-Chainge finance Hack for insufficient validation 150 k $

-Curio Defi Hack post-mortem 40 m $ https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-curio-hack-march-2024 @EthSecurity1

Zelic found critical vulnerability in Gains network forks

https://x.com/zellic_io/status/1781389554764886289?s=61
@EthSecurity1

Exploiting precision loss vai fuzz testing

https://dacian.me/exploiting-precision-loss-via-fuzz-testing

A Collection of Notes, Checklists, Writeups on Bug Bounty Hunting and Web Application Security.

https://github.com/HolyBugx/HolyTips

Immunefi writeups list

https://github.com/sayan011/Immunefi-bug-bounty-writeups-list
@EthSecurity1

Hedgey finance Hacked Post-mortem 44 m $ consider consensys Audited it Earlier https://blog.cube3.ai/2024/04/19/hedgey-finance-hack-flashloan-cube3-postmortem-report/ @EthSecurity1

2 critical vulnerabilities found in fraud proof https://medium.com/offchainlabs/security-disclosure-289a4ad50709 @EthSecurity1

Deploy scripts are now in scope for smart contract audits https://medium.com/cyfrin/deploy-scripts-are-now-in-scope-for-smart-contract-audits-7fbb95788ce7 What is zk audit? https://www.zellic.io/blog/what-is-a-zk-audit/ Astar Critical Vulnerability https://www.zellic.io/blog/finding-a-critical-vulnerability-in-astar/ @ETHSecurity1

in Astar Bug, amount transfered truncate to 0.why is that? The amount argument gets truncated to 0 because of how the read function is implemented in the EvmDataReader struct.

When the read function is called with a type parameter of BalanceOf<Runtime, Instance>, which is a type alias for u128, it reads 32 bytes from the calldata and then uses buffer.copy_from_slice to copy the relevant bytes into a u128 buffer.

However, since the input value is larger than the maximum u128 value, the buffer.copy_from_slice function will only copy the lower 16 bytes of the input value into the buffer, effectively truncating the value.

In this case, when the input value is type(uint128).max + 1, the lower 16 bytes of this value are all zeros. Therefore, the buffer.copy_from_slice function copies these zero bytes into the buffer, resulting in a u128 value of 0.

This is why the amount argument gets truncated to 0, allowing the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. @EthSecurity1

1-Vulnerability Report: Binance PoR Dummy User Attack https://www.leku.blog/binance_vuln/ 2-Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.00138 3-Patrick collins & txFusion join
to discuss TxFusion, a set of tools and products designed to improve developers' experience on the ZK ecosystem.
Today, at 7 pm UTC on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUmM7LF4ch0 @EthSecurity1

Blast integration Bugs https://nirlinsecurity.xyz/p/blast-integration-bugs-part-1
Hamburger Validity Proof
https://xuwinnie.review/research/hamburger-factory-validity @EthSecurity1

Cosmos IBC Reentrancy Infinite Mint https://www.asymmetric.re/blog/cosmos-ibc-reentrancy-infinite-mint @EthSecurity1

sonneFinance Post-mortem Lost 20 m $
https://medium.com/@SonneFinance/post-mortem-sonne-finance-exploit-12f3daa82b06 @EthSecurity1

https://reports.yaudit.dev/reports/05-2023-Sonne/#4-high---unclear-protection-against-hundred-finance-attack-vector

Auditors mentioned their unclear approach! @Ethsecurity1

💡 Sonne Finance's Timelock Implementation on Optimism Hack Analysis:

https://x.com/Olympix_ai/status/1792534207769510123

https://medium.com/@olympixai/sonne-finance-exploited-a-detailed-analysis-0b52151d4d2a

#Defi_Research Optimized lending protocol for redeemable assets https://gist.github.com/0xngmi/c92ce3fce377a0e72c1e90052db98bf1 Modern DeFi Lending Protocols, how it's made: Euler V2 https://mixbytes.io/blog/modern-defi-lending-protocols-how-its-made-euler-v2 @EthSecurity1

the problem with eip4337. https://x.com/jtriley_eth/status/1795151789282750481 @EthSecurity1

unassigned pool earnings In the context of the Uniswap V3 protocol, the "unassigned pool earnings" How it works:

When a user deposits their assets into the pool, they earn a share of the pool's earnings.
The pool earns rewards in the form of interest, fees, or other incentives.
The pool's earnings are not yet assigned to any specific user, so they are considered "unassigned".
When a user withdraws their assets from the pool, their share of the unassigned earnings is assigned to them.
Why unassigned pool earnings?

The unassigned pool earnings are a result of the way the Uniswap V3 protocol is designed. When a user deposits their assets into the pool, they earn a share of the pool's earnings. However, the earnings are not yet assigned to any specific user, so they are considered "unassigned".

How are unassigned pool earnings assigned?

When a user withdraws their assets from the pool, their share of the unassigned earnings is assigned to them. This is done by calculating the user's share of the pool's earnings based on their deposited assets and the pool's earnings.

Why is it important?

The unassigned pool earnings are important because they represent the rewards earned by the pool, which are not yet assigned to any specific user. When a user withdraws their assets from the pool, their share of the unassigned earnings is assigned to them, ensuring that they receive their fair share of the pool's earnings. in recent audit protocol ignored unassigned pool earnings https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-04-interest-rate-model-judging?tab=readme-ov-file#issue-h-2-unassigned-pool-earnings-can-be-stolen-when-a-maturity-borrow-is-liquidated-by-depositing-at-maturity-with-1-principal
@EthSecurity1

#Defi_reasearch Typical vulnerabilities in lending and CDP protocols https://blog.decurity.io/typical-vulnerabilities-in-lending-and-cdp-protocols-e778e540e215 Borrowing on Ethereum: Comparing Architecture Evolution of MakerDAO, Yield, Aave, Compound, & Euler https://hackernoon.com/borrowing-on-ethereum-comparing-architecture-evolution-of-makerdao-yield-aave-compound-and-euler Trustless Yield Aggregator protocol with customized risk profiles based on per-user policies https://gist.github.com/0xngmi/653aa70d3162f0ef4a41d56ced602a6c @EthSecurity1

Velocore Incident Post-Mortem 7 m$ loss
https://velocorexyz.medium.com/velocore-incident-post-mortem-6197020ec3e9 @EthSecurity1

An OKX user disclosed today that hackers purchased his personal information and used AI to create fake videos. Hackers used these to change the victim's OKX passwords and even 2FA. More than $2 million US were stolen. Be wary of Deepfakes and personal data leaks. — link