Palestine was destroyed in 12 months - but the Nakba has gone on for 75 years
The Nakba devastated the lives and aspirations of the Palestinian people. Only a thorough process of restitutive justice, with the help of the world, can begin to right the wrongs.
At the beginning of February 1947, the British cabinet decided to end the mandate over Palestine and leave the country after nearly 30 years of rule.
The economic crisis in Britain following the Second World War brought a Labour government to power, which was willing to shrink the empire and cater for the needs of the people of the British Isles. Palestine proved to be a burden and no longer an asset as both the native Palestinians and the Zionist settlers were now fighting against the British mandate and demanding its end.
The die was cast in a cabinet meeting on 1 February 1947 and the fate of Palestine was entrusted to the UN - an inexperienced international organisation back then, already affected by the onset of the cold war between the US and the USSR.
Nonetheless, the two superpowers consented, exceptionally, to allow other member states to offer a solution to what was called âthe Palestine questionâ, without their interference.
The discussion about Palestineâs future was transferred to the UN Special Committee on Palestine (Unscop), made up of member states. This enraged the Palestinians and member states of the Arab League, as they expected post-mandatory Palestine to be treated in the same way any other mandatory state in the region - namely, allowing the people themselves to democratically determine their political future.
Nobody in the Arab world would have agreed to allow European settlers in North Africa to take part in determining the future of the newly independent countries. Similarly, the Palestinians rejected the idea that the settler Zionist movement - consisting mostly of settlers who had arrived just two years before the UN Palestine refugee agency (UNRWA) was appointed in 1949 - would have a say in the future of their homeland.
The Palestinians boycotted Unscop and, as they feared, the committee proposed creating a Jewish state on nearly half of their homeland as part of UN General Assembly resolution 181 passed on 29 November 1947.
The Zionist leadership accepted the partition of Palestine (welcoming the principle of a Jewish state), but had no intention of adhering to it in practice, seeing as half of the population would still be Palestinian, and the space allotted only half of the country coveted by the Zionist movement.
Ethnic cleansing masterplan
Already for more than 30 years, historians have unearthed enough declassified archival material, mainly from Israel, for exposing the Zionist strategy from November 1947 up to the end of 1948. I called the Zionist strategy at the period, in my work, a masterplan for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
The passage of time, the exposure of more material, and the ever-growing and crucial Palestinian projects of oral history, only accentuated the adequacy of applying this term to the events called by the Palestinians the Nakba.
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The Nakba devastated the lives and aspirations of the Palestinian people. Only a thorough process of restitutive justice, with the help of the world, can begin to right the wrongs.
At the beginning of February 1947, the British cabinet decided to end the mandate over Palestine and leave the country after nearly 30 years of rule.
The economic crisis in Britain following the Second World War brought a Labour government to power, which was willing to shrink the empire and cater for the needs of the people of the British Isles. Palestine proved to be a burden and no longer an asset as both the native Palestinians and the Zionist settlers were now fighting against the British mandate and demanding its end.
The die was cast in a cabinet meeting on 1 February 1947 and the fate of Palestine was entrusted to the UN - an inexperienced international organisation back then, already affected by the onset of the cold war between the US and the USSR.
Nonetheless, the two superpowers consented, exceptionally, to allow other member states to offer a solution to what was called âthe Palestine questionâ, without their interference.
The discussion about Palestineâs future was transferred to the UN Special Committee on Palestine (Unscop), made up of member states. This enraged the Palestinians and member states of the Arab League, as they expected post-mandatory Palestine to be treated in the same way any other mandatory state in the region - namely, allowing the people themselves to democratically determine their political future.
Nobody in the Arab world would have agreed to allow European settlers in North Africa to take part in determining the future of the newly independent countries. Similarly, the Palestinians rejected the idea that the settler Zionist movement - consisting mostly of settlers who had arrived just two years before the UN Palestine refugee agency (UNRWA) was appointed in 1949 - would have a say in the future of their homeland.
The Palestinians boycotted Unscop and, as they feared, the committee proposed creating a Jewish state on nearly half of their homeland as part of UN General Assembly resolution 181 passed on 29 November 1947.
The Zionist leadership accepted the partition of Palestine (welcoming the principle of a Jewish state), but had no intention of adhering to it in practice, seeing as half of the population would still be Palestinian, and the space allotted only half of the country coveted by the Zionist movement.
Ethnic cleansing masterplan
Already for more than 30 years, historians have unearthed enough declassified archival material, mainly from Israel, for exposing the Zionist strategy from November 1947 up to the end of 1948. I called the Zionist strategy at the period, in my work, a masterplan for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
The passage of time, the exposure of more material, and the ever-growing and crucial Palestinian projects of oral history, only accentuated the adequacy of applying this term to the events called by the Palestinians the Nakba.
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In recent years, an old definition of Zionism as a settler colonial movement was revived by scholars researching the history of Palestine. This would clearly explain why the Zionist leadership could never have accepted a partitioned Palestine.
Like any other settler colonial movement, it was a movement of Europeans who were outcasts in that continent, and had to make a new life for themselves elsewhere, usually in places already inhabited by other people.
The need to eliminate indigenous people became the hallmark of such movements, leading for instance to the genocide of the Native Americans in North America.
Having as much of the new place with as few natives as possible was already a central theme of the Zionist ideology and movement from its very inception. British rule disabled any significant land takeover (less than six percent of the lands of Palestine were under Zionist ownership by 1948). But on the land that was bought by Zionists, mainly through purchase from the Palestinian elite and absentee landowners living outside of Palestine, the local farmers were ethnically cleansed with the approval of the British authorities.
The Zionist leadership began planning for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in February 1947 and early operations took place already a year later under the noses of the British mandatory authorities.
The Zionist leadership needed to rush through its ethnic cleansing operations against the Palestinians in February 1948, starting with the forceful eviction of three villages on the coast between Jaffa and Haifa. The US and other members of the UN had already begun to doubt the wisdom of a partition plan and searched for alternative solutions. The US State Department proposed a five-year international trusteeship over Palestine in order to give additional time for further negotiations.
Facts on the ground
So, the first thing the Zionist leadership did was to establish facts on the ground even before the official end of the mandate (due on 15 May 1948). That meant cleansing Palestinians from the areas allocated by the UN for the Jewish state as well as taking over as many of the towns of Palestine as possible.
The Palestinians were no military match for the Zionist paramilitary groups. Some Arab volunteers arrived, but could do little to defend the Palestinians from being ethnically cleansed. The Arab world waited until 15 May before sending troops into Palestine.
That the Palestinians were quite defenceless between 29 November 1947 (when the UN partition resolution was adopted) and 15 May 1948 (the day the mandate ended and units from neighbouring Arab states arrived to try and save the Palestinians) is not a mere chronological fact. It categorically debunks the main claim in Israeli propaganda about the war - that Palestinians became refugees because the Arab world invaded Palestine and told them to leave; a myth too many people around the world still accept today.
According to this narrative, had the Arab world refrained from attacking Israel, the Palestinians might have escaped the fate of refugeehood and exile.
Nearly a quarter of a million Palestinians were already refugees before 15 May 1948 and a reluctant Arab world sent its armies to try and save the others.
Almost all Palestinians living in Haifa and Jaffa were forcefully removed from their homes and the towns of Bisan, Safad and Acre were completely depopulated. The villages around them suffered a similar fate. In the area around the western slopes of the Jerusalem mountains, tens of villages were ethnically cleansed, and at times, as unfolded in Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948, the expulsions were accompanied by massacres.
