lsraeli occupation forces detain more than 3100 Palestinians since the start of 2023.
1. Between 1950s-1960s, Libya was among the poorest countries in the whole wide world. However since 1969 when Gaddafi became Libyan leader, he made Libya Africa's richest country with over $150 billion in foreign reserves with zero debt/budget deficit.
2. During Muammar Gaddafi's reign as Libyan leader, Libya had the strongest and most valuable currency in Africa. Libyan Dinar was also one of the strongest currencies in the world.
3. 1 Libyan Dinar = $0.82781 as at 2011 before d western bloc orchestrated an anti-government protest in Libya, hijacked the protest with thousands of well trained & armed ISIS & Al-Qaeda terrorists whom they used as mercenaries to toppled Gaddafi's Socialist Jamahiriya govt.
4. Gaddafi proposed d idea behind Libyan strong currency to AU, he wanted African countries to work 2gda to create an African currency backed by African gold in order to strengthen our economy & to alleviate some struggling African countries from economic deterioration & poverty.
5. Libya had over 140 Tonnes of Gold and similar amounts in silver which could have been used to initiate the proposed African currency all the gold have disappeared today and Libyan foreign reserves has diminished to an unprecedented level.
2. During Muammar Gaddafi's reign as Libyan leader, Libya had the strongest and most valuable currency in Africa. Libyan Dinar was also one of the strongest currencies in the world.
3. 1 Libyan Dinar = $0.82781 as at 2011 before d western bloc orchestrated an anti-government protest in Libya, hijacked the protest with thousands of well trained & armed ISIS & Al-Qaeda terrorists whom they used as mercenaries to toppled Gaddafi's Socialist Jamahiriya govt.
4. Gaddafi proposed d idea behind Libyan strong currency to AU, he wanted African countries to work 2gda to create an African currency backed by African gold in order to strengthen our economy & to alleviate some struggling African countries from economic deterioration & poverty.
5. Libya had over 140 Tonnes of Gold and similar amounts in silver which could have been used to initiate the proposed African currency all the gold have disappeared today and Libyan foreign reserves has diminished to an unprecedented level.
International Humanitarian Law
What is it?
International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It lays out the responsibilities of states and non-state armed groups during an armed conflict.
It requires, among other things:
the rapid and unimpeded passage for humanitarian aid during armed conflicts
the freedom of movement for humanitarian workers in conflict areas
the protection of civilians (including medical and humanitarian workers)
the protection of refugees, prisoners, and the wounded and sick.
Why is this important?
The rules are designed to protect civilians and humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts in any part of the world. Without them, there would be no international standards at all for this.
IHL is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on protecting civilians in conflict and the 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols.
While many parts of IHL are now accepted as international customary law (i.e., general practice, accepted as law and which is independent of treaty law), increasingly it is violated by warring parties.
Buildings belonging to relief organisations are attacked, vehicles and convoys hijacked, and staff murdered or kidnapped. Such violence affects civilians and prevents millions of people from receiving life-saving assistance.
These violations continue to be among the most critical challenges for IHL.
How are we helping?
As most humanitarian action takes place in areas of armed conflicts, violations of IHL greatly hinder the EU's ability to fulfil its humanitarian aid objectives of meeting the needs of those affected, and also endanger the security of EU humanitarian partners.
Therefore, as one of the world’s largest humanitarian donors, the EU has always been firmly committed to promoting compliance with IHL.
All EU countries have ratified the 4 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The EU also is the only regional organisation to adopt (in 2005; updated in 2009) guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL.
In March 2021, the Commission adopted a Communication on the EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles. It stresses how important it is for the EU to continue to put the promotion and application of IHL consistently at the heart of its external action.
In 2009, the EU issued guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL. In 2018, it published an initial report on how they were being implemented, highlighting the wide-ranging measures the EU carries out in support of IHL. Every year since then, the EU has continued to publish such reports.
The European Commission, through its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO), promotes the global compliance with IHL and humanitarian principles in general.
Examples of activities which the European Commission supports are:
advocacy in support of IHL through multilateral forums, dedicated public events (e.g., European Humanitarian Forum), and dialogue with other donors and partner organisations.
advocacy for compliance with IHL in specific armed conflicts
thematic advocacy linked to IHL (e.g. children and armed conflict, protecting education facilities from attack, protecting humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts, protecting civilian infrastructure)
funding partners to disseminate IHL knowledge and advocacy in conflict-affected countries (e.g., Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Ukraine)
funding activities aimed at increasing the capacities of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL.
in 2022, the EU launched a 3-year pilot programmatic partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross on preventing IHL violations.
What is it?
International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It lays out the responsibilities of states and non-state armed groups during an armed conflict.
It requires, among other things:
the rapid and unimpeded passage for humanitarian aid during armed conflicts
the freedom of movement for humanitarian workers in conflict areas
the protection of civilians (including medical and humanitarian workers)
the protection of refugees, prisoners, and the wounded and sick.
Why is this important?
The rules are designed to protect civilians and humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts in any part of the world. Without them, there would be no international standards at all for this.
IHL is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on protecting civilians in conflict and the 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols.
While many parts of IHL are now accepted as international customary law (i.e., general practice, accepted as law and which is independent of treaty law), increasingly it is violated by warring parties.
Buildings belonging to relief organisations are attacked, vehicles and convoys hijacked, and staff murdered or kidnapped. Such violence affects civilians and prevents millions of people from receiving life-saving assistance.
These violations continue to be among the most critical challenges for IHL.
How are we helping?
As most humanitarian action takes place in areas of armed conflicts, violations of IHL greatly hinder the EU's ability to fulfil its humanitarian aid objectives of meeting the needs of those affected, and also endanger the security of EU humanitarian partners.
Therefore, as one of the world’s largest humanitarian donors, the EU has always been firmly committed to promoting compliance with IHL.
All EU countries have ratified the 4 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The EU also is the only regional organisation to adopt (in 2005; updated in 2009) guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL.
In March 2021, the Commission adopted a Communication on the EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles. It stresses how important it is for the EU to continue to put the promotion and application of IHL consistently at the heart of its external action.
In 2009, the EU issued guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL. In 2018, it published an initial report on how they were being implemented, highlighting the wide-ranging measures the EU carries out in support of IHL. Every year since then, the EU has continued to publish such reports.
