Forwarded from @intheMatrixxx (Pouissant⭐️⭐️⭐️)
Did ya catch it ?
The BOOM?
"Are you a better businessman or politician?
Trump: "Well, a better businessman."
Well, there have been many good businessmen, but only "45" Presidents"!
ONLY 45! @mgshowchannel
The BOOM?
"Are you a better businessman or politician?
Trump: "Well, a better businessman."
Well, there have been many good businessmen, but only "45" Presidents"!
ONLY 45! @mgshowchannel
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Forwarded from Qtime Network 🇺🇸🇳🇱
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Yesterday Greece 🇬🇷 Big demonstration in Athens against the deployment of university police on Greek campuses. A protest is also underway in Thessaloniki.
Things you won’t see on MSM
Via @AnonymeCitoyen
@QtimeNetwork
Things you won’t see on MSM
Via @AnonymeCitoyen
@QtimeNetwork
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
Devastating 7.2 magnitude earthquake strikes off Taiwan coast, tsunami warning issued on Japanese island of Miyakojima. Taiwan suffers large scale destruction
t.me/asbmil
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
Secretary-General Guterres says he spoke with EU leaders this week about lifting sanctions on Russian fertilizer exports
Major European ports have signaled their readiness to facilitate the export of Russian fertilizers, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in an interview with RIA Novosti, published on Saturday.
Earlier, Putin stated that Russia is ready to deliver hundreds of thousands of tons of free fertilizer to countries in need, however, the deliveries were stopped at European ports.
t.me/asbmil
Major European ports have signaled their readiness to facilitate the export of Russian fertilizers, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in an interview with RIA Novosti, published on Saturday.
Earlier, Putin stated that Russia is ready to deliver hundreds of thousands of tons of free fertilizer to countries in need, however, the deliveries were stopped at European ports.
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
Algeria is reportedly about to receive $7 billion worth of new Russian weapons after signing a major arms deal in 2021. It was confirmed on September 15th by U.S. Senator Marco Rubio. As it often goes for countries buying weapons from Russia instead of USA, Rubio is calling for sanctions on Algeria.
Algeria is often the first costumer to receive newest Russian weapons, even ahead of the Russian Armed Forces themselves. What is in store for them is unknown, although they have repeatedly shown interest in Su-57s & already operate S400s, Buk M2’s & Pantsir-SM, as well as newest upgrades of S300 systems. It is possible that Algeria is looking to expand their well structured air defense umbrella with the S-500 Hypersonic Air Defence Systems.
t.me/asbmil
Algeria is often the first costumer to receive newest Russian weapons, even ahead of the Russian Armed Forces themselves. What is in store for them is unknown, although they have repeatedly shown interest in Su-57s & already operate S400s, Buk M2’s & Pantsir-SM, as well as newest upgrades of S300 systems. It is possible that Algeria is looking to expand their well structured air defense umbrella with the S-500 Hypersonic Air Defence Systems.
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
On 7 September, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Valeryi Zaluzhnyi, and Lieutenant General Mikhail Zabrodskii first Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Rada’s Committee for National Security, Defense, and Intelligence, wrote a revealing article for UkrInform —
It shows the complete dependence of Ukrainian military capability on Western military and financial support, and intentions to escalate the war if Ukraine is well-supported, as well as seize back Crimea from Russia, and engage in massive artillery and other air attacks on Russian territory. But the most important aspects of the article are indications of the Ukrainian military command’s disagreement with President Volodomyr Zelenskiy to conduct the present offensives in the south in the Kherson direction and in the north in the Izyum direction without the proper preparation and sufficient manpower and weaponry and instead carry out a military offensive for what seem to be largely political reasons at great costs to Ukraine’s personnel and weapons stockpiles without any real prospects of making a permanent breakthrough on either front.
In brief, Zalyuzhnyi article reads like a cryptic critique of Zelenskiy’s September counteroffensives in the south and north. In arguing for the creation of a Ukrainian military capable of conducting a counteroffensive “in 2023” to take Crimea, Zalyuzhnyi notes: “turning to the situation in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are likely to be in 2023, everything seems less clear. In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex combination of the actual position of the collision line, the available resources and a set of combat-ready troops and, obviously, finding a strategic initiative in the hands of the enemy. At the same time, following this logic, we will express strong reservations about the outline of the line of collision from the point of view of the Ukrainian side. Its contours have an extremely unfavorable configuration, again on the Izyum and Bakhmut directions. The enemy’s significant interference shackles any operational maneuver for the Ukrainian troops and requires, in fact, a double set of forces to contain it.” In other words, the Ukrainian military lacks at present the forces necessary for conducting the counteroffensive currently underway around the Izyum bridgehead in the north, slightly east of Kharkiv.
