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#عاجل سقوط طائرة حربية أمريكية في الكويت ..
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
This is the flood.
This is the regional war.
This is the breaking of the chain.
This is the day—
Liberation.
@TheGhostsITM
This is the regional war.
This is the breaking of the chain.
This is the day—
Liberation.
@TheGhostsITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
An AWS data center in the UAE, mainly used by Israel’s military, suffered a fire after objects struck the facility.
@TheGhostsITM
@TheGhostsITM
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Forwarded from Cyber Dispatch™️
The attack group (ransomware) INC Ransom has published Ramet Ltd. as a victim.
Ramet Ltd. is one of the largest and leading construction and industry companies in Israel, specializing in residential development, infrastructure (bridging and tunneling), logistics centers, commerce, and fortification.
The group has taken a clear political stance and is not motivated solely by financial gain.
Ramet Ltd. is one of the largest and leading construction and industry companies in Israel, specializing in residential development, infrastructure (bridging and tunneling), logistics centers, commerce, and fortification.
The group has taken a clear political stance and is not motivated solely by financial gain.
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
Cyber Dispatch™️
The attack group (ransomware) INC Ransom has published Ramet Ltd. as a victim. Ramet Ltd. is one of the largest and leading construction and industry companies in Israel, specializing in residential development, infrastructure (bridging and tunneling), logistics…
קבוצת התקיפה (נוזקת הכופר) INC Ransom פרסמה את חברת רמת בע"מ כקורבן.
רמת בע"מ היא אחת מחברות הבנייה והתעשייה הגדולות והמובילות בישראל, המתמחה בפיתוח מגורים, תשתיות (גישור ומנהור), מרכזים לוגיסטיים, מסחר ומיגון.
הקבוצה נקטה עמדה פוליטית ברורה ואינה מונעת אך ורק משיקולים כלכליים.
@TheGhostsITM
רמת בע"מ היא אחת מחברות הבנייה והתעשייה הגדולות והמובילות בישראל, המתמחה בפיתוח מגורים, תשתיות (גישור ומנהור), מרכזים לוגיסטיים, מסחר ומיגון.
הקבוצה נקטה עמדה פוליטית ברורה ואינה מונעת אך ורק משיקולים כלכליים.
@TheGhostsITM
Work has been halted at the gas production platform in the "Leviathan" field, which is operated by the Israeli company "Chevron".
Al-Manar, the Lebanese satellite television station that serves as the official media arm of the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah, confirms that the building targeted in Haret Hreik a short while ago belongs to the network.
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Protesters took the streets of New York City, rallying in Times Square and other areas to demand an immediate end to the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
Forwarded from 𓂆 #OpIsrael
𓂆 #OpIsrael
A devastating war is at the doors. Join #OpIsrael
حرب طاحنة على الابواب#
Forwarded from 𓂆 #OpIsrael
To our Russian, Moroccan, Algerian, European, African, Chinese, Cuban, South American, and Asian brothers—Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and all.
Join #OpIsrael NOW!
Спасибо... شكراً... 谢谢... Terima Kasih... Cảm ơn... Gracias... Merci... Obrigado... Thank you...
اللهم احفظهم، كما كانوا لنا السند في كل زمان، و الوقفة في كل مكان.
(Oh God, protect them, as they have been our support in every time, and our stand in every place.)
In solidarity, forever.
Palestine Cyber Resistance
#OpIsraelTeam
Join #OpIsrael NOW!
Спасибо... شكراً... 谢谢... Terima Kasih... Cảm ơn... Gracias... Merci... Obrigado... Thank you...
اللهم احفظهم، كما كانوا لنا السند في كل زمان، و الوقفة في كل مكان.
(Oh God, protect them, as they have been our support in every time, and our stand in every place.)
In solidarity, forever.
Palestine Cyber Resistance
#OpIsraelTeam
❤🔥1
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
Mary Trump, the niece of the U.S. president, reshared a post about the Minab massacre in Iran, which occurred in a joint US-Israeli airstrike, writing: “I dare anyone to justify this.”
While Iran has explicitly announced that it is not willing to negotiate with the US, Trump, in a Truth Social post on Tuesday, claimed it was "Too Late" for talks and signaled no intention of ending US-Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic.
Forwarded from إعلام المقاومة الفلسطينية
#عاااااااجل …سلاح الجو القطري يقصف إيران.