Israel's worst atrocities
The entry of Arab armies - Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon - in May 1948 posed a serious challenge to the new state of Israel.
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Like any other settler colonial movement, it was a movement of Europeans who were outcasts in that continent, and had to make a new life for themselves elsewhere, usually in places already inhabited by other people.
The need to eliminate indigenous people became the hallmark of such movements, leading for instance to the genocide of the Native Americans in North America.
Having as much of the new place with as few natives as possible was already a central theme of the Zionist ideology and movement from its very inception. British rule disabled any significant land takeover (less than six percent of the lands of Palestine were under Zionist ownership by 1948). But on the land that was bought by Zionists, mainly through purchase from the Palestinian elite and absentee landowners living outside of Palestine, the local farmers were ethnically cleansed with the approval of the British authorities.
The Zionist leadership began planning for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in February 1947 and early operations took place already a year later under the noses of the British mandatory authorities.
The Zionist leadership needed to rush through its ethnic cleansing operations against the Palestinians in February 1948, starting with the forceful eviction of three villages on the coast between Jaffa and Haifa. The US and other members of the UN had already begun to doubt the wisdom of a partition plan and searched for alternative solutions. The US State Department proposed a five-year international trusteeship over Palestine in order to give additional time for further negotiations.
Facts on the ground
So, the first thing the Zionist leadership did was to establish facts on the ground even before the official end of the mandate (due on 15 May 1948). That meant cleansing Palestinians from the areas allocated by the UN for the Jewish state as well as taking over as many of the towns of Palestine as possible.
The Palestinians were no military match for the Zionist paramilitary groups. Some Arab volunteers arrived, but could do little to defend the Palestinians from being ethnically cleansed. The Arab world waited until 15 May before sending troops into Palestine.
That the Palestinians were quite defenceless between 29 November 1947 (when the UN partition resolution was adopted) and 15 May 1948 (the day the mandate ended and units from neighbouring Arab states arrived to try and save the Palestinians) is not a mere chronological fact. It categorically debunks the main claim in Israeli propaganda about the war - that Palestinians became refugees because the Arab world invaded Palestine and told them to leave; a myth too many people around the world still accept today.
According to this narrative, had the Arab world refrained from attacking Israel, the Palestinians might have escaped the fate of refugeehood and exile.
Nearly a quarter of a million Palestinians were already refugees before 15 May 1948 and a reluctant Arab world sent its armies to try and save the others.
Almost all Palestinians living in Haifa and Jaffa were forcefully removed from their homes and the towns of Bisan, Safad and Acre were completely depopulated. The villages around them suffered a similar fate. In the area around the western slopes of the Jerusalem mountains, tens of villages were ethnically cleansed, and at times, as unfolded in Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948, the expulsions were accompanied by massacres.
Israel's worst atrocities
The entry of Arab armies - Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon - in May 1948 posed a serious challenge to the new state of Israel.
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But by that time, the military capacity of the Jewish community had increased considerably (with the help of weapons from the Eastern bloc that were purchased, with Soviet approval, from Czechoslovakia, which possessed a large number of Second World War surplus arms left behind by the German and Russian armies. (Britain and France embargoed arms supplies to all sides concerned at the time.)
As a result, Israeli forces were able to carry out missions on two fronts: first, against the Arab armies; and, second, by continuing its ethnic cleansing operations, targeting mostly areas accorded by the UN partition resolution to the Arab state.
The operation in the Upper Galilee in particular recorded some of the worst atrocities committed by the Israeli army during the Nakba: partly because of the fierce resistance of people who already knew the fate awaiting them under Israeli occupation; and partly due to the fatigue of the occupying forces, who dispensed with any previous inhibitions in the way they treated the civilian population.
The message from the world to Israel was that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine was acceptable - as compensation for the Holocaust and the centuries of antisemitism in Europe
In the massacre at al-Dawayima, near Hebron, on 29 October 1948, it is estimated that 455 Palestinians, half of them women and children, were executed by Israeli soldiers.
Two areas of historical Palestine escaped the fate of being ethnically cleansed. The area that became known as the West Bank was taken over almost without a fight by Jordanian and Iraqi forces. This was in part a tacit agreement between Israel and Jordan that in return for this annexation, Jordan would play a minimal military role in the overall Arab effort to salvage Palestine.
Yet, under Israeli pressure after the war, Jordan conceded, during armistice negotiations, part of what was supposed to be its West Bank. This area is called Wadi Ara, connecting the Mediterranean and the Jenin district.
This annexation posed a problem to a settler colonial state such as Israel. Having more territory meant having also more Palestinians in the Jewish state. Thus, smaller ethnic cleansing operations took place, to reduce the number of Palestinians living in Wadi Ara.
This connection between geography and demography led Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, to reject the pressure from his generals to occupy the West Bank (these generals would become the politicians pushing for the takeover of the West Bank in the war of 1967 to compensate for the âmistakeâ of not occupying it in 1948).
The ongoing Nakba
Israel also left alone another area, which became known as the Gaza Strip. It was an artificial rectangle of land Israel created as a huge receptacle for the hundreds of thousands of refugees it cleansed from the southern parts of Palestine and allowed Egypt to keep it as a military-occupied area.
On the ruins of Palestinian villages, Israel built settlements (quite often using a Hebrew version of the Arabic name - thus Saffuriya became Tzipori and Lubya became Lavi) or planted parks, trying to erase any trace of the culture, life and society it destroyed within nine months in 1948.
Half of Palestineâs population became refugees, and hundreds of villages were demolished and its towns were de-Arabised by the occupying forces.
The Nakba destroyed a country as well as the lives and aspirations of its people. The huge human capital that Palestinian society had developed was, through refugees, invested in other Arab countries, contributing to their cultural, educational and economic development.
The message from the world to Israel was that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, which was well known in the West, was acceptable - mainly as compensation for the Holocaust and the centuries of antisemitism that had plagued Europe.
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As a result, Israeli forces were able to carry out missions on two fronts: first, against the Arab armies; and, second, by continuing its ethnic cleansing operations, targeting mostly areas accorded by the UN partition resolution to the Arab state.
The operation in the Upper Galilee in particular recorded some of the worst atrocities committed by the Israeli army during the Nakba: partly because of the fierce resistance of people who already knew the fate awaiting them under Israeli occupation; and partly due to the fatigue of the occupying forces, who dispensed with any previous inhibitions in the way they treated the civilian population.
The message from the world to Israel was that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine was acceptable - as compensation for the Holocaust and the centuries of antisemitism in Europe
In the massacre at al-Dawayima, near Hebron, on 29 October 1948, it is estimated that 455 Palestinians, half of them women and children, were executed by Israeli soldiers.
Two areas of historical Palestine escaped the fate of being ethnically cleansed. The area that became known as the West Bank was taken over almost without a fight by Jordanian and Iraqi forces. This was in part a tacit agreement between Israel and Jordan that in return for this annexation, Jordan would play a minimal military role in the overall Arab effort to salvage Palestine.
Yet, under Israeli pressure after the war, Jordan conceded, during armistice negotiations, part of what was supposed to be its West Bank. This area is called Wadi Ara, connecting the Mediterranean and the Jenin district.
This annexation posed a problem to a settler colonial state such as Israel. Having more territory meant having also more Palestinians in the Jewish state. Thus, smaller ethnic cleansing operations took place, to reduce the number of Palestinians living in Wadi Ara.
