CVE-2026-127273 - Linksys EA8100 JNAP API IsAdminPasswordDefault missing authentication
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127273
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability has been found in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This affects the function GetWANStatus/GetWANStatus3/IsAdminPasswordDefault of the component JNAP API. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 5.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127273
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability has been found in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This affects the function GetWANStatus/GetWANStatus3/IsAdminPasswordDefault of the component JNAP API. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 5.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-127274 - Linksys EA8100 CheckAdminPassword excessive authentication
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127274
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability was found in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /jnap/core/CheckAdminPassword. The manipulation results in improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts. The attack may be performed from remote. The attack requires a high level of complexity. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 3.7 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127274
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability was found in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /jnap/core/CheckAdminPassword. The manipulation results in improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts. The attack may be performed from remote. The attack requires a high level of complexity. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 3.7 | LOW
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CVE-2026-127275 - Linksys EA8100 JNAP API ui_server.lua SetUnsecuredWiFiWarning missing authentication
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127275
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability was determined in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This issue affects the function SetRemoteSetting/SetUnsecuredWiFiWarning of the file ui_server.lua of the component JNAP API. This manipulation of the argument isEnabled/enabled causes missing authentication. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 10.0 | CRITICAL
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127275
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :A vulnerability was determined in Linksys EA8100 1.0.3.216940. This issue affects the function SetRemoteSetting/SetUnsecuredWiFiWarning of the file ui_server.lua of the component JNAP API. This manipulation of the argument isEnabled/enabled causes missing authentication. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity: 10.0 | CRITICAL
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CVE-2026-128065 - @grpc/grpc-js: RBAC override configs in VirtualHost and Route resources are not applied
CVE ID :CVE-2026-128065
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :@grpc/grpc-js implements the core functionality of gRPC purely in JavaScript, without a C++ addon. From 1.14.0 through 1.14.1, XdsServer in @grpc/grpc-js-xds can acknowledge Route and VirtualHost resources while failing to apply their RBACPerRoute override configurations. The override parser is not registered under the override message type, override maps are stored under a type URL instead of the configured HTTP filter name, and VirtualHost override maps are not read. When experimental RBAC is enabled and a trusted xDS control plane supplies a broad top-level ALLOW policy with a stricter matching override, affected servers evaluate RPCs under the broad policy and can accept requests that should be denied. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.2.
Severity: 6.9 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-128065
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :@grpc/grpc-js implements the core functionality of gRPC purely in JavaScript, without a C++ addon. From 1.14.0 through 1.14.1, XdsServer in @grpc/grpc-js-xds can acknowledge Route and VirtualHost resources while failing to apply their RBACPerRoute override configurations. The override parser is not registered under the override message type, override maps are stored under a type URL instead of the configured HTTP filter name, and VirtualHost override maps are not read. When experimental RBAC is enabled and a trusted xDS control plane supplies a broad top-level ALLOW policy with a stricter matching override, affected servers evaluate RPCs under the broad policy and can accept requests that should be denied. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.2.
Severity: 6.9 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-128066 - Pillow: Memory DoS in TIFF and EXIF IFD parsing via overlapping tag data
CVE ID :CVE-2026-128066
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 1.0 through 12.3.0, ImageFileDirectory_v2.load() in src/PIL/TiffImagePlugin.py retains a separate bytes object for each out-of-line IFD tag value without limiting the total data read or preventing distinct tags from referencing the same file region. A small crafted TIFF or EXIF-bearing JPEG, PNG, WebP, or MPO can therefore cause memory use quadratic in the input size. TIFF and some JPEG paths trigger parsing during Image.open(), while other formats are exposed when EXIF is requested, including through getexif() or ImageOps.exif_transpose(). The declared pixel dimensions do not bound this metadata allocation, so decompression-bomb checks do not prevent process memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.