The situation “in the south and east is no better,” writes Zaluzhnyi. He notes: “The threat of the enemy’s advance in the direction of Zaporozhye has already been noted. In addition, the danger of the enemy developing partial success in the direction of Gulyai-Pole is not disappearing, which, under certain conditions, could pose a threat to the capture of the entire grouping of Ukrainian troops in the East. The existence of the enemy’s operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.”
As simultaneous counteroffensives, surely approved if not conceptualized and certainly ordered by Zelenskiy are ongoing in early autumn 2022, Zaluzhnyi calls for “several consecutive, and ideally simultaneous counter-attacks during the 2023 campaign.”
He then outlines a series of measures – the creation of 20 new brigades and weapons systems capable of striking Russia at a depth of 2000 kilometers, for example — needed to be taken before such simultaneous counteroffensives, an offensive to take Crimea, and bringing the war to Russian territory and its population can begin in 2023-2024.
Finally, it is perhaps a cryptic signal that Zaluzhnyi chose as his co-author a leader of the opposition ‘European Solidarity’ party led by former president Petro Poroshenko, now under indictment by Zelenskyi’s prosecutors.
Continuing 1/2
It shows the complete dependence of Ukrainian military capability on Western military and financial support, and intentions to escalate the war if Ukraine is well-supported, as well as seize back Crimea from Russia, and engage in massive artillery and other air attacks on Russian territory. But the most important aspects of the article are indications of the Ukrainian military command’s disagreement with President Volodomyr Zelenskiy to conduct the present offensives in the south in the Kherson direction and in the north in the Izyum direction without the proper preparation and sufficient manpower and weaponry and instead carry out a military offensive for what seem to be largely political reasons at great costs to Ukraine’s personnel and weapons stockpiles without any real prospects of making a permanent breakthrough on either front.
In brief, Zalyuzhnyi article reads like a cryptic critique of Zelenskiy’s September counteroffensives in the south and north. In arguing for the creation of a Ukrainian military capable of conducting a counteroffensive “in 2023” to take Crimea, Zalyuzhnyi notes: “turning to the situation in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are likely to be in 2023, everything seems less clear. In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex combination of the actual position of the collision line, the available resources and a set of combat-ready troops and, obviously, finding a strategic initiative in the hands of the enemy. At the same time, following this logic, we will express strong reservations about the outline of the line of collision from the point of view of the Ukrainian side. Its contours have an extremely unfavorable configuration, again on the Izyum and Bakhmut directions. The enemy’s significant interference shackles any operational maneuver for the Ukrainian troops and requires, in fact, a double set of forces to contain it.” In other words, the Ukrainian military lacks at present the forces necessary for conducting the counteroffensive currently underway around the Izyum bridgehead in the north, slightly east of Kharkiv.
The situation “in the south and east is no better,” writes Zaluzhnyi. He notes: “The threat of the enemy’s advance in the direction of Zaporozhye has already been noted. In addition, the danger of the enemy developing partial success in the direction of Gulyai-Pole is not disappearing, which, under certain conditions, could pose a threat to the capture of the entire grouping of Ukrainian troops in the East. The existence of the enemy’s operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.”
As simultaneous counteroffensives, surely approved if not conceptualized and certainly ordered by Zelenskiy are ongoing in early autumn 2022, Zaluzhnyi calls for “several consecutive, and ideally simultaneous counter-attacks during the 2023 campaign.”
He then outlines a series of measures – the creation of 20 new brigades and weapons systems capable of striking Russia at a depth of 2000 kilometers, for example — needed to be taken before such simultaneous counteroffensives, an offensive to take Crimea, and bringing the war to Russian territory and its population can begin in 2023-2024.
Finally, it is perhaps a cryptic signal that Zaluzhnyi chose as his co-author a leader of the opposition ‘European Solidarity’ party led by former president Petro Poroshenko, now under indictment by Zelenskyi’s prosecutors.