The European Commission, through its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO), promotes the global compliance with IHL and humanitarian principles in general.
Examples of activities which the European Commission supports are:
advocacy in support of IHL through multilateral forums, dedicated public events (e.g., European Humanitarian Forum), and dialogue with other donors and partner organisations.
advocacy for compliance with IHL in specific armed conflicts
thematic advocacy linked to IHL (e.g. children and armed conflict, protecting education facilities from attack, protecting humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts, protecting civilian infrastructure)
funding partners to disseminate IHL knowledge and advocacy in conflict-affected countries (e.g., Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Ukraine)
funding activities aimed at increasing the capacities of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL.
in 2022, the EU launched a 3-year pilot programmatic partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross on preventing IHL violations.
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War & Law
International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.
Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
On 16 June 2020, the ICRC hosted a webinar to launch the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Conventions. An expert panel discussed the Commentary’s main findings on key humanitarian issues related to the treatment of prisoners of war.
Search Subscribe to newsletter
Updated Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Launch of the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention from ICRC on Vimeo.
Updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, the ICRC commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. The updated Commentaries on the First and Second Conventions were published in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention related to the treatment of prisoners of war is now available. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project, explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last seven decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different from those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that this new Commentary clarifies?
The Commentary sheds light on many issues, and in particular on the obligations Parties have vis-à -vis prisoners of war. The Third Geneva Convention covers a broad array of considerations relating to a prisoner’s life from the time of capture to their final release and repatriation. Many of the key issues clarified by the updated Commentary concern the changes that have taken place in this connection. For instance, today, medical ethics and data-protection standards are far more developed than in 1949. This raises questions regarding the application of provisions that require medical data to be disclosed, and also about how data should be handled and protected in our digitalized world. Such questions would also extend to the appropriate use by Detaining Powers of electronic means to identify prisoners of war – including biometrics – or of new technologies to conduct surveillance.
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International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.
Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
On 16 June 2020, the ICRC hosted a webinar to launch the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Conventions. An expert panel discussed the Commentary’s main findings on key humanitarian issues related to the treatment of prisoners of war.
Search Subscribe to newsletter
Updated Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Launch of the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention from ICRC on Vimeo.
Updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, the ICRC commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. The updated Commentaries on the First and Second Conventions were published in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention related to the treatment of prisoners of war is now available. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project, explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last seven decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different from those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that this new Commentary clarifies?
The Commentary sheds light on many issues, and in particular on the obligations Parties have vis-à -vis prisoners of war. The Third Geneva Convention covers a broad array of considerations relating to a prisoner’s life from the time of capture to their final release and repatriation. Many of the key issues clarified by the updated Commentary concern the changes that have taken place in this connection. For instance, today, medical ethics and data-protection standards are far more developed than in 1949. This raises questions regarding the application of provisions that require medical data to be disclosed, and also about how data should be handled and protected in our digitalized world. Such questions would also extend to the appropriate use by Detaining Powers of electronic means to identify prisoners of war – including biometrics – or of new technologies to conduct surveillance.
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The updated Commentary also covers the changes that have taken place in understanding of people’s needs. For example, the Convention covers such matters as disability and mental health, but the terminology used had become obsolete, and an updated interpretation was needed. The Convention has a provision pertaining specifically to respect for women, and the interpretation in this regard had to be updated as well.
Thus, this Commentary reflects the changes in practice and other areas that have taken place since the middle of the 20th century.
The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use this Commentary?
The Commentary is an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers, lawyers and those engaging with detention in armed conflicts. It will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. It will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. There is a strong need for the law to be known and understood by all, and we are confident that the updated Commentary will become an important tool in this regard.
How is this Commentary relevant in view of the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts today?
Security detention is a common practice in all armed conflicts. While the phenomenon of prisoners of war, regulated by the Third Geneva Convention, is pertinent to international armed conflicts, it is important to remember that this Convention was the first treaty to formulate standards of treatment in internment. The Convention develops in detail key principles, such as respect for the life and dignity of the individual, which remain relevant for non-international armed conflicts.
Common Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on non-international armed conflicts, and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
Does the new Commentary take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to protect persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the updated Commentary take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the Commentary.
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Thus, this Commentary reflects the changes in practice and other areas that have taken place since the middle of the 20th century.
The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use this Commentary?
The Commentary is an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers, lawyers and those engaging with detention in armed conflicts. It will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. It will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. There is a strong need for the law to be known and understood by all, and we are confident that the updated Commentary will become an important tool in this regard.
How is this Commentary relevant in view of the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts today?
Security detention is a common practice in all armed conflicts. While the phenomenon of prisoners of war, regulated by the Third Geneva Convention, is pertinent to international armed conflicts, it is important to remember that this Convention was the first treaty to formulate standards of treatment in internment. The Convention develops in detail key principles, such as respect for the life and dignity of the individual, which remain relevant for non-international armed conflicts.
Common Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on non-international armed conflicts, and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
Does the new Commentary take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to protect persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the updated Commentary take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the Commentary.
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Commentaries bring fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, we have commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last six decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different to those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that the Commentaries clarify?
The Commentaries shed light on many issues, from how the various rules of international humanitarian law apply in the complex conflicts of today, to the obligation Parties have vis-Ă -vis the wounded and sick. For example, the First Geneva Convention requires the wounded and sick to be protected and respected. But what does that mean in practice? What standard of medical care is required for the treatment of the wounded and sick? How can the wounded and sick be collected and cared for when there are no troops on the ground? The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the First Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use the Commentaries?
The Commentaries are an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers and lawyers to be able to ensure protection of victims during armed conflict. They will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. But they will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. We know that the 1950s Commentaries have been useful for them. So we are confident that the updated Commentaries will become an equally important tool, as they provide more nuanced insights and references.
How do the Commentaries reflect the prevalence of today's non-international armed conflicts?
As the majority of conflicts today are of a non-international character, the regulation of these conflicts has become a crucial issue. Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on these conflicts and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
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What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, we have commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last six decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different to those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that the Commentaries clarify?
The Commentaries shed light on many issues, from how the various rules of international humanitarian law apply in the complex conflicts of today, to the obligation Parties have vis-Ă -vis the wounded and sick. For example, the First Geneva Convention requires the wounded and sick to be protected and respected. But what does that mean in practice? What standard of medical care is required for the treatment of the wounded and sick? How can the wounded and sick be collected and cared for when there are no troops on the ground? The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the First Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use the Commentaries?