Severity: 8.7 | HIGH
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-128066
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 1.0 through 12.3.0, ImageFileDirectory_v2.load() in src/PIL/TiffImagePlugin.py retains a separate bytes object for each out-of-line IFD tag value without limiting the total data read or preventing distinct tags from referencing the same file region. A small crafted TIFF or EXIF-bearing JPEG, PNG, WebP, or MPO can therefore cause memory use quadratic in the input size. TIFF and some JPEG paths trigger parsing during Image.open(), while other formats are exposed when EXIF is requested, including through getexif() or ImageOps.exif_transpose(). The declared pixel dimensions do not bound this metadata allocation, so decompression-bomb checks do not prevent process memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.
Severity: 8.7 | HIGH
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CVE-2026-128067 - Pillow: Heap buffer overflow saving TIFF with libtiff when tags override image size
CVE ID :CVE-2026-128067
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 2.3.0 through 12.3.0, Pillow applications that save compressed TIFF images through libtiff can pass attacker-controlled image geometry tags to the encoder while allocating its row buffer from the actual image dimensions. The affected TiffImagePlugin._save path allows ImageWidth, ImageLength, or SamplesPerPixel from exif=, tiffinfo=, or a source TIFF IFD to make libtiff consume a larger scanline than the buffer supplied by ImagingLibTiffEncode. This can read heap memory into the generated TIFF or crash the process. When TIFF Predictor 2 is enabled, libtiff can rewrite the oversized scanline in place and corrupt memory beyond the buffer. A carried-over PlanarConfiguration value of 2 instead makes libtiff use a shorter scanline and can produce an undecodable output file, but is not established to cause the out-of-bounds access. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.
Severity: 8.4 | HIGH
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-128067
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 2.3.0 through 12.3.0, Pillow applications that save compressed TIFF images through libtiff can pass attacker-controlled image geometry tags to the encoder while allocating its row buffer from the actual image dimensions. The affected TiffImagePlugin._save path allows ImageWidth, ImageLength, or SamplesPerPixel from exif=, tiffinfo=, or a source TIFF IFD to make libtiff consume a larger scanline than the buffer supplied by ImagingLibTiffEncode. This can read heap memory into the generated TIFF or crash the process. When TIFF Predictor 2 is enabled, libtiff can rewrite the oversized scanline in place and corrupt memory beyond the buffer. A carried-over PlanarConfiguration value of 2 instead makes libtiff use a shorter scanline and can produce an undecodable output file, but is not established to cause the out-of-bounds access. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.
Severity: 8.4 | HIGH
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CVE-2026-92735 - Vault integrated storage join may disclose server environment credentials
CVE ID :CVE-2026-92735
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise are vulnerable to an issue in the integrated storage join process that may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a new, uninitialized node to cause that node to send credentials from its server environment to an attacker-controlled server. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-92735) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 5.9 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-92735
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise are vulnerable to an issue in the integrated storage join process that may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a new, uninitialized node to cause that node to send credentials from its server environment to an attacker-controlled server. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-92735) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 5.9 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-93333 - Vault audit device prefix vulnerable to log injection
CVE ID :CVE-2026-93333
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Vault's audit devices did not validate the contents of a configured audit log prefix and did not consistently enforce the server-level setting that restricts audit log prefixing. This may allow a privileged operator to inject content into audit logs, potentially leading to forged or misleading audit records. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-93333) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 2.7 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-93333
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Vault's audit devices did not validate the contents of a configured audit log prefix and did not consistently enforce the server-level setting that restricts audit log prefixing. This may allow a privileged operator to inject content into audit logs, potentially leading to forged or misleading audit records. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-93333) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 2.7 | LOW
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CVE-2026-93335 - Vault vulnerable to ACL deny bypass via trailing slash
CVE ID :CVE-2026-93335
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Vault Community Edition and Vault Enterprise did not consistently apply explicit ACL policy deny rules to request paths that differ only by a trailing slash. This may allow an authenticated user who holds a broader delete permission on system configuration paths to disable a secrets engine, auth method, or audit device that a more specific deny rule was intended to protect. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-93335) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 6.5 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-93335
Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 12:20 a.m. | 24 minutes ago
Description :Vault Community Edition and Vault Enterprise did not consistently apply explicit ACL policy deny rules to request paths that differ only by a trailing slash. This may allow an authenticated user who holds a broader delete permission on system configuration paths to disable a secrets engine, auth method, or audit device that a more specific deny rule was intended to protect. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-93335) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.2.2 and Vault Enterprise 2.2.2, 1.21.14, and 1.19.25.
