an issue found by zellic in the Cairo VM during a recent audit of Starknet OS.
This bug has been fixed as an immediate patch to Starknet's current version 0.13.3.
https://community.starknet.io/t/remediating-a-potential-sequencer-prover-inconsistency-in-the-cairo-vm/115313
@EthSecurity1
This bug has been fixed as an immediate patch to Starknet's current version 0.13.3.
https://community.starknet.io/t/remediating-a-potential-sequencer-prover-inconsistency-in-the-cairo-vm/115313
@EthSecurity1
Starknet Community Forum
Remediating a potential sequencer-prover inconsistency in the Cairo VM
This post presents the disclosure process of a subtle issue in the Cairo VM which was discovered during the Starknet OS audit. The transaction execution in SN is done in 2 phases: Sequencing and proving. During a Starknet OS audit done by @fcremo from @Zellic_io…
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Forwarded from Vladimir S. | Officer's Channel (Vladimir S. | officercia)
SlowMist founder: we discovered that the hacker who attacked zkLend has a close connection to the hacker who attacked EraLend in July 2023, and we suspect they are the same person: x.com/officer_cia/status/1890132436589445291?12
#security #privacy #investigation
#security #privacy #investigation
X (formerly Twitter)
Vladimir S. | Officer's Notes (@officer_secret) on X
. @SlowMist_Team founder @evilcos : we discovered that the hacker who attacked @zkLend has a close connection to the hacker who attacked @Era_Lend in July 2023, and we suspect they are the same person.
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Urgent Update for Geth Users!
Attention validators! If you are running Geth v1.15.1, upgrade to v1.15.2 immediately to prevent potential financial loss! @EthSecurity1
Attention validators! If you are running Geth v1.15.1, upgrade to v1.15.2 immediately to prevent potential financial loss! @EthSecurity1
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If you are running LND older than 0.18.5 and/or LITD older than 0.14.1, upgrade immediately. Apparently, affected Lightning nodes can be completely drained by attackers. #Bitcoin @EthSecurity1
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the Lazarus hackers first found the targeted employees through social engineering, added private GitHub repository access to the victims or victimized employees through live chat tools, and tricked the users into running the code that contained the backdoor.
🧵
https://x.com/im23pds/status/1892767073605931065?s=61
High level Attack flow
https://x.com/dhkleung/status/1893073663391604753?s=61
@EthSecurity1
🧵
https://x.com/im23pds/status/1892767073605931065?s=61
High level Attack flow
https://x.com/dhkleung/status/1893073663391604753?s=61
@EthSecurity1
X (formerly Twitter)
23pds (山哥) (@im23pds) on X
🧐Lazarus Hacker, i know you can see my X posting, I've caught you on the trail and we'll be posting a related tracking article disclosing the details of this attack. @SlowMist_Team @evilcos
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Infini defi hacked for $50 million. all dai stolen change into ether and spread in accounts @EthSecurity1
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Hegic finance hacked for 0.8275 wBTC. root cause is developer forgot to subtract "t.share" value, user can withdraw multiple times. @EthSecurity1 #Reentrancy
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⚠️A critical vulnerability (GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh) has been discovered in the widely-used elliptic encryption library.
https://slowmist.medium.com/private-key-leakage-in-ecdsa-signatures-analysis-of-malformed-input-vulnerability-in-the-elliptic-24f73c05cac1 @EthSecurity1
https://slowmist.medium.com/private-key-leakage-in-ecdsa-signatures-analysis-of-malformed-input-vulnerability-in-the-elliptic-24f73c05cac1 @EthSecurity1
Medium
Private Key Leakage in ECDSA Signatures: Analysis of Malformed Input Vulnerability in the Elliptic…
Author: enze
Editor: Liz
Editor: Liz
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someone with a $500 bankroll accidentally discovered we were using an old FTM price to mark Sonic ($0.70 vs $0.50) and looped it $50/time in our UI for twelve hours today and like +40x'ed his port, whoever you are ggwp you deserve it (you should learn how to use an API tho)
https://x.com/tomkysar/status/1897125825889398817 @EthSecurity1
https://x.com/tomkysar/status/1897125825889398817 @EthSecurity1
X (formerly Twitter)
tk ⛽️ (@tomkysar) on X
someone with a $500 bankroll accidentally discovered we were using an sold FTM price to mark Sonic ($0.70 vs $0.50) and looped it $50/time in our UI for twelve hours today and like +40x'ed his port, whoever you are ggwp you deserve it (you should learn how…
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critical vulnerability let in time.fun steal all trading fees and modify metadata (e.g. change "toly's minute" to "vitalik's minute") of every tokens launched.
time.fun provides each new user with a dedicated wallet to deposit USDC for trading. User's private key is securely stored in a third party provider. But SOL is needed to cover gas fees and time.fun wants a seamless interaction for users, the wallet “HW2C...Lo1H” signs every trade transaction alongside the user’s wallet signature. Surprisingly, this same wallet also owns all tokens launched by time.fun. As it is one of the signers, we can act on behalf of “HW2C...Lo1H” if we can let the backend sign arbitrary data.
@EthSecurity1
time.fun provides each new user with a dedicated wallet to deposit USDC for trading. User's private key is securely stored in a third party provider. But SOL is needed to cover gas fees and time.fun wants a seamless interaction for users, the wallet “HW2C...Lo1H” signs every trade transaction alongside the user’s wallet signature. Surprisingly, this same wallet also owns all tokens launched by time.fun. As it is one of the signers, we can act on behalf of “HW2C...Lo1H” if we can let the backend sign arbitrary data.
