Do It by Code
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GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra produces proof of the Cycle Double Cover Conjecture [pdf]
Article, Comments
Yesterday, we made GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra generally available. Today, we're sharing that it produced a proof of the 50-year-old Cycle Double Cover Conjecture using 64 subagents in just under one hour. We're sharing the prompt and proof below. We're excited to see what you all do with Ultra!

Posted by Ethan Knight, 2 hours ago
see: https://t.me/DoItByCode/1858
GPT-5.6 Sol overtakes Fable 5 on VoxelBench

the highest scoring model yet with over 1k votes!

Posted by Voxelbench, 7 minutes ago
😱1
Linus jogou a real: AI é útil e vai ser usada no desenvolvimento do kernel Linux, quem achar ruim pode fazer fork e vazar

Posted by Gustavo Noronha, 9 hours ago

source
CVE-2026-63030:
WordPress RCE: REST API batch-route confusion and SQL injection issue leading to Remote Code Execution (severity: critical)
WordPress versions 6.9 and higher are vulnerable to a REST API batch-route confusion weakness, which combined with an SQL injection issue (GHSA-fpp7-x2x2-2mjf) leads to Remote Code Execution.

WordPress versions 7.0.2, 6.9.5, and 7.1 beta2 have been released, containing fixes for the vulnerability.
Due to the severity of the vulnerability it is recommended that you update your sites immediately.
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Adam Kues at Assetnote / Searchlight Cyber.


CVE-2026-60137:
Facilitated SQL injection vulnerability in the author__not_in parameter of WP_Query
WordPress versions 6.8 and higher are vulnerable to an SQL injection issue.
In WordPress versions 6.9 and higher, this combined with a REST API batch-route confusion issue (GHSA-ff9f-jf42-662q) leads to Remote Code Execution.

WordPress versions 7.0.2, 6.9.5, 6.8.6, and 7.1 beta2 have been released, containing fixes for the vulnerability.
Due to the severity of the vulnerability it is recommended that you update your sites immediately.
Discovered and responsibly disclosed as a team by TF1T, dtro, and haongo.


PoCs so far:
- Icex0/wp2shell-poc (no actual rce, pretty useless)
- dinosn/wp2shell-lab
- codeb0ssx/Ultimate-wp2shell
Cloudflare deployed WAF protections for 2 critical WordPress vulns before public release: unauthenticated RCE + SQLi.

If your WordPress traffic is proxied through Cloudflare, the new rules help reduce exposure while you patch. Fixes are in 7.0.2, with backports to 6.9.5, 6.8.6, and 7.1 Beta 2.

Patch anyway. WAF is not a substitute for updating.

https://cfl.re/4yrOFNH

Posted by Cloudflare, 3 hours ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobian_conjecture

hello there the jacobian conjecture is false thanx to my close friend akhil for asking about it and my other close friend fable for working during the world cup final

((1+xy)^3 z + y^2 (1+xy) (4+3xy), y + 3 x (1+xy)^2 z + 3 x y^2 (4+3xy), 2 x - 3 x^2 y - x^3 z): \C^3\to \C^3, has jacobian determinant -2, and sends (0, 0, -1/4), (1, -3/2, 13/2), and (-1, 3/2, 13/2) to (-1/4, 0, 0)


Posted by levent, 1 hour ago
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Last year we announced a partnership with Epic Games to bring Unity to Fortnite - and today, we want to show you where we are.

This is Fantasy Kingdom: a Unity game rendering natively inside @UnrealEngine. Physics, lighting, input: all synchronized between engines🎮👇

🔗 Want to try it out for yourself? Fill out our interest form to be considered for early access: https://on.unity.com/Fortnite_InterestForm


Posted by Unity, 1 hour ago
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Introducing Happy Oyster, the groundbreaking real-time world model from @HappyOysterAI, live today on Reactor!

Explore any world you can imagine, or take the director's chair and shape the story as it happens.