Severity: 6.5 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-127282 - SourceCodester Smart Attendance System with QR Code Scanner reset_password.php cross site scripting
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127282
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A vulnerability was determined in SourceCodester Smart Attendance System with QR Code Scanner 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file reset_password.php. This manipulation of the argument Username causes cross site scripting. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
Severity: 5.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127282
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A vulnerability was determined in SourceCodester Smart Attendance System with QR Code Scanner 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file reset_password.php. This manipulation of the argument Username causes cross site scripting. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
Severity: 5.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-127283 - SourceCodester Food Ordering System Admin Image update_food.php unrestricted upload
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127283
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Food Ordering System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file admin/update_food.php of the component Admin Image Handler. Such manipulation of the argument cmd leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127283
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Food Ordering System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file admin/update_food.php of the component Admin Image Handler. Such manipulation of the argument cmd leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
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CVE-2026-127284 - SourceCodester Food Ordering System Admin Write add_category.php sql injection
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127284
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Food Ordering System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file admin/add_category.php of the component Admin Write Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument title/description/price/current_image/featured/active/id results in sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127284
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Food Ordering System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file admin/add_category.php of the component Admin Write Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument title/description/price/current_image/featured/active/id results in sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
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CVE-2026-127915 - TLV iterator does not bound each entry against the declared TLV area in MCUboot bootutil
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127915
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :The MCUboot TLV iterator bootutil_tlv_iter_next() in boot/bootutil/src/tlv.c walks image trailer TLVs with a single loop guard (it->tlv_off < it->tlv_end) and advances by sizeof(struct image_tlv) + tlv.it_len using the attacker-controlled it_len field, without validating that the entry's header or payload stays within it->tlv_end. As a result the 4-byte header read can extend up to 3 bytes past the declared TLV area, and the returned (off, len) can describe a payload that runs past it. The path is pre-authentication: TLVs are parsed during bootutil_img_validate() before the signature is verified, and a crafted image can be presented through DFU / serial-recovery / OTA. However the impact is contained by surrounding guards: bootutil_img_validate() first rejects a TLV area larger than bootutil_max_image_size(), the default LOAD_IMAGE_DATA sink is flash_area_read() which bounds-checks against the flash partition and fails an out-of-partition read, and every payload consumer (EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, EXPECTED_KEY_TLV, EXPECTED_SIG_TLV, IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT) clamps len against a fixed buffer before copying. The residual effect in a default flash build is therefore an out-of-region read confined to the attacker's own slot partition whose result is never observable, yielding at worst a clean validation failure rather than memory corruption or information disclosure. A genuine (though still bounded) out-of-bounds read remains under the non-default MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD configuration, where LOAD_IMAGE_DATA is an unchecked memcpy. The fix is to validate each entry's header and payload against it->tlv_end inside the iterator.
