a colonial construct. Archaeological evidence confirms urban settlements and sophisticated governance on the Iranian plateau dating to the third millennium BCE . This deep civilizational identity stands in stark contrast to states like the United States (a 300-year-old colonial project) or Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies—entities whose current geopolitical existence is tethered to external security guarantees and financial subsidies . For Iran, this is a war of national survival rooted in millennia of collective identity; for its adversaries, it is a war of choice. Consequently, the strategic stakes are asymmetrical: Iran fights for existential continuity, while its adversaries calculate the costs of imperial overreach.
The Decentralized Command Doctrine: Mosaic Defense
In anticipation of decapitation strikes targeting the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has transitioned to a decentralized command structure. This doctrine, developed over two decades following observations of the Iraqi military’s collapse in 2003, has now been fully activated . The IRGC has been restructured into 31 autonomous operational units—one for Tehran and 30 distributed at the provincial level—creating what strategists term a "Mosaic Defense" .
Under this model, each unit commander holds independent tactical authority to launch retaliatory strikes, deploy drones, and execute guerrilla operations without requiring real-time approval from central command in Tehran . This is the military application of a decentralized collective: like the anonymous collective, each node operates autonomously toward a shared objective. The death of a Supreme Leader or a general does not paralyze the system; rather, it triggers an immediate succession protocol where each command echelon has pre-identified successors spanning three ranks . This ensures that operational tempo is maintained even as communications are disrupted.
Unity of Effort Versus Unity of Command
In a war of survival, unity of command is a liability; unity of effort is the objective. Iran’s strategy rejects the centralized model that proved fatal for conventional armies facing technologically superior foes. Instead, it leverages "unity of efficiency"—coordinated action among distributed commanders who understand the strategic end state without needing micro-management . The martyrdom of leadership figures does not demoralize the force; it serves as a catalyst for Jihad within the ranks, transforming grief into operational momentum.
The Nationalist Paradigm and Ummah Solidarity
The current conflict has catalyzed a profound shift in Iran’s societal cohesion. While the Islamic identity remains foundational, the response to external aggression has galvanized a secular nationalist unity. Mass rallies following recent strikes demonstrate that citizens are rallying around the national flag, transcending individual political figures .