Halting the Solana Blockchain with Epsilon Stake https://tik-old.ee.ethz.ch/file/9d40dad802dd12d9ba1f1b7c1759920c/Solana___ICDCN_24.pdf
@EthSecurity1

what is domain separator?
                                                                   The domain separator helps prevent signature reuse attacks in DeFi protocols by making signatures unique to a particular contract and message type. Here are some more details:                                                          

Without a domain separator, a signature could potentially be reused for different messages or contracts. This enables various attacks.

For example, a signature approving a small transfer amount could be reused to approve a large transfer on another contract.Or a signature meant for a benign callback could be reused to trigger funds transfers.

The domain separator binds a signature to a specific contract address and message type.

It is computed from the contract address, a salt value, and the message EIP-712 typehash.When generating a signature, the signer computes and includes the domain separator.When verifying a signature, the contract recomputes the expected domain separator.If the domain separators don't match, the signature is invalid for that context.

This prevents simply replaying a signature on another contract/message type.

Even a tiny change to the contract address, salt, or message typehash invalidates old signatures.

So attackers cannot trivially transfer or forge signatures between contexts.
                                                                                                                               
some potential pitfalls: 
            
Forgetting to specify the domain separator when verifying signatures. This would allow cross-contract/message replay attacks.

Using a constant/hardcoded domain separator value rather than computing it dynamically. This defeats the purpose of making it context-specific.

Not updating the salt value periodically. Over time, old signatures could potentially be replayed on contracts with the same address.

Computing the domain separator incorrectly, such as omitting important components like the contract address. This could again allow reuse across contexts.

Failing to sanitize or validate input values used in domain separator computation. These should not be attacker-controlled.

Setting domain separators on a per-function rather than per-contract basis. This doesn't fully isolate signatures to a single context.

Not accounting for potential metadata like chain/network ID in domain separators. Signatures may not be cross-chain compatible.

Not versioning the domain separator format or hashing algorithm over time. Old styles could be replayed.

Failing to specify expected calldata/function signature when relevant. Signatures for calls are less isolated.

Not regenerating domain separators when upgrading a contract implementation. Old contexts may be accessible.
‍
Insufficient entropy or non-randomness in salt values, compromising uniqueness over time.@EthSecurity1

New year start with new loss. Orbit Bridge ~81.5 m $
Happy new year

Twice hack 4.5 m$
https://www.theblock.co/post/270080/radiant-capital-reportedly-hacked-eth?utm_source=telegram1&utm_medium=social
@EthSrcurity1

ECRecover and Signature Verification in Ethereum https://coders-errand.com/ecrecover-signature-verification-ethereum/
This blog has great articles about cryptography and ZK

And sure watch this

Ethereum yellow paper
https://youtu.be/e84V1MxRlYs?si=ysB4c21fT9Ce024u
@EthSecurity1

DYDX exploite post-mortem

https://www.theblock.co/post/270275/dydx-publishes-post-mortem-9-million-november-attack

Gamma protocol is third hack in 2024
https://twitter.com/GammaStrategies/status/1742882840247779453
@Ethsecurity1

gamma exploit post_mortem 6.18 m $ loss https://medium.com/gamma-strategies/post-mortem-remediation-plan-9a62f10d90f3 @EthSecurity1

We are glad to opensource our holistic security strategy for Solana dev teams.

Here is a Systematic Security Roadmap for a full lifecycle of Solana applications.

https://github.com/Rektoff/Security-Roadmap-for-Solana-applications

https://x.com/rektoff_xyz/status/1744771734782263613?s=20

2023 web3security Facts:

83% of protocols hacked in 2023 was audited

56.7% rugpulls happened in BSC

Certik-Peckshield-slowmist- Quantstamp are firms that performed security audits on exploited projects(before exploit).

62% projects compensated after exploit

34% projects audited after the exploits

78% attackers accepted bug bounty

@EthSecurity1

Near smart contract security course https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL7Gwuo_MOL740lhKTvouCJvk4sAyuqZqT

Near protocol lay off 50% of staff


ZKP Series: Principles and
Implementation of Extensibility Attacks on Groth16 Proofs https://slowmist.medium.com/zkp-series-principles-and-implementation-of-extensibility-attacks-on-groth16-proofs-aedcd703323a @EthSecurity1

Easy transferfrom(victim,Hacker,3.3 m $)
Bungee Exploit
@EthSecurity1

https://cointelegraph.com/news/trezor-discloses-66k-users-affected-phishing-attack

Seems trustwallet used trezor library too. Code suffers randomness issues

Ethereum Smart Contract Auditor's 2023 Rewind https://ventral.digital/posts/2024/1/19/ethereum-smart-contract-auditors-2023-rewind/ Top 10 Blockchain Hacking Techniques of 2023 https://blog.openzeppelin.com/top-10-blockchain-hacking-techniques-of-2023-submissions-open @EthSecurity1

gmee got hacked https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-gamee-token-hack-january-2024 @EthSecurity1

In orbit accident I was wondering how keys compromised. This is post-mortem:
https://medium.com/orbit-chain/official-statement-regarding-orbit-bridge-exploit-551928f3dc52

And MIM hack analysis

https://x.com/kankodu/status/1752581744803680680?s=61
@EthSecurity1

It appears a Ripple insider was hacked for ~213M XRP ($112.5M)

Source address
rJNLz3A1qPKfWCtJLPhmMZAfBkutC2Qojm

So far the stolen funds have been laundered through MEXC, Gate, Binance, Kraken, OKX, HTX, HitBTC, etc

Update: Confirmation of the hack from Chris Larsen (Ripple Co-Founder & Executive Chairman)

Theft addresses
rGhR13XyM43WdDaSMznHd5rZ4cJatybvEg
rHQVKntyfkDCPhEBL2ctryuEAkDZgckmmV
rLsUemhuBZtF44rqqzneb2F9JgyrRYYd4t
rKPERax7t9iFvT3RHXn5nifyNpzp9a4hBa
rpjs4HLX1gJoEenH69PsQmXaXY22QhCYAT
rLRhugR4ysNa2xkt4E6fKN8krs9jatCp6w
rnCyeUNvfDbtTagGEPjBfTCBz6EqJjf2Uj
rHVjfYzTaB8MzSoQGqpzH9barZr85QsZW7

Vitalik wrote about risks of restaking in this article from May 2023.

Good to take a step back sometimes and look at the safety too

👇

https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2023/05/21/dont_overload.html

Warpcast is strange! Get approves account keys onchain and store eth keys on it's server :(
Eth keys : hold asset(EOA)

@Ethsecurity1

- PlayDapp Heist: Attackers minted 200M PLA tokens, valuing a massive $31M loss. A significant portion, $5.9M worth, found its way to the Gate platform. The exploit was due to a security vulnerability. @EthSecurity1

considering Blast as clone of optimism ToB found only 1 Low on Blast, when Spearbit found 6 Crit, 6 H, 11 M and 14 L https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2024-01-metalayerblast-securityreview.pdf

https://github.com/spearbit/portfolio/blob/master/pdfs/report-blast-contracts-review-draft.pdf

Blast source code deep dive:
https://twitter.com/jarrodWattsDev/status/1727584394796323042?s=20

@EthSecurity1