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127915
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :The MCUboot TLV iterator bootutil_tlv_iter_next() in boot/bootutil/src/tlv.c walks image trailer TLVs with a single loop guard (it->tlv_off < it->tlv_end) and advances by sizeof(struct image_tlv) + tlv.it_len using the attacker-controlled it_len field, without validating that the entry's header or payload stays within it->tlv_end. As a result the 4-byte header read can extend up to 3 bytes past the declared TLV area, and the returned (off, len) can describe a payload that runs past it. The path is pre-authentication: TLVs are parsed during bootutil_img_validate() before the signature is verified, and a crafted image can be presented through DFU / serial-recovery / OTA. However the impact is contained by surrounding guards: bootutil_img_validate() first rejects a TLV area larger than bootutil_max_image_size(), the default LOAD_IMAGE_DATA sink is flash_area_read() which bounds-checks against the flash partition and fails an out-of-partition read, and every payload consumer (EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, EXPECTED_KEY_TLV, EXPECTED_SIG_TLV, IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT) clamps len against a fixed buffer before copying. The residual effect in a default flash build is therefore an out-of-region read confined to the attacker's own slot partition whose result is never observable, yielding at worst a clean validation failure rather than memory corruption or information disclosure. A genuine (though still bounded) out-of-bounds read remains under the non-default MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD configuration, where LOAD_IMAGE_DATA is an unchecked memcpy. The fix is to validate each entry's header and payload against it->tlv_end inside the iterator.
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE-2026-127916 - MCUboot image hash span is not bounded against the slot, allowing a read past the flash area during image validation
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127916
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image's header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed. The callers bound part of the span, or none of it: On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) and Zephyr's single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well. The image is hashed before its signature is checked, so anyone who can place an image in a slot (an OTA or SMP update delivered through the application, or serial recovery) reaches this read before authentication. Whether a malformed header produces an actual read beyond the area depends on the flash backend: Backends whose flash_area_read() bounds-checks the request (Zephyr, Espressif, NuttX, Mbed) return an error once the chunked read crosses the end of the area. Validation fails and the image is rejected, with no over-read. With MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY (Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_IMG_HASH_DIRECTLY_ON_STORAGE, available from 2.2.0, not enabled by default) the span is hashed through a single direct pointer into memory-mapped flash, with no bounds check. The Cypress PSoC6 port's flash_area_read() (boot/cypress/cy_flash_pal/cy_flash_map.c, from 1.6.0) does not bound the read: its assert()s compare against the area's absolute offset rather than its size, and it copies with memcpy(). The bytes read past the area feed only the digest, which is compared internally and never returned, so nothing is disclosed. The realistic effect is a read fault during image validation: up to 64 KB past the slot on the upgrade path, and potentially much further on the paths that skip the header check. Where validation is repeated at every boot (a pending upgrade, or the single-slot loader checking its image), the fault can recur on each reset and keep the device from booting. The fix makes bootutil_img_hash() add the three sizes with boot_u32_safe_add() and reject an image whose span, including the sector offset used in swap-using-offset mode, does not fit in the flash area, before any of it is hashed. Because the bound is applied where the bytes are read, it covers every caller.
Severity: 2.9 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127916
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image's header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed. The callers bound part of the span, or none of it: On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) and Zephyr's single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well. The image is hashed before its signature is checked, so anyone who can place an image in a slot (an OTA or SMP update delivered through the application, or serial recovery) reaches this read before authentication. Whether a malformed header produces an actual read beyond the area depends on the flash backend: Backends whose flash_area_read() bounds-checks the request (Zephyr, Espressif, NuttX, Mbed) return an error once the chunked read crosses the end of the area. Validation fails and the image is rejected, with no over-read. With MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY (Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_IMG_HASH_DIRECTLY_ON_STORAGE, available from 2.2.0, not enabled by default) the span is hashed through a single direct pointer into memory-mapped flash, with no bounds check. The Cypress PSoC6 port's flash_area_read() (boot/cypress/cy_flash_pal/cy_flash_map.c, from 1.6.0) does not bound the read: its assert()s compare against the area's absolute offset rather than its size, and it copies with memcpy(). The bytes read past the area feed only the digest, which is compared internally and never returned, so nothing is disclosed. The realistic effect is a read fault during image validation: up to 64 KB past the slot on the upgrade path, and potentially much further on the paths that skip the header check. Where validation is repeated at every boot (a pending upgrade, or the single-slot loader checking its image), the fault can recur on each reset and keep the device from booting. The fix makes bootutil_img_hash() add the three sizes with boot_u32_safe_add() and reject an image whose span, including the sector offset used in swap-using-offset mode, does not fit in the flash area, before any of it is hashed. Because the bound is applied where the bytes are read, it covers every caller.
