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One of our customers was about to getting scammed because he didn't care about what our website says and he didn't even read anywhere else he just paid and I don't even know who did he texted he doesn't even reply my emails.
I don't know why he even buying COPG if he doesn't know how a payment works.
I will also send him an official email from my website, which I think is useless.
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COPG Module Updates/Community
Photo
These kinds of buyers are making me so tired.
PayPal documents are so hard to deal with.
PayPal documents are so hard to deal with.
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COPG Module Updates/Community
COPG-v7.5.0.zip
I forgot to add some new features in changelog
COPG Module Updates/Community
COPG-v7.5.0.zip
Install Patches — new
Install modified / re-signed / downgraded APKs. A new Install Patches entry under Settings → Global Hooks opens one sheet with four patches: Disable signature verification, Allow downgrade, Disable install verifier (Play Protect scan), and Allow compressed resources.arsc. They patch Android's package installer inside system_server, so nothing loads into any app — undetectable, and the signature-bypass is applied at the JCA/crypto layer so it covers V1/V2/V3 in one place. Disable signature verification also forces the package manager's checkSignatures result to *always match*, so cross-app signature trust-checks pass (the "signature verification always true" behavior). FREE; lives under the System-Server Spoofs master switch (enable it and reboot to arm), with a boot-crash guard. Enabling signature bypass lowers a real security boundary for every install on the device — only install APKs you trust.
Credit: idea/technique ports of Lucky Patcher's signature-verification patches and PMPatch by vova7878 (whose v7878 engine COPG uses), plus CorePatch. COPG's implementation is its own.*
Install modified / re-signed / downgraded APKs. A new Install Patches entry under Settings → Global Hooks opens one sheet with four patches: Disable signature verification, Allow downgrade, Disable install verifier (Play Protect scan), and Allow compressed resources.arsc. They patch Android's package installer inside system_server, so nothing loads into any app — undetectable, and the signature-bypass is applied at the JCA/crypto layer so it covers V1/V2/V3 in one place. Disable signature verification also forces the package manager's checkSignatures result to *always match*, so cross-app signature trust-checks pass (the "signature verification always true" behavior). FREE; lives under the System-Server Spoofs master switch (enable it and reboot to arm), with a boot-crash guard. Enabling signature bypass lowers a real security boundary for every install on the device — only install APKs you trust.
Credit: idea/technique ports of Lucky Patcher's signature-verification patches and PMPatch by vova7878 (whose v7878 engine COPG uses), plus CorePatch. COPG's implementation is its own.*
I found a method to do CPU spoofing more cleanly, but it only works on kernels higher than v5.9. My own device is 4.19.
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COPG Module Updates/Community
I found a method to do CPU spoofing more cleanly, but it only works on kernels higher than v5.9. My own device is 4.19.
Well I think it's time to move some spoofs on the kernel level.
But I'm not sure if everyone can use it.
But I'm not sure if everyone can use it.
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COPG Module Updates/Community
Well I think it's time to move some spoofs on the kernel level. But I'm not sure if everyone can use it.
Well I need to have a good device my own device is too old.
Sadly I can't do it right now ...
Sadly I can't do it right now ...
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