The Commentaries are an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers and lawyers to be able to ensure protection of victims during armed conflict. They will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. But they will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. We know that the 1950s Commentaries have been useful for them. So we are confident that the updated Commentaries will become an equally important tool, as they provide more nuanced insights and references.
How do the Commentaries reflect the prevalence of today's non-international armed conflicts?
As the majority of conflicts today are of a non-international character, the regulation of these conflicts has become a crucial issue. Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on these conflicts and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
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But it also deals with pressing topics such as sexual violence and non-refoulement, which is the prohibition of sending people back to countries where their lives could be in danger.
What other developments do the Commentaries take into account?
A good example is the way the protection of women is addressed. The reference in the original Commentary to women as "weaker than oneself and whose honour and modesty call for respect" would no longer be considered appropriate. Of course, the original Commentaries were a product of the social and historical context of the time. Today, however, there is a deeper understanding that women, men, girls and boys have specific needs and capacities linked to the different ways armed conflict may affect them. The new Commentary reflects the social and international legal developments in relation to equality of the sexes.
Do the new Commentaries take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to provide protection to persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the new Commentaries take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the new Commentaries.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
The Geneva Conventions – one of humanity's most important accomplishments of the last century - are turning 70 on 12 August 2019. It's a moment to celebrate all the lives the conventions have helped save, note the further work that needs to be done and to remind the world of the importance of protecting people from the worst of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war. The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as "grave breaches". Those responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, whatever nationality they may hold.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The First Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.
This Convention represents the fourth updated version of the Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick following those adopted in 1864, 1906 and 1929. It contains 64 articles. These provide protection for the wounded and sick, but also for medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports. The Convention also recognizes the distinctive emblems. It has two annexes containing a draft agreement relating to hospital zones and a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Second Geneva Convention protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.
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What other developments do the Commentaries take into account?
A good example is the way the protection of women is addressed. The reference in the original Commentary to women as "weaker than oneself and whose honour and modesty call for respect" would no longer be considered appropriate. Of course, the original Commentaries were a product of the social and historical context of the time. Today, however, there is a deeper understanding that women, men, girls and boys have specific needs and capacities linked to the different ways armed conflict may affect them. The new Commentary reflects the social and international legal developments in relation to equality of the sexes.
Do the new Commentaries take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to provide protection to persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the new Commentaries take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the new Commentaries.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
The Geneva Conventions – one of humanity's most important accomplishments of the last century - are turning 70 on 12 August 2019. It's a moment to celebrate all the lives the conventions have helped save, note the further work that needs to be done and to remind the world of the importance of protecting people from the worst of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war. The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as "grave breaches". Those responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, whatever nationality they may hold.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The First Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.
This Convention represents the fourth updated version of the Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick following those adopted in 1864, 1906 and 1929. It contains 64 articles. These provide protection for the wounded and sick, but also for medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports. The Convention also recognizes the distinctive emblems. It has two annexes containing a draft agreement relating to hospital zones and a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Second Geneva Convention protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.
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This Convention replaced Hague Convention of 1907 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention. It closely follows the provisions of the first Geneva Convention in structure and content. It has 63 articles specifically applicable to war at sea. For example, it protects hospital ships. It has one annex containing a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Third Geneva Convention applies to prisoners of war.
This Convention replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. It contains 143 articles whereas the 1929 Convention had only 97. The categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status were broadened in accordance with Conventions I and II. The conditions and places of captivity were more precisely defined, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and the judicial proceedings instituted against them. The Convention establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The Convention has five annexes containing various model regulations and identity and other cards.
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.
The Geneva Conventions, which were adopted before 1949. were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II showed the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Convention adopted in 1949 takes account of the experiences of World War II. It is composed of 159 articles. It contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war, without addressing the conduct of hostilities, as such, which was later examined in the Additional Protocols of 1977. The bulk of the Convention deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. It spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-Ă -vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for populations in occupied territory. It also contains a specific regime for the treatment of civilian internees. It has three annexes containing a model agreement on hospital and safety zones, model regulations on humanitarian relief and model cards.
Common Article 3
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, marked a breakthrough, as it covered, for the first time, situations of non-international armed conflicts. These types of conflicts vary greatly. They include traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside the government. Common Article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted. It is like a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an international character:
It requires humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse distinction. It specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, the taking of hostages and unfair trial.
It requires that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be collected and cared for.
It grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
It calls on the parties to the conflict to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into force through so-called special agreements.
It recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Given that most armed conflicts today are non-international, applying Common Article 3 is of the utmost importance. Its full respect is required.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
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The Third Geneva Convention applies to prisoners of war.
This Convention replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. It contains 143 articles whereas the 1929 Convention had only 97. The categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status were broadened in accordance with Conventions I and II. The conditions and places of captivity were more precisely defined, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and the judicial proceedings instituted against them. The Convention establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The Convention has five annexes containing various model regulations and identity and other cards.
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.
The Geneva Conventions, which were adopted before 1949. were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II showed the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Convention adopted in 1949 takes account of the experiences of World War II. It is composed of 159 articles. It contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war, without addressing the conduct of hostilities, as such, which was later examined in the Additional Protocols of 1977. The bulk of the Convention deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. It spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-Ă -vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for populations in occupied territory. It also contains a specific regime for the treatment of civilian internees. It has three annexes containing a model agreement on hospital and safety zones, model regulations on humanitarian relief and model cards.
Common Article 3
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, marked a breakthrough, as it covered, for the first time, situations of non-international armed conflicts. These types of conflicts vary greatly. They include traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside the government. Common Article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted. It is like a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an international character:
It requires humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse distinction. It specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, the taking of hostages and unfair trial.
It requires that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be collected and cared for.
It grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
It calls on the parties to the conflict to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into force through so-called special agreements.
It recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Given that most armed conflicts today are non-international, applying Common Article 3 is of the utmost importance. Its full respect is required.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
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In the two decades that followed the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the world witnessed an increase in the number of non-international armed conflicts and wars of national liberation. In response, two Protocols Additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1977. They strengthen the protection of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflicts and place limits on the way wars are fought. Protocol II was the first-ever international treaty devoted exclusively to situations of non-international armed conflicts.
In 2005, a third Additional Protocol was adopted creating an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.