This connection between geography and demography led Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, to reject the pressure from his generals to occupy the West Bank (these generals would become the politicians pushing for the takeover of the West Bank in the war of 1967 to compensate for the âmistakeâ of not occupying it in 1948).
The ongoing Nakba
Israel also left alone another area, which became known as the Gaza Strip. It was an artificial rectangle of land Israel created as a huge receptacle for the hundreds of thousands of refugees it cleansed from the southern parts of Palestine and allowed Egypt to keep it as a military-occupied area.
On the ruins of Palestinian villages, Israel built settlements (quite often using a Hebrew version of the Arabic name - thus Saffuriya became Tzipori and Lubya became Lavi) or planted parks, trying to erase any trace of the culture, life and society it destroyed within nine months in 1948.
Half of Palestineâs population became refugees, and hundreds of villages were demolished and its towns were de-Arabised by the occupying forces.
The Nakba destroyed a country as well as the lives and aspirations of its people. The huge human capital that Palestinian society had developed was, through refugees, invested in other Arab countries, contributing to their cultural, educational and economic development.
The message from the world to Israel was that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, which was well known in the West, was acceptable - mainly as compensation for the Holocaust and the centuries of antisemitism that had plagued Europe.
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Hence, Israel continued its ethnic cleansing after 1967, when once more additional occupied space brought it more âundesiredâ people. This time the ethnic cleansing was incremental, and goes on until today.
Nonetheless, the Palestinians are still there, showing incredible resilience and resistance - alongside the ongoing Nakba, there is an ongoing intifada and, as long Israel does not account for what it had done and is doing, the colonisation will continue, as will the anti-colonialist struggle against it.
The only possible way of rectifying past evils is by respecting the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and the establishment of one state all over historical Palestine based on the principles of democracy, equality and social justice.
This must be built through a process of restitutive justice which compensates the people for their loss of land, careers and life by the new state and with the help of the world.
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Nonetheless, the Palestinians are still there, showing incredible resilience and resistance - alongside the ongoing Nakba, there is an ongoing intifada and, as long Israel does not account for what it had done and is doing, the colonisation will continue, as will the anti-colonialist struggle against it.
The only possible way of rectifying past evils is by respecting the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and the establishment of one state all over historical Palestine based on the principles of democracy, equality and social justice.
This must be built through a process of restitutive justice which compensates the people for their loss of land, careers and life by the new state and with the help of the world.
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James Baldwin and the Jewish State
Baldwin didnât speak often of Israel, but he still managed to say plenty
For James Baldwin, nothing started or stopped at the borders of the United States. His comments about Black-Jewish tension in the country of his birth took on worldly dimensions, offering unusual insight into domestic race relations, international affairs, and conflict in the Middle East.
Baldwin wasnât a policy wonk, but, befitting a person of his stature, he commented regularly on contemporary issues of global import. Public figures donât normally escape questions about Palestine and Israel; Baldwin was no exception. The few times he spoke about the region reveal a thinker of significant prescience and a skilled rhetorician who doesnât allow audiences the luxury of comfort.
His most notable assessment of Zionism and Israel arose in context of a 1984 controversy surrounding then-Democratic presidential candidate Jesse Jackson, whose campaign represented a milestone in Black and progressive politics. Jackson used the epithet âHymietownâ to describe New York City in what he thought was an off-the-record conversation with a journalist. (âHymieâ is an anti-Jewish slur.) When the comment was reported, it erupted into scandal.
Baldwin, who claimed that âJesse is singled out for particular reasons,â discussed the controversy at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, featured in The Cross of Redemption, an anthology of uncollected talks, essays, and reviews (Baldwin was a stringent, at times unforgiving, reviewer). Because the Q&A is transcribed, we get to witness Baldwin speaking extemporaneously.
It is a remarkable document, in part because the audience doesnât seem to get what Baldwin is saying. Rather than dispensing platitudes about conflict and peace, he identifies Zionism as a concern of Western imperialism:
Whenever Israel is mentioned one is required, it appears sometimes to me, to maintain a kind of pious silence. Well, why? It is a state like other states. It has come into existence in a peculiar way. But it does not, does not, become a state because people who wrote the Balfour Declaration, or Winston Churchill, or for that matter anyone in Europe, or in the Western world, really cared what happened to the Jews. I wish I could say differently, but I would be lying if I didâit came into existence as a means of protecting Western interests at the gate of the Middle East.
Baldwin reinforces this point when somebody from the audience questions the validity of implying that Israel âwas set up to protect oil interests in that area.â Baldwin responds: âI said to protect the vital interests of the Western world, and I donât mean to be sardonic or cynical, but I would be lying to you and lying by my own experience if I said to you that the Europeansâthe English, the Dutch, the Germans, the Frenchâimpressed me as having any vivid concern for Jews.â He returns to the theme of Jewish people being either disposable or instrumentalized in traditions of Western capitalism.
For Baldwin, Zionism isnât an atavistic cultural or religious attribute, but the modern articulation of an age-old colonial logic. âIn order to be a Zionist,â he notes, âit is not necessary to love the Jews. I know some Zionists who are definitely anti-Semitic.â This point impugns some of Zionismâs basic premises: that Israel embodies Jewishness; that Israel is a necessary response to anti-Semitism; that Israel offers a utopian model of nationhood. Among other uses, the ideology shows how likely, even necessary, it is in imperialist cosmologies to uncouple humans who occupy a territory from the economic utility of nation-states that exist in their name.
What does it mean to be an anti-Semitic Zionist? (Baldwin is correct, by the way; evangelical Christian leaders, Western heads of state, and Gulf Arab billionaires all in some way fit the label.) It shows, to begin with, that Zionism cannot deliver on its claim to preserve the well-being of Jewish people around the -
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Baldwin didnât speak often of Israel, but he still managed to say plenty
For James Baldwin, nothing started or stopped at the borders of the United States. His comments about Black-Jewish tension in the country of his birth took on worldly dimensions, offering unusual insight into domestic race relations, international affairs, and conflict in the Middle East.
Baldwin wasnât a policy wonk, but, befitting a person of his stature, he commented regularly on contemporary issues of global import. Public figures donât normally escape questions about Palestine and Israel; Baldwin was no exception. The few times he spoke about the region reveal a thinker of significant prescience and a skilled rhetorician who doesnât allow audiences the luxury of comfort.
His most notable assessment of Zionism and Israel arose in context of a 1984 controversy surrounding then-Democratic presidential candidate Jesse Jackson, whose campaign represented a milestone in Black and progressive politics. Jackson used the epithet âHymietownâ to describe New York City in what he thought was an off-the-record conversation with a journalist. (âHymieâ is an anti-Jewish slur.) When the comment was reported, it erupted into scandal.
Baldwin, who claimed that âJesse is singled out for particular reasons,â discussed the controversy at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, featured in The Cross of Redemption, an anthology of uncollected talks, essays, and reviews (Baldwin was a stringent, at times unforgiving, reviewer). Because the Q&A is transcribed, we get to witness Baldwin speaking extemporaneously.
It is a remarkable document, in part because the audience doesnât seem to get what Baldwin is saying. Rather than dispensing platitudes about conflict and peace, he identifies Zionism as a concern of Western imperialism:
Whenever Israel is mentioned one is required, it appears sometimes to me, to maintain a kind of pious silence. Well, why? It is a state like other states. It has come into existence in a peculiar way. But it does not, does not, become a state because people who wrote the Balfour Declaration, or Winston Churchill, or for that matter anyone in Europe, or in the Western world, really cared what happened to the Jews. I wish I could say differently, but I would be lying if I didâit came into existence as a means of protecting Western interests at the gate of the Middle East.
