๐•ƒ๐”ผ๐”พ๐”ธ๐•ƒ โ„‚๐•Œโ„โ„๐”ผโ„•๐•‹ ๐”ธ๐”ฝ๐”ฝ๐”ธ๐•€โ„๐•Š ๐”น๐•ช- โ„•๐•’๐•ฅ๐•ฆ๐•ฃ๐•’๐• ๐•๐•ฆ๐•ค๐•ฅ๐•š๐•”๐•– โ„ข
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๐•ƒ๐”ผ๐”พ๐”ธ๐•ƒ โ„‚๐•Œโ„โ„๐”ผโ„•๐•‹ ๐”ธ๐”ฝ๐”ฝ๐”ธ๐•€โ„๐•Š ๐”น๐•ช- โ„•๐•’๐•ฅ๐•ฆ๐•ฃ๐•’๐• ๐•๐•ฆ๐•ค๐•ฅ๐•š๐•”๐•– โ„ข
42514_2024_3_1501_71888_Judgement_19-Jun-2026.pdf
๐Ÿšถ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ Fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads.

This judgment missed to recognise right side walking as the normal rule instead of left side which also causes problem.

Hierarchy of Rights (necessary when proportionality test is considered in case of conflict it will prevail without any proportionality test)

We have started walking long before wheels were put on our path. The primary right of movement under Article 19(1)(d) is the Fundamental Right to Walk, a right that precedes the right to move on wheels and this precious right must extend to guaranteeing access to safe and well demarcated footpath. The citizenโ€™s fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles.

Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, is not a legislation for protecting the right to walk on the footpath.

Need of New Law

For enforcement of this Right use 32/ 226, Motor vehicle Act and Sections 38-40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for the enforcement of public duties can be enforced against the Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, or the Panchayats.

Re: Fundamental Right to
Walk and Footpath, 2026
โค3
Future like Cyber Hack incidents, do you think IT Act will apply if yes which provision?

เคˆ-เคฐเคฟเค•เฅเคถเคพ เคฌเฅˆเคŸเคฐเฅ€ เคฒเฅ‰เค• เค•เคฐ เคฐเคนเฅ‡ เค เค—, 300 เคฐเฅเคชเค เคฎเคพเค‚เค—เคคเฅ‡ เคนเฅˆเค‚: เคญเฅ‹เคชเคพเคฒ-เค‰เคœเฅเคœเฅˆเคจ เคธเคฎเฅ‡เคค เค•เคˆ เคถเคนเคฐเฅ‹เค‚ เคฎเฅ‡เค‚ เคถเคฟเค•เคพเคฏเคค;
https://dainik.bhaskar.com/3yttHdJir4b


#cyber@CurrentLegalGK
โค2
๐•ƒ๐”ผ๐”พ๐”ธ๐•ƒ โ„‚๐•Œโ„โ„๐”ผโ„•๐•‹ ๐”ธ๐”ฝ๐”ฝ๐”ธ๐•€โ„๐•Š ๐”น๐•ช- โ„•๐•’๐•ฅ๐•ฆ๐•ฃ๐•’๐• ๐•๐•ฆ๐•ค๐•ฅ๐•š๐•”๐•– โ„ข
Dressing Pet Dog As Lord Krishna Out Of Devotion Not Offence Under S.298 BNS: P&H High Court Quashes FIR https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/punjab-and-haryana-high-court/dressing-up-pet-dog-as-lord-krishna-not-offence-section-298-bns-desecration-insult-to-religionโ€ฆ
Pet Dog in Krishna Avtar?

CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
individual expression of the petitioner, shaped by her personal experiences, cannot be criminalized merely because it does not align with the sensitivities of others. In the absence of mens rea, criminal proceedings cannot be initiated to validate subjective perceptions of hurt. Constitutional tolerance must override hypersensitivity which leads innocent acts to be construed as desecration."

MEANING OF THE TERM 'OBJECT'
The first ingredient as to commission of the alleged offence relates to the actus reus i.e. damage, destroy, or defile a place of worship or object. The present case relates to subject matter of 'object'. In relation to Section 298 of BNS (erstwhile Section 295 of IPC), the word 'object' has been interpreted in a plethora of precedents: the landmark is Queen Empress v. Imam Ali, (1887) . A combined reading of the aforesaid authorities reveals that the term 'object' must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the word 'place of worship'; accordingly, unless the 'object' is in a place of worship, or carried in a procession on a festive occasion, Section 298 of BNS would not apply. Hence, in the present case, the 'object' which the petitioner made her pet dog wear, cannot be interpreted as 'object' within the meaning of Section 298 of BNS.