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In 2005, a third Additional Protocol was adopted creating an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.
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Many Uyghurs said the reasons they were given for their detention were not tied to specific acts; rather, they were informed that they were detained because they were classified as “suspicious” or “untrustworthy” or as a “terrorist” or an “extremist”. #FreeUyghurs
China looks into technology to identify Uyghurs “likely” to become “terrorists”. The law gave the authorities access to communication, travel, and work history; social media profiles; internet search history; financial information; and family connections. #FreeUyghurs
Anyone in Xinjiang who speaks out about the internment camps, is perceived to have spoken, is accused of, or is affiliated with anyone who has, risks detention, arrest, imprisonment, torture, & disappearance, not only for themselves but also for their family members. #FreeUyghurs
China looks into technology to identify Uyghurs “likely” to become “terrorists”. The law gave the authorities access to communication, travel, and work history; social media profiles; internet search history; financial information; and family connections. #FreeUyghurs
Anyone in Xinjiang who speaks out about the internment camps, is perceived to have spoken, is accused of, or is affiliated with anyone who has, risks detention, arrest, imprisonment, torture, & disappearance, not only for themselves but also for their family members. #FreeUyghurs
Anonymous Sudan hackers group claims to have targeted and attacked Snapp, a ride-hailing application in Iran.
#Iran
#AnonymousSudan #cti #ddos
#Iran
#AnonymousSudan #cti #ddos
Countries where more Turkish citizens voted for Erdogan:
The bulk of Erdogan’s international votes came from citizens living in large diaspora countries in Europe, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, as well as across the Middle East and North Africa.
In Germany, which hosts 1.5 million eligible voters, Erdogan won some 67 percent of the vote.
At 95 percent, Turkish voters in Lebanon represented the highest percentage of Erdogan votes, followed by Jordan (90 percent) and Egypt (78 percent).
More Turks living in the following countries below favoured Erdogan:
Lebanon (95.28%), Jordan (90.37%), Egypt (78.59%), Belgium (74.91%), Pakistan (73.91%), Austria (73.88%), Kyrgyzstan (71.34%), Netherlands (70.45%), Saudi Arabia (69.3%), Germany (67.36%), France (66.57%), Libya (66.28%), Kuwait (64.61%), Qatar (61.71%), Luxembourg (60.64%), Denmark (60.47%), Algeria (58.96%), Morocco (58.58%), Iraq (58.42%), Uzbekistan (57.55%), Malaysia (57.11%), Iran (55.1%), Norway (54.23%), Azerbaijan (53.59%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51.24%) and Tanzania (50.45%).
The bulk of Erdogan’s international votes came from citizens living in large diaspora countries in Europe, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, as well as across the Middle East and North Africa.
In Germany, which hosts 1.5 million eligible voters, Erdogan won some 67 percent of the vote.
At 95 percent, Turkish voters in Lebanon represented the highest percentage of Erdogan votes, followed by Jordan (90 percent) and Egypt (78 percent).
More Turks living in the following countries below favoured Erdogan:
Lebanon (95.28%), Jordan (90.37%), Egypt (78.59%), Belgium (74.91%), Pakistan (73.91%), Austria (73.88%), Kyrgyzstan (71.34%), Netherlands (70.45%), Saudi Arabia (69.3%), Germany (67.36%), France (66.57%), Libya (66.28%), Kuwait (64.61%), Qatar (61.71%), Luxembourg (60.64%), Denmark (60.47%), Algeria (58.96%), Morocco (58.58%), Iraq (58.42%), Uzbekistan (57.55%), Malaysia (57.11%), Iran (55.1%), Norway (54.23%), Azerbaijan (53.59%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51.24%) and Tanzania (50.45%).
Countries where more Turkish citizens voted for Kilicdaroglu:
Kilicdaroglu dominated in many parts of Europe and North America where he secured more than 80 percent of the vote in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom as well as many parts of Southern and Eastern Europe.
The majority of Turks living in the following countries below favoured Kilicdaroglu:
Portugal (94.65%), Estonia (94.17%), Ireland (91.2%), Poland (90.02%), Czech Republic (89.28%), Lithuania (89.07%), Singapore (88.75%), New Zealand (86.01%), Montenegro (84.63%), US (82.57%), Greece (81.55%), Thailand (81.52%), Canada (80.86%), UK (80.38%), Hungary (76.94%), Malta (76.9%), Brazil (74.59%), Belarus (74.43%), Italy (74.13%), Israel (74.07%), South Africa (73.05%), Bulgaria (72.47%), China (71.99%), Bahrain (71.5%), Spain (71.1%), Finland (70.55%), Georgia (66.67%), Albania (65.71%), Oman (65.56%), United Arab Emirates (64.72%), Japan (63.48%), Romania (59.67%), Nigeria (59.6%), Serbia (59.19%), Ukraine (58.33%), Cyprus (58.15%), Switzerland (57.18%), Moldova (57.14%), Kosovo (56.9%), Australia (56.29%), Russia (54.81%), North Macedonia (54.62%), Sweden (53.08%), Turkmenistan (52.24%) and Kazakhstan (52.18%).
Kilicdaroglu dominated in many parts of Europe and North America where he secured more than 80 percent of the vote in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom as well as many parts of Southern and Eastern Europe.
The majority of Turks living in the following countries below favoured Kilicdaroglu:
Portugal (94.65%), Estonia (94.17%), Ireland (91.2%), Poland (90.02%), Czech Republic (89.28%), Lithuania (89.07%), Singapore (88.75%), New Zealand (86.01%), Montenegro (84.63%), US (82.57%), Greece (81.55%), Thailand (81.52%), Canada (80.86%), UK (80.38%), Hungary (76.94%), Malta (76.9%), Brazil (74.59%), Belarus (74.43%), Italy (74.13%), Israel (74.07%), South Africa (73.05%), Bulgaria (72.47%), China (71.99%), Bahrain (71.5%), Spain (71.1%), Finland (70.55%), Georgia (66.67%), Albania (65.71%), Oman (65.56%), United Arab Emirates (64.72%), Japan (63.48%), Romania (59.67%), Nigeria (59.6%), Serbia (59.19%), Ukraine (58.33%), Cyprus (58.15%), Switzerland (57.18%), Moldova (57.14%), Kosovo (56.9%), Australia (56.29%), Russia (54.81%), North Macedonia (54.62%), Sweden (53.08%), Turkmenistan (52.24%) and Kazakhstan (52.18%).
