Do It by Code
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We uhhhhh... do things by coding them.

"This is wild, multi-agent coordination, clearly infrastructure hacking. We should not."
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Claude reveals ECDSA curve origins
Article, Comments
https://words.filippo.io/seeds-solved/

This isn’t an ECDSA break: it explains how the public curve parameters were chosen, making deliberate manipulation less plausible. Some details remain unexplained, including why certain valid candidate curves were skipped.
The finding: the mysterious seeds behind P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 came from an old C-library pseudorandom generator initialized with Unix timestamps from 1997–1998, rather than hashes of supposedly forgotten phrases.
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DeepSeek V4.1F-1017 has built this in like 5 minutes.
(Since then it's autistically rabbitholing into minor details)
These are unambiguously better than Opus's.
It's a good deal stronger than V4.1.

Posted by Teortaxes▶️ (DeepSeek 推特🐋铁粉 2023 – ∞), 3 hour ago

DeepSeek-v4.1-Flash-1017 on huggingface
Article, Comments
🚨 Confirmed. OpenCode hacked. Keys stolen.

Telling customers to revoke.

Posted by Matt Johansen, 2 hours ago
Congratulations to OpenAI on this great model release!

Posted by Lisan al Gaib, 30 minutes ago
CVE-2026-99999: PwnEscape: linux kernel full Guest-to-Host KVM Escape
(score: 9.3 critical)
blog post
vercel blog post

ipv4: If a packet with bad checksum metadata gets into the ipv4 stack, skb_checksum_help can corrupt the network header.

Affected versions:
All versions above 2.6.27 unless they got a patch applied to them, many branches already got the patch backported to them:
• 5.10: through 5.10.271 → fixed in 5.10.272
• 5.15: through 5.15.222 → fixed in 5.15.223
• 6.1: through 6.1.189 → fixed in 6.1.190
• 6.6: through 6.6.158 → fixed in 6.6.159
• 6.12: through 6.12.112 → fixed in 6.12.113
• 6.18: through 6.18.56 → fixed in 6.18.57
• 7.2: through 7.2.10 → fixed in 7.2.11
• 7.3 release candidates: through 7.3-rc6 → fixed in 7.3-rc7



Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.

If however, updating to the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this issue can be found at these commits:
- a464d95
- 0fab003
- 94524b7
- a65f69e
- 32a8b0a
- f3e835a
- c3e3346
- 6785011
The Intel 8087 chip: floating-point addition and subtraction

Intel 8087 chip introduced in 1980 significantly improved floating-point operations, with a speedup of almost 100 times over the 8086 processor. The microcode implementation of addition and subtraction involves complex logic to handle special cases such as infinities, zeros, and NaN values.
WPSplinter: pre-auth RCE over WPS

a pre-authentication memory corruption vulnerability in Broadcom's legacy WPS implementation used by Wi-Fi routers and access points.

Broadcom’s legacy WPS Monitor software mishandles fragmented WPS setup messages carried over EAP. Its length checks don’t adequately constrain the reassembled message to the actual destination buffer.

Who’s affected?
Routers/access points using the vulnerable legacy Broadcom component, across both eCos and Linux firmware. Having a Broadcom chip alone does not establish vulnerability; the exact software and hardware revision matter.

device list (just some examples):
TP-Link: VR1600, TD-VG5612, Archer C3150, C5400, VR600, VR900, VR2800
Cisco: elected RV routers and WAP access points.

Broadcom stated that it replaced WPS Monitor with hostapd starting in 2018. Device owners need a firmware update from their OEM or ISP; older eCos-based products may have no migration path.

there is also no CVE assigned for this. Broadcom declined to request a CVE, stating that the affected software was obsolete and outside its support window.



Tools to fingerprint WiFi Access Points running the Broadcom SDK and a list of known affected devices: https://github.com/qkaiser/broadcom-wps
Around $1.3 million USD (at the time of the attack) drained from Qubic crypto wallets due to weak random algorithm.

Between 23:42 UTC on 17 October and 01:26 UTC on 18 October, an attacker drained 1,404 Qubic wallets, totalling around 2.94 trillion QU. (source)

Seeds are affected if they were created:
On an iPhone or iPad, in any browser, before 18 October 2026
On a Mac using Safari, before 18 October 2026
In the Qubic iOS app, before July 2025
(source)


they coordinated a protective halt of the network at tick 85,371,949.