Baldwin reinforces this point when somebody from the audience questions the validity of implying that Israel âwas set up to protect oil interests in that area.â Baldwin responds: âI said to protect the vital interests of the Western world, and I donât mean to be sardonic or cynical, but I would be lying to you and lying by my own experience if I said to you that the Europeansâthe English, the Dutch, the Germans, the Frenchâimpressed me as having any vivid concern for Jews.â He returns to the theme of Jewish people being either disposable or instrumentalized in traditions of Western capitalism.
For Baldwin, Zionism isnât an atavistic cultural or religious attribute, but the modern articulation of an age-old colonial logic. âIn order to be a Zionist,â he notes, âit is not necessary to love the Jews. I know some Zionists who are definitely anti-Semitic.â This point impugns some of Zionismâs basic premises: that Israel embodies Jewishness; that Israel is a necessary response to anti-Semitism; that Israel offers a utopian model of nationhood. Among other uses, the ideology shows how likely, even necessary, it is in imperialist cosmologies to uncouple humans who occupy a territory from the economic utility of nation-states that exist in their name.
What does it mean to be an anti-Semitic Zionist? (Baldwin is correct, by the way; evangelical Christian leaders, Western heads of state, and Gulf Arab billionaires all in some way fit the label.) It shows, to begin with, that Zionism cannot deliver on its claim to preserve the well-being of Jewish people around the -
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- world. It is first and foremost a state and as such will be oriented toward the interests of a domestic elite.
Moreover, the mere possibility of an anti-Semitic Zionist illustrates that the state isnât a pastoral sanctuary, but an entity implicated in the same violence it purports to mitigate. A rupture facilitates interplay between colonization and capitalism: confuse a people with the state, a formation devoted to inhuman pursuits, and the people will never live up to any kind of idealization; the state is incapable ofâand uninterested inâthe resolution of trauma.
Anti-Semitic Zionists are possible because Israel benefits a chauvinistic ruling class; members of that class give zero shits about the health of the stateâs inhabitants. In fact, given the conditions of violence and accumulation in the Imperium, itâs logical to dislike Jews and love Israel. The alt-right didnât select Israel as a model of statecraft at random.
Baldwin wasnât alone in this sort of analysis. For over a century, Palestinian thinkers, along with a plethora of decolonial voices, have similarly implicated ethnonationalism. Baldwin didnât need to specialize in the region or have personal history there to cultivate an incisive critique of Zionism. He appears to have a sensual understanding of its peculiar violence. And why not? He understood capitalism, colonization, and imperialism. He understood messianism and exceptionalism. He understood American racism.
A close follower of Baldwin may have anticipated his approach. Heâd expressed displeasure with Zionism and its reification of whiteness before the UMass event. His thoughts on Black-Jewish relations are too complicated for a single article (or for my range of comprehension), but, if theyâre possible to summarize, the following line does the trick: âOne does not wishâŚto be told by an American Jew that his suffering is as great as the American Negroâs suffering. It isnât, and one knows that it isnât from the very tone in which he assures you that it is.â
This line, revealing a man who is weary but unbowed, isnât meant to hierarchize suffering for the sake of racial credibility. In a 1979 Nation article, Baldwin locates whiteness not in physiognomy or genetics, but in social relations: âThe Jew, in America, is a white man. He has to be, since I am a black man, and, as he supposes, his only protection against the fate which drove him to America.â
Baldwin views Jewish aspirations to whiteness as a foolish conciliation to inherently hostile forces: âBut the state of Israel was not created for the salvation of the Jews; it was created for the salvation of the Western interests. This is what is becoming clear (I must say that it was always clear to me). The Palestinians have been paying for the British colonial policy of âdivide and ruleâ and for Europeâs guilty Christian conscience for more than thirty years.â (Note that Baldwin dates injustice to 1948, not to 1967.)
The reference to Palestinians is important. Baldwin, who describes himself as âpro-Arab,â refuses to omit them from the conversation, which means he refuses to render what is stupidly called âthe conflictâ an inherently Jewish concern (something anti-Zionists are apt to do, if only unwittingly). He underscores the point:
there is absolutelyârepeat: absolutelyâno hope of establishing peace in what Europe so arrogantly calls the Middle East (how in the world would Europe know? having so dismally failed to find a passage to India) without dealing with the Palestinians. The collapse of the Shah of Iran not only revealed the depth of the pious Carterâs concern for âhuman rights,â it also revealed who supplied oil to Israel, and to whom Israel supplied arms. It happened to be, to spell it out, white South Africa.
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Moreover, the mere possibility of an anti-Semitic Zionist illustrates that the state isnât a pastoral sanctuary, but an entity implicated in the same violence it purports to mitigate. A rupture facilitates interplay between colonization and capitalism: confuse a people with the state, a formation devoted to inhuman pursuits, and the people will never live up to any kind of idealization; the state is incapable ofâand uninterested inâthe resolution of trauma.
Anti-Semitic Zionists are possible because Israel benefits a chauvinistic ruling class; members of that class give zero shits about the health of the stateâs inhabitants. In fact, given the conditions of violence and accumulation in the Imperium, itâs logical to dislike Jews and love Israel. The alt-right didnât select Israel as a model of statecraft at random.
Baldwin wasnât alone in this sort of analysis. For over a century, Palestinian thinkers, along with a plethora of decolonial voices, have similarly implicated ethnonationalism. Baldwin didnât need to specialize in the region or have personal history there to cultivate an incisive critique of Zionism. He appears to have a sensual understanding of its peculiar violence. And why not? He understood capitalism, colonization, and imperialism. He understood messianism and exceptionalism. He understood American racism.
A close follower of Baldwin may have anticipated his approach. Heâd expressed displeasure with Zionism and its reification of whiteness before the UMass event. His thoughts on Black-Jewish relations are too complicated for a single article (or for my range of comprehension), but, if theyâre possible to summarize, the following line does the trick: âOne does not wishâŚto be told by an American Jew that his suffering is as great as the American Negroâs suffering. It isnât, and one knows that it isnât from the very tone in which he assures you that it is.â
This line, revealing a man who is weary but unbowed, isnât meant to hierarchize suffering for the sake of racial credibility. In a 1979 Nation article, Baldwin locates whiteness not in physiognomy or genetics, but in social relations: âThe Jew, in America, is a white man. He has to be, since I am a black man, and, as he supposes, his only protection against the fate which drove him to America.â
Baldwin views Jewish aspirations to whiteness as a foolish conciliation to inherently hostile forces: âBut the state of Israel was not created for the salvation of the Jews; it was created for the salvation of the Western interests. This is what is becoming clear (I must say that it was always clear to me). The Palestinians have been paying for the British colonial policy of âdivide and ruleâ and for Europeâs guilty Christian conscience for more than thirty years.â (Note that Baldwin dates injustice to 1948, not to 1967.)
The reference to Palestinians is important. Baldwin, who describes himself as âpro-Arab,â refuses to omit them from the conversation, which means he refuses to render what is stupidly called âthe conflictâ an inherently Jewish concern (something anti-Zionists are apt to do, if only unwittingly). He underscores the point:
there is absolutelyârepeat: absolutelyâno hope of establishing peace in what Europe so arrogantly calls the Middle East (how in the world would Europe know? having so dismally failed to find a passage to India) without dealing with the Palestinians. The collapse of the Shah of Iran not only revealed the depth of the pious Carterâs concern for âhuman rights,â it also revealed who supplied oil to Israel, and to whom Israel supplied arms. It happened to be, to spell it out, white South Africa.