Severity: 2.9 | LOW
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CVE-2026-127928 - AES image key left on the stack after serial-recovery encrypted-image handling in MCUboot
CVE ID :CVE-2026-127928
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :In MCUboot's serial-recovery encrypted-image support (boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial_encryption.c), decrypt_image_inplace() and boot_image_validate_encrypted() each keep a stack-local struct boot_status. boot_enc_load() writes the plaintext per-image AES key into its enckey[] field. Neither function cleared this structure before returning. In addition, a decrypt failure inside the per-sector loop of decrypt_image_inplace() returned early and skipped the total_out: cleanup, which left the expanded AES key context (enc_data) on the stack as well. The error paths of boot_image_validate_encrypted() similarly skipped boot_enc_zeroize(). The affected code is built when encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) are combined with serial recovery. It runs when an encrypted image is uploaded to the primary slot over the recovery protocol, and when the image list or state is queried while an encrypted image is in the secondary slot. After these functions return, the image's AES content key remains in dead stack memory. An attacker who can later read device RAM, for example through a debug port or retained RAM, can recover it. This weakens the confidentiality of image-encryption keys within the bootloader trust boundary. A recovered key exposes the plaintext of the encrypted firmware image it protects. The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed. No remote or recovery-protocol channel that returns this memory is known, so exploitation requires a separate memory-read capability.
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-127928
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :In MCUboot's serial-recovery encrypted-image support (boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial_encryption.c), decrypt_image_inplace() and boot_image_validate_encrypted() each keep a stack-local struct boot_status. boot_enc_load() writes the plaintext per-image AES key into its enckey[] field. Neither function cleared this structure before returning. In addition, a decrypt failure inside the per-sector loop of decrypt_image_inplace() returned early and skipped the total_out: cleanup, which left the expanded AES key context (enc_data) on the stack as well. The error paths of boot_image_validate_encrypted() similarly skipped boot_enc_zeroize(). The affected code is built when encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) are combined with serial recovery. It runs when an encrypted image is uploaded to the primary slot over the recovery protocol, and when the image list or state is queried while an encrypted image is in the secondary slot. After these functions return, the image's AES content key remains in dead stack memory. An attacker who can later read device RAM, for example through a debug port or retained RAM, can recover it. This weakens the confidentiality of image-encryption keys within the bootloader trust boundary. A recovered key exposes the plaintext of the encrypted firmware image it protects. The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed. No remote or recovery-protocol channel that returns this memory is known, so exploitation requires a separate memory-read capability.
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE-2026-128091 - AES key schedule not cleared by the TinyCrypt AES-CTR backend in MCUboot bootutil
CVE ID :CVE-2026-128091
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :When MCUboot is built with the TinyCrypt crypto backend (MCUBOOT_USE_TINYCRYPT), bootutil_aes_ctr_drop() in boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/aes_ctr_tinycrypt.h was an empty stub. The AES-CTR context for this backend is the fully expanded AES-128 key schedule (struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct). Generic code relies on this hook to release and clear key state, so with TinyCrypt nothing was cleared. The mbedTLS and PSA backends do free or destroy their key state here. As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port. The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory().
