Forwarded from Tironianae 🍊 🍊 Z. - Ultra Verbum Vincet (Tironianae)
🤔#Hmmm @BrainStorm_Joe "In my line of work, where we handle projects in occupied buildings, security isn’t an afterthought—it’s at the very core of our planning. Ever since Sandy Hook, #Security has been one of the most crucial aspects of any job we take on. I’ve spent over 30 years in both the public and private sectors, and every Director of Security I’ve worked with has been a true professional: sharp, meticulous, and serious about their work.
But it’s beyond baffling to look back at the decisions made since November 2020. They knew a Trump rally would bring a million people to the Capitol, yet somehow, in all those high-level discussions, no one thought to put up a fence? Not one person raised this glaring oversight because there was a ‘plan’ in place, and what the public was told about January 6 barely scratches the surface. The reality of that day was something entirely different from the narrative we were fed—filtered, repackaged, and delivered as a ready-made story.
And then, we saw it endlessly branded as an ‘insurrection,’ a term that hardly fits the facts, no matter how often it’s repeated. What we saw wasn’t a failure in planning; it was a controlled event. They drip-feed us information in a way so selective and distorted that we’re either tuning it out or forgetting it altogether. This wasn’t just an oversight—it was calculated. or @MariaBartiromo it's #JustACoincidence .
news9.com/story/67219e11…
https://x.com/TGonTheCouch/status/1852332860323094644?t=vXC1nXuQ2QSW2ULICb7IbA&s=19
But it’s beyond baffling to look back at the decisions made since November 2020. They knew a Trump rally would bring a million people to the Capitol, yet somehow, in all those high-level discussions, no one thought to put up a fence? Not one person raised this glaring oversight because there was a ‘plan’ in place, and what the public was told about January 6 barely scratches the surface. The reality of that day was something entirely different from the narrative we were fed—filtered, repackaged, and delivered as a ready-made story.
And then, we saw it endlessly branded as an ‘insurrection,’ a term that hardly fits the facts, no matter how often it’s repeated. What we saw wasn’t a failure in planning; it was a controlled event. They drip-feed us information in a way so selective and distorted that we’re either tuning it out or forgetting it altogether. This wasn’t just an oversight—it was calculated. or @MariaBartiromo it's #JustACoincidence .
news9.com/story/67219e11…
https://x.com/TGonTheCouch/status/1852332860323094644?t=vXC1nXuQ2QSW2ULICb7IbA&s=19
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🤔#Hmmm @gizadeathstar
has the info below been researched of possible link between #Patton & #Forrestal's Deaths....
There’s certainly a compelling argument to be made that both James Forrestal and General George S. Patton expressed views and took stances that could have conflicted with the interests of integrating former Nazis and German scientists into American military and intelligence circles. Their untimely deaths, coupled with their stated concerns, have led some historians and researchers to speculate about their views on this controversial assimilation.
Forrestal’s Concerns and Mental Decline: Forrestal was an outspoken critic of Soviet expansionism and was deeply concerned about Communist infiltration within the U.S. government, which may have made him wary of any alliances or associations that could jeopardize American sovereignty or values, including Operation Paperclip. As Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was deeply involved in early Cold War policies and was reportedly uneasy about U.S. reliance on German scientists. His opposition to certain policies and isolation within government circles, combined with his sudden removal and tragic death, fueled speculation that he may have stood in opposition to factions within the government supporting the more pragmatic, expedient use of Nazi expertise.
Patton’s Views on Soviet and German Policy: Patton, near the end of World War II, became increasingly vocal about his concerns regarding Soviet influence in Europe. He even suggested, controversially, that the U.S. should take a stronger stance against the USSR rather than compromising or allowing Soviet dominance. Although Patton was less directly involved in decisions about Paperclip, his views on the German situation were well-known, and he expressed a desire to leverage German resources and manpower differently, perhaps seeing German scientists more as tools to maintain postwar control over Europe rather than fully integrating them into U.S. research and military.