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
How a $50,000 Iranian Drone Strategy Could Unravel the GCC and Its Western Allies
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
For decades, the military strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its American allies has focused on high-tech air superiority and massive conventional forces. They have prepared for tank battles in the desert and dogfights in the sky. But as the sun sets over the Arabian Peninsula, a terrifying new reality is setting in: the next war will not be won by the most advanced fighter jet, but by the cheapest drone, targeting the one thing this region cannot live without—water.
The strategic genius of Iran's playbook is its brutal simplicity. Tehran has identified the GCC's single point of failure. More than 60% of the freshwater across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain does not come from rains or rivers, but from the colossal, energy-consuming desalination plants that line the coast. These plants are the lifeblood of the Arab nations—vast industrial complexes that turn seawater into survival. They are also incredibly vulnerable.
A coordinated drone swarm—each unit costing as little as $50,000—descending on the desalination and sanitation plants that service the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These facilities do not supply one city alone; they sustain the life of an entire nation. From Riyadh to Jeddah, from Dammam to the smallest villages in the desert, the population of more than 35 million people depends on this infrastructure. Air defense systems, designed to stop sophisticated jets, are ill-equipped to handle a swarm of slow, low-flying, inexpensive drones. Once those turbines and reverse osmosis facilities are hit, the clock starts ticking for every Saudi citizen.
A kingdom of millions without a tap, a faucet, or a drop of clean water does not have weeks; it has days. Without water, sanitation fails, disease blooms, and civil order crumbles. Within two weeks, the population would face a biblical catastrophe. They would not be fighting an enemy; they would be fighting for a drink. The entire nation grinds to a halt.
But the water war is only phase one. Iran's strategy also targets the stomach. The majority of GCC states import up to 90% of their food, much of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran, as it has done in the now with tankers, closes the strait and interdicts supply lines, the food stops now. A population without water and without food is not a nation; it is a humanitarian disaster zone. The Gulf, for all its wealth, becomes a prison without provisions.
Why does this matter to the West? Because the GCC is not just an oil exporter anymore; it is the financial engine of the future. The Gulf states are primary investors in American AI data centers and cutting-edge technology. They supply the capital and the energy that fuels the next industrial revolution in the United States. If the Gulf's economy collapses under the weight of a water and food crisis, the funding stops. The data centers go dark. The AI projects that underpin Wall Street and the American defense industry would stall. The American economy, already in a dire situation, would face collapse.
This is the strategic trap. Iran does not need to defeat the US Navy in a naval battle. It simply needs to cut the hose. It needs to turn off the taps across the Arabian Peninsula. In a war of survival, where the enemy targets your ability to drink and eat, the most expensive missile defense system in the world is useless against a man dying of thirst. This is why, in this war, Iran holds all the cards. The United States will lose this war.
· UAE: Committed to invest $1.4 trillion in the United States over the next decade (2026-2036) . This builds on an existing $1 trillion economic relationship between the two countries .
By #OpIsraelTeam, War Correspondent, Gulf Region
For decades, the military strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its American allies has focused on high-tech air superiority and massive conventional forces. They have prepared for tank battles in the desert and dogfights in the sky. But as the sun sets over the Arabian Peninsula, a terrifying new reality is setting in: the next war will not be won by the most advanced fighter jet, but by the cheapest drone, targeting the one thing this region cannot live without—water.
The strategic genius of Iran's playbook is its brutal simplicity. Tehran has identified the GCC's single point of failure. More than 60% of the freshwater across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain does not come from rains or rivers, but from the colossal, energy-consuming desalination plants that line the coast. These plants are the lifeblood of the Arab nations—vast industrial complexes that turn seawater into survival. They are also incredibly vulnerable.
A coordinated drone swarm—each unit costing as little as $50,000—descending on the desalination and sanitation plants that service the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These facilities do not supply one city alone; they sustain the life of an entire nation. From Riyadh to Jeddah, from Dammam to the smallest villages in the desert, the population of more than 35 million people depends on this infrastructure. Air defense systems, designed to stop sophisticated jets, are ill-equipped to handle a swarm of slow, low-flying, inexpensive drones. Once those turbines and reverse osmosis facilities are hit, the clock starts ticking for every Saudi citizen.
A kingdom of millions without a tap, a faucet, or a drop of clean water does not have weeks; it has days. Without water, sanitation fails, disease blooms, and civil order crumbles. Within two weeks, the population would face a biblical catastrophe. They would not be fighting an enemy; they would be fighting for a drink. The entire nation grinds to a halt.
