Droidspaces is now integrable with GKI devices without breaking the Kernel ABI! π₯³
Go check out the updated guide here: https://github.com/ravindu644/Droidspaces-OSS/blob/main/Documentation/Kernel-Configuration.md#gki
Thanks to @neversettle_xD and @anonymous_yolo, who made this possible and provided me with the necessary info.
Droidspaces-supported kernels for OnePlus GKI devices: https://github.com/WildKernels/OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS
#announcement
Go check out the updated guide here: https://github.com/ravindu644/Droidspaces-OSS/blob/main/Documentation/Kernel-Configuration.md#gki
Thanks to @neversettle_xD and @anonymous_yolo, who made this possible and provided me with the necessary info.
Droidspaces-supported kernels for OnePlus GKI devices: https://github.com/WildKernels/OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS
#announcement
β€11π₯2π2π1π©1
Droidspaces v6.0.0 has been released..!
https://github.com/ravindu644/Droidspaces-OSS/releases/tag/v6.0.0
https://github.com/ravindu644/Droidspaces-OSS/releases/tag/v6.0.0
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New feature: Ability to backup the container as a tarball :)
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Can anyone try the recently discovered "Copy Fail" vulnerability on Droidspaces?
https://github.com/tgies/copy-fail-c/releases/tag/v0.2.0
Looks like I don't have a supported kernel.
What is expected is gaining root access inside the container or total container escape.
https://github.com/tgies/copy-fail-c/releases/tag/v0.2.0
Looks like I don't have a supported kernel.
What is expected is gaining root access inside the container or total container escape.
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Droidspaces
Can anyone try the recently discovered "Copy Fail" vulnerability on Droidspaces? https://github.com/tgies/copy-fail-c/releases/tag/v0.2.0 Looks like I don't have a supported kernel. What is expected is gaining root access inside the container or total containerβ¦
It seems like Google saved all ya all asses by turning off the core Android kernel configuration necessary for this vulnerability:
But that doesnβt mean we are immune to this kind of attack since non-GKI kernels exist.
We still gotta block the necessary syscalls needed for this kind of attack using seccomp for the greater good.
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=yBut that doesnβt mean we are immune to this kind of attack since non-GKI kernels exist.
We still gotta block the necessary syscalls needed for this kind of attack using seccomp for the greater good.
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