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-128091
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :When MCUboot is built with the TinyCrypt crypto backend (MCUBOOT_USE_TINYCRYPT), bootutil_aes_ctr_drop() in boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/aes_ctr_tinycrypt.h was an empty stub. The AES-CTR context for this backend is the fully expanded AES-128 key schedule (struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct). Generic code relies on this hook to release and clear key state, so with TinyCrypt nothing was cleared. The mbedTLS and PSA backends do free or destroy their key state here. As a result, boot_state_clear(), which boot_go() calls before handing off to the application, left the image's AES content-encryption key schedule in the static boot_data state. This is the case after an encrypted upgrade in single-image builds, where boot_enc_zeroize() is not called. boot_decrypt_key() likewise left the ECIES-derived key-encryption key schedule on the stack. The affected build uses MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES with TinyCrypt, which is the default ECDSA and Ed25519 backend in the Zephyr port. The first AES-128 round key equals the cipher key, so anyone who can read the leftover bootloader RAM after boot can recover the image content key and decrypt that encrypted image. That includes a physical attacker with debug or RAM access, or code later running on the device. This weakens image-encryption key confidentiality (and so the confidentiality of the encrypted image's plaintext). The device's long-term private decryption key is not exposed, and image authenticity is not affected. The fix wipes the context with bootutil_wipe_memory().
Severity: 2.0 | LOW
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CVE-2026-128321 - Tight JPEG decoding in TightVNC and UltraVNC viewers contains a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability
CVE ID :CVE-2026-128321
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :Tight JPEG decoding in TightVNC and UltraVNC viewers contains a heap-based buffer overflow because an attacker-controlled framebuffer rectangle width is not validated against a fixed-size decoding buffer. A malicious VNC server can cause an out-of-bounds heap write when a user connects, resulting in application crash and potentially other memory-corruption impacts.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-128321
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :Tight JPEG decoding in TightVNC and UltraVNC viewers contains a heap-based buffer overflow because an attacker-controlled framebuffer rectangle width is not validated against a fixed-size decoding buffer. A malicious VNC server can cause an out-of-bounds heap write when a user connects, resulting in application crash and potentially other memory-corruption impacts.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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CVE-2026-15465 - GPU DDK - Write UAF in OSDebugSignalPID due to incorrect management of PID resources
CVE ID :CVE-2026-15465
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls through the DDK kernel module interface. Under unsupported use of the interface, a use-after-free condition may occur that can lead to kernel memory corruption, platform instability, or system reboot. The weakness occurs when software references memory after it has been released. Accessing memory after free may result in corruption of valid data structures, unexpected program behaviour, process crashes, or execution of unintended operations.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-15465
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls through the DDK kernel module interface. Under unsupported use of the interface, a use-after-free condition may occur that can lead to kernel memory corruption, platform instability, or system reboot. The weakness occurs when software references memory after it has been released. Accessing memory after free may result in corruption of valid data structures, unexpected program behaviour, process crashes, or execution of unintended operations.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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CVE-2026-16659 - Pre-authentication NULL pointer dereference in MCUboot serial-recovery image upload (encrypted-image builds)
CVE ID :CVE-2026-16659
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :MCUboot's serial-recovery image-upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c declares const struct flash_area *fap = NULL and assigns it only via flash_area_open() part-way through the function. Two early validation failures (goto out_invalid_data) — a CBOR map that fails to decode, or an upload packet missing the off/data members — branch past the open while fap is still NULL, then fall into the shared epilogue. In MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES builds that epilogue unconditionally calls boot_handle_enc_fw(fap), which reaches boot_image_load_header() and flash_area_read() and dereferences the NULL flash_area. The defect is reachable pre-authentication: the trigger is the very first serial-recovery upload command carrying a malformed payload. The guarding conditions are default-true on a fresh recovery session — img_num, curr_off and img_size are zero-initialized statics, so curr_off == img_size and the primary-slot test both hold. It requires a non-default build: encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES / Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) together with an active serial-recovery transport, on the Zephyr or Mynewt port (the two that build both boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c and boot_serial_encryption.c with MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES). The impact is a transient denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. fap is a hard NULL rather than an attacker-controlled value, so there is no memory-corruption or information-leak primitive and image authentication is unaffected. Whether the dereference faults is platform-dependent — on targets where address 0x0 is mapped readable flash the read merely returns an error and execution continues, while targets that trap NULL (MPU / null-pointer-exception detection) take a hard fault. Because serial recovery is unauthenticated by design and already permits the console attacker to write the secondary slot, the added capability is only a low-value transient crash. The related unconditional flash_area_close(fap) call in the same epilogue is a safe no-op on the ports that reach it, so it does not contribute to the dereference. The affected ports are the Zephyr port — boot/zephyr/CMakeLists.txt compiles boot_serial.c under CONFIG_MCUBOOT_SERIAL and boot_serial_encryption.c under CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE — and the Mynewt port, whose mcuboot_config.h defines MCUBOOT_SERIAL unconditionally and MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES under any BOOTUTIL_ENCRYPT_ syscfg, with boot/boot_serial/pkg.yml declaring no explicit source list so the whole directory is built. The Espressif port is not affected**: it compiles boot_serial.c but not boot_serial_encryption.c, and defines no MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, so the #ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES block containing the call is preprocessed away. The NuttX, Cypress and Mbed ports do not build boot_serial.c at all.