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Here Baldwin reduces a baroque analysis to its essentials. Zionism facilitates global structures of white supremacy and so cultural or religious investment in the ideology hinders an ethical politics. Of course Israel sided with white South Africa. Of course Israel expedites US and European machinations in the so-called Middle East. Thatâs why it was created. Destroying Palestine was a prelude to reactionary alliances.
Last week, Facebook revealed that an Israeli consulting firm has meddled in elections throughout the Global South, what a company spokesman called âa staggering diversity of regions.â Baldwin wouldnât have been surprised and neither should anybody else. Israel, after all, is a longtime interloper in US elections. In a world bifurcated according to geographies of wealth and deprivation, Israel serves the transnational class of war partisans, mercenary firms, and arms merchants.
Baldwin recognized what too many luminaries in the Western left ignore: Israel isnât a reconstructed product of its surroundings or a benign ideal unmoored from some noble origin; it is a portal to limitless imposition of discipline onto an expendable, alien world.
âBut the state of Israel was not created for the salvation of the Jews; it was created for the salvation of the Western interests. This is what is becoming clear (I must say that it was always clear to me)." ~ James Baldwin
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Last week, Facebook revealed that an Israeli consulting firm has meddled in elections throughout the Global South, what a company spokesman called âa staggering diversity of regions.â Baldwin wouldnât have been surprised and neither should anybody else. Israel, after all, is a longtime interloper in US elections. In a world bifurcated according to geographies of wealth and deprivation, Israel serves the transnational class of war partisans, mercenary firms, and arms merchants.
Baldwin recognized what too many luminaries in the Western left ignore: Israel isnât a reconstructed product of its surroundings or a benign ideal unmoored from some noble origin; it is a portal to limitless imposition of discipline onto an expendable, alien world.
âBut the state of Israel was not created for the salvation of the Jews; it was created for the salvation of the Western interests. This is what is becoming clear (I must say that it was always clear to me)." ~ James Baldwin
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lsraeli occupation forces detain more than 3100 Palestinians since the start of 2023.
1. Between 1950s-1960s, Libya was among the poorest countries in the whole wide world. However since 1969 when Gaddafi became Libyan leader, he made Libya Africa's richest country with over $150 billion in foreign reserves with zero debt/budget deficit.
2. During Muammar Gaddafi's reign as Libyan leader, Libya had the strongest and most valuable currency in Africa. Libyan Dinar was also one of the strongest currencies in the world.
3. 1 Libyan Dinar = $0.82781 as at 2011 before d western bloc orchestrated an anti-government protest in Libya, hijacked the protest with thousands of well trained & armed ISIS & Al-Qaeda terrorists whom they used as mercenaries to toppled Gaddafi's Socialist Jamahiriya govt.
4. Gaddafi proposed d idea behind Libyan strong currency to AU, he wanted African countries to work 2gda to create an African currency backed by African gold in order to strengthen our economy & to alleviate some struggling African countries from economic deterioration & poverty.
5. Libya had over 140 Tonnes of Gold and similar amounts in silver which could have been used to initiate the proposed African currency all the gold have disappeared today and Libyan foreign reserves has diminished to an unprecedented level.
2. During Muammar Gaddafi's reign as Libyan leader, Libya had the strongest and most valuable currency in Africa. Libyan Dinar was also one of the strongest currencies in the world.
3. 1 Libyan Dinar = $0.82781 as at 2011 before d western bloc orchestrated an anti-government protest in Libya, hijacked the protest with thousands of well trained & armed ISIS & Al-Qaeda terrorists whom they used as mercenaries to toppled Gaddafi's Socialist Jamahiriya govt.
4. Gaddafi proposed d idea behind Libyan strong currency to AU, he wanted African countries to work 2gda to create an African currency backed by African gold in order to strengthen our economy & to alleviate some struggling African countries from economic deterioration & poverty.
5. Libya had over 140 Tonnes of Gold and similar amounts in silver which could have been used to initiate the proposed African currency all the gold have disappeared today and Libyan foreign reserves has diminished to an unprecedented level.
International Humanitarian Law
What is it?
International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It lays out the responsibilities of states and non-state armed groups during an armed conflict.
It requires, among other things:
the rapid and unimpeded passage for humanitarian aid during armed conflicts
the freedom of movement for humanitarian workers in conflict areas
the protection of civilians (including medical and humanitarian workers)
the protection of refugees, prisoners, and the wounded and sick.
Why is this important?
The rules are designed to protect civilians and humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts in any part of the world. Without them, there would be no international standards at all for this.
IHL is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on protecting civilians in conflict and the 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols.
While many parts of IHL are now accepted as international customary law (i.e., general practice, accepted as law and which is independent of treaty law), increasingly it is violated by warring parties.
Buildings belonging to relief organisations are attacked, vehicles and convoys hijacked, and staff murdered or kidnapped. Such violence affects civilians and prevents millions of people from receiving life-saving assistance.
These violations continue to be among the most critical challenges for IHL.
How are we helping?
As most humanitarian action takes place in areas of armed conflicts, violations of IHL greatly hinder the EU's ability to fulfil its humanitarian aid objectives of meeting the needs of those affected, and also endanger the security of EU humanitarian partners.
Therefore, as one of the worldâs largest humanitarian donors, the EU has always been firmly committed to promoting compliance with IHL.
All EU countries have ratified the 4 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The EU also is the only regional organisation to adopt (in 2005; updated in 2009) guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL.
In March 2021, the Commission adopted a Communication on the EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles. It stresses how important it is for the EU to continue to put the promotion and application of IHL consistently at the heart of its external action.
In 2009, the EU issued guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL. In 2018, it published an initial report on how they were being implemented, highlighting the wide-ranging measures the EU carries out in support of IHL. Every year since then, the EU has continued to publish such reports.
The European Commission, through its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO), promotes the global compliance with IHL and humanitarian principles in general.
Examples of activities which the European Commission supports are:
advocacy in support of IHL through multilateral forums, dedicated public events (e.g., European Humanitarian Forum), and dialogue with other donors and partner organisations.
advocacy for compliance with IHL in specific armed conflicts
thematic advocacy linked to IHL (e.g. children and armed conflict, protecting education facilities from attack, protecting humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts, protecting civilian infrastructure)
funding partners to disseminate IHL knowledge and advocacy in conflict-affected countries (e.g., Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Ukraine)
funding activities aimed at increasing the capacities of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL.
in 2022, the EU launched a 3-year pilot programmatic partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross on preventing IHL violations.
What is it?
International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It lays out the responsibilities of states and non-state armed groups during an armed conflict.
It requires, among other things:
the rapid and unimpeded passage for humanitarian aid during armed conflicts
the freedom of movement for humanitarian workers in conflict areas
the protection of civilians (including medical and humanitarian workers)
the protection of refugees, prisoners, and the wounded and sick.
Why is this important?
The rules are designed to protect civilians and humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts in any part of the world. Without them, there would be no international standards at all for this.
IHL is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on protecting civilians in conflict and the 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols.
While many parts of IHL are now accepted as international customary law (i.e., general practice, accepted as law and which is independent of treaty law), increasingly it is violated by warring parties.