Conflict with Pragmatic Cold War Policy: Both men held strong nationalist and ideological views, and their reservations may have conflicted with the more pragmatic Cold War policies being adopted, which often prioritized immediate advantages over moral considerations. This conflict has led to theories that both men were marginalized because their views clashed with those who saw Nazi expertise as a strategic asset against the Soviet Union.
While there is no concrete evidence that Forestall and Patton were removed solely because of their views on Nazi integration into U.S. systems, their isolation, outspoken concerns, and untimely deaths contribute to the sense that they stood at odds with certain strategic decisions in postwar U.S. policy.
has the info below been researched of possible link between #Patton & #Forrestal's Deaths....
There’s certainly a compelling argument to be made that both James Forrestal and General George S. Patton expressed views and took stances that could have conflicted with the interests of integrating former Nazis and German scientists into American military and intelligence circles. Their untimely deaths, coupled with their stated concerns, have led some historians and researchers to speculate about their views on this controversial assimilation.
Forrestal’s Concerns and Mental Decline: Forrestal was an outspoken critic of Soviet expansionism and was deeply concerned about Communist infiltration within the U.S. government, which may have made him wary of any alliances or associations that could jeopardize American sovereignty or values, including Operation Paperclip. As Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was deeply involved in early Cold War policies and was reportedly uneasy about U.S. reliance on German scientists. His opposition to certain policies and isolation within government circles, combined with his sudden removal and tragic death, fueled speculation that he may have stood in opposition to factions within the government supporting the more pragmatic, expedient use of Nazi expertise.
Patton’s Views on Soviet and German Policy: Patton, near the end of World War II, became increasingly vocal about his concerns regarding Soviet influence in Europe. He even suggested, controversially, that the U.S. should take a stronger stance against the USSR rather than compromising or allowing Soviet dominance. Although Patton was less directly involved in decisions about Paperclip, his views on the German situation were well-known, and he expressed a desire to leverage German resources and manpower differently, perhaps seeing German scientists more as tools to maintain postwar control over Europe rather than fully integrating them into U.S. research and military.
Conflict with Pragmatic Cold War Policy: Both men held strong nationalist and ideological views, and their reservations may have conflicted with the more pragmatic Cold War policies being adopted, which often prioritized immediate advantages over moral considerations. This conflict has led to theories that both men were marginalized because their views clashed with those who saw Nazi expertise as a strategic asset against the Soviet Union.
While there is no concrete evidence that Forestall and Patton were removed solely because of their views on Nazi integration into U.S. systems, their isolation, outspoken concerns, and untimely deaths contribute to the sense that they stood at odds with certain strategic decisions in postwar U.S. policy.
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Forwarded from Tironianae 🍊 🍊 Z. - Ultra Verbum Vincet (Tironianae)
NEW: The Pentagon Fails to Send Absentee Ballots to Active Military Service Members
Source: townhall.com/tipsheet/sarah…
Source: townhall.com/tipsheet/sarah…
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11.3 END OF OCCUPATION AND DURATION OF GC OBLIGATIONS
(https://www.scribd.com/document/269684399/Chapter-11-Military-Occupation)
The status of belligerent occupation ends when the conditions for its application are no longer met. Certain GC [Geneva Code] obligations with respect to occupied territory continue for the duration of the occupation after the general close of military operations.
End of Occupation. Belligerent occupation ceases
11.3.1 when the conditions for its application are no longer met.81 In particular, as discussed below, the status of belligerent occupation ceases when the invader no longer factually governs the occupied territory or when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the State of the occupied territory and the Occupying Power.82
Belligerent occupation ends when the Occupying Power no longer has effectively placed the occupied territory under its control.83 For example, an uprising by the local population may a locality, by posting a notice which gave a list of offences against the troops for which the penalty of death would be inflicted.”).
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(Footnotes for this page only)
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77 Refer to § 11.9.3 (Procedural Obligation – Notification to the Population of Changes in Law); § 11.11.2.1
(Publication of Penal Provisions Before Coming Into Force).