But the water war is only phase one. Iran's strategy also targets the stomach. The majority of GCC states import up to 90% of their food, much of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran, as it has done in the now with tankers, closes the strait and interdicts supply lines, the food stops now. A population without water and without food is not a nation; it is a humanitarian disaster zone. The Gulf, for all its wealth, becomes a prison without provisions.
Why does this matter to the West? Because the GCC is not just an oil exporter anymore; it is the financial engine of the future. The Gulf states are primary investors in American AI data centers and cutting-edge technology. They supply the capital and the energy that fuels the next industrial revolution in the United States. If the Gulf's economy collapses under the weight of a water and food crisis, the funding stops. The data centers go dark. The AI projects that underpin Wall Street and the American defense industry would stall. The American economy, already in a dire situation, would face collapse.
This is the strategic trap. Iran does not need to defeat the US Navy in a naval battle. It simply needs to cut the hose. It needs to turn off the taps across the Arabian Peninsula. In a war of survival, where the enemy targets your ability to drink and eat, the most expensive missile defense system in the world is useless against a man dying of thirst. This is why, in this war, Iran holds all the cards. The United States will lose this war.
· UAE: Committed to invest $1.4 trillion in the United States over the next decade (2026-2036) . This builds on an existing $1 trillion economic relationship between the two countries .
Forwarded from 𓂆 Palestine
· Qatar: Has invested approximately $6.6 billion in U.S. universities alone over several decades .
· GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (combined): GCC SWFs collectively manage approximately $4.8–5.0 trillion in assets, with an estimated 65–75% of their capital deployment directed internationally toward North America, Europe, and Asia . In 2025 alone, 47% of all sovereign investments globally went to the United States .
· QIA (Qatar Investment Authority) and PIF (Saudi Public Investment Fund) are among the most active investors in U.S. technology and AI infrastructure .
The GCC has invested TRILLIONS in America:
UAE alone committed $1.4T over next decade. Qatar funds US universities. Saudi PIF backs American AI & tech.
If Iran cuts the water—GCC collapses. If GCC collapses, US economy follows. $50,000 drone. Trillion-dollar consequence.
#OpIsraelTeam
· GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (combined): GCC SWFs collectively manage approximately $4.8–5.0 trillion in assets, with an estimated 65–75% of their capital deployment directed internationally toward North America, Europe, and Asia . In 2025 alone, 47% of all sovereign investments globally went to the United States .
· QIA (Qatar Investment Authority) and PIF (Saudi Public Investment Fund) are among the most active investors in U.S. technology and AI infrastructure .
The GCC has invested TRILLIONS in America:
UAE alone committed $1.4T over next decade. Qatar funds US universities. Saudi PIF backs American AI & tech.
If Iran cuts the water—GCC collapses. If GCC collapses, US economy follows. $50,000 drone. Trillion-dollar consequence.
#OpIsraelTeam
Forwarded from ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ
#OpIsrael: A Decade of Evolution in Pro-Palestinian Hacktivism
By #TheGhostsITM
#OpIsrael first emerged in 2013 as an Anonymous-branded campaign, mobilizing loose collectives to target Israeli regime and commercial websites in response to military operations in Gaza. More than a decade later, the operation banner has become one node within a broader and more fragmented pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel hacktivist movement. Today's campaigns routinely target not only Israeli entities but also allied infrastructure, including U.S. assets and military installations across the Arab world.
More than 100 identifiable hacktivist crews have been observed conducting or supporting offensive operations tied to the Israel–Iran and Israel–Palestine conflict theaters. Their tactics include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements, data leaks, and opportunistic intrusions into less-hardened critical infrastructure and media targets.
Groups include DieNet, Mad Ghost, RuskiNet, UNIT 1948, Rippersec, IndoHaxSec, 313Team, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Moroccan Black Cyber Army, CyberDragonzz, Nation of Saviors, BlackEmber, AnonGhost, FADTeam, Handala Hack, StuxTeam, NoName057(16), Garuda Eye, and Keymous—among over 100 others. This growing roster illustrates how pro-Palestinian and pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystems have begun to overlap both tactically and narratively, pooling tools, botnets, and propaganda channels across Telegram and dark-social platforms.
In parallel, pro-Muslim and regional clusters in Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have joined this "cyber front," presenting their operations as a defense of Gaza and a rejection of what they describe as U.S.-backed regional hegemony. Today, these crews have also positioned themselves as defenders of Iran and Iranians against what they perceive as the empire, the Israeli regime, and Gulf and Arab allies aligned with imperial interests.