Buildings belonging to relief organisations are attacked, vehicles and convoys hijacked, and staff murdered or kidnapped. Such violence affects civilians and prevents millions of people from receiving life-saving assistance.
These violations continue to be among the most critical challenges for IHL.
How are we helping?
As most humanitarian action takes place in areas of armed conflicts, violations of IHL greatly hinder the EU's ability to fulfil its humanitarian aid objectives of meeting the needs of those affected, and also endanger the security of EU humanitarian partners.
Therefore, as one of the worldâs largest humanitarian donors, the EU has always been firmly committed to promoting compliance with IHL.
All EU countries have ratified the 4 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The EU also is the only regional organisation to adopt (in 2005; updated in 2009) guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL.
In March 2021, the Commission adopted a Communication on the EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles. It stresses how important it is for the EU to continue to put the promotion and application of IHL consistently at the heart of its external action.
In 2009, the EU issued guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL. In 2018, it published an initial report on how they were being implemented, highlighting the wide-ranging measures the EU carries out in support of IHL. Every year since then, the EU has continued to publish such reports.
The European Commission, through its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO), promotes the global compliance with IHL and humanitarian principles in general.
Examples of activities which the European Commission supports are:
advocacy in support of IHL through multilateral forums, dedicated public events (e.g., European Humanitarian Forum), and dialogue with other donors and partner organisations.
advocacy for compliance with IHL in specific armed conflicts
thematic advocacy linked to IHL (e.g. children and armed conflict, protecting education facilities from attack, protecting humanitarian and medical workers during armed conflicts, protecting civilian infrastructure)
funding partners to disseminate IHL knowledge and advocacy in conflict-affected countries (e.g., Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Ukraine)
funding activities aimed at increasing the capacities of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL.
in 2022, the EU launched a 3-year pilot programmatic partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross on preventing IHL violations.
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War & Law
International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.
Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
On 16 June 2020, the ICRC hosted a webinar to launch the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Conventions. An expert panel discussed the Commentaryâs main findings on key humanitarian issues related to the treatment of prisoners of war.
Search Subscribe to newsletter
Updated Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Launch of the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention from ICRC on Vimeo.
Updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, the ICRC commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. The updated Commentaries on the First and Second Conventions were published in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention related to the treatment of prisoners of war is now available. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project, explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last seven decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different from those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that this new Commentary clarifies?
The Commentary sheds light on many issues, and in particular on the obligations Parties have vis-Ă -vis prisoners of war. The Third Geneva Convention covers a broad array of considerations relating to a prisonerâs life from the time of capture to their final release and repatriation. Many of the key issues clarified by the updated Commentary concern the changes that have taken place in this connection. For instance, today, medical ethics and data-protection standards are far more developed than in 1949. This raises questions regarding the application of provisions that require medical data to be disclosed, and also about how data should be handled and protected in our digitalized world. Such questions would also extend to the appropriate use by Detaining Powers of electronic means to identify prisoners of war â including biometrics â or of new technologies to conduct surveillance.
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International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.
Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
On 16 June 2020, the ICRC hosted a webinar to launch the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Conventions. An expert panel discussed the Commentaryâs main findings on key humanitarian issues related to the treatment of prisoners of war.
Search Subscribe to newsletter
Updated Commentary brings fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Launch of the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention from ICRC on Vimeo.
Updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, the ICRC commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. The updated Commentaries on the First and Second Conventions were published in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention related to the treatment of prisoners of war is now available. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project, explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last seven decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different from those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that this new Commentary clarifies?
The Commentary sheds light on many issues, and in particular on the obligations Parties have vis-Ă -vis prisoners of war. The Third Geneva Convention covers a broad array of considerations relating to a prisonerâs life from the time of capture to their final release and repatriation. Many of the key issues clarified by the updated Commentary concern the changes that have taken place in this connection. For instance, today, medical ethics and data-protection standards are far more developed than in 1949. This raises questions regarding the application of provisions that require medical data to be disclosed, and also about how data should be handled and protected in our digitalized world. Such questions would also extend to the appropriate use by Detaining Powers of electronic means to identify prisoners of war â including biometrics â or of new technologies to conduct surveillance.
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The updated Commentary also covers the changes that have taken place in understanding of peopleâs needs. For example, the Convention covers such matters as disability and mental health, but the terminology used had become obsolete, and an updated interpretation was needed. The Convention has a provision pertaining specifically to respect for women, and the interpretation in this regard had to be updated as well.
Thus, this Commentary reflects the changes in practice and other areas that have taken place since the middle of the 20th century.
The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use this Commentary?
The Commentary is an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers, lawyers and those engaging with detention in armed conflicts. It will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. It will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. There is a strong need for the law to be known and understood by all, and we are confident that the updated Commentary will become an important tool in this regard.
How is this Commentary relevant in view of the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts today?
Security detention is a common practice in all armed conflicts. While the phenomenon of prisoners of war, regulated by the Third Geneva Convention, is pertinent to international armed conflicts, it is important to remember that this Convention was the first treaty to formulate standards of treatment in internment. The Convention develops in detail key principles, such as respect for the life and dignity of the individual, which remain relevant for non-international armed conflicts.
Common Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on non-international armed conflicts, and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
Does the new Commentary take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to protect persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the updated Commentary take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the Commentary.
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Thus, this Commentary reflects the changes in practice and other areas that have taken place since the middle of the 20th century.
The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use this Commentary?
The Commentary is an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers, lawyers and those engaging with detention in armed conflicts. It will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. It will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. There is a strong need for the law to be known and understood by all, and we are confident that the updated Commentary will become an important tool in this regard.
How is this Commentary relevant in view of the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts today?
Security detention is a common practice in all armed conflicts. While the phenomenon of prisoners of war, regulated by the Third Geneva Convention, is pertinent to international armed conflicts, it is important to remember that this Convention was the first treaty to formulate standards of treatment in internment. The Convention develops in detail key principles, such as respect for the life and dignity of the individual, which remain relevant for non-international armed conflicts.
Common Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on non-international armed conflicts, and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
Does the new Commentary take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to protect persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the updated Commentary take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the Commentary.
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Commentaries bring fresh insights on continued relevance of Geneva Conventions
What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, we have commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last six decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different to those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that the Commentaries clarify?
The Commentaries shed light on many issues, from how the various rules of international humanitarian law apply in the complex conflicts of today, to the obligation Parties have vis-Ă -vis the wounded and sick. For example, the First Geneva Convention requires the wounded and sick to be protected and respected. But what does that mean in practice? What standard of medical care is required for the treatment of the wounded and sick? How can the wounded and sick be collected and cared for when there are no troops on the ground? The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the First Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use the Commentaries?
The Commentaries are an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers and lawyers to be able to ensure protection of victims during armed conflict. They will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. But they will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. We know that the 1950s Commentaries have been useful for them. So we are confident that the updated Commentaries will become an equally important tool, as they provide more nuanced insights and references.
How do the Commentaries reflect the prevalence of today's non-international armed conflicts?
As the majority of conflicts today are of a non-international character, the regulation of these conflicts has become a crucial issue. Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on these conflicts and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
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What is acceptable and what is prohibited in armed conflict? The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 form the foundation of international humanitarian law and provide a framework setting out the answers to that question.
Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention
In the 1950s, the ICRC published a set of commentaries on these Conventions, giving practical guidance on their implementation. But to reflect the developments in law and practice since then, we have commissioned a new set of commentaries which seek to reflect the current interpretations of the Conventions. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, who heads the commentaries project explains more below.
What's the main aim of the updated Commentaries?
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today's armed conflicts. We see this as an important contribution to reaffirming the continued relevance of the Conventions, generating respect for them and strengthening protection for victims caught up in armed conflict. The experience gained in applying and interpreting the Conventions over the last six decades has generated a detailed understanding of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very different to those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second World War.
Can you give an example of issues that the Commentaries clarify?
The Commentaries shed light on many issues, from how the various rules of international humanitarian law apply in the complex conflicts of today, to the obligation Parties have vis-Ă -vis the wounded and sick. For example, the First Geneva Convention requires the wounded and sick to be protected and respected. But what does that mean in practice? What standard of medical care is required for the treatment of the wounded and sick? How can the wounded and sick be collected and cared for when there are no troops on the ground? The answers to these and other questions have both legal and operational dimensions which the Commentary on the First Convention addresses.
Who do you anticipate will use the Commentaries?
The Commentaries are an essential tool for practitioners like military commanders, officers and lawyers to be able to ensure protection of victims during armed conflict. They will be used to train members of the armed forces, prepare instructions for armed forces and ensure that military orders comply with the law. But they will also be useful for judges who have to apply humanitarian law, including in criminal courts and tribunals where those accused of violating the law may be prosecuted. Other users include lawyers in government, international organizations, the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as academics. We know that the 1950s Commentaries have been useful for them. So we are confident that the updated Commentaries will become an equally important tool, as they provide more nuanced insights and references.
How do the Commentaries reflect the prevalence of today's non-international armed conflicts?
As the majority of conflicts today are of a non-international character, the regulation of these conflicts has become a crucial issue. Article 3 is a central provision of the Conventions on these conflicts and the new Commentary provides a comprehensive interpretation of all the aspects of this "mini Convention". These include its scope of application, the requirement of humane treatment, the care for the wounded and sick, humanitarian activities, and criminal aspects and compliance.
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But it also deals with pressing topics such as sexual violence and non-refoulement, which is the prohibition of sending people back to countries where their lives could be in danger.
What other developments do the Commentaries take into account?
A good example is the way the protection of women is addressed. The reference in the original Commentary to women as "weaker than oneself and whose honour and modesty call for respect" would no longer be considered appropriate. Of course, the original Commentaries were a product of the social and historical context of the time. Today, however, there is a deeper understanding that women, men, girls and boys have specific needs and capacities linked to the different ways armed conflict may affect them. The new Commentary reflects the social and international legal developments in relation to equality of the sexes.
Do the new Commentaries take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to provide protection to persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the new Commentaries take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the new Commentaries.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
The Geneva Conventions â one of humanity's most important accomplishments of the last century - are turning 70 on 12 August 2019. It's a moment to celebrate all the lives the conventions have helped save, note the further work that needs to be done and to remind the world of the importance of protecting people from the worst of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war. The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as "grave breaches". Those responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, whatever nationality they may hold.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The First Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.
This Convention represents the fourth updated version of the Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick following those adopted in 1864, 1906 and 1929. It contains 64 articles. These provide protection for the wounded and sick, but also for medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports. The Convention also recognizes the distinctive emblems. It has two annexes containing a draft agreement relating to hospital zones and a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Second Geneva Convention protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.
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What other developments do the Commentaries take into account?
A good example is the way the protection of women is addressed. The reference in the original Commentary to women as "weaker than oneself and whose honour and modesty call for respect" would no longer be considered appropriate. Of course, the original Commentaries were a product of the social and historical context of the time. Today, however, there is a deeper understanding that women, men, girls and boys have specific needs and capacities linked to the different ways armed conflict may affect them. The new Commentary reflects the social and international legal developments in relation to equality of the sexes.
Do the new Commentaries take into account other areas of international law?
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted, many areas of international law were still in their infancy, such as human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law, but they have grown significantly in the meantime. These areas of law are complementary to humanitarian law as they all seek to provide protection to persons in need of it. Humanitarian law is not a self-contained body of law; there is a lot of communication with other areas of international law. Therefore, current interpretations offered in the new Commentaries take these developments in other areas into account whenever they are relevant for the interpretation of a Convention rule. There are also developments in other, more technical areas such as the law of treaties or the law on State responsibility which are also reflected in the new Commentaries.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
The Geneva Conventions â one of humanity's most important accomplishments of the last century - are turning 70 on 12 August 2019. It's a moment to celebrate all the lives the conventions have helped save, note the further work that needs to be done and to remind the world of the importance of protecting people from the worst of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war. The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as "grave breaches". Those responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, whatever nationality they may hold.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The First Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.
This Convention represents the fourth updated version of the Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick following those adopted in 1864, 1906 and 1929. It contains 64 articles. These provide protection for the wounded and sick, but also for medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports. The Convention also recognizes the distinctive emblems. It has two annexes containing a draft agreement relating to hospital zones and a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Second Geneva Convention protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.
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This Convention replaced Hague Convention of 1907 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention. It closely follows the provisions of the first Geneva Convention in structure and content. It has 63 articles specifically applicable to war at sea. For example, it protects hospital ships. It has one annex containing a model identity card for medical and religious personnel.
The Third Geneva Convention applies to prisoners of war.
This Convention replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. It contains 143 articles whereas the 1929 Convention had only 97. The categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status were broadened in accordance with Conventions I and II. The conditions and places of captivity were more precisely defined, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and the judicial proceedings instituted against them. The Convention establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The Convention has five annexes containing various model regulations and identity and other cards.
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.
The Geneva Conventions, which were adopted before 1949. were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II showed the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Convention adopted in 1949 takes account of the experiences of World War II. It is composed of 159 articles. It contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war, without addressing the conduct of hostilities, as such, which was later examined in the Additional Protocols of 1977. The bulk of the Convention deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. It spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-Ă -vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for populations in occupied territory. It also contains a specific regime for the treatment of civilian internees. It has three annexes containing a model agreement on hospital and safety zones, model regulations on humanitarian relief and model cards.
Common Article 3
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, marked a breakthrough, as it covered, for the first time, situations of non-international armed conflicts. These types of conflicts vary greatly. They include traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside the government. Common Article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted. It is like a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an international character:
It requires humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse distinction. It specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, the taking of hostages and unfair trial.
It requires that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be collected and cared for.
It grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
It calls on the parties to the conflict to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into force through so-called special agreements.
It recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Given that most armed conflicts today are non-international, applying Common Article 3 is of the utmost importance. Its full respect is required.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
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The Third Geneva Convention applies to prisoners of war.
This Convention replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. It contains 143 articles whereas the 1929 Convention had only 97. The categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status were broadened in accordance with Conventions I and II. The conditions and places of captivity were more precisely defined, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and the judicial proceedings instituted against them. The Convention establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The Convention has five annexes containing various model regulations and identity and other cards.
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.
The Geneva Conventions, which were adopted before 1949. were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II showed the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Convention adopted in 1949 takes account of the experiences of World War II. It is composed of 159 articles. It contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war, without addressing the conduct of hostilities, as such, which was later examined in the Additional Protocols of 1977. The bulk of the Convention deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. It spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-Ă -vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for populations in occupied territory. It also contains a specific regime for the treatment of civilian internees. It has three annexes containing a model agreement on hospital and safety zones, model regulations on humanitarian relief and model cards.