Severity: 4.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-16659
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :MCUboot's serial-recovery image-upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c declares const struct flash_area *fap = NULL and assigns it only via flash_area_open() part-way through the function. Two early validation failures (goto out_invalid_data) — a CBOR map that fails to decode, or an upload packet missing the off/data members — branch past the open while fap is still NULL, then fall into the shared epilogue. In MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES builds that epilogue unconditionally calls boot_handle_enc_fw(fap), which reaches boot_image_load_header() and flash_area_read() and dereferences the NULL flash_area. The defect is reachable pre-authentication: the trigger is the very first serial-recovery upload command carrying a malformed payload. The guarding conditions are default-true on a fresh recovery session — img_num, curr_off and img_size are zero-initialized statics, so curr_off == img_size and the primary-slot test both hold. It requires a non-default build: encrypted images (MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES / Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE) together with an active serial-recovery transport, on the Zephyr or Mynewt port (the two that build both boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c and boot_serial_encryption.c with MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES). The impact is a transient denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. fap is a hard NULL rather than an attacker-controlled value, so there is no memory-corruption or information-leak primitive and image authentication is unaffected. Whether the dereference faults is platform-dependent — on targets where address 0x0 is mapped readable flash the read merely returns an error and execution continues, while targets that trap NULL (MPU / null-pointer-exception detection) take a hard fault. Because serial recovery is unauthenticated by design and already permits the console attacker to write the secondary slot, the added capability is only a low-value transient crash. The related unconditional flash_area_close(fap) call in the same epilogue is a safe no-op on the ports that reach it, so it does not contribute to the dereference. The affected ports are the Zephyr port — boot/zephyr/CMakeLists.txt compiles boot_serial.c under CONFIG_MCUBOOT_SERIAL and boot_serial_encryption.c under CONFIG_BOOT_ENCRYPT_IMAGE — and the Mynewt port, whose mcuboot_config.h defines MCUBOOT_SERIAL unconditionally and MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES under any BOOTUTIL_ENCRYPT_ syscfg, with boot/boot_serial/pkg.yml declaring no explicit source list so the whole directory is built. The Espressif port is not affected**: it compiles boot_serial.c but not boot_serial_encryption.c, and defines no MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, so the #ifdef MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES block containing the call is preprocessed away. The NuttX, Cypress and Mbed ports do not build boot_serial.c at all.