Motivation, Legality, and the 'Just War' Narrative
Hacktivist messaging consistently explains cyber operations against Israel, U.S. assets, and Gulf-based American infrastructure as a response to what they characterize as an illegal and aggressive war against Iran and systemic violations of Palestinian rights under occupation. These actors routinely invoke international humanitarian law (IHL)—specifically principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity—to argue that disrupting logistics, media, or regime systems constitutes a proportionate response when kinetic operations have caused sustained civilian harm and formal international accountability mechanisms have failed.
Legal scholars acknowledge that cyber operations can, under certain conditions, qualify as "methods of warfare" and are bound by the same IHL principles that govern kinetic force.
Activists who defend hacktivist operations argue that when states engage in disproportionate or indiscriminate digital coercion, non-state actors stepping in on behalf of affected civilians are morally justified—even if they operate in a legal gray zone.
State Sponsorship, Attribution, and the IRGC Question
Western, Indian, and Israeli threat intelligence reports frequently characterize pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel hacktivist crews as fronts or auxiliaries for Iranian state organs—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated units—citing shared targeting priorities and aligned narratives. However, attribution in cyberspace remains technically and legally complex. Under the Tallinn Manual and state responsibility doctrine, evidence of "effective control," direction, or substantial support is required before non-state conduct can be formally imputed to a government.
In practice, the ecosystem defies easy categorization. Some crews operate with clear ideological proximity to state actors like Iran or Russia and may benefit from tool leaks, training, or tacit tolerance. Others tell a different story.
By #TheGhostsITM
#OpIsrael first emerged in 2013 as an Anonymous-branded campaign, mobilizing loose collectives to target Israeli regime and commercial websites in response to military operations in Gaza. More than a decade later, the operation banner has become one node within a broader and more fragmented pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel hacktivist movement. Today's campaigns routinely target not only Israeli entities but also allied infrastructure, including U.S. assets and military installations across the Arab world.
More than 100 identifiable hacktivist crews have been observed conducting or supporting offensive operations tied to the Israel–Iran and Israel–Palestine conflict theaters. Their tactics include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements, data leaks, and opportunistic intrusions into less-hardened critical infrastructure and media targets.
Groups include DieNet, Mad Ghost, RuskiNet, UNIT 1948, Rippersec, IndoHaxSec, 313Team, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Moroccan Black Cyber Army, CyberDragonzz, Nation of Saviors, BlackEmber, AnonGhost, FADTeam, Handala Hack, StuxTeam, NoName057(16), Garuda Eye, and Keymous—among over 100 others. This growing roster illustrates how pro-Palestinian and pro-Russian hacktivist ecosystems have begun to overlap both tactically and narratively, pooling tools, botnets, and propaganda channels across Telegram and dark-social platforms.
In parallel, pro-Muslim and regional clusters in Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have joined this "cyber front," presenting their operations as a defense of Gaza and a rejection of what they describe as U.S.-backed regional hegemony. Today, these crews have also positioned themselves as defenders of Iran and Iranians against what they perceive as the empire, the Israeli regime, and Gulf and Arab allies aligned with imperial interests.
Motivation, Legality, and the 'Just War' Narrative
Hacktivist messaging consistently explains cyber operations against Israel, U.S. assets, and Gulf-based American infrastructure as a response to what they characterize as an illegal and aggressive war against Iran and systemic violations of Palestinian rights under occupation. These actors routinely invoke international humanitarian law (IHL)—specifically principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity—to argue that disrupting logistics, media, or regime systems constitutes a proportionate response when kinetic operations have caused sustained civilian harm and formal international accountability mechanisms have failed.
Legal scholars acknowledge that cyber operations can, under certain conditions, qualify as "methods of warfare" and are bound by the same IHL principles that govern kinetic force.
Activists who defend hacktivist operations argue that when states engage in disproportionate or indiscriminate digital coercion, non-state actors stepping in on behalf of affected civilians are morally justified—even if they operate in a legal gray zone.
State Sponsorship, Attribution, and the IRGC Question
Western, Indian, and Israeli threat intelligence reports frequently characterize pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel hacktivist crews as fronts or auxiliaries for Iranian state organs—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated units—citing shared targeting priorities and aligned narratives. However, attribution in cyberspace remains technically and legally complex. Under the Tallinn Manual and state responsibility doctrine, evidence of "effective control," direction, or substantial support is required before non-state conduct can be formally imputed to a government.
In practice, the ecosystem defies easy categorization. Some crews operate with clear ideological proximity to state actors like Iran or Russia and may benefit from tool leaks, training, or tacit tolerance. Others tell a different story.