No transactions are processing, so the drained funds cannot be moved or sold while this is resolved.

(in case you think halting the network is a good thing: it's not, it just shows how centralized their network is, while having the mask of "decentralized")
🔥1
On macOS you can reduce binary startup overhead by 10% but only if you pretend to be Matlab (source)

Posted by Kevin 🇺🇦, 31 minutes ago
😭1
CVE-2026-111943: Go will reject certificate chains containing eight distrusted SPKIs

someone downloaded the CA cert data from ccadb resources and it seems to be affecting 16 certs, all from eMudhra: list

The eight CA names are:

eMudhra BV — Netherlands
• EM DV TLS CA - G3B
• EM OV TLS CA - G3B
• EM EV TLS CA - G3B
• EM OV CS CA - G3B

eMudhra Inc — USA
• EM DV TLS CA - G3C
• EM OV TLS CA - G3C
• EM EV TLS CA - G3C
• EM OV CS CA - G3C

the Go commit itself doesn't name these. also they are not explaining what's exactly CVE-2026-111943, I tried searching for it and couldn't find any tracker listing it. if you know any more details, feel free to share.
tdesktop has been enrolled last week in Anthropic's OSS Scanner project, aimed at continuously scanning open-source repos for security vulnerabilities

see https://red.anthropic.com/oss-scanner/
https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner/pull/541
https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/commit/63a1831728147e941ad2dc8939879cf5afe419c7
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Do It by Code
CVE-2026-111943: Go will reject certificate chains containing eight distrusted SPKIs someone downloaded the CA cert data from ccadb resources and it seems to be affecting 16 certs, all from eMudhra: list The eight CA names are: eMudhra BV — Netherlands…
eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise (tracked as 2083449)

The secret P-384 keys for these intermediate CAs are all zeros except the last 8 bits.

All not-updated software can be MITM'ed now.
IOT boxes that can't or don't update are now trivially MITM'able forever.


If you run Go:

go get go@1.27.3

(source)

Are there workarounds for Linux?
Until a distribution ships an updated ca-certificates package, expert users can distrust the affected roots in the system trust store. This is NOT recommended for ordinary users.

On Debian and Ubuntu, run as root:
sed -i \
-e 's|^mozilla/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.crt|!&|' \
-e 's|^mozilla/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.crt|!&|' \
/etc/ca-certificates.conf && update-ca-certificates
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php2shell

Tomorrow is a helluva day.

Posted by Kirill Firsov, 6 hours ago
Do It by Code
php2shell Tomorrow is a helluva day. Posted by Kirill Firsov, 6 hours ago
two 0day/0click RCE vulnerabilities in PHP

CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
details will be published in 14:00 UTC today (in 9 hours)

links:
- patch
- php archive
- php announcement
- watchTowr
- php2shell by Calif Research
- php2shell by wiz research

note: this is not just about wordpress, all tools/platforms relying on php may be affected

Sites that were taken offline (until they upgrade) due to these vulns:
GOG, anilist, wikipedia/wikimedia
Do It by Code
eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise (tracked as 2083449) The secret P-384 keys for these intermediate CAs are all zeros except the last 8 bits. All not-updated software can be MITM'ed now. IOT boxes that can't or don't update are now trivially MITM'able forever.…
More private keys by the Indian certificate authority have been discovered. These are all small numbers.

People are suspecting that they interpreted 384 bit keys to mean that they should pick numbers from 1-384 to use as their private keys.

Posted by Izzatologist, 57 minutes ago
Do It by Code
More private keys by the Indian certificate authority have been discovered. These are all small numbers. People are suspecting that they interpreted 384 bit keys to mean that they should pick numbers from 1-384 to use as their private keys. Posted by Izzatologist…
Eight eMudhra intermediate certificate-authority keys had these values:

4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237

Generator Labs reports independently recovering those exact values from the public certificates. So yes: one private key was literally the number 4. Not a shortened display or the beginning of a longer number.

Mozilla’s investigation confirms that all eight were below 256 (literally zeroes everywhere except the last byte) and could be recovered almost instantly by checking the tiny range of possibilities.

For scale: a properly generated P-384 private key is selected from roughly 2^384 possibilities, a range reaching approximately 116 decimal digits. Not 384 possibilities. These keys were catastrophically weaker than intended.