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won re-election on Sunday in a heavily-contested run-off election.
With more than 99 percent of both domestic and international votes counted, Erdogan secured 52.16 percent of the vote, and challenger Kemal Kilicdaroglu received 47.84 percent.
Domestic election results
Erdogan won 52 out of the country’s 81 provinces, one more than during the first round.
Kilicdaroglu repeated his first-round performance by winning Turkey’s biggest city Istanbul and the capital, Ankara.
At 85.7 percent, domestic voter turnout was about 3 percent lower than during the first round on May 14.
With more than 99 percent of both domestic and international votes counted, Erdogan secured 52.16 percent of the vote, and challenger Kemal Kilicdaroglu received 47.84 percent.
Domestic election results
Erdogan won 52 out of the country’s 81 provinces, one more than during the first round.
Kilicdaroglu repeated his first-round performance by winning Turkey’s biggest city Istanbul and the capital, Ankara.
At 85.7 percent, domestic voter turnout was about 3 percent lower than during the first round on May 14.
Why do more than 800 million people live in hunger?
Ten percent of the world’s population does not have enough food, the highest number in more than a decade.
Hunger levels are rising around the world.
As many as 828 million people – or 10 percent of the world’s population – go to bed hungry each night, 46 million more than the previous year, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Of those affected by hunger, two-thirds are women and 80 percent live in areas prone to climate change.
To raise awareness about global hunger levels, The Hunger Project, a non-profit, designated May 28 as World Hunger Day.
Hunger is a debilitating state that occurs when the body is deprived of food for an extended period.
Prolonged periods of hunger can lead to health problems and can cause lifelong physical and cognitive damage, particularly among children.
Undernutrition extends beyond calorie intake to indicate deficiencies in energy and protein, as well as vital vitamins and minerals.
Following a decade of consistent decrease, global hunger has witnessed an upward trend in recent years. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of undernourished individuals increased by more than 150 million, primarily fuelled by conflicts, climate change, economic shocks and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hunger levels are rising around the world
As many as 828 million people went to bed hungry each night in 2021.
The cost of food has also increased. Between 2019 and 2022, the FAO Food Price Index (FPI) – which measures the change in global prices of a basket of food products including sugar, meat, cereals, dairy and vegetable oil – increased from 95.1 points to 143.7 points.
The number of people experiencing acute food shortages, which measures a person’s inability to consume adequate food and, as a result, puts their lives or livelihoods in immediate danger, has increased for the fourth year in 2022, with 258 million people facing acute hunger, according to the 2023 edition of the Global Report on Food Crisis.
In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine – two of the biggest global producers of staple cereals, oilseeds and fertiliser – led to huge disruptions in international supply chains which pushed up the prices of grain, fertiliser and energy. This led to the global FPI reaching its highest level on record in 2022.
Projections for the future outlook of global hunger suggest that hunger will persist, with more devastating effects from extreme weather events.
Ten percent of the world’s population does not have enough food, the highest number in more than a decade.
Hunger levels are rising around the world.
As many as 828 million people – or 10 percent of the world’s population – go to bed hungry each night, 46 million more than the previous year, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Of those affected by hunger, two-thirds are women and 80 percent live in areas prone to climate change.
To raise awareness about global hunger levels, The Hunger Project, a non-profit, designated May 28 as World Hunger Day.
Hunger is a debilitating state that occurs when the body is deprived of food for an extended period.
Prolonged periods of hunger can lead to health problems and can cause lifelong physical and cognitive damage, particularly among children.
Undernutrition extends beyond calorie intake to indicate deficiencies in energy and protein, as well as vital vitamins and minerals.
Following a decade of consistent decrease, global hunger has witnessed an upward trend in recent years. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of undernourished individuals increased by more than 150 million, primarily fuelled by conflicts, climate change, economic shocks and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hunger levels are rising around the world
As many as 828 million people went to bed hungry each night in 2021.
The cost of food has also increased. Between 2019 and 2022, the FAO Food Price Index (FPI) – which measures the change in global prices of a basket of food products including sugar, meat, cereals, dairy and vegetable oil – increased from 95.1 points to 143.7 points.
The number of people experiencing acute food shortages, which measures a person’s inability to consume adequate food and, as a result, puts their lives or livelihoods in immediate danger, has increased for the fourth year in 2022, with 258 million people facing acute hunger, according to the 2023 edition of the Global Report on Food Crisis.
In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine – two of the biggest global producers of staple cereals, oilseeds and fertiliser – led to huge disruptions in international supply chains which pushed up the prices of grain, fertiliser and energy. This led to the global FPI reaching its highest level on record in 2022.
Projections for the future outlook of global hunger suggest that hunger will persist, with more devastating effects from extreme weather events.
The End Stage of American Empire
All around us things are falling apart. Collectively, Americans are experiencing national and imperial decline. Can America save itself? Is this country, as presently constituted, even worth saving?
For me, that last question is radical indeed. From my early years, I believed deeply in the idea of America. I knew this country wasn’t perfect, of course, not even close. Long before the 1619 Project, I was aware of the “original sin” of slavery and how central it was to our history. I also knew about the genocide of Native Americans. (As a teenager, my favorite movie — and so it remains — was Little Big Man, which pulled no punches when it came to the white man and his insatiably murderous greed.)
Nevertheless, America still promised much, or so I believed in the 1970s and 1980s. Life here was simply better, hands down, than in places like the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China. That’s why we had to “contain” communism — to keep them over there, so they could never invade our country and extinguish our lamp of liberty. And that’s why I joined America’s Cold War military, serving in the Air Force from the presidency of Ronald Reagan to that of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney. And believe me, it proved quite a ride. It taught this retired lieutenant colonel that the sky’s anything but the limit.
In the end, 20 years in the Air Force led me to turn away from empire, militarism, and nationalism. I found myself seeking instead some antidote to the mainstream media’s celebrations of American exceptionalism and the exaggerated version of victory culture that went with it (long after victory itself was in short supply). I started writing against the empire and its disastrous wars and found likeminded people at TomDispatch — former imperial operatives turned incisive critics like Chalmers Johnson and Andrew Bacevich, along with sharp-eyed journalist Nick Turse and, of course, the irreplaceable Tom Engelhardt, the founder of those “tomgrams” meant to alert America and the world to the dangerous folly of repeated U.S. global military interventions.