Continuing 1/2
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
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The article came out on the background of ‘chatter’ in the Ukrainian and Russian press, media, in particular on Telegram channels reporting that Zaluzhniy was opposed to Zelenskiy’s plan to conduct dual counteroffensives now, that Zaluzhnyi recently convinced Zelenskiy to halt the southern counteroffensive in Kherson and divert resources to the northern counteroffensive in Izyum.
This article is a clear, if somewhat cryptic expression fo Zaluzhnyi’s disagreement with Zelenskiy’s hasty Kherson and Izyum offensives and is important for at least four reasons. First, it is more evidence of the tensions between the military and political leaderships in the country – understandable in the current near catastrophic situation Ukraine finds itself in – and between the Office of the President and Zelenskiy, on the one hand, and the military command and elements within the political opposition, on the other hand, over the conduct of the war. Second, these tensions risk the politicization of the military and a grave deterioration in civil-military relations – a precondition for a military or palace coup supported by the military. Third, an alliance of the Poroshenko-supportive portion of the Ukrainian opposition with any military opposition –particularly if it includes the neofascist element in society and the military — would pose a grave threat to Zelenskiy’s regime. Fourth, these risks are likely to grow should the Kherson and Izyum offensives become complete failures with high casualties and great damage to the army’s morale and operational capacity.
Although we are certainly not there yet, the risk of instability in Kiev appears real and could be growing.
— analysis written by an American scholar Gordon Hahn
t.me/asbmil
The article came out on the background of ‘chatter’ in the Ukrainian and Russian press, media, in particular on Telegram channels reporting that Zaluzhniy was opposed to Zelenskiy’s plan to conduct dual counteroffensives now, that Zaluzhnyi recently convinced Zelenskiy to halt the southern counteroffensive in Kherson and divert resources to the northern counteroffensive in Izyum.
This article is a clear, if somewhat cryptic expression fo Zaluzhnyi’s disagreement with Zelenskiy’s hasty Kherson and Izyum offensives and is important for at least four reasons. First, it is more evidence of the tensions between the military and political leaderships in the country – understandable in the current near catastrophic situation Ukraine finds itself in – and between the Office of the President and Zelenskiy, on the one hand, and the military command and elements within the political opposition, on the other hand, over the conduct of the war. Second, these tensions risk the politicization of the military and a grave deterioration in civil-military relations – a precondition for a military or palace coup supported by the military. Third, an alliance of the Poroshenko-supportive portion of the Ukrainian opposition with any military opposition –particularly if it includes the neofascist element in society and the military — would pose a grave threat to Zelenskiy’s regime. Fourth, these risks are likely to grow should the Kherson and Izyum offensives become complete failures with high casualties and great damage to the army’s morale and operational capacity.
Although we are certainly not there yet, the risk of instability in Kiev appears real and could be growing.
— analysis written by an American scholar Gordon Hahn
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
In short, for those who don’t have time to read it, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valeryi Zaluzhny, along with the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian national security, defense and intelligence just dissed the entire counter offensive, and say they don’t have the manpower and strategic advantage to achieve the goals. Displaying disagreement with the actions ordered by Volodymyr Zelenskyy — Zaluzhny calls for the creation of 20 brigades with strike capability of weapon systems that can hit 2000KM deep into Russia and attacking the Russian federation “taking the war to their population” and taking Crimea in 2023
t.me/asbmil
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Battlefield Insights
Deployment point of Kraken nationalist battalion of Ukraine was destroyed by Russian missiles.
t.me/asbmil
t.me/asbmil
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Forwarded from Covid Truth Bombs (Daniel Horowitz)
WV university researchers just published in JAMA showing that "no significant association was found between antibody level and infection observed during the Omicron surge." It's hard to overstate the importance here. They are now approving vaccines - not just for covid but now for anything (monkeypox and flu shots) based on antibody levels. Now we know its crap science
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Forwarded from HATS 🎩
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Bill Clinton - Government Experiments On People's Health
@HATSTRUTH 🎩
@HATSTRUTH 🎩
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Forwarded from HATS 🎩
Media is too big
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HYDROGEN Peroxide (H202)Kills Germs, Viruses And Cancer Cells Just By Rubbing...
@HATSTRUTH 🎩
@HATSTRUTH 🎩
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