Common Article 3
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, marked a breakthrough, as it covered, for the first time, situations of non-international armed conflicts. These types of conflicts vary greatly. They include traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside the government. Common Article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted. It is like a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an international character:
It requires humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse distinction. It specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, the taking of hostages and unfair trial.
It requires that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be collected and cared for.
It grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
It calls on the parties to the conflict to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into force through so-called special agreements.
It recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Given that most armed conflicts today are non-international, applying Common Article 3 is of the utmost importance. Its full respect is required.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
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In the two decades that followed the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the world witnessed an increase in the number of non-international armed conflicts and wars of national liberation. In response, two Protocols Additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1977. They strengthen the protection of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflicts and place limits on the way wars are fought. Protocol II was the first-ever international treaty devoted exclusively to situations of non-international armed conflicts.
In 2005, a third Additional Protocol was adopted creating an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.
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In 2005, a third Additional Protocol was adopted creating an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.
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Many Uyghurs said the reasons they were given for their detention were not tied to specific acts; rather, they were informed that they were detained because they were classified as âsuspiciousâ or âuntrustworthyâ or as a âterroristâ or an âextremistâ. #FreeUyghurs
China looks into technology to identify Uyghurs âlikelyâ to become âterroristsâ. The law gave the authorities access to communication, travel, and work history; social media profiles; internet search history; financial information; and family connections. #FreeUyghurs
Anyone in Xinjiang who speaks out about the internment camps, is perceived to have spoken, is accused of, or is affiliated with anyone who has, risks detention, arrest, imprisonment, torture, & disappearance, not only for themselves but also for their family members. #FreeUyghurs
China looks into technology to identify Uyghurs âlikelyâ to become âterroristsâ. The law gave the authorities access to communication, travel, and work history; social media profiles; internet search history; financial information; and family connections. #FreeUyghurs
Anyone in Xinjiang who speaks out about the internment camps, is perceived to have spoken, is accused of, or is affiliated with anyone who has, risks detention, arrest, imprisonment, torture, & disappearance, not only for themselves but also for their family members. #FreeUyghurs
Anonymous Sudan hackers group claims to have targeted and attacked Snapp, a ride-hailing application in Iran.
#Iran
#AnonymousSudan #cti #ddos
#Iran
#AnonymousSudan #cti #ddos
Countries where more Turkish citizens voted for Erdogan:
The bulk of Erdoganâs international votes came from citizens living in large diaspora countries in Europe, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, as well as across the Middle East and North Africa.
In Germany, which hosts 1.5 million eligible voters, Erdogan won some 67 percent of the vote.
At 95 percent, Turkish voters in Lebanon represented the highest percentage of Erdogan votes, followed by Jordan (90 percent) and Egypt (78 percent).
More Turks living in the following countries below favoured Erdogan:
Lebanon (95.28%), Jordan (90.37%), Egypt (78.59%), Belgium (74.91%), Pakistan (73.91%), Austria (73.88%), Kyrgyzstan (71.34%), Netherlands (70.45%), Saudi Arabia (69.3%), Germany (67.36%), France (66.57%), Libya (66.28%), Kuwait (64.61%), Qatar (61.71%), Luxembourg (60.64%), Denmark (60.47%), Algeria (58.96%), Morocco (58.58%), Iraq (58.42%), Uzbekistan (57.55%), Malaysia (57.11%), Iran (55.1%), Norway (54.23%), Azerbaijan (53.59%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51.24%) and Tanzania (50.45%).
The bulk of Erdoganâs international votes came from citizens living in large diaspora countries in Europe, including Germany, France and the Netherlands, as well as across the Middle East and North Africa.
In Germany, which hosts 1.5 million eligible voters, Erdogan won some 67 percent of the vote.
At 95 percent, Turkish voters in Lebanon represented the highest percentage of Erdogan votes, followed by Jordan (90 percent) and Egypt (78 percent).
More Turks living in the following countries below favoured Erdogan:
Lebanon (95.28%), Jordan (90.37%), Egypt (78.59%), Belgium (74.91%), Pakistan (73.91%), Austria (73.88%), Kyrgyzstan (71.34%), Netherlands (70.45%), Saudi Arabia (69.3%), Germany (67.36%), France (66.57%), Libya (66.28%), Kuwait (64.61%), Qatar (61.71%), Luxembourg (60.64%), Denmark (60.47%), Algeria (58.96%), Morocco (58.58%), Iraq (58.42%), Uzbekistan (57.55%), Malaysia (57.11%), Iran (55.1%), Norway (54.23%), Azerbaijan (53.59%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51.24%) and Tanzania (50.45%).
Countries where more Turkish citizens voted for Kilicdaroglu:
Kilicdaroglu dominated in many parts of Europe and North America where he secured more than 80 percent of the vote in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom as well as many parts of Southern and Eastern Europe.
The majority of Turks living in the following countries below favoured Kilicdaroglu:
Portugal (94.65%), Estonia (94.17%), Ireland (91.2%), Poland (90.02%), Czech Republic (89.28%), Lithuania (89.07%), Singapore (88.75%), New Zealand (86.01%), Montenegro (84.63%), US (82.57%), Greece (81.55%), Thailand (81.52%), Canada (80.86%), UK (80.38%), Hungary (76.94%), Malta (76.9%), Brazil (74.59%), Belarus (74.43%), Italy (74.13%), Israel (74.07%), South Africa (73.05%), Bulgaria (72.47%), China (71.99%), Bahrain (71.5%), Spain (71.1%), Finland (70.55%), Georgia (66.67%), Albania (65.71%), Oman (65.56%), United Arab Emirates (64.72%), Japan (63.48%), Romania (59.67%), Nigeria (59.6%), Serbia (59.19%), Ukraine (58.33%), Cyprus (58.15%), Switzerland (57.18%), Moldova (57.14%), Kosovo (56.9%), Australia (56.29%), Russia (54.81%), North Macedonia (54.62%), Sweden (53.08%), Turkmenistan (52.24%) and Kazakhstan (52.18%).
Kilicdaroglu dominated in many parts of Europe and North America where he secured more than 80 percent of the vote in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom as well as many parts of Southern and Eastern Europe.
The majority of Turks living in the following countries below favoured Kilicdaroglu:
Portugal (94.65%), Estonia (94.17%), Ireland (91.2%), Poland (90.02%), Czech Republic (89.28%), Lithuania (89.07%), Singapore (88.75%), New Zealand (86.01%), Montenegro (84.63%), US (82.57%), Greece (81.55%), Thailand (81.52%), Canada (80.86%), UK (80.38%), Hungary (76.94%), Malta (76.9%), Brazil (74.59%), Belarus (74.43%), Italy (74.13%), Israel (74.07%), South Africa (73.05%), Bulgaria (72.47%), China (71.99%), Bahrain (71.5%), Spain (71.1%), Finland (70.55%), Georgia (66.67%), Albania (65.71%), Oman (65.56%), United Arab Emirates (64.72%), Japan (63.48%), Romania (59.67%), Nigeria (59.6%), Serbia (59.19%), Ukraine (58.33%), Cyprus (58.15%), Switzerland (57.18%), Moldova (57.14%), Kosovo (56.9%), Australia (56.29%), Russia (54.81%), North Macedonia (54.62%), Sweden (53.08%), Turkmenistan (52.24%) and Kazakhstan (52.18%).