78 For example, Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, §1(1) (May 16, 2003) (“The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration … .”).
79 For example, John D. Negroponte & Jeremy Greenstock, Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (“the United States, the United Kingdom, and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise the powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq … .”).
80 For example, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483, 2 (May 22, 2003) (“Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the ‘Authority’),”); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (Aug. 6, 1990) (“Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,”).
81 Refer to § 11.2.2 (Standard for Determining When Territory Is Considered Occupied).
82 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW & PRECEDENTS 801 (“The status of military government continues from the inception of the actual occupation till the invader is expelled by force of arms, or himself abandons the conquest, or till, under a treaty of peace, the country is restored to its original allegiance or becomes incorporated with the domain of the prevailing belligerent.”).
83 Refer to § 11.2.2.1 (“Actually Placed” – Effectiveness of Occupation).
________________________
(Text continues)
________________________
(https://www.scribd.com/document/269684399/Chapter-11-Military-Occupation)
The status of belligerent occupation ends when the conditions for its application are no longer met. Certain GC [Geneva Code] obligations with respect to occupied territory continue for the duration of the occupation after the general close of military operations.
End of Occupation. Belligerent occupation ceases
11.3.1 when the conditions for its application are no longer met.81 In particular, as discussed below, the status of belligerent occupation ceases when the invader no longer factually governs the occupied territory or when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the State of the occupied territory and the Occupying Power.82
Belligerent occupation ends when the Occupying Power no longer has effectively placed the occupied territory under its control.83 For example, an uprising by the local population may a locality, by posting a notice which gave a list of offences against the troops for which the penalty of death would be inflicted.”).
________________________
(Footnotes for this page only)
________________________
77 Refer to § 11.9.3 (Procedural Obligation – Notification to the Population of Changes in Law); § 11.11.2.1
(Publication of Penal Provisions Before Coming Into Force).
78 For example, Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, §1(1) (May 16, 2003) (“The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration … .”).
79 For example, John D. Negroponte & Jeremy Greenstock, Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (“the United States, the United Kingdom, and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise the powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq … .”).
80 For example, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483, 2 (May 22, 2003) (“Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the ‘Authority’),”); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (Aug. 6, 1990) (“Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,”).
81 Refer to § 11.2.2 (Standard for Determining When Territory Is Considered Occupied).
82 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW & PRECEDENTS 801 (“The status of military government continues from the inception of the actual occupation till the invader is expelled by force of arms, or himself abandons the conquest, or till, under a treaty of peace, the country is restored to its original allegiance or becomes incorporated with the domain of the prevailing belligerent.”).
83 Refer to § 11.2.2.1 (“Actually Placed” – Effectiveness of Occupation).
________________________
(Text continues)
________________________
prevent the Occupying Power from actually enforcing its authority over occupied territory. Similarly, the Occupying Power’s expulsion or complete withdrawal from the territory would also suffice because the former Occupying Power generally would not be able to control sufficiently the occupied territory.
Belligerent occupation also may end when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the Occupying Power and the State of the occupied territory (although, as discussed in the following subsection, certain GC obligations may continue to apply).84 For example, if a new, independent government of the previously occupied territory assumes control of the territory and consents to the presence of the previously occupying forces, then such a situation would no longer be considered a belligerent occupation. Similarly, if a peace treaty legitimately transfers the territory to the sovereignty of the Occupying Power, then the Occupying Power would no longer be characterized as such. However, an Occupying Power is not permitted, under the law of belligerent occupation, to annex occupied territory.85
Duration of GC Obligations in the Case of Occupied Territory. In the home territory of parties to the conflict, the application of the GC shall cease on the general close of military operations.86
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the GC shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such State exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the GC:
• 1 through 12 (general provisions and common articles, e.g., the Protecting Power
continues to function, and the derogation for security reasons continues to apply);
• 27, 29 through 34 (humane treatment);
• 47 (preserves rights as against change by annexation or arrangement with the local
authorities so long as occupation lasts);
• 49 (transfers, evacuation, and deportation);
• 51, 52 (prohibitions against certain compulsory service and protection of workers);
• 53 (respect for property);
• 59, 61 through 63 (facilitating relief programs);
• 64 through 77 (criminal proceedings); and
________________________
(Footnotes for this page only)