RANJANNI GAUR
versus
STATE OF PUNJAB
2026
#BNS@CurrentLegalGK
โค4
1. In a criminal trial for kidnapping, the prosecution's case relies heavily on the testimony of the eyewitness (PW-1) who identifies the accused for the first time in the court ("dock identification"). No Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted by the investigating agency. The accused argues that this dock identification, occurring years after the incident, is inherently unreliable and fatal to the prosecution's case. Which of the following factors, if established by the prosecution, would be most appropriate for a court to uphold the conviction despite the absence of a TIP?
(a) The eyewitness is a close relative of the victim and has a strong interest in ensuring the conviction of the accused.
(b) The accused was arrested a week after the incident from a different city based on a vague description, and his photograph was shown to the witness by the police prior to the trial.
(c) The incident occurred in the evening under dim streetlights, but the witness had a brief, fleeting glimpse of the accused's face.
(d) The accused was arrested on the spot immediately after the crime, and the witness had provided a detailed and accurate physical description of the accused to the police in the First Information Report (FIR) promptly after the incident.
Answer: D
Cause Title: HARJINDRA SINGH ETC. VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P. Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that dock identification of the accused in the absence of the Test Identification Parade (TIP) would not be fatal to the prosecution's case if the accused was sufficiently described in the complaint or was arrested on the spot immediately after the occurrence of the crime.
Dock Identification Of Accused For First Time In Court Without Test Identification Parade Not Fatal To Prosecution Always : Supreme Court
2. In a paternity suit where the plaintiff claims inheritance rights, the defendant, who has been acquitted in a prior criminal prosecution for rape involving the plaintiff's mother, challenges the trial court's order directing him to undergo a DNA test. The defendant argues that the acquittal conclusively establishes that no biological relationship exists and that the subsequent civil suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. Additionally, he contends that compelling him to provide a DNA sample violates his fundamental right to privacy.
Which of the following represents the most accurate legal position?
(A) The defendant's acquittal in the criminal case operates as res judicata in the civil suit, conclusively establishing the absence of paternity. Consequently, the DNA test cannot be directed as it would serve no purpose and would be a futile exercise, also infringing upon his privacy rights.
(B) The civil suit for declaration of paternity is barred by the principle of res judicata as the issue of paternity could have been, and was, incidentally determined in the criminal proceedings. The right to privacy is absolute and outweighs the plaintiff's claim, thus the DNA test order must be set aside.
(C) The acquittal in the criminal case does not operate as res judicata in the subsequent civil suit, as the standard of proof is different (beyond reasonable doubt vs. preponderance of probabilities). A DNA test may be directed as scientific evidence is indispensable to resolve the question of biological parentage, provided that a balance is struck between the plaintiff's right to know his parentage and the defendant's right to privacy.
(D) A DNA test can only be ordered in a civil suit if the criminal trial resulted in a conviction, as the standard of proof is higher in criminal cases. Since the defendant was acquitted, there is no 'prima facie' case to compel him to undergo a DNA test, and doing so would be a violation of his testimonial compulsion rights under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Answer: C
Cause Title: C VERSUS A& ANR., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612
Explanation: The Supreme Court recently held that a DNA test may be directed in a paternity dispute even where the alleged father was previously acquitted in a criminal rape case, observing that scientific evidence becomes indispensable when no other evidence can conclusively resolve the question of biological parentage.
Acquittal In Rape Case Doesn't Bar Scientific Determination Of Paternity : Supreme Court Upholds DNA Test Order
3. A, claiming to be the absolute owner of a large tract of land, executes a Sale Deed in favor of B for valuable consideration. Subsequently, in a separate title suit filed by C, the true owner, a competent court declares that A had no legal title to the property at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed. Based on this judicial finding, a criminal complaint is filed against A for the offense of forgery under Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code, alleging that the Sale Deed executed by A is a "false document" under Section 464. Which of the following is the most accurate legal position regarding A's criminal liability for forgery?
A) A is guilty of forgery because the Sale Deed was executed based on a false claim of ownership, which constitutes the making of a false document with the intent to defraud B.
B) A is not guilty of forgery because the Sale Deed was executed to assert a right to property, and the subsequent judicial finding of defective title does not, by itself, render the document 'false' under Section 464 of the IPC.
C) A is guilty of forgery under Section 467 (Forgery of valuable security) because the Sale Deed is a valuable security and its execution was predicated on a false claim of title.
D) A is not guilty of forgery only if he can prove that he had a bona fide belief in his ownership at the time of executing the document; mere negligent claim of title is insufficient to attract the offense.
Answer: B