@EthSecurity1
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At 23:00 CET on 05.03.25, the 1inch team discovered a vulnerability in resolver smart contracts using the obsolete Fusion v1 implementation. No end-user funds were at risk—only resolvers using Fusion v1 in their own contracts. @EthSecurity1
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EthSecurity
At 23:00 CET on 05.03.25, the 1inch team discovered a vulnerability in resolver smart contracts using the obsolete Fusion v1 implementation. No end-user funds were at risk—only resolvers using Fusion v1 in their own contracts. @EthSecurity1
1inch market maker @trustedvolumes got hacked for over $4.5M and a few smaller MMs got hacked for $0.5M yesterday.
The root cause is that 1inch calls MM contract’s resolveOrders function to get funds to its settlement contract. Most bots only checked the msg.sender = settlement contract - and unfortunately there was an arbitrary call vulnerability in settlement contract. Thus the hacker could forge resolveOrders call and drain MM contracts.
The funny thing is the hacker incorrectly transferred half of the stolen funds to the 1inch settlement contract, making the funds available for everyone to grab, and he spent quite sometime to get funds back. We were trying to compete but the hacker got it first unfortunately.
By shoucccc
1inch Postmortem by decurity
https://blog.decurity.io/yul-calldata-corruption-1inch-postmortem-a7ea7a53bfd9
@EthSecurity1
The root cause is that 1inch calls MM contract’s resolveOrders function to get funds to its settlement contract. Most bots only checked the msg.sender = settlement contract - and unfortunately there was an arbitrary call vulnerability in settlement contract. Thus the hacker could forge resolveOrders call and drain MM contracts.
The funny thing is the hacker incorrectly transferred half of the stolen funds to the 1inch settlement contract, making the funds available for everyone to grab, and he spent quite sometime to get funds back. We were trying to compete but the hacker got it first unfortunately.
By shoucccc
1inch Postmortem by decurity
https://blog.decurity.io/yul-calldata-corruption-1inch-postmortem-a7ea7a53bfd9
@EthSecurity1
Medium
Yul Calldata Corruption — 1inch Postmortem
This is an overview of one of the toughest DeFi exploits which happened around 5 pm UTC on March 5, 2025.
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Forwarded from Vladimir S. | Officer's Channel (Vladimir S. | officercia)
Trezor Reveals Potential Vulnerability in Older Safe 3 Crypto Wallets !
Trezor disclosed a potential vulnerability in its Safe 3 wallet after Ledger identified a supply chain attack using voltage glitching.
The attack requires physical access and advanced skills, making it unlikely for widespread exploitation. Newer Trezor models, including Safe 5, are unaffected. Users are advised to buy from official sources, use strong PINs, enable passphrases, and keep firmware updated.
• https://www.theblock.co/post/346018/trezor-discloses-vulnerability-safe-3-crypto-wallet-rival-ledger
#opsec #security
Trezor disclosed a potential vulnerability in its Safe 3 wallet after Ledger identified a supply chain attack using voltage glitching.
The attack requires physical access and advanced skills, making it unlikely for widespread exploitation. Newer Trezor models, including Safe 5, are unaffected. Users are advised to buy from official sources, use strong PINs, enable passphrases, and keep firmware updated.
• https://www.theblock.co/post/346018/trezor-discloses-vulnerability-safe-3-crypto-wallet-rival-ledger
#opsec #security
The Block
Trezor discloses potential vulnerability in older Safe 3 crypto wallets following white hat research by rival Ledger
The attack, discovered by Ledger security researchers, involves "voltage glitching" and reprogramming a device's microcontroller.
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Issues in Protocols Interacting with Uniswap V3 Liquidity & Cross-Chain Swaps - link
Modern Stablecoins, How They're Made: M^0 - link
Bybit Hack Tracing Dune panel - link
@EthSecurity1
Modern Stablecoins, How They're Made: M^0 - link
Bybit Hack Tracing Dune panel - link
@EthSecurity1
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Forwarded from Vladimir S. | Officer's Channel (Vladimir S. | officercia)
Use this list of fantastic telegram channels I've put together in order to discover them as your own personal Web3-Google!
Feel free to use this folder to onboard your non-web3 friends to Web3, as the majority of the channels are maintained by independent researchers. There are also additional channels for news, CT reviews, and more!
Link: t.me/addlist/uesom31GM1I4Yjgy
#telegram #offtopic
Feel free to use this folder to onboard your non-web3 friends to Web3, as the majority of the channels are maintained by independent researchers. There are also additional channels for news, CT reviews, and more!
Link: t.me/addlist/uesom31GM1I4Yjgy
#telegram #offtopic
Telegram
Web3 Pack
Vladimir S. | officercia invites you to add the folder “Web3 Pack”, which includes 80 chats.
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DeFi Liquidation Vulnerabilities - link
Learn how to debug bytecode with huff and forge - link
Solidity Development with Foundry: Cast, Anvil, Chisel, and Forge by Ethereum Engineering group - link
@EthSecurity1
Learn how to debug bytecode with huff and forge - link
Solidity Development with Foundry: Cast, Anvil, Chisel, and Forge by Ethereum Engineering group - link
@EthSecurity1
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Reduce The Risk of Cyber Attacks: Isolated Dev Environments - link
Mapping the DeFi crime landscape: an evidence-based picture - link
Yul Puzzles
@EthSecurity1
Mapping the DeFi crime landscape: an evidence-based picture - link
Yul Puzzles
@EthSecurity1
www.cyfrin.io
Isolated Dev Environments: Reduce The Risk of Cyber Attacks
Learn how isolated development environments like Docker containers can protect your code and sensitive data from cyber threats. Stay secure and informed!
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