84 Refer to § 11.2.2.3 (“Of the Hostile Army” – Belligerent Occupation Applies to Enemy Territory).
85 Refer to § 11.4.2 (Limitations on the Power of the Occupying Power Stemming From Its Lack of Sovereignty
Over Occupied Territory).
86 Refer to § 10.3.4 (Commencement and Duration of Protected Person Status).
________________________
• 143 (access by Protecting Powers and the ICRC).87
The one-year time limit for the cessation of the application of the GC (apart from the provisions that continue to apply to the extent that the Occupying Power exercises the functions of government in occupied territory) was proposed to account for situations like those of Germany and Japan after World War II.88 AP I provides that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and AP I shall cease to apply, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation;89 coalition partners that are Occupying Powers and Parties to AP I would be bound by this rule.
In any case, individuals entitled to GC protection who remain in the custody of the Occupying Power following the end of occupation retain that protection until their release, repatriation, or re-establishment.90 In addition, it may be appropriate following the end of occupation to continue to apply by analogy certain rules from the law of belligerent occupation, even if such rules do not apply as a matter of law.91
________________________
Belligerent occupation also may end when a hostile relationship no longer exists between the Occupying Power and the State of the occupied territory (although, as discussed in the following subsection, certain GC obligations may continue to apply).84 For example, if a new, independent government of the previously occupied territory assumes control of the territory and consents to the presence of the previously occupying forces, then such a situation would no longer be considered a belligerent occupation. Similarly, if a peace treaty legitimately transfers the territory to the sovereignty of the Occupying Power, then the Occupying Power would no longer be characterized as such. However, an Occupying Power is not permitted, under the law of belligerent occupation, to annex occupied territory.85
Duration of GC Obligations in the Case of Occupied Territory. In the home territory of parties to the conflict, the application of the GC shall cease on the general close of military operations.86
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the GC shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such State exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the GC:
• 1 through 12 (general provisions and common articles, e.g., the Protecting Power
continues to function, and the derogation for security reasons continues to apply);
• 27, 29 through 34 (humane treatment);
• 47 (preserves rights as against change by annexation or arrangement with the local
authorities so long as occupation lasts);
• 49 (transfers, evacuation, and deportation);
• 51, 52 (prohibitions against certain compulsory service and protection of workers);
• 53 (respect for property);
• 59, 61 through 63 (facilitating relief programs);
• 64 through 77 (criminal proceedings); and
________________________
(Footnotes for this page only)
84 Refer to § 11.2.2.3 (“Of the Hostile Army” – Belligerent Occupation Applies to Enemy Territory).
85 Refer to § 11.4.2 (Limitations on the Power of the Occupying Power Stemming From Its Lack of Sovereignty
Over Occupied Territory).
86 Refer to § 10.3.4 (Commencement and Duration of Protected Person Status).
________________________
• 143 (access by Protecting Powers and the ICRC).87
The one-year time limit for the cessation of the application of the GC (apart from the provisions that continue to apply to the extent that the Occupying Power exercises the functions of government in occupied territory) was proposed to account for situations like those of Germany and Japan after World War II.88 AP I provides that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and AP I shall cease to apply, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation;89 coalition partners that are Occupying Powers and Parties to AP I would be bound by this rule.
In any case, individuals entitled to GC protection who remain in the custody of the Occupying Power following the end of occupation retain that protection until their release, repatriation, or re-establishment.90 In addition, it may be appropriate following the end of occupation to continue to apply by analogy certain rules from the law of belligerent occupation, even if such rules do not apply as a matter of law.91
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