But this isn’t a plug for TomDispatch. It’s a plug for freeing your mind as much as possible from the thoroughly militarized matrix that pervades America. That matrix drives imperialism, waste, war, and global instability to the point where, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, the risk of nuclear Armageddon could imaginably approach that of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As wars — proxy or otherwise — continue, America’s global network of 750-odd military bases never seems to decline. Despite upcoming cuts to domestic spending, just about no one in Washington imagines Pentagon budgets doing anything but growing, even soaring toward the trillion-dollar level, with militarized programs accounting for 62% of federal discretionary spending in 2023.
Indeed, an engorged Pentagon — its budget for 2024 is expected to rise to $886 billion in the bipartisan debt-ceiling deal reached by President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy — guarantees one thing: a speedier fall for the American empire. Chalmers Johnson predicted it; Andrew Bacevich analyzed it. The biggest reason is simple enough: incessant, repetitive, disastrous wars and costly preparations for more of the same have been sapping America’s physical and mental reserves, as past wars did the reserves of previous empires throughout history. (Think of the short-lived Napoleonic empire, for example.)
Known as “the arsenal of democracy” during World War II, America has now simply become an arsenal, with a military-industrial-congressional complex intent on forging and feeding wars rather than seeking to starve and stop them. The result: a precipitous decline in the country’s standing globally, while at home Americans pay a steep price of accelerating violence (2023 will easily set a record for mass shootings) and “carnage” (Donald Trump’s word) in a once proud but now much-bloodied “homeland.”
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All around us things are falling apart. Collectively, Americans are experiencing national and imperial decline. Can America save itself? Is this country, as presently constituted, even worth saving?
For me, that last question is radical indeed. From my early years, I believed deeply in the idea of America. I knew this country wasn’t perfect, of course, not even close. Long before the 1619 Project, I was aware of the “original sin” of slavery and how central it was to our history. I also knew about the genocide of Native Americans. (As a teenager, my favorite movie — and so it remains — was Little Big Man, which pulled no punches when it came to the white man and his insatiably murderous greed.)
Nevertheless, America still promised much, or so I believed in the 1970s and 1980s. Life here was simply better, hands down, than in places like the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China. That’s why we had to “contain” communism — to keep them over there, so they could never invade our country and extinguish our lamp of liberty. And that’s why I joined America’s Cold War military, serving in the Air Force from the presidency of Ronald Reagan to that of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney. And believe me, it proved quite a ride. It taught this retired lieutenant colonel that the sky’s anything but the limit.
In the end, 20 years in the Air Force led me to turn away from empire, militarism, and nationalism. I found myself seeking instead some antidote to the mainstream media’s celebrations of American exceptionalism and the exaggerated version of victory culture that went with it (long after victory itself was in short supply). I started writing against the empire and its disastrous wars and found likeminded people at TomDispatch — former imperial operatives turned incisive critics like Chalmers Johnson and Andrew Bacevich, along with sharp-eyed journalist Nick Turse and, of course, the irreplaceable Tom Engelhardt, the founder of those “tomgrams” meant to alert America and the world to the dangerous folly of repeated U.S. global military interventions.
But this isn’t a plug for TomDispatch. It’s a plug for freeing your mind as much as possible from the thoroughly militarized matrix that pervades America. That matrix drives imperialism, waste, war, and global instability to the point where, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, the risk of nuclear Armageddon could imaginably approach that of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As wars — proxy or otherwise — continue, America’s global network of 750-odd military bases never seems to decline. Despite upcoming cuts to domestic spending, just about no one in Washington imagines Pentagon budgets doing anything but growing, even soaring toward the trillion-dollar level, with militarized programs accounting for 62% of federal discretionary spending in 2023.
Indeed, an engorged Pentagon — its budget for 2024 is expected to rise to $886 billion in the bipartisan debt-ceiling deal reached by President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy — guarantees one thing: a speedier fall for the American empire. Chalmers Johnson predicted it; Andrew Bacevich analyzed it. The biggest reason is simple enough: incessant, repetitive, disastrous wars and costly preparations for more of the same have been sapping America’s physical and mental reserves, as past wars did the reserves of previous empires throughout history. (Think of the short-lived Napoleonic empire, for example.)
Known as “the arsenal of democracy” during World War II, America has now simply become an arsenal, with a military-industrial-congressional complex intent on forging and feeding wars rather than seeking to starve and stop them. The result: a precipitous decline in the country’s standing globally, while at home Americans pay a steep price of accelerating violence (2023 will easily set a record for mass shootings) and “carnage” (Donald Trump’s word) in a once proud but now much-bloodied “homeland.”
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Lessons from History on Imperial Decline
I’m a historian, so please allow me to share a few basic lessons I’ve learned. When I taught World War I to cadets at the Air Force Academy, I would explain how the horrific costs of that war contributed to the collapse of four empires: Czarist Russia, the German Second Reich, the Ottoman empire, and the Austro-Hungarian empire of the Habsburgs. Yet even the “winners,” like the French and British empires, were also weakened by the enormity of what was, above all, a brutal European civil war, even if it spilled over into Africa, Asia, and indeed the Americas.
And yet after that war ended in 1918, peace proved elusive indeed, despite the Treaty of Versailles, among other abortive agreements. There was too much unfinished business, too much belief in the power of militarism, especially in an emergent Third Reich in Germany and in Japan, which had embraced ruthless European military methods to create its own Asiatic sphere of dominance. Scores needed to be settled, so the Germans and Japanese believed, and military offensives were the way to do it.
As a result, civil war in Europe continued with World War II, even as Japan showed that Asiatic powers could similarly embrace and deploy the unwisdom of unchecked militarism and war. The result: 75 million dead and more empires shattered, including Mussolini’s “New Rome,” a “thousand-year” German Reich that barely lasted 12 of them before being utterly destroyed, and an Imperial Japan that was starved, burnt out, and finally nuked. China, devastated by war with Japan, also found itself ripped apart by internal struggles between nationalists and communists.
