Весьма интересная статья про момент в котором мы все сейчас живём, очень жаль что за пэйволлом
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/derisking-china-reliant-supply-chains-is-creating-new-risks-b5f26440
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/derisking-china-reliant-supply-chains-is-creating-new-risks-b5f26440
WSJ
‘Derisking’ China-Reliant Supply Chains Is Creating New Risks
The U.S. and Chinese economies appear to be growing apart. The real story is more complicated, and worrying.
Lunatic Asylum
Фазан https://www.wing.com.ua/content/view/23800/52/
Недурно.
Надо замутить нейровидео где оно валит лучём в сторону противника
Надо замутить нейровидео где оно валит лучём в сторону противника
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Lunatic Asylum
Весьма интересная статья про момент в котором мы все сейчас живём, очень жаль что за пэйволлом https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/derisking-china-reliant-supply-chains-is-creating-new-risks-b5f26440
Studies from the Federal Reserve, the Peterson Institute for International Economics and elsewhere have shown that Trump-era tariffs probably reduced overall U.S. manufacturing employment and output by raising the cost of imports for downstream industries.
Second, it means that in the next crisis, applying economic pressure on China might be more complicated. Direct sanctions or import bans targeting China in a crisis over Taiwan or the South China Sea would be difficult enough: Would Washington target Vietnamese and Mexican imports too? Would EU member states ban imports from Hungary, where Chinese battery makers are investing heavily?
By forcing supply chains to superficially rearrange now, Western democracies may have squandered a portion of their real, or perceived, leverage. And politicians, incorrectly assuming that they have sufficiently insulated their economies, may miscalculate and stumble into an actual hot conflict.
One way to encourage the emergence of a truly denser, more resilient network outside China—and one featuring real competition rather than firms finding ways to game new trade barriers—could be to join trade deals excluding China and led by close allies like Japan. But the toxic politics of trade in the U.S. mean that many politicians will probably remain focused on creating the appearance of derisking, rather than doing what is necessary to make it a reality.
Second, it means that in the next crisis, applying economic pressure on China might be more complicated. Direct sanctions or import bans targeting China in a crisis over Taiwan or the South China Sea would be difficult enough: Would Washington target Vietnamese and Mexican imports too? Would EU member states ban imports from Hungary, where Chinese battery makers are investing heavily?
By forcing supply chains to superficially rearrange now, Western democracies may have squandered a portion of their real, or perceived, leverage. And politicians, incorrectly assuming that they have sufficiently insulated their economies, may miscalculate and stumble into an actual hot conflict.
One way to encourage the emergence of a truly denser, more resilient network outside China—and one featuring real competition rather than firms finding ways to game new trade barriers—could be to join trade deals excluding China and led by close allies like Japan. But the toxic politics of trade in the U.S. mean that many politicians will probably remain focused on creating the appearance of derisking, rather than doing what is necessary to make it a reality.
WSJ
China’s Yuan Is Quietly Gaining Ground
The Chinese currency’s use abroad has risen sharply. That could complicate the impact of any future Western sanctions.
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