Available via API.

Try it now: http://reactor.inc/happy-oyster


Posted by reactor, 10 hours ago
CVE-2026-11144
Use after free in Media in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted video file. (Chromium security severity: Medium)


CVE-2026-11136
Use after free in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Do It by Code
TOCTOU
TOCTOU: time-of-check to time-of-use
It's a race condition that happens between "checking" and "using" something

this is a common and simple example of it:

  cacheData := cacheMap.Get(key)
if cacheData == nil {
cacheData = &BinanceDepthCachedData{
Coin: key,
LastUsedAt: time.Now(),
}
cacheMap.Add(key, cacheData)
}

where Get and Add are atomic (they have a lock in them to prevent concurrent operations); however the entire operation itself is not atomic:

Goroutine A: Get → nil
Goroutine B: Get → nil
Goroutine A: Add(objectA)
Goroutine B: Add(objectB)


since this is a purely logical race, race detectors tool usually can't detect it

The fix is to do the entire check + use with a single lock, e.g:

  mut := hlInfoReqMutexes.GetOrCreateDefault(mutKey)
mut.Lock()
defer mut.Unlock()

whereas the GetOrCreateDefault (or GetOrCreate(key, lambda)) use a single lock operation
Do It by Code
TOCTOU: time-of-check to time-of-use It's a race condition that happens between "checking" and "using" something this is a common and simple example of it: cacheData := cacheMap.Get(key) if cacheData == nil { cacheData = &BinanceDepthCachedData{…
How bad can this be?

It can range from harmless wasted work to critical security vulnerability
depending on what the created object(s) controls and whether an attacker can trigger concurrent calls:

1. Low severity: duplicate construction

v := cache.Get(key)
if v == nil {
v = parseConfig(key)
cache.Add(key, v)
}


Two goroutines parse the same immutable config. One value overwrites the other, but they’re equivalent. just CPU time is wasted

2. Moderate severity: inconsistent or split state

uppose the object contains mutable state. Both callers create different objects, and one gets stored:

A creates objectA and continues using it
B creates objectB and stores it
A stores objectA—or B remains the winner


Now some code may use objectA while future lookups use objectB.

- Lost updates
- Inconsistent counters
- Orphaned resources / Incorrect cleanup (memory leaks)
- Hard-to-reproduce application failures
Do It by Code
How bad can this be? It can range from harmless wasted work to critical security vulnerability depending on what the created object(s) controls and whether an attacker can trigger concurrent calls: 1. Low severity: duplicate construction v := cache.Get(key)…
3. High severity: ineffective per-key locking

A common dangerous example is lazily creating a mutex:

lock := locks.Get(accountID)
if lock == nil {
lock = &sync.Mutex{}
locks.Add(accountID, lock)
}

lock.Lock()
defer lock.Unlock()
processWithdrawal(accountID)


Two requests can create and lock two different mutexes. Both enter the supposedly protected operation simultaneously; can result in:

- Double withdrawal
- Duplicate payment
- Oversold inventory
- Duplicate coupon redemption
- Corrupted files or database state
The first browser-to-kernel full-chain RCE on Android 17 #poc
https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia/tree/main/IonStack
CVE-2026-10702: Firefox JIT RCE Vulnerability Explained
ref:
https://rootme.nebusec.io/

CVE-2026-10702 is a Just-In-Time (JIT) miscompilation vulnerability in the JavaScript Engine of Mozilla Firefox. The flaw resides in the JIT component and is classified as a type confusion issue under [CWE-843]. Mozilla addressed the defect in Firefox 151.0.3 as part of security advisory MFSA-2026-54.

Exploitation requires user interaction, such as visiting a malicious web page that triggers the affected code generation path. Successful exploitation can produce limited availability impact within the renderer process. Mozilla has not reported in-the-wild exploitation, and EPSS data indicates a low predicted exploitation probability.


Posted by blackorbird, 2 weeks ago