As with its prequel, even most of the “winners” of World War II emerged in a weakened state. In defeating Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union had lost 25 to 30 million people. Its response was to erect, in Winston Churchill’s phrase, an “Iron Curtain” behind which it could exploit the peoples of Eastern Europe in a militarized empire that ultimately collapsed due to its wars and its own internal divisions. Yet the USSR lasted longer than the post-war French and British empires. France, humiliated by its rapid capitulation to the Germans in 1940, fought to reclaim wealth and glory in “French” Indochina, only to be severely humbled at Dien Bien Phu. Great Britain, exhausted from its victory, quickly lost India, that “jewel” in its imperial crown, and then Egypt in the Suez debacle.
There was, in fact, only one country, one empire, that truly “won” World War II: the United States, which had been the least touched (Pearl Harbor aside) by war and all its horrors. That seemingly never-ending European civil war from 1914 to 1945, along with Japan’s immolation and China’s implosion, left the U.S. virtually unchallenged globally. America emerged from those wars as a superpower precisely because its government had astutely backed the winning side twice, tipping the scales in the process, while paying a relatively low price in blood and treasure compared to allies like the Soviet Union, France, and Britain.
History’s lesson for America’s leaders should have been all too clear: when you wage war long, especially when you devote significant parts of your resources — financial, material, and especially personal — to it, you wage it wrong. Not for nothing is war depicted in the Bible as one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. France had lost its empire in World War II; it just took later military catastrophes in Algeria and Indochina to make it obvious. That was similarly true of Britain’s humiliations in India, Egypt, and elsewhere, while the Soviet Union, which had lost much of its imperial vigor in that war, would take decades of slow rot and overstretch in places like Afghanistan to implode.
Meanwhile, the United States hummed along, denying it was an empire at all, even as it adopted so many of the trappings of one.
2 of 4
I’m a historian, so please allow me to share a few basic lessons I’ve learned. When I taught World War I to cadets at the Air Force Academy, I would explain how the horrific costs of that war contributed to the collapse of four empires: Czarist Russia, the German Second Reich, the Ottoman empire, and the Austro-Hungarian empire of the Habsburgs. Yet even the “winners,” like the French and British empires, were also weakened by the enormity of what was, above all, a brutal European civil war, even if it spilled over into Africa, Asia, and indeed the Americas.
And yet after that war ended in 1918, peace proved elusive indeed, despite the Treaty of Versailles, among other abortive agreements. There was too much unfinished business, too much belief in the power of militarism, especially in an emergent Third Reich in Germany and in Japan, which had embraced ruthless European military methods to create its own Asiatic sphere of dominance. Scores needed to be settled, so the Germans and Japanese believed, and military offensives were the way to do it.
As a result, civil war in Europe continued with World War II, even as Japan showed that Asiatic powers could similarly embrace and deploy the unwisdom of unchecked militarism and war. The result: 75 million dead and more empires shattered, including Mussolini’s “New Rome,” a “thousand-year” German Reich that barely lasted 12 of them before being utterly destroyed, and an Imperial Japan that was starved, burnt out, and finally nuked. China, devastated by war with Japan, also found itself ripped apart by internal struggles between nationalists and communists.
As with its prequel, even most of the “winners” of World War II emerged in a weakened state. In defeating Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union had lost 25 to 30 million people. Its response was to erect, in Winston Churchill’s phrase, an “Iron Curtain” behind which it could exploit the peoples of Eastern Europe in a militarized empire that ultimately collapsed due to its wars and its own internal divisions. Yet the USSR lasted longer than the post-war French and British empires. France, humiliated by its rapid capitulation to the Germans in 1940, fought to reclaim wealth and glory in “French” Indochina, only to be severely humbled at Dien Bien Phu. Great Britain, exhausted from its victory, quickly lost India, that “jewel” in its imperial crown, and then Egypt in the Suez debacle.
There was, in fact, only one country, one empire, that truly “won” World War II: the United States, which had been the least touched (Pearl Harbor aside) by war and all its horrors. That seemingly never-ending European civil war from 1914 to 1945, along with Japan’s immolation and China’s implosion, left the U.S. virtually unchallenged globally. America emerged from those wars as a superpower precisely because its government had astutely backed the winning side twice, tipping the scales in the process, while paying a relatively low price in blood and treasure compared to allies like the Soviet Union, France, and Britain.
History’s lesson for America’s leaders should have been all too clear: when you wage war long, especially when you devote significant parts of your resources — financial, material, and especially personal — to it, you wage it wrong. Not for nothing is war depicted in the Bible as one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. France had lost its empire in World War II; it just took later military catastrophes in Algeria and Indochina to make it obvious. That was similarly true of Britain’s humiliations in India, Egypt, and elsewhere, while the Soviet Union, which had lost much of its imperial vigor in that war, would take decades of slow rot and overstretch in places like Afghanistan to implode.
Meanwhile, the United States hummed along, denying it was an empire at all, even as it adopted so many of the trappings of one.
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In fact, in the wake of the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington’s leaders would declare America the exceptional “superpower,” a new and far more enlightened Rome and “the indispensable nation” on planet Earth. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, its leaders would confidently launch what they termed a Global War on Terror and begin waging wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, as in the previous century they had in Vietnam. (No learning curve there, it seems.) In the process, its leaders imagined a country that would remain untouched by war’s ravages, which was we now know — or do we? — the height of imperial hubris and folly.
For whether you call it fascism, as with Nazi Germany, communism, as with Stalin’s Soviet Union, or democracy, as with the United States, empires built on dominance achieved through a powerful, expansionist military necessarily become ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and dysfunctional. Ultimately, they are fated to fail. No surprise there, since whatever else such empires may serve, they don’t serve their own people. Their operatives protect themselves at any cost, while attacking efforts at retrenchment or demilitarization as dangerously misguided, if not seditiously disloyal.
That’s why those like Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, and Daniel Hale, who shined a light on the empire’s militarized crimes and corruption, found themselves imprisoned, forced into exile, or otherwise silenced. Even foreign journalists like Julian Assange can be caught up in the empire’s dragnet and imprisoned if they dare expose its war crimes. The empire knows how to strike back and will readily betray its own justice system (most notably in the case of Assange), including the hallowed principles of free speech and the press, to do so.
Perhaps he will eventually be freed, likely as not when the empire judges he’s approaching death’s door. His jailing and torture have already served their purpose. Journalists know that to expose America’s bloodied tools of empire brings only harsh punishment, not plush rewards. Best to look away or mince one’s words rather than risk prison — or worse.
Yet you can’t fully hide the reality that this country’s failed wars have added trillions of dollars to its national debt, even as military spending continues to explode in the most wasteful ways imaginable, while the social infrastructure crumbles.