Cause Title: BHIKHUBHAI GOVINDBHAI PATEL & ANR. VERSUS THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that a person does not commit forgery merely by executing a document asserting ownership over a property, even if that claim is subsequently found to be legally unsustainable.
No Forgery Merely Because Person Executed Document Wrongly Claiming Ownership Of Property : Supreme Court
4. A Hindu male, 'X', dies intestate in 2025, leaving behind his widow 'W', his son 'S' from his first wife, and his daughter 'D' from his second wife. All are Class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They inherit X's self-acquired property. 'W' claims she can sell a portion of the entire inherited property to pay for 'D's' higher education, arguing that as the senior-most member and a co-owner, she can act as the Karta of the property for the benefit of the family. 'S' challenges this, stating that 'W' has no such authority.
Which of the following statements correctly represents the legal position?
A) 'W' cannot sell the property on behalf of others as a Karta because the heirs inherit the property as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares.
B) 'W' can act as the Karta and sell the property for 'D's' education, as it is a legal necessity for the benefit of the family, and her share as a coparcener is not separate.
C) 'W' can sell the entire property only if she obtains the consent of 'S' and 'D', as they are all joint tenants and no single co-owner can act as a Karta.
D) 'W' can sell the property, but only with the permission of a civil court under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, as she is the natural guardian of 'D'.
Answer: A
Cause Title: DARUBAI & ANR. VERSUS KAMALABAI & ORS., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that heirs inheriting intestate property under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 hold it as tenants-in-common with definite shares, and not as a joint family property. Consequently, no co-heir can alienate the property on behalf of others, as the concept of a Karta does not apply in such cases.
Hindu Succession Act | After Intestate Succession, One Co-Heir Cannot Alienate Shares Of Others Acting As Karta : Supreme Court
5. A plaintiff files a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The agreement was executed in 1990, with a stipulated period of four months for completion. The defendant rescinded the contract in early 1991. The plaintiff institutes the suit in late 1993. At trial, the plaintiff produces bank statements and fixed deposit receipts dating from 1999 to 2001 to prove financial capacity. The defendant contests the suit, arguing lack of continuous readiness and willingness. Which of the following is the most accurate legal position regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof?
(A) The plaintiff need only prove readiness and willingness as on the date of filing of the suit, and any subsequent financial documents are admissible to show capacity at that time.
(B) The plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness only at the time of the agreement; delay in filing the suit is irrelevant if the suit is within the limitation period.
(C) The plaintiff must continuously demonstrate readiness and willingness from the date of the agreement through the decree, and financial documents created years after the suit was filed cannot retroactively establish such readiness for the relevant period.
(D) The plaintiff's burden is discharged if the total consideration is deposited in court at any time before the final decree, regardless of when the funds were arranged.
Answer: C
Cause Title: MOHAMMED KHALEEL (D) THROUGH LRs & ORS. VERSUS JAYAMMA, Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638
Explanation: The Supreme Court reiterated that a party seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell must continuously demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform its contractual obligations from the date of the agreement, holding that financial documents created years after institution of the suit cannot be relied upon to establish such readiness.
Specific Relief Act | Readiness Must Be Proved From Time For Agreement Execution & Not Just After Filing Suit : Supreme Court
6. An arbitral award is passed on 1st January 2024. The losing party files an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking correction of certain computational errors in the award. The Arbitral Tribunal entertains the application, hears the parties, and ultimately dismisses it on 1st April 2024, holding that no correction is warranted. The certified copy of the order dismissing the Section 33 application is received by the party on 10th April 2024. The party then files an application under Section 34 to set aside the arbitral award on 15th July 2024. The opposing party objects, contending that the limitation period under Section 34(3) started running from the date of the original award (1st January 2024) because the Section 33 application was dismissed and was not "maintainable" or "allowed." Which of the following is the correct legal position regarding the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3)?
(A) The limitation period under Section 34(3) begins from the date of the original award (1st January 2024), because a dismissed Section 33 application does not extend the limitation period.
(B) The limitation period begins from the date of disposal of the Section 33 application (1st April 2024), regardless of whether the application was allowed, dismissed, or held to be not maintainable, provided it was formally invoked and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal.
(C) The limitation period begins only from the date of disposal of the Section 33 application if the application was allowed and resulted in a modification of the award; if dismissed, the limitation reverts to the date of the original award.
(D) The limitation period begins from the date the certified copy of the order disposing of the Section 33 application is received (10th April 2024), but only if the opposing party does not challenge the maintainability of the Section 33 application.