Severity: 4.0 | MEDIUM
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CVE-2026-16662 - Uninitialised bootloader stack disclosed into the measured-boot attestation record via a short EXPECTED_HASH TLV in MCUboot
CVE ID :CVE-2026-16662
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image's EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len > sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record. The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when the image reaching boot_save_boot_status() was not hash-validated on that boot. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr's CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. The direct-XIP and RAM-load strategies in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c validate the selected slot unconditionally and are not affected. The short TLV survives only where the integrator has turned primary-slot validation off: the swap and overwrite loader built without MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT, which checks only the image magic before calling boot_add_shared_data(), and the Zephyr single-slot loader (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c) built without it, including the MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT_ONCE variant, which skips validation once the trailer records an earlier successful one. It is also reachable through a time-of-check/time-of-use change to tamperable external flash between validation and the boot-record read. Placing the crafted image requires physical or flash-write access to the device; in a single-slot build with serial recovery enabled, the serial-recovery upload writes the primary slot directly and can place it as well. In these configurations the boot record's measurement is already not trustworthy: with validation off, the hash copied into the record is the image's own unverified EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, which the attacker chooses. The defect therefore does not weaken attestation integrity any further. What it adds is a path for bootloader memory to leave the device: up to 63 bytes (IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1) of uninitialised bootloader stack are embedded in the measurement field that a downstream attestation service sends to a remote verifier. In the configurations analysed the residue is bootloader internal state (TLV offsets and lengths, flash addresses, loop state), not key material, but what occupies that stack region depends on configuration and on which code ran before boot_save_boot_status(). It is reported as a low-severity, defense-in-depth disclosure with no integrity or availability impact. This is distinct from the already-fixed record_len integer underflow in the same routine (GHSA-8hrv-4cp5-4rg3). The fix rejects any EXPECTED_HASH_TLV whose length is not exactly IMAGE_HASH_SIZE.
Severity: 2.4 | LOW
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-16662
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image's EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len > sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record. The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when the image reaching boot_save_boot_status() was not hash-validated on that boot. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr's CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. The direct-XIP and RAM-load strategies in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c validate the selected slot unconditionally and are not affected. The short TLV survives only where the integrator has turned primary-slot validation off: the swap and overwrite loader built without MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT, which checks only the image magic before calling boot_add_shared_data(), and the Zephyr single-slot loader (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c) built without it, including the MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT_ONCE variant, which skips validation once the trailer records an earlier successful one. It is also reachable through a time-of-check/time-of-use change to tamperable external flash between validation and the boot-record read. Placing the crafted image requires physical or flash-write access to the device; in a single-slot build with serial recovery enabled, the serial-recovery upload writes the primary slot directly and can place it as well. In these configurations the boot record's measurement is already not trustworthy: with validation off, the hash copied into the record is the image's own unverified EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, which the attacker chooses. The defect therefore does not weaken attestation integrity any further. What it adds is a path for bootloader memory to leave the device: up to 63 bytes (IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1) of uninitialised bootloader stack are embedded in the measurement field that a downstream attestation service sends to a remote verifier. In the configurations analysed the residue is bootloader internal state (TLV offsets and lengths, flash addresses, loop state), not key material, but what occupies that stack region depends on configuration and on which code ran before boot_save_boot_status(). It is reported as a low-severity, defense-in-depth disclosure with no integrity or availability impact. This is distinct from the already-fixed record_len integer underflow in the same routine (GHSA-8hrv-4cp5-4rg3). The fix rejects any EXPECTED_HASH_TLV whose length is not exactly IMAGE_HASH_SIZE.
Severity: 2.4 | LOW
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CVE-2026-16664 - Unchecked serial-recovery image index causes out-of-bounds slot-table read in MCUboot Zephyr port
CVE ID :CVE-2026-16664
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num 2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER 2 entries, so any img_num >= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read. The path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image >= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices). flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFF converts to -1 and reads all_slots[-2], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num >= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth. This vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below.
Severity: 5.1 | MEDIUM
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CVE ID :CVE-2026-16664
Published : 13 Nov. 2026, 2.18 | 2 jam, 26 menit ago
Description :MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num 2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER 2 entries, so any img_num >= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read. The path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image >= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices). flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFF converts to -1 and reads all_slots[-2], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num >= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth. This vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below.
Severity: 5.1 | MEDIUM
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