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We Spent $20 to Achieve RCE and Accidentally Became the Admins of .MOBI Article, Comments
- The researchers accidentally gained control of the .MOBI domain registry by purchasing the expired domain dotmobiregistry.net for $20.
- By controlling the legacy WHOIS server at dotmobiregistry.net, they were able to intercept and respond to WHOIS queries for .MOBI domains, including from major Certificate Authorities.
- The researchers discovered a critical vulnerability in the phpWhois library that allows remote code execution by injecting malicious data into WHOIS responses.
- They also found a command injection vulnerability in the fail2ban security tool that could be exploited via malformed WHOIS responses.
- The researchers were able to use their control of the WHOIS server to provide rogue email addresses to Certificate Authorities, allowing them to obtain valid TLS/SSL certificates for .MOBI domains they did not own.
- This undermined the entire Certificate Authority validation process for the .MOBI top-level domain, putting secure communications at risk.
- The researchers found that their WHOIS server was receiving millions of queries from a wide range of internet infrastructure, including government, spam filtering, and antivirus systems.
- The researchers did not actually issue any rogue certificates, but demonstrated the ability to do so, highlighting a critical flaw in the TLS/SSL certificate issuance process.
- The researchers notified the NCSC and ShadowServer Foundation, who worked to mitigate the issue by sinkholing the dotmobiregistry.net domain.
- The researchers conclude that this incident exposes fundamental flaws in how internet infrastructure and security processes like WHOIS and Certificate Authorities operate, which could be exploited by well-resourced attackers.
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Android now allows apps to block sideloading
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Android now allows apps to block sideloading Article, Comments
Android will Block Apps Installed Outside the Play Store — Google rolls out Google Play Integrity API.

What does this mean? Developers will now be able to easily detect if you've installed an app from an unofficial source and block it, forcing you to install from the Play Store.

This new API could potentially put an end to ALL app mods. It's already being used by some games, and there will probably be more of them in the future.

Google is stabbing all Android freedom lovers in the back.
Credit: hitechdailynews
Что то новое под ZK...
Do It by Code pinned «Defusedxml – defusing XML bombs and other exploits Article, Comments»
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Billion laughs / exponential entity expansion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billion_laughs
The original example uses 9 levels of 10 expansions in each level to expand the string lol to a string of 3 * 10 9 bytes, hence the name "billion laughs". The resulting string occupies 3 GB (2.79 GiB) of memory; intermediate strings require additional memory. Because most parsers don't cache the intermediate step for every expansion it is repeated over and over again. It increases the CPU load even more.
An XML document of just a few hundred bytes can disrupt all services on a machine within seconds.

Example XML:
<!DOCTYPE xmlbomb [
<!ENTITY a "1234567890" >
<!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;">
<!ENTITY c "&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;">
<!ENTITY d "&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;">
]>
<bomb>&d;</bomb>
quadratic blowup entity expansion

A quadratic blowup attack is similar to a Billion Laughs attack; it abuses entity expansion, too. Instead of nested entities it repeats one large entity with a couple of thousand chars over and over again. The attack isn't as efficient as the exponential case but it avoids triggering countermeasures of parsers against heavily nested entities. Some parsers limit the depth and breadth of a single entity but not the total amount of expanded text throughout an entire XML document.
A medium-sized XML document with a couple of hundred kilobytes can require a couple of hundred MB to several GB of memory. When the attack is combined with some level of nested expansion an attacker is able to achieve a higher ratio of success.

<!DOCTYPE bomb [
<!ENTITY a "xxxxxxx... a couple of ten thousand chars">
]>
<bomb>&a;&a;&a;... repeat</bomb>
external entity expansion (remote)

Entity declarations can contain more than just text for replacement. They can also point to external resources by public identifiers or system identifiers. System identifiers are standard URIs. When the URI is a URL (e.g. a http:// locator) some parsers download the resource from the remote location and embed them into the XML document verbatim.
Simple example of a parsed external entity:
<!DOCTYPE external [
<!ENTITY ee SYSTEM "http://www.python.org/some.xml">
]>
<root>&ee;</root>
Show HN: A whiteboard that writes math equations
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New video of Reachy 2 by France-based Pollen Robotics shows it performing teleoperated high-precision tasks.

The beta version of the bot with open-source ecosystem launches next month.

Prices: $75K for the full robot with a mobile base; $38K for a stationary one-armed model.
Characters that can be represented as a sum of a perfect range

print(b" ".join([chr(sum(range(i))).encode(errors="ignore") for i in range(1000)]).decode(errors="ignore"))


credits: davide
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What have students made using Unreal Engine?

Using everything from Unreal Engine and MetaHuman to RealityCapture and Quixel Megascans, these projects are a showcase of what’s possible with a little imagination and the Epic ecosystem!

This video gives you a glimpse at some of the stunning work produced by our talented community of students in 2024 📚


These are not some company-sponsored games, these are games made by university students around the world.