Clinging Bitterly to Guns and Religion
Today, America clings ever more bitterly to guns and religion. If that phrase sounds familiar, it might be because Barack Obama used it in the 2008 presidential campaign to describe the reactionary conservatism of mostly rural voters in Pennsylvania. Disillusioned by politics, betrayed by their putative betters, those voters, claimed the then-presidential candidate, clung to their guns and religion for solace. I lived in rural Pennsylvania at the time and recall a response from a fellow resident who basically agreed with Obama, for what else was there left to cling to in an empire that had abandoned its own rural working-class citizens?
Something similar is true of America writ large today. As an imperial power, we cling bitterly to guns and religion. By “guns,” I mean all the weaponry America’s merchants of death sell to the Pentagon and across the world. Indeed, weaponry is perhaps this country’s most influential global export, devastatingly so. From 2018 to 2022, the U.S. alone accounted for 40% of global arms exports, a figure that’s only risen dramatically with military aid to Ukraine. And by “religion,” I mean a persistent belief in American exceptionalism (despite all evidence to the contrary), which increasingly draws sustenance from a militant Christianity that denies the very spirit of Christ and His teachings.
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For whether you call it fascism, as with Nazi Germany, communism, as with Stalin’s Soviet Union, or democracy, as with the United States, empires built on dominance achieved through a powerful, expansionist military necessarily become ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and dysfunctional. Ultimately, they are fated to fail. No surprise there, since whatever else such empires may serve, they don’t serve their own people. Their operatives protect themselves at any cost, while attacking efforts at retrenchment or demilitarization as dangerously misguided, if not seditiously disloyal.
That’s why those like Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, and Daniel Hale, who shined a light on the empire’s militarized crimes and corruption, found themselves imprisoned, forced into exile, or otherwise silenced. Even foreign journalists like Julian Assange can be caught up in the empire’s dragnet and imprisoned if they dare expose its war crimes. The empire knows how to strike back and will readily betray its own justice system (most notably in the case of Assange), including the hallowed principles of free speech and the press, to do so.
Perhaps he will eventually be freed, likely as not when the empire judges he’s approaching death’s door. His jailing and torture have already served their purpose. Journalists know that to expose America’s bloodied tools of empire brings only harsh punishment, not plush rewards. Best to look away or mince one’s words rather than risk prison — or worse.
Yet you can’t fully hide the reality that this country’s failed wars have added trillions of dollars to its national debt, even as military spending continues to explode in the most wasteful ways imaginable, while the social infrastructure crumbles.
Clinging Bitterly to Guns and Religion
Today, America clings ever more bitterly to guns and religion. If that phrase sounds familiar, it might be because Barack Obama used it in the 2008 presidential campaign to describe the reactionary conservatism of mostly rural voters in Pennsylvania. Disillusioned by politics, betrayed by their putative betters, those voters, claimed the then-presidential candidate, clung to their guns and religion for solace. I lived in rural Pennsylvania at the time and recall a response from a fellow resident who basically agreed with Obama, for what else was there left to cling to in an empire that had abandoned its own rural working-class citizens?
Something similar is true of America writ large today. As an imperial power, we cling bitterly to guns and religion. By “guns,” I mean all the weaponry America’s merchants of death sell to the Pentagon and across the world. Indeed, weaponry is perhaps this country’s most influential global export, devastatingly so. From 2018 to 2022, the U.S. alone accounted for 40% of global arms exports, a figure that’s only risen dramatically with military aid to Ukraine. And by “religion,” I mean a persistent belief in American exceptionalism (despite all evidence to the contrary), which increasingly draws sustenance from a militant Christianity that denies the very spirit of Christ and His teachings.
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Yet history appears to confirm that empires, in their dying stages, do exactly that: they exalt violence, continue to pursue war, and insist on their own greatness until their fall can neither be denied nor reversed. It’s a tragic reality that the journalist Chris Hedges has written about with considerable urgency.
The problem suggests its own solution (not that any powerful figure in Washington is likely to pursue it). America must stop clinging bitterly to its guns — and here I don’t even mean the nearly 400 million weapons in private hands in this country, including all those AR-15 semi-automatic rifles. By “guns,” I mean all the militarized trappings of empire, including America’s vast structure of overseas military bases and its staggering commitments to weaponry of all sorts, including world-ending nuclear ones. As for clinging bitterly to religion — and by “religion” I mean the belief in America’s own righteousness, regardless of the millions of people it’s killed globally from the Vietnam era to the present moment — that, too, would have to stop.
History’s lessons can be brutal. Empires rarely die well. After it became an empire, Rome never returned to being a republic and eventually fell to barbarian invasions. The collapse of Germany’s Second Reich bred a third one of greater virulence, even if it was of shorter duration. Only its utter defeat in 1945 finally convinced Germans that God didn’t march with their soldiers into battle.
What will it take to convince Americans to turn their backs on empire and war before it’s too late? When will we conclude that Christ wasn’t joking when He blessed the peacemakers rather than the warmongers?
As an iron curtain descends on a failing American imperial state, one thing we won’t be able to say is that we weren’t warned.
by William J. Astore
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The problem suggests its own solution (not that any powerful figure in Washington is likely to pursue it). America must stop clinging bitterly to its guns — and here I don’t even mean the nearly 400 million weapons in private hands in this country, including all those AR-15 semi-automatic rifles. By “guns,” I mean all the militarized trappings of empire, including America’s vast structure of overseas military bases and its staggering commitments to weaponry of all sorts, including world-ending nuclear ones. As for clinging bitterly to religion — and by “religion” I mean the belief in America’s own righteousness, regardless of the millions of people it’s killed globally from the Vietnam era to the present moment — that, too, would have to stop.
History’s lessons can be brutal. Empires rarely die well. After it became an empire, Rome never returned to being a republic and eventually fell to barbarian invasions. The collapse of Germany’s Second Reich bred a third one of greater virulence, even if it was of shorter duration. Only its utter defeat in 1945 finally convinced Germans that God didn’t march with their soldiers into battle.
What will it take to convince Americans to turn their backs on empire and war before it’s too late? When will we conclude that Christ wasn’t joking when He blessed the peacemakers rather than the warmongers?
As an iron curtain descends on a failing American imperial state, one thing we won’t be able to say is that we weren’t warned.
by William J. Astore
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